

not only demonstrate German violations of the Geneva Conventions but crimes against humanity. A comparison of these survivor's experiences with those of the Luft Stalags is informative, although Lagrandeur certainly does not suggest life in a Stalag was as pleasant as *Hogan's Heroes*.

A third section discussing the forced marches that migrated POWs to new camps at war's end and subsequent liberation by Soviet and Western armies. Three appendices on the Geneva Convention, War Claims Commission Report, and a short study on which Bomber Command planes provided aircrew with the highest survival rate round out the book. This last appendix seems strange until one realizes that all of Lagrandeur's oral history sources flew for Bomber Command. He does not explain why this is so. Nonetheless, Lagrandeur provides the Canadian POW experience, but their experiences were similar to all prisoner airmen from the Western allies. Further discussion on what made the Canadian perspective unique from, say, the American or British ones would enrich the text. Maddeningly, the book lacks an index and footnotes; but frankly, the illustrations and general narrative help make up for this.

Shortly after reading *We Flew*, I had the pleasure of meeting Squadron Leader George Sweanor, RCAF, retired. Sweanor, a former Krieger, knew many of the characters in this book. His discussion of his experiences and assistance in the Great Escape confirmed the accuracy of Lagrandeur's narrative. In addition, the book is consistent with narratives and exhibits in various Canadian museums. Those interested in Krieger life and military professionalism under difficult circumstances, particularly Canadian readers, will find moving between the depths of irony to some hilarious moments contained within the book rather enjoyable.

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Learning to Love the Bomb: Canada's Nuclear Weapons during the Cold War. By Sean M. Maloney. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007. Maps. Tables. Diagrams. Photographs. Notes. Appendices. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xxvi, 472. \$29.95 ISBN: 1-57488-616-0

This is history at its best. Leaving no archival and other primary sources unturned, Maloney has written the new

reference standard on Canada's national security policy for the period 1948-1968, which coincides with the peak of Canada's influence in the world. In telling the story of Canada's nuclear strategy, he convincingly shows that Canada has not always been irrelevant or simply a neutral peacemaker when it came to military use in world affairs.

That Canada had access to nuclear weapons (defensive tactical weapons as well as offensive theatre weapons) and supported the U.S. and NATO nuclear weapons infrastructure (e.g., storage, dispersal, communications, and early warning facilities) during the Cold War is not well understood by just about everyone. Maloney fills this gap in a very comprehensive manner. In doing so, he shows that Canada's decisions to access nuclear weaponry were consistent with its national interest (necessity to work within an alliance or coalition, and maintaining forward security and relative military autonomy) and thus commensurate with the roles it had undertaken to play in the defense of North America and its NATO allies. Without these decisions, Maloney argues, Canada would not have had the influence it had on its enemies and allies or in the furtherance of non-security interests. These decisions, however, did not come about easily, especially under Prime Minister Diefenbaker's government (1957-1963). Maloney details the political and bureaucratic infighting that plagued this administration and which affected Canada's reputation with its U.S. and NATO allies. Diefenbaker's personality-driven style, his vulnerability to domestic politics, and over-sensibility to criticism unnecessarily delayed NORAD and nuclear agreements and prevented Canada from meeting its defense commitments head on (e.g., by deliberately blocking acceptance of the nuclear agreements during the Berlin Crisis in 1961, and not allowing a formal alert of Canadian forces in 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis).

While the 1963 demise of Diefenbaker's conservative government and its replacement by Pearson's liberal government resolved a host of lingering nuclear issues (minus nuclear anti-submarine warfare), thus allowing Canada to finally meet the bulk of its commitments, it also laid the groundwork for successive liberal governments to denuclearize Canadian forces and consequently significantly reduce Canada's influence within NATO (Canada's 1 Air Division in Allied Command Europe lost its nuclear strike role in 1971, and the following year the U.S. removed the nuclear capability from Canadian soil, with exception of the Genie anti-aircraft rockets removed in 1984).

While Canada "saw no need for an independent nuclear weapons program," in the 1950s and 1960s it was flexible and responsive enough to adapt to the new realities imposed by the advent of nuclear weapons in a way that would be congruent with its national interests (for example, as Maloney argues, "if Canada did not negotiate an integrated air defense arrangement [NORAD], the United States would [have been] forced to plan for its air defense as though Canada did not exist," thus affecting Canada's sovereignty).

Overall, this book is rich in its understanding of the processes, personalities and factors that affected Canada's nuclear decisions, and which gave Canada added influence during the Cold War. It is well researched, technically proficient, and highly recommended to Cold War historians, defense analysts, and policy officials.

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Air National Guard at 60: A History. By Susan Rosenfeld and Charles J. Gross. Arlington, Va.: ANG History Office, 2007. Photographs. Maps. Pp. ii, 73. \$11.00. Paperback. ISBN: 978-0-16-079501-5 www.bookstore.gpo.gov

In limited space, this monograph has crammed a fair amount of history and a good deal of operational detail on the employment of the Air National Guard. It is well illustrated by outstanding photographs. Less attention is given to prosaic matters such as recruitment, ground support, and to the ever-present problem of maintaining flying proficiency—especially when transitioning to a completely different class of aircraft (not just a higher letter in the same series).

During the past sixty years, the Air Guard has been a valuable resource both to the U.S. Air Force and to the states from which it is drawn—showing the continuing strength of our Federal Citizen-in-Arms concept. The story of the organized militia in the air starts in the balloons of the Civil War; then individual Guardsmen in propelled flight in World War I; and, finally, authorized units in the troop list of the National Defense Act of 1920.

That Act provided for twenty-nine observation squadrons, one for each of the eighteen infantry divisions and the nine corps but maybe not for all of the four Guard cavalry divisions whose organization was never completed. These squadrons