Forging Land Forces for the Army of Tomorrow
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Unethical Leadership and Its Relation to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
Major Ross Cossar

Practical Sustainment Concepts for The Non-Linear Battlespace
Major Devon Matsalla

A Short History of Surveillance and Target Acquisition Artillery
Major Richard Little, CD

A Socio-Economic Profile of Afghanistan
Captain H. Christian Breede, MA

Soviet Third World Intervention Policy: The Invasion of Afghanistan
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Courage and Reward in the War of 1812
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The nature of information as well as its dissemination continues to evolve at a rapid pace. With new media capabilities providing ever-increasing access to a wider audience, we are constantly challenged with new opportunities for the delivery of data and knowledge to our readers. The editors and staff of The Canadian Army Journal are constantly working to take advantage of these new opportunities, while still continuing to create a first-class publication for Canada's Army within this constantly changing environment.

In 2007 the Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, along with the Army Publishing Office, launched The Canadian Army Journal’s new website. Here, our readers can access the latest copies of the CAJ as well as explore a fully-searchable database of previous issues dating back to 1998. The website has received thousands of visitors since it first went ‘live’, and that audience continues to expand daily. Wanting to ensure that the website remains both innovative and informative, we will be investing further in developing its resources over the coming year. For example, in 2009 the CAJ will begin a project to digitize the original run of the Canadian Army Journal (1947-1965), and also make these available to readers via our website. Other similar projects will follow, so watch for further announcements to come.

At the same time, we will continue to produce ‘hardcopy’, as we appreciate that digital files can sometimes fail, and that there is still no true replacement for the feel of a book in one’s hand. However, appreciating the desire to reduce our burden on resources and the environment, as well as incorporate new forms of media into the journal, in 2009 The Canadian Army Journal will begin a new publication schedule of three issues per year. The CAJ will come to you in the late spring (April), summer (August), and fall (December) timeframes. In addition, from time to time we will include special inserts with the journal on specific topics of interest to our readers.

Finally, I would like to thank our readers for their tremendous loyalty and support for The Canadian Army Journal. At the end of the day, it is your journal, and we look forward to your continued support, contributions and letters in the years to come.

Kind regards,
Major Andrew B. Godefroy
Editor-in-Chief
The Family of Land Combat Systems (FLCS) is the conceptual representation of all the equipment capabilities that the Canadian Army needs to accomplish its mission today and in the future. As the Chief of Staff of Land Strategy the responsibility of building for tomorrow while equipping today’s Army falls on my team. In order to achieve this goal, the FLCS combines network capabilities, autonomous air and ground systems, direct and indirect fire platforms, service support elements, individual soldiers systems and aviation assets to form ‘a system of systems’ that will give the Army its ability to operate throughout the full spectrum of conflict.

As we try to balance operational commitments with modernization and transformational initiatives, it is paramount that we understand this family of land systems and highlight some of the key areas where the Army is currently focusing its efforts. In order to do so, the ideas that form the basis of the FLCS model will be reviewed, the key elements of the land combat systems will be laid out and lastly the challenges that mark our progress will be exposed. This process will be required in order to inform the model and align our effort on the central objective of our Army strategy: a modern, flexible, robust medium-weight land force, optimized for sustained counter-insurgency operations, with a complimentary heavy surge capability.

The Family of Land Combat Systems represents the conceptual model of all equipment capabilities our soldiers need today and tomorrow.
Adaptive Dispersed Operations

In the spring of 2007 the Adaptive Dispersed Operations force employment concept for the land component of Land Operations 2021: A Force Employment Concept for Canada’s Army of Tomorrow was endorsed by the Canadian Forces. The Army Commander, Lieutenant-General Leslie, wrote at the time, ...

...the Army must work towards a fuller understanding of the character of the future security environment, and its implications for future armed conflict. Moreover, it must foster operational concepts and doctrine that are clear, relevant and always forward-looking. Finally, it must seek capabilities that ensure its effectiveness in the future multidimensional battlespace at home and abroad."

Land Operations 2021 was the product of this detailed analysis of the future security environment. At the centre of this understanding is the ability to deliberately use dispersion and aggregation in order to create and sustain a tactical advantage over an adept and adaptive adversary. In order to truly give this ability to the Army, a significant number of new capabilities will need to be developed, acquired and fielded.

Key Elements of the FLCS

Within the FLCS conceptual model, there are myriad projects that aim to deliver these new capabilities. Internal to the Army, these capabilities are being developed along the timelines established in the Land Capability Development Plan (LCDP) and inserted in the Strategic Investment Plan for the Department. At present, the key elements that require the Army’s focused attention are the numerous CIED initiatives, the Close Combat Vehicle (CCV), the Long Range Precision Rocket System (LRPRS), the Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle (TAPV), the Upgrade of the LAV III fleet, the Upgrade of the Tracked Light Armoured Vehicle (TLAV), Force Mobility Enhancements (FME), Ground Based Air and Munitions Defence (GBAMD) and the Logistic Vehicle Modernization Project (LVMP).

This model represents the area of focus for our major capital projects. While the Army is equipping for the whole spectrum, the focus lies in counter-insurgency operations with the ability to surge up or down as required.
The CCV project aims to field a fleet of very highly protected, operationally mobile and very tactically agile combat vehicles that will deliver the capability required for the Army’s strategic surge capability. The LRPRS will provide the Force Commander a deep strike precision capability in support of a land force, coalition and joint operations. The nature of operations envisioned under Land Operations 2021 is such that additional long-range indirect fire capabilities will be required to provide fire support for troops dispersed over a greatly increased area of operations. The TAPV intends on delivering a platform that will replace the COYOTE fleet, the RG-31 fleet and add to the Light Utility Vehicle Wheeled (G-Wagon) capability. It is a key component of the Future Combat Vehicle System (FCVS) program and will provide a multi-purpose combat capability. The project will field a modern fleet of tactical modular general-utility armoured vehicles for use in domestic and expeditionary operations that are highly mobile and extremely versatile, and provide a very high degree of survivability.

The LAV III upgrade seeks to improve the survivability, mobility and effects of the in-service LAV III platform, while maximizing command support and human interface factors. This upgrade represents the core Army capability and will extend the life of this platform to 2035. The TLAV will enhance existing M113 tracked light armoured vehicles with improved protection, mobility, and self-defence capability, and serve as a bridge and an enabler to the future capabilities promised by the TAPV and CCV.

Force mobility enhancements are urgently needed as our troops rely heavily on the engineer mobility vehicles in current operations, and our current fleet needs replacement. GBAMD will modernize, replace and/or augment the current Ground Based Air Defence capability known as Low Level Air Defence. Deliverables will likely include radar, a networked/integrated command, control and communications system, munitions and a launcher or launcher systems, all of which will have to operate in a positive airspace control domain in a joint/coalition environment. The system will be required to defeat the conventional air threat and the asymmetric air threat, cruise missiles, and munitions such as rockets, artillery shells and mortar bombs in domestic and international operations.

Lastly, the LVMP will build upon the ongoing Medium Support Vehicle System project; it will address the remaining deficiencies ranging from light to heavy-weight. It will also incorporate a degree of ballistic protection—a capability not currently fielded in the existing fleets—and deliver a modern heavy and light logistic vehicle capability that will replace the Light and Medium Support Vehicles.

**Challenges**

The pressure that is exerted by present day commitments on delivering current capabilities should not distract us from the promise offered by technological advances. The pursuit of these land capabilities burdens us with rational choices. Taking into account the resources allotted, operational effectiveness and the need for a wide range of capabilities, the FLCS represents a coherent concept that will in time yield an Army that excels in close combat in an adaptive dispersed environment.

The road to achieve this goal will not be without challenges. The availability of qualified personnel in acquisition and requirements positions is but one of the many challenges that must be overcome. The availability of new equipment in sufficient numbers to properly equip the Army in operations as well as to train the Army is another. Lastly, the infrastructure that is needed to house and maintain these new capabilities cannot be built fast enough. Therefore, we face a period where a number of complex choices must be made in order to achieve our ambitious goals.

While we recognize that the Army does not have the benefit of a ‘flagship’ piece of equipment to capture the imagination, it requires proactive, visionary capability development. It calls for careful synchronization of the fielding of these capabilities, while continuing to succeed in operations. These multiple demands will place a particular burden on our
soldiers. Nonetheless, we need to exploit recent technological trends across the spectrum, while balancing the need for firepower, mobility and protection, which can be achieved through careful planning and leadership.

Endnote

EDITORIAL—WAR AND REMEMBRANCE

Major Andrew B. Godefroy CD, PhD, plsc

Ever since Lieutenant Colonel John McCrae’s famous poem, *In Flanders Fields*, first appeared in Punch Magazine on 8 December 1915, Canadians have associated their memory of war with the iconic four leaf red poppy so easily found in the fields of France and Flanders. As November arrives this year, millions across the country will once again don this symbol to show their appreciation and support for an army second to none in the world. These days, especially, the poppy and all it represents figures heavily on our minds, as we remember those soldiers of our own generation so recently lost on operations at home and abroad. We feel the loss of each soldier deeply, knowing there is no replacement for the lives that so enriched our service and our legacy.

The end of the First World War in Europe on 11 November 1918 also provided us with the day on which we choose to publicly mark our remembrance of those who gave their lives in Canada’s wars. It is important to note, however, that not all Canadian soldiers were witness to an armistice on that day—in fact after 11 o’clock on 11 November 1918 several Canadian soldiers on the other side of Europe were still fighting for their very lives. At a place named Tulgas on the Dvina River, a handful of gunners of the 67th Battery, Canadian Field Artillery, a unit of the often forgotten North Russian Expeditionary Force (NREF), had their defensive positions nearly overrun that morning during a surprise attack by a force of five hundred Bolshevik Red Guards. Among the casualties that day was Corporal S.B. Wareham. Previously awarded the Military Medal for bravery on the western front, he was killed sometime after 11 o’clock while defending his artillery piece from Bolsheviks trying to capture the gun. For many other Canadian soldiers also serving in the new Soviet Russia, it would be several more months before their wars finally ended and they could come home.

The history of Canada’s role in the First World War has witnessed a tremendous resurgence this year. After many decades of drought on the subject, several new books by Canadian authors and historians have appeared this season ranging from popular surveys to detailed analyses. In our book review section over the next two issues, a number of these First World War releases are discussed at length, offering readers a good selection of the newer works to consider for their own libraries.

This fall also witnessed one of Canada’s greatest and most terrible battles of the First World War come alive on the big screen. Actor Paul Gross wrote, directed, and starred in the film, *Passchendaele*, a somber and emotional tribute to his grandfather Michael Dunne, who had served in the Great War with the 10th Canadian Infantry Battalion. It was a rare thing to see Canada’s Army portrayed so prominently in cinema or to be made the centre of a film’s story, but Gross successfully ensured that Canada’s history in the terrible battles that defined the beginning of the 20th century was no longer ignored.

In keeping with the theme of remembrance, this issue of the Canadian Army Journal includes much material dedicated to the legacy of our soldiers. We continue our publication of citations for newly bestowed honours and awards, and juxtapose this modern day courage against T. Robert Fowler’s essay on Canadian courage and reward during the ‘Great War’ of the nineteenth century. He has also provided us with a detailed biography of yet another valiant soldier, Leo Major, DCM and bar, whose passing away this October has deeply saddened us all.
Turning next to the present and the future, in addition to a guest editorial from Brigadier General Alain Tremblay, Chief of Staff Land Strategy discussing the Family of Land Combat Systems, this issue presents articles on the Battle Group 2021 study, leadership and its effects on the mitigation or exacerbation of PTSD, evolving sustainment and artillery concepts, as well as two detailed analyses of the political and social economy of Afghanistan. Supported by an interesting note to file from Major Mark Dillon of the British Army on the Canadian Army Operations Course (AOC) as well as a healthy dose of informed opinion from the stand up table, we hope this issue keeps you engaged. As always, enjoy, and we look forward to hearing from you.
HONOURS AND AWARDS

The three military valour decorations, namely the Victoria Cross, the Star of Military Valour and the Medal of Military Valour, were created by Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, Queen of Canada, on January 1, 1993. The Decorations may be awarded posthumously. The Victoria Cross is awarded for the most conspicuous bravery, a daring or pre-eminent act of valour or self-sacrifice, or extreme devotion to duty, in the presence of the enemy. The Star of Military Valour is awarded for distinguished and valiant service in the presence of the enemy. The Medal of Military Valour is awarded for an act of valour or devotion to duty in the presence of the enemy.

On 28 October 2008 Her Excellency the Right Honourable Michaëlle Jean, Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of Canada, announced the awarding of 3 Stars of Military Valour (SMV) and 8 Medals of Military Valour (MMV) to members of the Canadian Army who displayed gallantry and devotion to duty in combat.

CITATIONS

MILITARY VALOUR DECORATIONS

Corporal James Ball, S.M.V.
Edmonton, Alberta and Winnipeg, Manitoba

Captain Jonathan Snyder, S.M.V. (deceased)
Edmonton, Alberta and Penticton, British Columbia
Star of Military Valour

Corporal Steven Bancarz, M.M.V.
Edmonton and Calgary, Alberta

Corporal Cary Baker, M.M.V.
Edmonton, Alberta and Rossland, British Columbia

Captain Robert Peel, M.M.V., C.D.
Victoria, British Columbia
Medal of Military Valour

Corporals Baker, Ball and Bancarz, and captains Peel and Snyder were deployed to Afghanistan to serve as mentors to an Afghan company, when they were ambushed by Taliban insurgents on June 4, 2008. With little chance of survival, they exposed themselves to great peril and retaliated against the enemy while encouraging the Afghan soldiers to do the same. Captain Snyder seized control of the situation and ensured that the Afghan soldiers retrieved their wounded comrades. Corporal Ball led a two-man team across broken terrain to secure an extraction route that allowed for the execution of a fighting withdrawal by Captain Peel and corporals Bancarz and Baker. Because of their dedication, leadership and valour, many Afghan and Canadian lives were saved.

Sergeant William Kenneth MacDonald, S.M.V., C.D.
Denwood, Alberta and Regina, Saskatoon
Star of Military Valour

On August 3, 2006, amidst chaos and under sustained and intense enemy fire in Afghanistan, Sergeant MacDonald selflessly and repeatedly exposed himself to great peril in order to assist his wounded comrades. Despite the risk, he ensured that his men held on until reinforcements arrived and that the platoon’s focus remained on holding the ground that they had fought so hard to secure.
Major Joseph Antoine Dave Abboud, M.S.C., M.M.V., C.D.
Leavenworth, Kansas, United States of America and Sherbrooke, Quebec
Medal of Military Valour

A selfless and devoted commander of B Company, 3rd Battalion, Royal 22nd Régiment, Major Abboud led his combat team during an arduous battle in Afghanistan that lasted two days, in August 2007. His courage and leadership inspired his troops and contributed to the success of the mission.

Corporal Alexandre Benjamin Jonathan Dion, M.M.V.
Québec, Québec
Medal of Military Valour

On September 27, 2007, in the Panjwayi district of Afghanistan, enemy forces ambushed Corporal Dion’s platoon and grievously wounded a fellow soldier. Under direct and sustained enemy fire, he carried the injured soldier over 150 meters of difficult terrain to safety. Corporal Dion’s valiant actions helped to save the life of his comrade and enabled his platoon to safely withdraw from the scene.

Master Corporal Christopher Lorne Harding, M.M.V.
Souris, Manitoba
Medal of Military Valour

Master Corporal Harding was deployed with 6 Platoon, B Company, 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, in Afghanistan. When his section was attacked on July 8, 2006, he selflessly advanced across open terrain and commanded the battle, while providing first aid to a critically wounded soldier. His courageous actions under intense fire enabled his section to hold its position and to save the life of a comrade.

Warrant Oficer Tod Hopkin, M.M.V., C.D.
Edmonton and Wainwright, Alberta
Medal of Military Valour

On August 22 and 23, 2007, Warrant Officer Hopkin commanded the lead vehicle of a combat team through sustained enemy attacks, in Afghanistan, exposing himself to great risk in order to recapture a vital position. His composure and leadership were inspirational, and lead to the success of the mission.

Corporal Bryce Keller, M.M.V. (posthumous)
Sherwood Park, Alberta and Regina, Saskatchewan
Medal of Military Valour

On August 3, 2006, while exposed to intense enemy fire in Afghanistan, Corporal Keller demonstrated courage and leadership in order to allow his comrades to attend to a critically wounded soldier. Sadly, Corporal Keller made the ultimate sacrifice that day, but his selfless actions contributed to saving lives and enabled his platoon to hold vital terrain until reinforcements arrived.
FORGING LAND FORCES FOR THE ARMY OF TOMORROW—THE BATTLE GROUP 2021 STUDY

Major Alex Ruff MSC, CD and Major Andrew B. Godefroy CD, PhD

Nothing will further mitigate the risks and uncertainties of land warfare than the direct investment of resources in considering and planning ahead for those challenges. For professional volunteer armies such as our own, this means a permanent commitment to a dedicated and robust capability development process that encourages innovation, experimentation, and debate. Since the end of the Cold War, Canada’s Army first struggled to create, and then sustain, a successful approach to capability development, but over the years diligence in this regard has paid a tremendous dividend.¹ This article examines in detail one of the many current efforts that fall under the aegis of army capability development, specifically the Battle Group 2021 (BG2021) Study. As part of the ongoing investment in land force conceptual and doctrinal design, this study has played a central role in considering, testing, evaluating, and informing several land force development decisions and goals.

Since its inception, the BG2021 Study has been embedded within the 2nd Battalion, the Royal Canadian Regiment Battle Group (2 RCR BG), whose soldiers recently deployed to Hohenfels, Germany on Exercise COOPERATIVE SPIRIT 2008. As part of this America, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand Army Association (ABCA) exercise, 2 RCR BG not only enjoyed the opportunity to work with its close allies, but also to further test many of the BG2021 Study ideas and concepts. The result of this exercise was a success for both the study itself as well as Canadian land force development goals writ large.

The Army of Tomorrow: Land Operations 2021

Towards the end of the 1990s, the Canadian Army adopted a new ‘3-Army model’ that concentrated all ongoing land force development into three periods of focus. The first
army was considered the army in being, also referred to as the current build or the ‘Army of Today’. The second army was the ‘Army of Tomorrow’, a period of study that extended from the current builds of 2011 through to the year 2021 timeframe. The third army or the ‘Army of the Future’ is an objective force currently being studied under the project titled, ‘Future Army 2040’. With much of the ‘Army of Today’ currently in advanced stages of development or already deployed, the army’s conceptual and doctrinal design team has focused much of its attention over the last three years towards evolving the Army of Tomorrow (AoT) construct.

In March 2007 the Chief of Land Staff (CLS), Lieutenant General Andrew Leslie, approved and released new capstone guidance for future army development titled, ‘Land Operations 2021: The Force Employment Concept for the Army of Tomorrow’. As the ratified CF approach to land operations, the release of the new FEC represented the first step towards a sustained, cohesive, and collaborative approach to future land force development. From this capstone document, the army then initiated a series of more detailed conceptual and doctrinal design work that began with a series of studies of various organizational models.

Evolving Organizations

One of the central aspects of the evolving Land Operations 2021 Force Employment Concept is the Army’s proposed evolution towards optimised, infantry-centric, affiliated battle groups (ABGs) capable of operating within a formation context. This evolution will be subject to an iterative and comprehensive analysis process guided by the CF approved Land Operations 2021 Force Employment Concept—Adaptive Dispersed Operations (ADO), and will be synchronised with other initiatives such as Army Expansion, Territorial Battalion Groups, and Chief of Force Development’s (CFD) Force 2021 model. Further central to this effort was the CLS directed AoT Optimised Battle Group (OBG) Experiment, established in fall 2007, and directed to investigate and determine the feasibility of an OBG designed land force for the Army. The ‘test bed’ for this experiment required the engagement of not only simulated experimentation but also real army units, therefore the OBG experiment was built upon the 2nd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment (2 RCR) (see figure 1). A Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs (DLCD) experimentation team, consisting of one Major and one Master Warrant Officer, was embedded in 2 RCR to oversee all aspects of
the experiment. The scope of the experiment focused its examination of OBG capabilities towards both force employment (FE) as well as force generational (FG) perspectives.

In order to ensure that the optimum mix of capabilities and relationships are obtained, the investigation originally included an examination of capabilities, structures, doctrine, procedures, equipment, and force generation models. However, it soon became apparent that the scope of the project had advanced beyond what could be determined within the structure of 2 RCR BG alone. As such the OBG Experiment was re-named in fall 2008 to the BG2021 Study to reflect this broader scope, as well as to align itself within the larger Formation 2021 Study framework that was itself aligned with the CFD Force 2021 Study.

The AoT BG2021 Study will run until Army Expansion is complete. The primary purpose of the current study is to investigate two CLS-directed master questions (MQ), the results of which will be used to inform a series of decision points within the Army Expansion (2011—Build, 2016—Align, 2021—Transform), timeline. It is anticipated that this effort will
assist in ensuring that the Army writ large evolves in an informed and effective manner over the next several years. The specific issues being addressed are:

- MQ1. What is the optimal mix of capabilities to be grouped together in BGs to meet the challenges of the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE) and Future Security Environment (FSE)?

- MQ2. What is the most effective FG Course of Action (COA) for generating that optimal mix of capabilities?

Both of these questions, as well as other related battle group force capabilities, will be investigated within the context of a joint, interagency, multinational, public (JIMP) formation using full PRICIE criteria. Finally, the priority of effort for the PRICIE analysis will be shaped by, in order, command, sense, sustain, shield and act operational functions.

Data Collection

Data collection for the BG2021 Study is focused through extant 2 RCR BG training as part of the normal Managed Readiness Plan (MRP), and in conjunction with many of the constraints associated with Whole Fleet Management (WFM). Although this approach restricts data collection, through the synchronization of available resources and training opportunities with the Combat Training Centre (CTC), 4 Engineer Support Regiment (4 ESR), 403 Squadron and other Army venues, it is possible to maximize data collection opportunities. Not solely focused on equipment, but also on the just as important people and processes, the study utilizes Human Dimension (HD) surveys generated by the Directorate of Military Personnel Operational Research and Analysis (DMPORA) to capture many of the human factors aspects that are involved in creating a permanent battle group structure.

Data collection to assist in determining the operational effectiveness of 2 RCR BG is presently achieved through the use of the Command Team Effectiveness (CTEF) Model and Instrument. The CTEF model was initially developed by a Scientific NATO Working Group to assess mission tasking, organization, and people qualities; to optimize processes; to identify stakeholders and their expectations; and to specify goals and outcomes. It is a tool in the process of validation, but to date it has proved very effective in capturing both quantitative as well as qualitative data for the BG2021 Study.
An additional but perhaps more important data collection tool assisting the BG2021 Study is a basic observation and recommendation form (see Figure 2) that can be filled out by any soldier, officer, or civilian at anytime. These observations are confidentially collected and compiled to form a database that helps capture all aspects of the BG2021 Study as well as other key concerns that potentially could affect the overall conceptual and doctrinal design of the AoT.

**Figure 2: Observation and Recommendation Form**

Realizing that data collection opportunities would be limited and that an operational effectiveness baseline would be required to compare the 2 RCR BG to other current formations, approval was sought and given in 2008 to utilize the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre (CMTC) Exercise MAPLE GUARDIAN serials to capture data on all the ‘ad-hoc’ battle groups (and the whole formation as of fall 2008) currently being trained and tested for overseas deployments. This data is proving extremely beneficial in advising the AoT development along with providing a solid and robust comparison baseline. It is hoped and expected that the success of this current approach to analysis will be repeated in future related studies supporting Formation 2021 development.
Exercise Cooperative Spirit 2008

In September 2008 elements of the American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand (ABCA) Armies deployed to take part in Exercise COOPERATIVE SPIRIT 2008. This month-long field exercise at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) at Hohenfels, Germany, provided a realistic counter-insurgency (COIN)-based, Afghanistan-focused environment to test interoperability amongst the ABCA partners, as well as prepare units for future coalition combat operations. 2 RCR Battle Group was the Canadian contribution to this multinational exercise.

The lead elements of 2 RCR BG arrived at the beginning of the month and established a forward operating base from which the main BG HQ later commanded and supported its infantry companies deployed out into the area of operations (AO). The first several days were spent conducting command post exercises and honing battle drills. This was followed by a full scale deployment into the AO where sub-units conducted a series of missions ranging from peacetime engagement, to stabilization, to counterinsurgency combat operations.
BG2021 Study Team deployed alongside all units, with some observers assigned to data collection at the BG HQ level while others went forward to observe the various companies. Throughout the whole exercise, data was collected on every form of activity and fed back to a defence science team for initial correlation and analysis.

Not only was Exercise COOPERATIVE SPIRIT a great opportunity to enhance interoperability between these five coalition partners, it was really the first substantive valid data collection event for the BG2021 Study team. 2 RCR BG achieved some great training opportunities, ABCA captured several key interoperability concerns, and the BG2021 Study collected some significant data in support of its own objectives. Major Jeff Forgrave, a logistics officer commanding Administration Coy perhaps stated it best when he said, “2 RCR BG was the right unit at the right time to participate on COOPERATIVE SPIRIT, because the BG2021 Study provided all the additional enablers/coordination centres to test this interoperability environment.”

The ability to seize upon a large-scale multinational training event and collect substantial amounts of relevant data was a major undertaking for the BG2021 Study, and it could not have been possible without the direct support of several other army organizations. LFAA HQ, LFCA Area Troops, DLCD, DFSA, PSTC, and even regiments such as 1st Hussars, all provided subject matter experts and other essential staff to assist with the observation and data collection, often at short notice. Yet it was this collective investment in BG2021 Study by all sectors of the Army that so clearly demonstrated its purpose.

Lessons Learned

Although most of the lessons and recommendations taken away from data collection events to date have yet to be fully analyzed, these discoveries are proving invaluable to the continued development of capabilities and requirements for future land forces. For example, some of the data collected to date suggests that the integration of intelligence personnel and influence activity/information operations personnel (CIMIC, PsyOps) into the BG is invaluable in improving its overall operational effectiveness, and though structures have yet to be determined, it is becoming clear that this capability needs to be established in a more permanent fashion. Other observations of note have also been made, the following of which provides but a short list of the many lessons being captured from the study.
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) at the BG level and lower are without a doubt essential in allowing these organizations to be successful in a COIN environment. The effect achieved by UAV feeds means that sub-units do not need to go in blind into objectives, and the capability to establish persistent surveillance contributes significantly to the disruption of insurgent activities and effects.

Although data acquisition through multiple sensors as well as other improved capabilities is ever increasing, the amount of information collected in support of intelligence functions, without a solid information management (IM) process, and the ability to filter, process, and collate the information and distribute it across the BG to all sub-units in a timely, efficient manner remains a serious challenge. Command posts are either becoming overloaded with information or worse, fail to get the relevant information they require as a result of these shortfalls in IM. If HQs are not provided with an increased analyst capability and the required equipment to support this activity, they will not be able to exploit the information they collect. This will certainly not contribute to evolving future operational capability. New paradigms must be explored, and the management of information considered with greater investment. Dismounted soldier Blue Force Tracking using improved GPS and Personal Role Radios (PRR), for example, can provide improved SA from section up to battle group level.

The soldier and his/her kit is major area of data collection and study, as future equipment considerations will have a great impact on formation effectiveness. For example, soldiers require all their individual soldier equipment (i.e. STANO) all the time in order to ensure proficiency, confidence, and operational effectiveness. Along the same vein, sub-units also require a robust echelon for their combat service support and success in an ADO environment.

Leadership progression, attrition and postings at the leadership levels are and will remain a challenge in achieving high levels of operational effectiveness. The study is attempting to pinpoint key positions and minimum time required in these positions to mitigate any decrease in effectiveness.

Finally, it was observed that collaborative planning, integration and coordination of activities between BG/ PRT/ ANA-OMLT/ANP-POMLT need to occur early and often. There has been significant difficulty integrating PRT/OMLT assets largely on account of unclear command structures and lack of mobile communications. This presents both leadership as well as organizational challenges for future commanders. All of the above examples are just some of the trends noticed to date. Complete detailed reports for all data collection events are available through DLCD and the BG2021 Study Team.

**Looking Ahead**

The BG2021 Study is an opportunity to capture many of the lessons learned and the way ahead in helping to ensure the Army is ready for the future. Data collection will remain a challenge, but is achievable through synchronization of resources and opportunities. 2 RCR BG and, it could be argued, the Army have already benefited by providing a somewhat ‘JIMP’ enabled BG to COOPERATIVE SPIRIT. This vital look in preparing the Army for the future cannot be accomplished without the continued support from the CF, Army, CTC and...
all units that interact with 2 RCR BG. The study has already identified that combined arms collective training opportunities cannot be wasted and all operations and planning staff must go the extra mile to synchronize and plan training opportunities that will benefit as many parties as possible.

Taking units out of the operational rotation to focus on future force development is a difficult decision. Yet the future benefit of doing so far outweighs the current short-term pain felt by any shortfalls. Historically, professional volunteer armies that invested in their future development mitigated the worst risks in war. Success in combat depended upon innovation as well as realistic training. The BG2021 Study incorporates both of these elements in its own development. Perhaps even more important, making firm commitments to future Army development is perhaps the clearest signal that it is indeed a professional force, and not one to be taken lightly by its adversaries.

About the Authors …


Major Andrew B. Godefroy joined the CF in 1990 as a sapper and was later commissioned from the ranks. He served with 3 FER from 1991-1997, on the staff at 1st Canadian Division Headquarters in 1997-1998, and then with the Directorate of Space Development from 1999-2004 first as a strategic analyst and then later as the Officer Commanding the Joint Space Support Team at the CF Joint Operations Group. Since 2004 he has served with the army’s Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, where he heads academic research, development, and publications as well as conceptual studies in autonomous ground systems. In the fall of 2008 he served in Hohenfels, Germany, as part of the BG2021 Study Observer/Controller Team.

Endnotes

1. For a survey of this subject see Major Andrew B. Godefroy, “Chasing the Silver Bullet: The Evolution of Capability Development in the Canadian Army”, Canadian Military Journal, (Spring 2007), pp.53-66.
4. NATO RTO TECHNICAL REPORT TR-HFM-087 “Military Command Team Effectiveness: Model and Instrument for Assessment and Improvement”, OPI: Dr Joe Baranski DRDC Toronto
5. Interview with Author, October 2008.
UNETHICAL LEADERSHIP AND ITS
RELATION TO POST TRAUMATIC
STRESS DISORDER

Major Ross Cossar

The surest way to a dose of PTSD is to commit an atrocity or criminal act that violates your code of ethics

Lt. Col. Dave Grossman

Almost thirty years after the introduction of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as a psychiatric condition in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), there remains a significant deficit in how much we actually know about the disorder (Stam, 2007). Although those people who are afflicted with PTSD present with specific patterns of stress reaction that can be labelled and effectively treated (Grossman, 2004), the underlying causes continue to elude medical research teams. Even though the diagnosis of PTSD includes a specific requirement for a traumatic stressor, the resulting conditions may actually be more dependent on personal dispositions, the surrounding circumstances and the available hierarchical support structures. To acknowledge some of these extraneous factors, this paper looks at the effect that leadership, manifested at multiple levels, has on the individual soldier who has deployed to a combat zone. More specifically, we look at how a lack of ethical leadership might play upon the soldier’s mind and be linked to a PTSD diagnosis.

A Review of PTSD

Although daily levels of stress can serve to focus our abilities to complete a task, exposure to a particularly traumatic event can knock some people’s ability to cope with stress off balance (Grossman, 2004). For soldiers, operational stress injuries, such as PTSD, can occur when the stress that is being experienced overwhelms their ability to respond appropriately to what they have encountered. While human to human personal attacks such as rape and torture consistently produce higher levels of PTSD in victims than natural disasters do, exposure to all stressors, including combat, are individually perceived on a scale that ranges from fear to excitement (O’Brien, 1998; McKeever & Huff, 2003; Stein, Seedat, Iverson & Wessely, 2007). It needs to be recognized that the majority of people who are exposed to a threatening violent experience will recover naturally (O’Brien, 1998; McKeever & Huff, 2003; Grossman, 2004). Although people will display post traumatic symptoms, such as altered central nervous system (CNS) reactivity and somatic disturbances for up to a few days after exposure to a significant stressor, fully developed PTSD will only affect three to ten percent of those exposed (O’Brien, 1998; Grossman, 2004; Stam, 2007; Stein et al., 2007). Individual differences also make identification of what might be perceived as stress difficult. One person’s daily stress could actually be perceived as horrifying to another person and the difference is often dependent on the individual’s life experiences (Friedman, 2003; Charuvastra & Cloitre, 2008).

The DSM, edition four text revised (DSM-IV TR), lays out the requirements needed by health care practitioners to identify a case of PTSD (O’Brien, 1998). As a disorder, PTSD has been collocated in the manual with anxiety because approximately 80% of those diagnosed with PTSD have co-morbid diagnoses with other anxiety disorders (Rosenbaum, 2004). As a guide for psychiatric assessment, the DSM-IV TR describes similar personal experiences that can be dissociated from a normal response to a traumatic event and outlines six required areas that combine to result in a PTSD diagnosis. Since the disorder can be seen as an abnormal reaction that some people have when they have been exposed
to an abnormal situation, section A of the DSM-IV TR states that PTSD is specifically linked to a traumatic event that is perceived to be limb or life threatening and that it involves a feeling of helplessness or horror. From this, intrusive memories are predictively linked with avoidant behaviours and hyper-arousal in a way that allows anticipation of particular responses in treatment (O’Brien, 1998). Therefore, section B of the DSM-IV TR requires at least one of a group of symptoms that involve re-experiencing the event; section C requires at least three separate issues of avoidance behaviour that may include a conscious effort to avoid distressing stimuli (Casada & Roache, 2006); and section D requires hyper-arousal to related stressors. Tying these together, section E of the DSM-IV TR requires that these conditions continue for at least a month, and section F requires that the combined issues cause the patient distress and social impairment (O’Brien, 1998; Rosenbaum, 2004). While an immediate reaction to a stressful event is normal, it is the extended reaction to all of the above sections that determines that the stress reaction has become abnormal.

Though PTSD is directly linked to a traumatic event (Friedman, 2003), there is a burgeoning body of evidence that suggests that there are other factors heavily correlated with the symptoms that may play a role in putting some people at greater risk of developing the disorder in these traumatic environs (Lamerson & Kelloway, 1996; O’Brien, 1998; Charuvastra & Cloitre, 2008). Along with family instability and previous psychological disorders, social support for the victim seems to be clearly linked to both the initial onset and severity of the diagnosis (McKeever & Huff, 2003; Rosenbaum, 2004; Charuvastra & Cloitre, 2008). Other ecological issues such as culture, in the form of national support, education and socioeconomic background also seem to be at play (Hautamaki & Coleman, 2001). This multiplicity of views within the medical community has allowed a PTSD creep to occur to the point that all accepted stressors are, in effect, decided by those involved and that interpretation of the DSM specifications is rather liberally applied. Without a physiological “gold” standard for measuring PTSD, diagnosis must be determined through subjective interpretations of the clinician and the patient (O’Brien, 1998). With all that we don’t know about PTSD, it is reasonable to suggest that the disorder arises from more than just exposure to a traumatic event.

**Thoughts on Leadership**

To add the effects of leadership to the cauldron of PTSD influences, one needs an understanding of leadership concepts. Like so many human constructs, there is not universal agreement on any one definition of leadership. At the end of his military career, Field Marshal Montgomery (1961) wrote that leadership is the “capacity and the will to rally men and women to a common purpose and the character that will inspire confidence.” Underwriting his thoughts is the conviction that truth and character are critical in leadership. In fact, Montgomery stated that truth was the centre of gravity for the common purpose. More recently, others have written about the importance of knowing the soldiers and providing for their welfare, for the soldiers who believe that they are cared for will put forth greater effort (Kellet, 1982; Thompson & Gignac, 2001). The individual soldier is the greatest asset a leader can have and Kellet (1982) provides multi-national studies that indicate that a frivolous waste of any resource is irresponsible. Few ideas will destroy the minds of soldiers as quickly as the thought that they are considered completely expendable by their leaders.

For at least the last two millennia, militaries have tried to reduce leadership into lists of essential principles—professional competence, personal responsibility, sound decision making and communication. By demonstrating a mix of these principles, a leader can inspire others to willingly accept the given task even if it involves danger and potential death for all (Kellet, 1982; Catignani, S., 2006). Not one of these principles involves coercion or deceit as an aspect of the art of leadership though the killing of one’s own soldiers has also been used throughout history to gain compliance within the group. Linked directly with the leader are the followers who Bidwell (cited in Kellet, 1982) divides into three distinct groups: some followers are loyal and enthusiastic, some willingly share in the tasks but are otherwise apathetic and some are malingerers who sap the group’s morale and tax the leader’s abilities. I would argue however, that the groups are actually located on a single
continuum of followers that is in constant flux. While they may be loyal in the beginning, there is the possibility that some soldiers may reach a point of total apathy and conversely, there will be inadequate soldiers who are moved, in part by good leadership, to a point where they become effective members of the team.

Leading enthusiastic soldiers who are like-minded in support of the goals of their leaders is relatively easy. However, even bad leaders can get what they want because most people like to receive direction. People tend to follow either what they deem to be legitimate authority or the path of least resistance. Contrary to Montgomery (1961), Barnett (cited in Hart, 1978) believed that morals and good character had nothing to do with leadership. He saw the act of leadership strictly as a relationship of power between animals where the will of one was imparted upon the rest. While people allow themselves to be led, particularly during times of danger or challenge, many look to others for direction all of the time. In 1951, Asch found that 35% of participants in a study would actively conform to incorrect answers made by others even when they had seen evidence to the contrary. Normative social influence causes people to act against their own judgments because they generally seek the approval of others. The astounding aspect of Asch's (1951) finding is that this preponderance to conform was prevalent in a group where the participants didn't know the other group members, could not be expected to build future relations with the experimental team and were expressing opinions about something as simple as the length of a pencil line. Group cohesion can be a very strong influence on the likelihood that a person will stand up for what he or she believes is right. In the fast paced, life threatening combat environment I'll argue that the percentage of those who will simply follow others is likely to rise.

Milgram (1974) conducted a series of now classic experiments that measured obedience. Volunteer participants were ordered to apply electrical shocks to a “student” when incorrect answers were given to some questions. After meeting the middle aged man who would play the student and watching him being attached to the apparatus, the participants were taken into another room where they could hear the answers given but not see the student. Along with hearing the student's answers, they could also hear the expressions of pain and anguish as they administered increasing levels of voltage to the student for each incorrect answer. Although no electrical shocks were actually being delivered by their actions, the participants were unaware of this and they continued to do as the experimenter told them, applying shocks that would have killed the student had they
actually. Over 65% of the participants in a number of variations on this experiment failed to follow their own conscience to actually stop administering the electrical punishments to another human being who they clearly believed they were hurting. Like Asch’s (1951) findings, Milgram’s participants were people who had no relationship to the authority of the experimenter. They just blindly followed the directions and most of those who questioned the experimenter about the effects of the voltages accepted the direction that the “test had to continue” (Milgram, 1974).

The contrast between the leadership concepts of Montgomery (1961) and Barnett (cited in Hart, 1978) is the root of this paper. While leadership can be exercised in an ethical manner that promotes trust and confidence, it can also be exercised with no moral integrity. The Asch (1951) and Milgram (1974) experiments were conducted in situations that are very different from the military hierarchy that promotes principled leadership while maintaining absolute power through military discipline. While Canadian soldiers are taught to follow lawful orders and Canadian military leaders are taught to command lawfully, deciding what is lawful at any moment in time will often mean that compliance is the default response. An individual’s response to authority can range from compliance with the order to refusal to comply and the engagement of higher commanders in setting things right. Between these two points, a person may choose to secretly subvert the instructions, challenge the orders but still comply or simply refuse to comply with the leader’s wishes (Santrock, J.W. & Mittner, J.O., 2005). Maxwell (cited by St. Cyr, 2007) suggested several levels of compliance. People may follow because they have to or they may follow because they want to. The decision to comply may also be the result of the leader’s past actions for the individual and the personal ethos that the leader is perceived to live by. Most people have a tough time resisting authority, in part because they want to believe that the direction they are receiving is well conceived, legal and ethical. Their problems can begin when they comply with orders that they know are wrong and they are then required to live with their actions.

The Effects of Ethical Leadership

Conducting one’s actions in an ethical manner means that there is concern for what is right in relation to the principles and obligations expected by one’s society. It is assumed that all action or inaction that affects other people whether conducted by an individual or by an institution involves ethics. Morality is about upholding the values and standards of
a culture. It assumes that there is a universal set of norms that will be followed by rational people. To extend this, a moral judgment concerns the requirement to adhere to these obligations or values and specifically involves a person’s duty to follow a particular course of action. This sort of judgment may lead to a moral dilemma where there are two or more possible approaches and the act of doing one will preclude being able to do the other. Moral dilemmas bring us back to ethical issues and the realization that, despite our values and guiding societal norms, we still operate in a very diverse and unclear world (Thomson et al. 2005). The cost of making such decisions can be an individual’s sense of self because the incongruence of one’s actions and normative attitudes can cause the strains that may lead to PTSD or other stress injuries.

A community can be viewed as a person’s peers, a social institution or a nation. What really defines a body of people as a community is some form of commonality such as shared beliefs, a common language or geography. Within each community is a wide array of people who bring their own strengths and weaknesses into the mix. Inevitably, some of the community members will be leaders who exert a great deal of influence upon both the values that the community membership will hold and how the community members will conduct themselves. Such influence may be very positive, such as that of Tommy Douglas’s in his efforts to implement universal health care for Canadians, while other influences can have disastrous results of the kind that Adolph Hitler brought upon Germany. Such varying styles of leadership can also influence members within the relatively small communities of military units. In other words, the actions of the leaders, at any level, will have a direct impact on how the people in the group live their lives. This means that the style of leader and peer support for those who have been traumatized influences their possibility for development of PTSD or other operational stress injuries (McKeever & Huff, 2003; Rosenbaum, 2004; Charuvastra & Cloitre, 2008). In particular, soldiers who accept immoral authority may, in fact, be traumatized by the very act of following orders from a leader who should be operating, as Montgomery (1961) suggested, within the confines of integrity and truth. Leadership from the state, the society, the military institution and their direct supervisors will influence the soldiers’ well-being and effectiveness. In particular, unethical leadership can influence the soldiers’ actions and cause undue operational stress such as PTSD.
Shay (1994) contrasts the lives of PTSD-afflicted Vietnam veterans with the characters of Homer's *Iliad* and explores the theme of soldiers’ reactions when the leadership has betrayed their sense of what is right. In the *Iliad*, when Achilles’ commander Agamemnon steals his prize of honour from him, Achilles’ sense of betrayal is such that he loses emotional control. Achilles’ rage reaches the point that he begins committing unspeakable atrocities against both the living and the dead. Like soldiers of today, Achilles expected his leaders to be moral and to honourably lead by example. As Grossman (2004) points out, while the killing of other human beings is not something that should be taken lightly, sometimes it must be done. Killing can occur in the cause of justice rather than vengeance. When such a position is taken and the killing is done within the confines of an order that is lawful and moral, a soldier’s integrity and honour may be maintained. To differentiate itself from an armed rabble, an army adopts codes of conduct that are acceptable to its society (Shay, 1994). This is accepted by the members as legitimate power granted by the society. It allows soldiers the opportunity to rid themselves of the guilt of killing (Nadelson, 2005). By using legitimate power to cross the boundary of what the society would accept as moral, leaders can rob the subordinate of the honour they expect to gain by serving their country. Agamemnon and many leaders since have stolen that sense of honour from their soldiers through unethical orders that have resulted in soldiers committing needless atrocities. With a positive correlation between violations of the soldiers’ own ethical guidelines and the development of PTSD, Grossman (2004) points out that doing what is right provides mental protection. However, doing wrong even when ordered by authority is still doing wrong and the soldiers who commit immoral acts are the ones who will have to live with the memories. There is one further difference between the experiences that Homer wrote of and those of soldiers today. During Achilles’ time, military leadership was on the field with the soldiers at the time of battle. Today’s commanders are thinly spread through the ranks and many of those who make the big decisions never see battle (Shay, 1994). Soldiers now have to trust in the leadership of people who they will never see or know. Unethical orders that break the trust between the soldiers serving their country and any of the societal institutions that sent them to war create the conditions that cause operational stress injuries and possibly even PTSD.

**State Leadership**

Although those in national leadership are well removed from the soldiers on the battlefield, there is no less reason to look at the orders that are promulgated from there than the orders that are verbally given by a platoon commander during a firefight. In fact, it is the state leadership that gives the direction for the military to become engaged in war and it is the state’s responsibility to ensure that military resources are not wasted.

Ambiguity of the mission will play on the minds of soldiers if they do not have a clear understanding of what is being purchased with their blood (Lamerson & Kelloway, 1996; Adler, Litz & Bartone, 2003). There is a difference between fighting for obvious national security and fighting to protect the profit margins of big businesses that tweak the decisions made by the politicians. The average citizen and soldier alike are bound to be suspicious about the underlying reasons for war when they learn, for example, that members of the U.S. Congress hold approximately 196 million dollars worth of defence industry stocks (Associated Press, 03/04/08; Goodman, 2008). Such figures make it hard to distinguish moral leadership from greed. Being on the defence against an aggressor is a legitimate cause that can alleviate the stress on a soldier who must kill. Finnish WWII veterans suffered some of the lowest rates of PTSD, in part, because they fought a defensive war first against the Russians and then against the Germans (Hautamaki & Coleman, 2001). Similarly, Israeli Defence Force soldiers who were fighting for the survival of their fledgling nation during the last 60 years also have lower rates of PTSD that combat veterans of other counties (Solomon, 1996). The key for the soldiers from Finland and Israel is that they perceived a need to fight. Not only were their own personal needs being threatened, but the needs of their families and communities were also in jeopardy. This suggests that it is very important for the health of our soldiers for the state leadership to explain why a war needs to be fought half way around the world. While it is abundantly clear in this post 9/11
world that attacks on the state can originate from virtually anywhere, why and how state security is maintained by fighting wars elsewhere is often very unclear. Although assisting the security of other nations should itself be a moral obligation and those nations that are able, should provide such assistance, the fuzzy line of altruistic assistance to others and the fulfillment of national interests can be hard for fighting soldiers to delineate (Dobreva-Martinova, Villeneuve, Strickland & Matheson, 2002). It is therefore incumbent on the state leadership to make clear, to the soldiers and the society as a whole, the reasons for the stress that is being created. If the state leaders can give this information based upon truth while standing on the moral high ground (Safty, 2003; Grossman, 2004), it then follows that soldiers will not be put in positions where atrocities are committed and operational stresses such as PTSD are incurred.

National resolve is an issue that is at least in part affected by the friendly forces body count. Soldier fatalities for the current U.S. war in Iraq rolled past 4000 this spring while Canadian, British and Dutch combat deaths are each approaching 100 for the war in Afghanistan. In addition, Iraqi civilian deaths are conservatively estimated around 90,000 individuals (Associated Press, 24/03/08). Forty percent of the world’s military actions since WWII have ended in failure when powerful nations have withdrawn from conflict for cost benefit relations rather than because of a military defeat (Sullivan, 2007). Taking action at home and abroad will consume tremendous resources and military capability is just one part of the overall picture. The combined impact of material and human expenditure can last for decades (Solomon, 1996) and will include ongoing health care issues such as PTSD for generations (Rosenbaum, 2004; Hautamaki & Coleman, 2001). Soldiers at the front need to believe that the state leaders have invested their efforts into a complete appreciation of the mission and that the international leadership they provide involves more than just projecting military power (Edwards, 2007). Considering the current U.S. war in Iraq, it is abundantly clear that the decision makers failed to comprehend the costs of establishing and maintaining a U.S. friendly regime there (Daalder & Lindsay; Record & Terrill, cited by Sullivan, 2007; Safty, 2003; Kinsley, 2007; Edwards, 2007). This failure to grasp the big picture means that soldiers’ lives are being risked for something that was less than clearly thought out. National leadership represents the top of a soldier’s world. The responsibility for the betrayal of “what is right” for the soldier rests on the shoulders of the state leaders (Kinsley, 2007) if they cannot sustain belief in the war effort. This is the breach of trust that will play upon the minds of those at the fighting front.

Social Leadership

Social support mitigates stress and has been clearly linked to a reduction in PTSD occurrences around the world (Noy, 1991; Solomon, 1996; Hautamaki & Coleman, 2001; Charuvastra & Cloitre, 2008). As Grossman (2004) so aptly states, “Grief shared is grief divided and joy shared is joy multiplied.” If a society has chosen through its leaders, to send its soldiers to war, then the society must remain supportive of those soldiers who have done the requested deeds on its behalf. In particular, this includes accepting responsibility for those who are broken physically and mentally (Shay, 1994). Soldiers often become quiet about their needs when it becomes apparent that nobody cares. Homer’s warriors of the Iliad wanted little more than public recognition that was free of shame. It is the same for today’s fighters except that the society to which most soldiers now return is vastly removed from the direct impacts of the war. WWII was the last time that citizens at home had their basic commodities rationed to support the war effort and, despite current media efforts, many citizens remain ignorant of the actions that their militaries are engaged in around the world. Ongoing support to soldiers and public recognition for what they have accomplished on behalf of their country is critical to the life time of memories that soldiers will encounter (Shay, 1994; Solomon, 1996; Hautamaki & Coleman, 2001). Rather than quick treatment, Finnish veterans have benefited from a continuous social narrative that has included, rather than excluded, their war time service to the country (Hautamaki & Coleman, 2001). Since honour can only come from the community, social support needs to respect courage and not stigmatize mental breakdown (Grossman, 2004; Stein et al., 2007). This is because each of our soldiers is a product of our own society carrying within him or herself whatever social
strengths or ills the society as a whole has bred into them. A communitarian philosophy that has strong social support in times of peace will carry those same values into times of crisis (McKeever & Huff, 2003; Ehrenreich, 2003; Grossman, 2004). Some of the ecological variables linked to PTSD include family instability, childhood anti-social behaviours and the lack of community support (McKeever and Huff, 2003). Veterans who perceive community support are more likely to recover from their operational stresses than those who perceive negativity towards their needs that were brought on because of their national service (Charuvastra & Cloitre, 2008). PTSD is almost always associated with a broken social bond that represents the same broken trust that those in leadership positions can create.

Society is made up of multiple institutions that each has its own hierarchy and within these groups there are countless leaders who have an opportunity to shape communitarian values. In general, despite the best efforts of consumerism to create a world of self-guided individuals, community leaders have obligations to do their best to improve society. Ethical leadership actually encompasses all citizens and it might better be viewed as self-guiding, with the followers getting the leaders they deserve. People, particularly in democracies, have the moral obligation to ensure that their leaders operate within the ethical principles that they expect (Dunlap, 1999). Societal leadership is the business of all community minded people (Ciulla, 2003; Safy, 2003) and the moral actions of a society’s people will influence the actions of their leaders. A misdirected society will produce leaders who accept unethical means of conduct that will in turn impact upon the stresses felt by its most vulnerable members.

Medical Leadership

One particular social institution whose unethical transgressions will impact upon a soldier’s mental health is the medical community. With estimates that 17 U.S. veterans commit suicide daily there is a critical need for medical leaders to coordinate existing programs into a concerted effort (Coleman, 2008). Overall health promotion rather than the current strategy of healing only after injury would be more effective. Bio-reductionism has gripped much of the medical world in an all-out effort to dissect human functions from human interaction to the point where holistic mental health issues receive minimal research support (O’Brien, 1998; Coughlan, unpublished). McKeever and Huff’s (2003) Diathetical Stress Model, outlines ecological factors of past family, friendship, co-worker and environ-
mental issues that can affect a person's susceptibility to PTSD. The Diathetical Stress Model is directly opposite to the model shaping current research, which seeks a physiological PTSD test that would eliminate the need to investigate a patient's experience. The current model has encouraged overall research effort to concentrate on biological studies (Ehrenreich, 2003) rather than putting effort into learning more from the patients. McKeever and Huff (2003) question the ethics of deliberately excluding the human experience from medical research, as most of the current work on PTSD is centred on psychobiology and pharmacotherapy (Hageman, Anderson & Jorgensen, 2001), in which the primary research hypothesis is that long term disorders are regulated by biological measures such as the dys-regulation of brain chemicals and neuro-endocrine pathways. It is not surprising perhaps that the search for a pharmacological fix is led by big businesses whose profit margins should make all of us question their motives for helping others. (Coughlan, unpublished)

Mental health issues are relatively misunderstood, compared to physical health issues, and the current bandwagon for PTSD may also be further polarizing the medical study of mental health (Ehrenreich, 2003; Grossman, 2004). While research money is being applied to the study of PTSD, other stress injuries that might afflict the soldier are largely ignored. The challenge for the medical community is to bring their various strands of study into a common vision that will put health before healing. Although the members of society at large have a moral obligation to assist their veterans, the medical community also has a professional obligation to ensure that human dignity is foremost in its care to others (Solomon, 1996). To aid this, the U.S. Institute of Medicine has partnered with Veterans’ Affairs to identify gaps in care and develop a comprehensive delivery plan. When dealing with people’s health there should be no room for untruths, communication failures or lies. PTSD can be cured. It is like a case of the flu that when properly cared for can heal, inoculate and make a person stronger (Grossman, 2004). Soldiers afflicted by operational stress need truthful care that will lead them to recovery rather than a life time of drugs and expensive therapy. All of this goes back to the bonds of trust that soldiers need to have with their leaders. While state leaders have oversight roles to ensure quality health care, the medical community itself is responsible to first do no harm (Weinstein, 2007). While there may be written policy standards to support this, in practice, poor performance is not often held accountable. Medical leaders, like the leaders of other societal institutions have a direct role to play in the health of the nation’s warriors and a clear requirement for trust that must be maintained.

**Military Leadership**

Since soldiers are hired "to act as tools of justice [and] follow edict handed down" (Lund, 2008), all volunteer armies, like those in much of the Western world, often say that the last time the soldier volunteered was the day they joined. With traditions and the blessing of the society, the military has developed an authoritative posture that is accepted by its members. Because the resulting authority is such that soldiers will risk their lives, it is imperative that the leaders within this institution do everything they can to uphold all that is considered right (Shay, 1994). With the awareness of PTSD and other operational stress injuries, the leaders’ challenge is to minimize the negative effects that such illnesses can pose to the organization and the individual (McFarlane & Bryant, 2007). The leader who gives an order that is unlawful, unethical and immoral risks undermining the spirit of the army and the individual soldier alike.

Combat stressors that include threats to life, physical comfort, social interactions and personal agency can be heightened by the conflicts of soldiers’ ethical values when they are presented as a moral dilemma on the battlefield (Kellet, 1982). Therefore, as Dalton (1994) stated “the trust required for effective leadership requires a standard of behaviour and the development of personal character that [is] in keeping with the highest moral code of society.” There is no room for leaders blindly condone actions that they know are wrong.

The recent Winter Soldier hearings conducted in Silver Spring, Maryland provide a stark picture of the experiences some American soldiers have had while serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. The speakers were eyewitnesses and often participants to atrocities conducted by U.S. service personnel during the current operations in those counties (Goodman, 2008).
Organized as an anti-war event, the messages are more importantly applied to the need for ethical command. Asymmetrical counterinsurgency war means that uniformed soldiers operating within the traditional sense of an army engage in hostilities with small groups of combatants who come from less hierarchical organizations. The enemy of today rarely wears a uniform and, due to the fighting power imbalance, often launches its attacks from within civilian populations in order to play against the ethical standards that western societies hold dear. Therefore, when soldiers encounter hostility from within a civilian area they are torn by the need to kill the belligerents and the need to avoid killing civilian bystanders. Hart Viges is a veteran of the Iraq war who spoke at the Winter Soldier hearings. He was ordered by a Lieutenant Colonel to shoot at all taxi cabs they encountered in the city. The message was clear: the enemy had used a taxi cab to camouflage their activities and now all taxis were considered hostile regardless of whether they might be carrying civilians. Because it seemed to Viges that such indiscriminate targeting was wrong, his sense of trust in the leadership was destroyed. When he personally fired mortar bombs on towns that he couldn’t see he felt torn by this broken trust. His confidence that the leaders were calling-in true enemy targets had been lost. Viges’ unit developed a racist attitude towards all of the Iraqi people that was seemingly condoned by the chain of command. Viges recalled that there was no respect for other human beings in his unit and though torn by his actions, he played along as a member of the group.

Another Iraq veteran, Jason Washburn, related stories of lax rules of engagement where the killing of virtually anyone other than an American was condoned and covered up. A spare shovel was carried by his unit so that, if required, it could be placed into the hands of a dead unarmed civilian. Photo evidence of someone burying an improvised explosive device could then be presented as justification for the kill. Because such indiscriminate violence was quietly encouraged by the leaders, Washburn now carries the guilt of killing a woman carrying groceries across the street to her home.

Jason Lemieux, a U.S. Marine Sergeant, received orders “to kill those you think need killing.” The general attitude was that without a clear mission it was better to destroy all Iraqis rather than lose one American life while trying to distinguish innocent civilians from legitimate enemy fighters. His officer once claimed that over one hundred “enemy” had been killed by their actions though Lemieux knows that there were only a couple of suspected belligerents in the town.
Veterans told the hearings that the killing was often uncontrolled and the soldiers knew that their officers would cover for them. Domingo Rosas was also a U.S army Sergeant in Iraq. When he enquired about a prisoner he had captured the day before, he learned that the Iraqi man had died during questioning. Rosas now struggles with his role in this man’s death and wonders how hard the questions have to be to kill a man. These four soldiers were just a few of the over two hundred who spoke at the hearings and while we can’t generalize their experiences to the entire military force in Iraq, the experiences of these men are a good indication that there are serious leadership issues that are inflicting mental anguish on their own soldiers. While such atrocity is not necessarily rampant, it is widespread. Even the Canadian military was involved in incidents of torture and the murder of civilians while they were deployed to Somalia in 1992. The subsequent inquiry found an attitude of leniency within the leadership and active attempts to cover up the story (Thomson et al. 2005).

Such cognitive dissonance must weigh heavily on these soldiers. Although they self-selected for a military job that could include combat experience, what they received seems a long way from what they bargained for. While combat violence can lead to PTSD in some who experience it, the examples of broken trust outlined at the Winter Soldier hearings is akin to the honour that Agamemnon stole from Achilles. These soldiers knew they were involved in activities that would disgrace their society. High stress environments, conflicting tasks, ambiguous orders and a lack of positive social support from the group the soldiers rely upon most will set up even the hardest soldier for an operational stress injury (Wilhelm, Kovess, Rios-Seidel & Finch, 2004). Within the military there are so many levels of middle managers that, even in a battalion of 600 soldiers, few individuals have more than eight or ten immediate subordinates reporting to them. The sergeants who spoke at the Winter Soldier hearings were both leaders and followers. They not only conducted atrocities against their better judgments; but would also, if by nothing more than silent de-individuation, have caused their own subordinates to do the same.

It has been established that stress can lead to depression. While it is thought that staying in the work environment aids in depression recovery, depression can also impact on personal relations, decision-making and the safety of others (O’Brien, 1998; Wilhelm et al., 2004). Decisions are then required on how best to handle a stress casualty, particularly if the casualty is a leader. Normally, front line workers such as soldiers, police and firefighters have lower suicide rates than the general population because they have self selected for the risk and believe they are there to do a good job. Even killing people can be utilitarian; however, one cannot escape the thought that crossing the line between sanctioned killing and murder may be the root cause of the spike in American service personnel who are taking their own lives.

It is difficult to find appropriate social support to aid in trauma recovery when the micro-society in which soldiers are operating has itself become ill. It is equally hard to find social support when the institution, with its bureaucratic influence, is also failing to meet society’s expectations. Organizational cultures and political climates will impact on soldiers when they do something they believe is wrong. Consider the impact of the company commander who offered a four day pass to the first person in his command to kill an Iraqi with a knife or bayonet (Wilhelm et al., 2004; Goodman, 2008). Similarly, it is currently being debated whether the culture of prisoner abuse that occurred in Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison was promulgated from the American Office of Legal Counsel at the Whitehouse when they wrote that torture conducted outside of the United States wasn’t really torture. There is no question that the actions of the leaders have a direct impact on the actions of the subordinates. Unfortunately, few people resist such unethical actions and some will even welcome the chance to operate outside of their society’s ethical principles. Such attitudes go directly against the societal shift over the last half century that calls for less death in war (Dunlap, 1999). The home front has a pretty low tolerance for body bags full of dead soldiers and not much more tolerance for the death of large numbers of foreign non-combatants. This
attitude can be seen in the new family of precision guided missiles that are supposed to reduce the so-called collateral damage when firing at insurgents who are located within civilian enclaves. Despite organizational attempts to maintain high ethical standards, frustration occurs when the current enemies deliberately use human shields, confident in the knowledge that westerners will balk at excessive killing (Dunlap, 1999). It is extremely tough for the soldier on the ground, frustrated by attacks that come in taxi cabs, to fight within the laws of armed conflict that balance military necessity, humanity and chivalry, against an enemy who exploits humanitarian attitudes (Thomson et al. 2005).

The Psychology Behind the Argument

Limited war, or the Just War, was a concept first raised by the church during the middle ages in an effort to protect non-combatants from indiscriminate killing. Although not well adhered to, the concept was enshrined in the Geneva Conventions in 1949 (Thomson et al., 2005; Slim, 2008). These conventions were partially written because of the widespread civilian death toll of WWII that was in part a result of the Holocaust, fire bombing of cities like Dresden and the nuclear bombs dropped in Japan (Slim, 2003). Yet genocides and mass killings continue to happen even in those countries that are considered civilized. Many non-combatants are simply armed hunters in their own culture and many combatants are unarmed except that they operate the computer that launches the weapon. Distinguishing the fighter from the civilian in war has always been a difficult task and societies, through their military structures often leave the decisions about who dies up to the soldier on the street in some faraway, hostile place. Krulak’s (1999) Strategic Corporal explains this with the analogy that it is often the junior leader on the ground who makes decisions that can have an impact viewed around the world. With the media passing information faster than the chain of command can make a decision, people around the world see for themselves the impact of war. It is no wonder that some of the presenters at the Winter Soldier hearings talked about how their actions changed when the media was present (Goodman, 2008). With the asymmetric changes in modern warfare, frequent ethical challenges (Thomson et al. 2005) put strains on the soldier that can be exceptionally intense; while leaders should be there to help the subordinate, they too can go wrong.

Even though the individual soldier may believe in ethical treatment of others, it is easy to get pulled into the killing. Fear, authority, dehumanization and indoctrination are just some of the factors that may lead people to react against their will (De Soir, 1995; Slim, 2008). Recall Milgram’s (1974) findings where over 65% of participants went along with perceived authority in a laboratory setting. While reactive aggression can be expected in a life-threatening situation, proactive aggression is a result of situational frustrations that lead to a response of coercion and power (De Soir, 1995). Not understanding the ethnic culture or language of the people they are there to assist can contribute to the development of racist attitudes that force soldiers closer to their in-group peers. For individual soldiers, this means that the only moral support available may be the peers who are wrapped up in the same atrocious acts. Group dynamics that cause people to operate beyond the social norms by becoming arrogant and tyrannical (Lebon, cited in Santrock& Mittner 2005) conflict with cognitive theories that suggest people are capable of self-regulation to shape their own environment (Thompson & Gignac, 2001). The extent of this conflict is relatively unknown and requires further study. Recovery from a traumatic event needs to include a sense of meaning for what has occurred along with a sense of self-mastery and the restoration of self-esteem. Clearly, if the leadership condoned the unethical actions of a soldier, the recovery process will need to extend social and professional help beyond the chain of command (Noy, 1991; Dobreva-Martinova et al. 2002).

A military unit in sustained combat requires a great deal of hierarchal trust to maintain its operational aims; and within the unit, the leaders require a certain robustness to conduct the business of death while maintaining a position on the moral high ground (Grossman, 2004; Hope, 2007). Although the army is held to higher ethical standards than the citizens in general, it is still comprised of a cross section of its particular society. While most people are decent human beings and by extension most soldiers are decent human beings, some
members of society do not live by the societal standards. When we encounter those who are acting unethically, it is the duty of both the citizen and the soldier to correct the situation. In particular, those who have been selected as leaders and who have been given the bond of trust for doing what is right, have a higher obligation not only to themselves but also to their subordinates.

There are, of course, many good news stories of people who have acted appropriately to set right the wrongs that were being done. In 1968, when a company of U.S. soldiers were massacring the civilian population of My Lai in Vietnam, Chief Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson landed his helicopter in the midst of the fray and actively protected Vietnamese citizens from the berserk American soldiers (Santrock & Mitterer, 2005; Thomson et al. 2005). Thompson also helped expose the slaughter during the subsequent trials. Since hope is not a military method for conducting business, it is only open knowledge of the atrocities that will bring about change. Although public awareness of the Rwandan Genocide failed to raise the world’s collective conscience enough to respond, national public response to the atrocities committed by Canadian soldiers in Somalia instigated the disbandment of a Regiment and changes to overall leadership training (Thomson et al. 2005). Deciding what is unethical or immoral in stressful situations can be difficult, even for senior leaders and the best course of action for helping the soldiers is to repeatedly instil the appropriate principles and obligations until a true cultural change of attitudes has occurred. Canada now teaches its military members to respect the dignity of all people, serve the nation and support lawful orders. It is acknowledged that cultural change can take generations. Among the obligations of a military leader, responsibility is seen as the most important. Such responsibility states that leaders live by the society’s expectations and that they are to answer for their decisions at all times (Thomson et al. 2005; Sharpe & Dowler, 2006). Providing leadership within the these ethical guidelines will ensure that mental health issues such as PTSD will not be compounded by the breach of trust that afflicted Achilles and continues to destroy good soldiers today (Shay, 1994; Grossman, 2004; Nadelson, 2005; Hendin & Haas, 2007).

Although a study of Lexington Kentucky firefighters suggests that good leadership did not reduce the possibility of PTSD (Howell, 2006), the experience of the Israelis, the Finns and many others has shown that good leadership minimizes psychiatric casualties and that caring social communities speed recovery (Kellet, 1982; Grossman, 2004; McKeever & Huff, 2003). While soldiers need to be responsible for their own actions, the support of their community peers and leaders is critical both during the battle and forever after (Hautamaki & Coleman, 2001; Grossman, 2004).

Conclusion

As members and leaders of the community, we all have a moral obligation to support each other. While I agree that good leadership makes a difference in a soldier’s mental health, I specifically contend that bad leadership is one of the myriad of critical ecological factors that can predict PTSD and other operational stress injuries. Further study is warranted for this important perspective. The leader who breaks the code of ethics and allows a complete breakdown of a soldier’s honour might just as well have pulled the trigger, for the damage done is often proving to be fatal anyway.

About the Author...

Major Ross Cossar has been an active member of the Primary Reserve with the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment since 1987. Following a tour to Afghanistan with TF3-06, he transferred his part-time studies Royal Military College credits to Trent University in Peterborough where he is now a full time psychology student. Military psychology has become his primary interest.
References


The key terrain of the National Support Element (NSE) in Afghanistan is not the high ground, neither is it the cities or the passes; the key to our operational success in Afghanistan is in our ability to use the roads. It is by the roads that we are forced to resupply deployed troops, to rotate personnel and to backload vehicles and equipment. It is by the threats buried in the roads that more Canadians have died in the last two years than in any other combat situation. By the nature of their vehicles and their tasks, there is no unit that uses the roads more than the NSE, yet the level of effort at formation level that goes into their preparation has been until now fairly limited. Intelligence collection and dissemination has been focused on the manoeuvre elements, even though sustainment operations share the same threat environment the minute they pass the Kandahar Airfield (KAF) gate. Little thought has been dedicated to the potential of sustainment operations as an information-gathering resource, providing the key intelligence required for the execution of the formation plan.

In the course of the deployment of Joint Task Force Afghanistan (JTFA) R4, the NSE explored the potential of sustainment intelligence with the development of an integral intelligence (S2) capability, and found this entity to be a significant enabler of the JTFA plan. This paper will outline the capability deficiency that we identified during the mounting programme, following by an identification of the requirements. The paper will then discuss the immediate impact of the creation of the S2 capability, the benefits of leveraging the resources available through the all source intelligence centre (ASIC) and the potential for expansion. Finally, it will provide recommendations for the current combat service support (CSS) concept for consideration by the doctrine experts, so that these lessons can benefit our future CSS soldiers.
Background to Sustainment Operations

EX REFLEXE RAPIDE reminded the NSE of the hostility of the environment that we would be entering in the summer of 2007. NSE “convoys”, as they were called at the time, were being attacked just as much if not more than the manoeuvre elements. By being on the roads every day, we were creating patterns that the enemy could easily follow. Our firepower and mobility were significantly less than that of the combat arms units, so we became the enemy’s target of choice. In response to the problem, the NSE CO, LCol Nicolas Eldaoud, conducted a massive internal reorganization, emphasizing battle procedure, rehearsals, drills and the level of detail that was required in the brief to on-site commanders. It was there that we buried the term “convoy” forever, and adopted the US “combat logistics patrol (CLP)” as the official jargon. The understanding that sustainment operations were now based on the patrol required now that the battle procedure and preparation be conducted with the same rigour and detail as for this inherently manoeuvre action. The Logistic Operations Center (LOC) in its current, meagre configuration was no longer in a position to provide the necessary red and brown situational awareness to the outgoing CLPs to prepare them for the conduct of patrols.

The Capability Deficiency

It was clear at that time that the NSE was lacking the intelligence picture. This was certainly no knock against the ASIC, which was developing products of unprecedented quality and timeliness. However, these products were primarily oriented towards terrain and situations in which the Battlegroup (BG), the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) were operating. Our questions had rather to deal with the improvised explosive device (IED) picture along the main supply routes (MSR), traffic conditions in the cities, road construction projects, the dimensions of roads and intersections, and the mobility of our 100-ton heavy equipment tank transporters (HETT). However, resources to answer these questions were limited and usually prioritized to the combat arms, and the CLPs had to settle for products already in circulation. Also, the intelligence cells that were briefing our CLPs had insufficient understanding of the limitations of our very specialized vehicles.

The deficiency was not only limited to intelligence coming into the NSE; we were in an extremely limited position to make any contribution to the overall intelligence picture.
Despite the fact that the NSE was on the roads every day, with over thirty pairs of eyes and ears capturing information of all sorts, there was no guidance to synchronize their observations with other units. CLP reports were rolling in with only bits and pieces of information rather than contributing towards a greater intelligence picture. Most importantly, there was no feedback on the info CLP Commanders were putting into their reports, on the importance of the data they included and on the impact that their information had on the overall intelligence picture. Effectively, there was little effort made to exploit CLPs in the development of the intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) plan.

The Requirement

Following our observations, as well as those of the OP ARCHER Roto 1 NSE, it was clear that an integral intelligence capability was required in the NSE, even though the establishment had no allowance for it. As Intelligence operators are a rare resource, we had to build it internally. The following were prerequisites:

- a dedicated intelligence collation capability for CLPs, including the task-tailoring of products in and the processing of relevant information out;
- an intimate understanding of transport resources, the vehicles and their ability to capture ISTAR information;
- an imagery intelligence (IMINT) analysis capability for imagery captured on CLPs;
- a dedicated interface with the JTFA ASIC and ISTAR Coordination Centre; and
- a mapping and charting capability.

It was a tough call to take a permanent Sgt 935 driver position from the transport platoon, of course a critical resource for the conduct of CLPs, and mould it into an NSE S2. Sgt Steve Tremblay, a primary reserve soldier from 51 Service Battalion (Svc Bn) who had already shown impressive talent, was selected for the task. Once in theatre, we continued digging to attempt to build a cell of at least two soldiers to maintain continuity over HLTA periods; however, there was no way we could produce a second position from within our already stretched establishment. Nonetheless, we loaded our Sgt on the Tactical Intelligence Operator Course (TIOC) and set him to work in the LOC.

The project required not only human, but material resources far beyond anything allowed by the establishment. An excellent opportunity presented itself through the JTFA Digitization Project, which was in the process of identifying material requirements for acquisition on our tour. Sgt Tremblay immediately took on the task, and by our deployment to Afghanistan, we had a fully functioning intelligence cell with a dedicated classified briefing capability, a plotter for mapping and charting requirements, and access to the various intelligence networks.

The Initial Impact

The Creation of the S2 Cell showed very promising results from the start, as it dedicated a single point of contact for the management of red situational awareness (SA) in the NSE. So in the first weeks of deployment, while Log Ops focused on maintaining the extremely ambitious tempo of CLPs, the S2 could spend his time analysing the multitude of intelligence products available through the ASIC and Engineer Intelligence Cells, pulling out the most relevant information for our CLP commanders. Most importantly, being a trucker himself, the S2 was able to leverage the intelligence capabilities of the ASIC and task-tailor the information to the specific requirements of the CLPs, with an appreciation for specialized logistic vehicles and their limitations. Also, the S2 could exploit information captured by the CLP by conducting post-operation briefings, and produce detailed INTREPs
and PATROLREPs for distribution throughout the JTFA Intelligence network. For the first time, the NSE was contributing to the ASIC relevant intelligence that had been filtered, processed and synthesized against the known current situation.

It was not long before the JTFA HQ perceived the potential of the NSE as an intelligence gatherer. We started receiving Requests for Information (RFI) about potential IED locations along our routes, requests for imagery of buildings, personnel, infrastructure and observations about the “pattern of life” in various areas. These were all tasks that were easy to coordinate by our NSE S2, who was now participating as the de facto representative at all ASIC production meetings. With the addition of a few video cameras on each CLP, our S2 had the ability to provide geo-reference video feed to the ASIC, which was being used to piece together and track activities being conducted along the MSRs and provide products to the entire force. Eventually, a new line was created in the ISTAR plan dedicated to the NSE, with named areas of interest (NAIs) along the MSRs and around our delivery points (DP) that were tasked to observe. The ASIC could now coordinate through the S2 to confirm potential threats received from their sensors and issue warnings to the force as a result. The NSE S2 was there to pass these points to outgoing CLPs and to coordinate the return of information back to the higher echelon.

The Benefits

The benefit of the NSE S2 soon surpassed our expectations in terms of the impact on NSE operations. The networking that was being established on the ASIC, the J2 and ISTAR nets had the by-product of disseminating interest and SA about our operations throughout the force. Flanking units wanted to know when CLPs were on the road, their composition and timings. There was a huge demand for our intelligence products, and indirectly, other
units were gaining a new interest in our surveillance and protection. Consequently, during ISTAR coordination meetings, the NSE S2 was able to request and secure highly valued ISTAR assets, such as dedicated UAVs, reconnaissance helicopters and road clearance packages (RCP) in areas of greatest tactical importance. By September 2007, month two of our tour, about every third CLP to the ZHARI-PANJWAYI Districts were now being supported by ISTAR and force protection assets—a direct impact feedback from the addition of our NSE S2 Cell.

The addition of a video camera on each CLP had become key for intelligence collection, force protection, training of future rotations, as well as post-incident investigation. Following a BG IED on a route in October 2007, the S2 was able to piece together the series of events that led to the incident through clips taken in the days before. With the help of various assets, we could detect the appearance of slight changes on the road at the site of the incident in the short time preceding the explosion. These changes may not individually have attracted any attention, but by piecing them together, we could build the Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTP) that insurgents were using and provide indicators to all units in the task force. Then, ASIC technicians could study other areas for these indications and issue threat warnings to the force as required. It was confirmed by ASIC technicians on a number of occasions that the information provided by the CLPs was saving lives on a regular basis.

… The prediction made about the … in Kandahar City was largely due to your [S2] reports… these observations made an impact on predicting the …. rising and therefore made people more vigilant. Tell him thank you from us! (JTFA J2 Ops, 15 Dec 07)

The success of the NSE S2 Cell reverberated throughout the Task Force, to allied forces, and all the way back to the strategic levels in Ottawa. Intelligence experts from all walks of life were making a point of visiting the NSE Int Cell, such as LCol Ferguson, the R5 J2, and even LGen Gauthier as the former Chief of Defence Intelligence, each thoroughly impressed by this novel and effective concept. The UK NSE S2 was requesting briefings on an almost daily basis in order to inform their own CLPs, which our S2 was able to accommodate within the confines of the classification of the information he possessed. At
one point, when our S2 went on his HLTA for three weeks, there was an enormous effort at JTFA and national levels to locate a replacement; however in the end we had to make do by leaning on the JTFA J2 Cell. However, despite the efforts of all to fill the gap, we suffered an evident void in the flow of relevant sustainment intelligence that had an impact on the confidence of the CLP Commanders and the effectiveness of the LOC. In the minds of the NSE Commanding Officer and JTFA intelligence experts, the NSE S2 capability has become a necessary component of the organization, critical to the achievement of the mission.

Recommendations

The current Army doctrine needs to recognize the importance of sustainment intelligence as an essential enabler on the 21st Century battlefield. Contrary to our current doctrine, which still sees logistic patrols as administrative convoys, we need to recognise CLPs as manoeuvre elements subject to the same threat environment as any other combat organization. Their battle procedure must be of identical rigour and detail to that of a reconnaissance or combat patrol, and consequently, they must be provided the same quality of intelligence and SA before setting off. We also need to recognise that as the primary users of the roads, the CLPs are one of the most convenient and effective means by which reports and imagery in the areas of the roads can be gathered. From an intelligence point of view, the fact that logistic vehicles are confined to the roads is perhaps their greatest asset, in that we are able to track and record life patterns over time, there where the threat is the greatest.

The key to capitalizing on sustainment intelligence in an environment such as Afghanistan is the presence of an integral and dedicated S2 cell in the heart of any sustainment organization. The role of this cell is to analyze and distribute relevant intelligence related to the planning and conduct of sustainment operations, and to exploit said operations for the benefit of the entire task force. The size and composition depend entirely on the organization’s mission and operational posture; however, at a minimum it must be able to perform the following functions:

- distribution of current red and brown SA throughout the sustainment organization, particularly to outgoing CLPs;
- management of sustainment RFIs and their submission to competent intelligence authorities;
- development of the sustainment operations intelligence-gathering plan in coordination with the higher formation, adjacent units, and the LOC;
• collation, analysis and dissemination of intelligence gathered by CLPs through debriefings and through reports and returns;
• collation, processing and dissemination of IMINT gathered on sustainment operations; and
• management of the intelligence network.

Finally, it is recommended that deployed sustainment operations be given priority for the assignment of ISTAR resources to enhance their force protection and surveillance on the battlefield. The addition of a dedicated ISTAR collator, working in close collaboration with the S2, should be considered for future sustainment establishments in order to exploit these assets.

Conclusion

The sacrifice of one trucker sergeant position within the NSE transport platoon has more than paid off with the creation of a sustainment intelligence capability. We not only increased the awareness, safety and protection of our CLPs, but we integrated the NSE into the overall information-gathering plan, contributing to the awareness and protection of all coalition members. With the incorporation of audio-visual tools in the CLPs, we have been able to record and track activities along the most important routes in our AOR, helping organizations such as the ASIC to piece together series of events, insurgent TTPs and deduce threat indicators for the entire force. In contributing to the ISTAR plan, we have conversely seen the attribution of ISTAR assets such as TUAV and EW in order to enhance the protection of our CLPs and our ability to react in intense situations. The synchronization of efforts between sustainment operations and those of the task force have set the NSE on par with other manoeuvre operations in the overall campaign plan.

The NSE was able to identify a capability deficiency within the current doctrine and establishment, which required bold measures to rectify. For this theatre of operations, and for others within the Three-Block War context, we have submitted recommendations for the inclusion of a dedicated S2 capability into CSS Doctrine. The threat environment along the roads no longer permits nonchalance with respect to the preparation of any form of patrol outside the wire, be it logistic, reconnaissance or otherwise. With the incorporation of a
suitable intelligence organization within the logistic chain, we are effectively gaining key
terrain in our battle against instability in the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century.

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About the Author...

Major Devon Matsalla was the Operations Officer of the Canadian National Support Element for Joint
Task Force Afghanistan Roto 4. His previous military experience includes 12 years as an Artillery
officer, before transferring into the EME branch in 2004. He is now employed as the Canadian Field
Artillery Equipment Manager based out of Gatineau, Quebec.
Surveillance and target acquisition (STA) artillery is a branch of the artillery that has seen tremendous change within the past five years. It has transformed from a very minor branch of the artillery to the dominant growing organisation within the army. STA within Canada has an interesting history, with a few famous names attached to it. STA within the global context has an extremely storied history that provides a suitable basis to understand how STA has evolved to its present state.

When one thinks of classic STA, the image of First World War sound ranging being used to destroy German guns at Vimy Ridge jumps to the forefront for any scholar of Canadian military history. Counter-battery was and is intertwined in the history of STA to the point where one does not exist without the other. It was not always so. STA existed purely for intelligence purposes, and counter-battery for direct fire purposes until the two were merged as a capability in the early part of the 20th century. It is an interesting examination to see how the two developed individually, but eventually became one.

During the late 1700s and into the early 1800s, Montgoller’s invention, the hot air balloon, proved to be a highly effective manner of providing surveillance over an area. The advantages viewed from Montgoller’s platform are the same ones that we have with our UAVs today. From the air, there is no dead ground. A trained observer from a balloon would be able to determine the locations of troop movements, placement of guns, and identification of lines of communications and pass this vital information to the ground for action by friendly forces. Napoleon, however, did not see the key advantage of aerial surveillance. He relied heavily upon the rapid field marching of his forces to dislocate the enemy, seize and maintain the initiative, and carry momentum forward to crush defences. The hours that it took to get a balloon airborne in a position to determine enemy locations were hours not spent on the march to seize the initiative.

Napoleon did, however, recognise the battle winning capability of firepower. It is a well established fact that artillery was his strongest and best trained arm. As such, it became incumbent upon allied forces to negate the effect of the guns. Due to the decorum of war, it was considered bad form, at the time, to have guns shoot at guns. Guns were to be employed to shred infantry and annihilate cavalry. Counter-battery in those days consisted primarily of passive measures, such as Lord Wellington famously ordering troops to adopt the prone position behind the crest of the ridge at Buçaco, Portugal, or active measures, such as having the 52nd Infantry Regiment manoeuvre to seize the guns at Waterloo.

By the time of the Crimean War, artillery became a more critical asset to destroy in order to win. The Russians, then and still today, relied heavily upon artillery. When fighting against an army of the day, it was normal to be harassed by artillery fire until the forces were musket shot distances away. When fighting the Russians, it was normal to be destroyed by the guns before even getting within musket range. Commanders shook their old ways of decorum, and placed a keen emphasis on destroying guns. They started shooting at guns with guns, but still they relied upon the manoeuvre forces to complete the job. The many histories of the Charge of the Light Brigade illustrate in great detail the absolute need to destroy the Russian guns. Notwithstanding that the brigade attacked the wrong battery; the fact that an entire cavalry brigade was drawn out of reserve to capture a battery of guns speaks volumes to the importance placed on counter-battery.

It was during the Crimean War that the engagement of guns by guns was no longer considered taboo, and gun-on-gun battles became a relatively common engagement. Direct
fire engagements were the norm for deployments. On the STA side, the only way that guns were identified was by cavalry reconnaissance, finding the manoeuvre forces would also locate the guns. Counter-battery was a key component to winning the battle. STA was not, yet.

Almost a half century later, when in South Africa, the field artillery went through an evolutionary change. The majority of deployments in the war, such as the battle at Leliefontein, had guns, cavalry and infantry all based in defensive lines, side by side. These deployments created conditions that allowed for the gunners to be engaged by Boer snipers while having the infantry located right beside them. The evolutionary change that was forced upon the gunners was to place the guns back, behind small hills, and engage indirectly. This, the standard shooting method today, was completely revolutionary a mere 110 years ago. This required a change of mindset for target acquisition. The addition of artillery officers to seek the targets, in what we would call the forward observation officer’s (FOO) job, was more of an adjustment of the plan than a conscious action to create an STA specialty.

The Great War was the vehicle by which STA artillery would receive its greatest technological development. At the outset, it was the proliferation of field artillery that required a comprehensive survey scheme to take into account the relatively recent developments in indirect fire. Trench warfare also brought out the need to aggressively pursue a thorough counter-battery programme. The fact that both forces facing across No-Man’s Land had the time, resources, and will to deploy massive amounts of artillery brought forth a new dynamic to the battlespace. The majority of Allied casualties during the Great War were the result of artillery fire. The impact artillery had on the fight demonstrated the need to destroy it.

British forces during the war were not focussed on counter-battery to the same extent that Canadian forces were. In many respects, the British high command distrusted much of the new technology and innovative measures to determine gun locations. They relied heavily upon traditional methods. One method involved the Counter-battery Staff Officer (CBSO) from one of their divisions driving from hilltop to hilltop looking for flashes from gun locations, timing the sound, comparing bearing of flash to length of time for sound and determining locations in that manner. Another method involved the use of huge ear horns to determine bearings to firings. Two ear horn setups could create crossed bearings which would be able to provide a location of the firing. The final method, aside from direct observation by ground forces, involved the return of the balloon. British forces would deploy an artillery officer into a “lighter than air” balloon that would be tethered to the ground. In the earlier part of the war, this proved to be highly effective. However, the increase in offensive air power saw the rise of fighters. These fighters would then engage the balloons. This limited the use of the balloons, and the number of officers who survived engagements, in the latter stages of the war. What was needed was a ground-based, technical solution to identifying gun locations.

Enter Major Andrew McNaughton. He was employed as the CBSO for the Canadian Corps. He was in the position to enable the use of the latest sound ranging technology on
the front lines. Three scientists created the sound ranging system whose principles are still in use throughout most of the world. Sir William Lawrence Bragg who was awarded the Nobel Prize in physics in 1915, headed a small group consisting of Sir Charles Galton Darwin, the grandson of Charles Darwin of the Beagle fame, and Professor Lucien Bull, from the Sorbonne University in France. The system they created involved surveying in a series of microphones, timing the passage of sound over these microphones and then being able to triangulate from these recordings the bearings of acoustic events. As long as at least three microphones heard the same sound, the location of its source could be calculated. This technologically advanced sound ranging system had its demands and limitations. It needed a highly precise survey scheme to prepare the position in order for it to be accurate. Its ability to perform in wind and rain was degraded, as was its performance during heavy barrages and other battle sounds. It could not stand alone.

In order to complement the capability of sound ranging, flash spotting was used. This technology required simply an accurately surveyed site and a survey instrument. The operator at the instrument would record the time and bearing of the flash he determined across No-Man’s Land, and these would be collated at the counter-battery office. There, multiple reports would be compared and relatively accurate firing locations were calculated. So with sound ranging, survey and flash spotting bringing counter-battery into the 20th century, the only thing missing from the evolutionary jump involved command and control.

That is where the innovation by Maj McNaughton was most important. In an article Andrew McNaughton wrote in Canadian Defence Quarterly in 1926, he detailed how the creation and effective use of the Canadian Counter-battery Office (CBO) helped the counter-battery fight become so effective. Each CBO kept detailed scheme diagrams for all systems. They ensured that Canadian guns were on a common survey scheme to Canadian locating assets. They had guns for counter-battery tasked to them for extensive periods of time, and kept extremely accurate logs and diaries that permitted the effective engagement of targets by minimising the knowledge gap of the enemy. In other words, by being highly organised and influential, the CBO was able to take the lead in the fight, which led to such impressive results. This was in stark contrast to the British Divisions.

Nowhere was the difference between Canadian and British STA and counter-battery more pronounced than during the Battle for Arras, of which the Battle of Vimy Ridge
played a part. Canadian counter-battery, for the week prior to H Hour, famously engaged and destroyed over 70% of the German artillery facing the Canadian lines. This allowed the Canadian infantry to fight the battle relatively unhampered by German artillery. Contrarily, the British divisions to the south were decimated by the German artillery. The end result was
that the only divisions that succeeded on that Easter Monday morning were the Canadian ones.

The resultant after-action review highlighted four key elements as to why the Canadian Corps was able to win with relative ease. Summarised, they were listed as:

- battle planning and battle procedure;
- commanders’ intent issued down to platoon level;
- mission rehearsal, including platoon practice on full-scale replicas; and
- ‘Counter-Battery Work’

This capability that was identified during the Battle of Vimy Ridge soon became the standard for Commonwealth forces to emulate. As a result, Canadian STA and counter-battery was established as the cutting edge.

This edge was lost during the interwar years. As happens when nations are not at war, militaries are downsized and capabilities are reduced in order to meet peacetime fiduciary limitations. Two of the capabilities that were reduced to near negligible levels were the STA and counter-battery operations.

With the outbreak of the Second World War, the STA once again expanded beyond all previous historical levels. In the Canadian order of battle were several survey regiments, each division and each corps had their own counter-battery headquarters. Technology even saw the introduction by war’s end of the first counter mortar radars. Yet, the most noteworthy aspect of STA Artillery was the introduction of the pilot observer.

In the latter parts of the war, the value added by having a STA set of eyes above the battlefield was once again in demand. Rather than use the balloon concept for a third war, the use of light observation aircraft, such as the Lysander and L19, became the hallmark of this capability. British and American forces were using this concept with great effect in the
Italian and North-west European campaigns. The Canadian squadrons, however, came a little too late for employment during the war. Three flying squadrons, 664, 665 and 666 Aerial Observations Squadrons, RCAF were deployed to France in May of 1945.

The end of the war saw the squadrons return to Canada having seen no significant combat action. However, just a few years later, the conflict in Korea offered the opportunity for this capability that was not exploited in the Second World War. The Canadian light aircraft were deployed to Korea and saw much action throughout their entire time during the conflict. This capability stayed with the artillery until well into the early 1970s.

During the post-Korea reductions in capability, the STA artillery saw, once again, its capability reduced to almost nothing. Notwithstanding this reduction, the technology of the day was advancing at an incredible pace. Radars were becoming more reliable, accurate and effective in detecting projectiles flying through the air. Sound ranging systems started using better quality microphones and processors to determine hostile battery locations. Meteorological understanding with the ballistic trajectory was growing and expanding with the use of rockets. Survey instruments were becoming more refined and reliable to use. Aircraft, on the other hand, had the greatest evolutionary change.

In 1963, the RCA, in conjunction with Canadair, started working on finding an unmanned replacement for the L19 light observation aircraft. The risk of losing a highly trained and valuable pilot due to enemy fire engaging a slow moving aircraft was too great. The way to reduce this risk was to have the flights executed by unmanned aircraft. The gunners that started working in 1963 with Canadair were flying the CL-89 drone. This was the precursor to the CL-289 drone, which is still in use in many nations around the world today. The work with the drone continued until the Canadian Army procured the system and designated the AN-USD-501 drone. This system stayed in operation with the artillery until the late 1970s. The system operated by flying a preset flight plan over pre-planned targets. Once the air vehicle recovered, the video tape of the flight was retrieved and analysed. Later versions had a wireless feed of video able to be captured at the Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) Troop.

The 1960s saw the development and procurement of other capabilities. The counter-mortar, AN-MPJ-501, radar, came into service with the artillery and formed the heart of the counter-battery/mortar system with the Gun-Sound ranging system. This radar was
an incredibly capable system for its day. It was an uncomplicated, mechanical radar that sent out radar energy to reflect off of projectiles. The reflected energy was captured by the radar and displayed on an oscilloscope. Based upon very simple algorithms in the radar, it could calculate the location of the origin of the projectile. This was a capability that could produce almost real time locations, a capacity that was completely unknown to that date. While other systems could produce accurate locations within minutes, the radar was doing it within seconds.

The 1968, unification and subsequent reductions to the Canadian Forces saw several changes to Locating artillery. For one, ballistic meteorology left the purview of the artillery and fell into the domain of the air force meteorology sections. Likewise, as capability was reduced, equipment was not kept up to date. For one, the AN-USD-501 drone came out of service in the late 1970s. Its replacement, the Unmanned Aerial Surveillance and Target Acquisition System (UASTAS) was initiated in 1975. It was not until 2003 that UASTAS procured a system, and then it was on an un-forecasted operational requirement. The counter-mortar radar did not get replaced when it went out of service in 1984. It was not until 2006 that Canada procured a radar to detect incoming projectiles. Sound ranging, on the other hand, did have a little boost. When the older GSR system went out of service, the artillery was able to procure a sound ranging system as part of a miscellaneous materials request in the mid 1980s. The SORAS62 system was the latest in computer technology to take on the ancient problem of locating the enemy artillery in the battlespace. Because it was not procured for operational and general use in the artillery, it was kept at the Field Artillery School.

The one aspect of the locating capability that did not fade in the late 20th century was survey. Gun batteries were still required to be on common grid, which required comprehensive survey schemes to be executed across the battlespace. Each field regiment and the school had nearly fully manned survey troops to carry this capability. Technology also saw the addition of better orientation devices and distance measuring capability. The use of infrared laser range finders, the tellurometer, gyroscopes and theodolites allowed highly accurate and limited error schemes to provide the orientation and fixation that gun batteries required.

The 1980s also saw the artillery try new and innovative steps in creating capabilities. The happy union between Canadair and the RCA in the 1960s was revisited in the 1980s. A
trials team from the school worked with Canadair to develop the CL-227 RPV affectionately known as the “Peanut”. For several years, the gunners worked with Canadair in improving their prototype for use as the beyond line of sight sensor. This was cutting edge technology. However, the capability was not to be had. The Peanut could not overcome some of its technological challenges in time and cost for procurement processes to see it become an operational capability.

As a result of the loss of some of these capabilities, the manning for Locating artillery also saw reduction. In the late 1960s, there were over 450 gunners that could claim their principle employment as Locating. By the late 1980s, it was down to less than 100. In order to mitigate this loss of experience, the RCA took to having select officers and NCOs train with the British Army on their STA courses. For years, every second year saw one officer and one Sergeant/Warrant Officer attend the annual Gunnery Careers Course at the Royal School of Artillery.

Into the 1990s, with Locating artillery reduced to survey and one SORAS6 system located at the school, the future of locating artillery was dim. The technological advancements in survey capabilities created the question of the relevance of survey troops within the regiments. With the artillery accepting the Gun Laying and Positioning System (GLPS) within its battery reconnaissance parties, the role of the regimental surveyor became less relevant. While GLPS is not an infallible piece of equipment, the regimental examination of manning priorities dictated that the risk could be managed without the regimental survey troop. So, in the year 2000, artillery survey was zero manned.

This left Locating artillery manned at approximately a dozen all ranks, all stationed at the school. The surveyors in the regiments were absorbed into other regimental duties. The SORAS6 system, being based upon 1980s technology, was becoming more and more fragile as spare parts were becoming harder and harder to locate. In 2002, the future of Locating artillery was bleak.

In January 2003, the prospect of the Canadian Army deploying back to Afghanistan brought about some change in perspective at the Army level when it came to Locating artillery. Principally, because the terrain in Kabul was not suited to operations by our fleet of tactical helicopters and aerial observation was determined to be a major capability that the commander required, the Army decided that it needed to procure quickly an UAV for
operations. Further, this was the first theatre where persistent indirect fire attacks were going to be experienced by our troops. An artillery detection capability was required for deployment.

Throughout the spring and early summer of 2003, the procurement staffs at Director of Land Requirements (DLR) and the Assistant Deputy Minister for Materiel (ADM(Mat)) worked long and hard hours to ensure that these capabilities were able to deploy to Kabul. The first rotation, Roto 0, would be based upon soldiers from 2 RCHA. The second Roto would be soldiers from 5 RALC. The Royal Canadian Artillery School also supplied a command and coordination cell to work at Brigade Headquarters.

In the spring, it was announced that Canada was leasing the Artillery Hunting Radar (ARTHUR) from the Swedish military for deployment to Kabul. The soldiers from 2 RCHA trained on the system and deployed in July 2003 to provide force protection to the Canadians at Camp Julien and Camp Warehouse. That summer, it was announced that the Canadian Forces had procured the Sperwer UAV system. Again, soldiers from 2 RCHA trained and deployed with the system to theatre. To help lessen the learning curve on flight operations, five pilot/navigators from the 1st Canadian Air Division deployed as well.

ARTHUR and Sperwer had some tremendous successes in theatre with Roto 0. They were followed up by more successes during Roto 1 with 5 RALC. The tours managed to integrate the UAV into coordinated military and civilian airspace—with incredible help from the Airspace Coordination Cell (ASCC)—detect and deter rocket attacks, and provide a credible and comprehensive artillery intelligence capability to the Brigade Headquarters. The tours also indicated to the Army that we needed to create, from relatively nothing, a credible, competent STA capability. The procurement of STA equipment was re-prioritised and the development of training standards and training plans were kicked into high gear. Doctrine development established roadmaps for the future development of capabilities that would, in time, become cutting edge amongst our allies.

In 2006, Canada procured a Mini UAV (MUAV), the Skylark, for operations in Kandahar. This UAV was identified as part of the road map for capability development. It deployed with limited success during TF 3-06, however, with a set of upgrades, it was flown to huge success during TF 1-07. It became fully integrated in the ISTAR plan, involved in sensor

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teaming activities, and was actually able to conduct target handoff to a FOO and a FAC for engagement.

Later in 2006, a sound ranging system and a counter-battery radar system were procured. The Hostile Artillery Locator II (HALO) was bought in the autumn and training took place with soldiers from 2 RCHA in the winter. It was deployed on time to the Kandahar area. Deploying with it was the Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar (LCMR). Two of these small radars deployed to Kandahar to work as part of an integrated detection capability. The successes of TF 1-07 were not limited to the MUAV. The LCMR proved to be a highly accurate and reliable system that could instantaneously produce grids to belligerent mortar firing positions. Counter-battery fire missions were initiated from LCMR contacts. HALO successes were there as well, but were not as evident. The difficult terrain offered by the area of operations hampered some of the precision of HALO. However, where reports would come in of rocket firing “to the north” which would cause the response to be in a general direction, the deployed HALO would give the location of the firing, within a football field, or two. This would allow the response, not always a howitzer round, to be focussed on an area, rather than a direction. This saved time and focused assets.

Afghanistan proved to be the starting point for Canada’s leap into the 21st century as far as STA artillery. The rapid advancement of technology throughout militaries and industry worldwide has created capabilities never envisioned by Bull, Bragg and Darwin during the Great War. Indeed, with many of the capabilities compartmentalised within equipment chains, capabilities that were in the realm of science fiction just a few years ago are now clearly visible on the horizon.

The CF is procuring, over the course of the next few years, a Small UAV (SUAV). This system will be larger than the Skylark MUAV, but remain smaller than the Sperwer TUAV. However, with capability development through technology, it will have the ability to provide dedicated, long flying, aerial surveillance to battle group commanders on operations. A Medium Range Radar for conducting counter-battery is also in the procurement process. This capability will offer a wide area surveillance capability for indirect fore weapons, and given the nature of 21st century software, it may even provide an air picture to the ASCC for clearance of fires.

With the recent experiences in Afghanistan and the upcoming procurements, the future of STA looks impressive. Three batteries, one from each field regiment, will stand up in the spring of 2008 as part of artillery transformation. The growth attained by STA Artillery today is due in no small part to standing upon the shoulders of those giants of the past centuries who created the capabilities and offered the grounding for today’s soldiers.

About the Author...

Major Richard Little was born the son of a soldier in 1970. In 1988, he joined the Army Reserve and in 1994 he enrolled in the Regular force. After postings to 5th Regiment d’Artillerie Legere du Canada and 1st Regiment Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, he was selected to attend the Gunnery Careers Course (Depth Fire) at the Royal School of Artillery in Larkhill, England. During this course, he was introduced and began working with UAVs, Weapon Locating Radar and Acoustic Weapon Location. Upon return to Canada, he was posted to the Royal Canadian Artillery School, in Gagetown, where he continued working with a variety of Surveillance and Target Acquisition systems. While at the school, he has worked with Skylark, Silver Fox, Vindicator, ScanEagle, Hermes, Altair and Sperwer UAVs, the ARTHUR, LCMR and Q36 Radars and the HALO Sound Ranging System. He travelled in 2003 to Israel with the Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre to evaluate UAV employment, and he also deployed to Kabul in 2003 as the operations officer for the deployment of Sperwer, Canada’s first operational deployment of a UAV and ARTHUR Weapon Locating Radar. He has recently returned from a deployment to Kandahar where he deployed the ScanEagle capability into the field and made it operational for the brigade on operations.
Endnotes

1. The radar would emit its radiation along a plane. The oscilloscope would show the levels of radiation return from that plane. As a round penetrated the plane, a bright dot would appear on the oscillo
coscope where its surrounding was dark. This would be the location of the round at that point in time.

2. The SORAS6 was a sound ranging system built by SATech from Sweden. It consisted of eight microphones and a calculating computer. The microphones were surveyed in, and if deployed properly, it could detect acoustic events 25 kilometres away. SATech was bought out in the early 1990s, and the new company opted not to support the system.

3. Canada’s deployment to Afghanistan has seen a major shift in artillery employment. During the first deployment, the only artillery assets deployed was a mortar battery, battery commander and forward observation officer parties. During the second deployment, to Kabul, a battery of four LG1s, the Sperwer TUAV, ARTHUR counter-battery radar, Fire Support Coordination Centre, Airspace Coordination Centre and Target Acquisition Coordination Centre were deployed. The deployment to Kandahar saw M777 howitzers, Mini UAVs, HALO Sound Ranging and Lightweight Counter Mortar Radars deployed.
A SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE OF AFGHANISTAN

Captain H. Christian Breede, MA

"If we institutionally define a nation-state as having a set of reciprocal economic, military, and even social rights and obligations, it becomes obvious that a modern nation-state is as much a state of mind as a geographic entity."

Louis Dupree

Louis Dupree was onto something. When he wrote the quotation cited above, he was articulating the importance of understanding the complex network of variables that define a country. Anyone proposing to nation build must understand the variables that are at work in such a complex endeavour. Nation building is what the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and by extension Canada are trying to do in Afghanistan. We should follow Mr. Dupree’s advice. For one to apply this advice to Afghanistan, the physical features of the land and the key features of the people, their culture, and economics must be understood. In short, a socio-economic profile of Afghanistan must be constructed, understood, and applied.

The term “socio-economics” is in and of itself vague. The definition found in the Concise Oxford Dictionary borders on the tautological, as they saw fit to suggest it means “relating to or concerned with the interaction of social and economic factors.” Even the website for the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics (SASE) does not offer a clear definition of what the term actually means. Under the heading of “What is Socio-Economics?” SASE suggests it is an “emerging meta-discipline” that assumes “that economics is not a self-contained system, but is embedded in society, polity, and culture.” The definition continues, but in so doing reveals its capitalist bias, suggesting “socio-economics regards competition as a subsystem encapsulated within a societal context . . . the societal context both enables and constrains competition…societal sources of order are necessary for markets to function efficiently.” Surprisingly (or perhaps not so much anymore), the clearest definition comes from Wikipedia where it highlights some of the key disciplines that are involved in the study of socio-economics. Despite the lack of clarity regarding the term’s exact definition, in order to build a socio-economic profile of Afghanistan, this article will examine the demographics, societal organization, economics, and religion of the country. Sources for these factors span, as the existing definitions suggest, several disciplines, notably history, political science, economics, and anthropology.

Overall, Afghanistan has been characterized as a “peasant-tribal society,” one that, according the annual Foreign Policy, “failed State Index 2007” received a “critical” (worst out of five possible cumulative ratings) and eighth out of the 60 least stable states. On that list, seventh and ninth were held by the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Guinea respectively. The top (worst) three spots were held by Sudan, Iraq and Somalia. Guatemala placed sixteenth. The article identified twelve indicators of “state failure” spanning international attention, socio-economics (as discussed above), and some rather less-clear criteria. Afghanistan rated on average at 8.5 with a deviation of only 3 points. Only one metric, that of external intervention (an historic issue for Afghanistan), rated worst in the field of 60, and one metric was below 8, that of human flight. Current headlines confirm these findings as Afghanistan is indeed a troubled country, one in which Canadians are heavily invested. The socio-economic factors that will be examined in this article will illustrate the acute difficulties in Afghanistan. Only through an understanding of these factors can true conditions be set for success.
Demographics

According to the Central Intelligence Agency’s annual World Fact Book, Afghanistan sits as the 49th largest country in the world (in terms of landmass), at just under 650,000 square kilometres, just slightly smaller than the total area of Saskatchewan. Afghanistan is landlocked in Central Asia, sharing boarders with Pakistan, Iran, and the former Soviet Central Asian Republics of Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Geographically situated below the Russian steppes, Afghanistan is divided from northeast to southwest by the massive Hindu Kush mountain range with plains to the north and south, eventually turning to desert. Afghanistan’s highest point is the peak of Nowshak at almost 7,500 meters and the lowest point is a basin in one of the main rivers, the Amu Darya at 285 meters above sea level. Not surprisingly, only 12% of Afghanistan’s landmass is arable (suitable for cultivations) while less than one-quarter percent hold permanent crops. Almost 30,000 square kilometres of land requires irrigation.

The climate is harsh with hot summers, cold winters with heavy snowfalls in the mountainous regions. Louis Dupree, one of the foremost experts on Central Asia, divides Afghanistan into 11 geographic zones, each varied depending on the region’s specific geography and all equally challenging to human settlement with control of water the central concern. Four principle rivers crisscross the landscape, with only one, the Kabul, spilling into the Indian Ocean via the Indus river system. The Amu Darya (the Oxus), Hari Rud and the Hilmand-Arghandab all flood in the spring and dry to a collection of pools in the summer—most water in Afghanistan originates from melting snow in the Hindu Kush. This inconsistent natural supply of water led to the development of an intricate system of irrigation canals and wells known as a Qanat. The Qanat system has allowed for sparse pockets of cultivation centred on the major settlements in Afghanistan. The two principal cultivation areas are in Kabul and Kandahar, while smaller concentrations are located in Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif.

The harsh climate and complex irrigation system implies a fragile agricultural industry. Without the Qanat system regulating the water, the rare irrigated land that exists would disappear, making agriculture almost impossible to sustain. Shocks (environmental or otherwise) are hard to absorb. Given the dispersion of settlements that the geographic and climatic realities dictate, centralization is inherently difficult. Dispersion is naturally encouraged over centralization. Dupree identifies two different types of settlement patterns; nuclear (clusters around other villages) and linear (along waterways or other vital communication nodes). Afghanistan, Dupree found, has a nuclear settlement pattern across which the population is distributed.

As the fortieth most populous state in the world, Afghanistan has almost 32 million people. Again, according to the World Fact Book, the population breakdown differs substantially from the Western average breakdown and slightly, but notably, from the regional average. Most western states have approximately 19% of their population below the age of fourteen, while those fifteen to sixty-five years of age make up about 66%. Given that the states making up the regional average are for the most part developing, their breakdown is consistent with this. Regionally (Figure 2), 33% of the population is below the age of 14 while 62% are within the 15-64 years of age range. Afghanistan, as indicated by Figure 1, has 45% of their population below the age of 14 and only 53% from the age of 15 to 64 years. Overall, the youth population in Afghanistan is larger, the workforce is
smaller and the aged population is almost statistically insignificant, both when compared to the Western and regional averages. The population, in a nuclear settlement pattern, is clustered on the cultivated pockets of Kabul, Kanadahar, Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat. With such a tenuous agricultural industry (thanks to its geography), a small potential work force, and large dependant population, Afghanistan’s demographic indicators seem to echo the findings of Foreign Policy’s dubious honour roll.

Amin Saikal refers to Afghanistan as having “a heterogeneous ethnos,”18 and the twenty-one different identified ethnicities19 only confirms this. What is interesting to note is that not all ethnic groups are Muslim. The Pashtuns, however, (who are predominantly Muslim), are most numerous.20 As language is often the key to cultural identity, an understanding of the languages that are spoken in Afghanistan is in order. Of the nineteen language families in existence, four are present in Afghanistan: Semitic, part of the Afro-Asiatic family; Dravidian; Uralic-Altaic; and Indo-European represent the myriad languages spoken in Afghanistan. Of the four, Indo-European, from which Dari and Pashto are derived, is the most common.21 Dari, the official language of Afghanistan, is a derivative of Persian and is, as Dupree suggests, the vehicular (lingua franca) language of the country, as it crosses several cultures. Pashto, on the other hand, is the vernacular language, only spoken by Pashtuns. Although similar, Dari more closely resembles the Persian language.22

Given the language differences mentioned above, along with the earlier conclusion that the Afghanistan is primarily an agrarian society, low literacy rates should be of little surprise. Again, drawing from Dupree, there is a distinct difference between illiterate cultures and non-literate cultures—one that Dupree takes great pains to articulate. Illiterate, as a term, is derogatory while non-literate is somewhat more descriptive. To borrow from Dupree, he cites culture as a “totality of a toolkit”23 while the society within that culture is an “action component…seldom [using] all of the available toolkit.”24 Most Afghans may not read printed Dari or Pashto, but their literary culture (such as poetry) is rich and varied. As an example, oral poetry plays a large part of Pashtun culture.25 The oral tradition of Afghanistan is typical of other societies with similar reliance on oration versus recording.

For the most part, Pashtuns are mostly located south of the Hindu Kush Mountains that bisect the country from east to west. Tajik, Uzbek and Turkomen ethnic groups straddle the border with their respective homelands north of those same mountains. The Hazaras, along with some of the lesser ethnic groups, have settled in the valleys and bowls of the mountains themselves. Clearly, the settlement patterns, linguistic differences, and diverse ethnicities, all point to the conclusion Dupree drew earlier: Afghanistan is a mosaic. The non-literate nature of the culture implies the norms are based upon interpretations from a small group of literate elites, both secular and sacred.26

Cultural Organization

Ibn Khaldun, one of the most influential Muslim scholars in history, writing in the fourteenth century, once suggested that many states exhibit a “cyclical model of revolutions.”27 This model applies just as readily to Afghanistan as to any other country. Anthropologist Richard Tapper, writing in the early 1980s, said “the essential elements of the cyclical model . . . [are] the foundation of a dynasty in the centre by a conqueror with support from the periphery; settlement in the centre; loss of support from the periphery; and replacement thence by
another conqueror within three generations." This four-stage cycle has played out in Afghanistan time and again, so much so that Dupree also referred to it when he described the fusion and fission theory of governance. Spanning over twenty-two pages, Dupree literally charts the various leaders of Afghanistan along one side while comparing across the top of the chart the various regions that either became part of Afghanistan or fell away under that particular leaders' reign. That the chart spans twenty-two pages speaks volumes to the historical instability (and truth to Ibn Khaldun's theory) of Afghanistan. The linchpin, around which these theories rotate however, has consistently been cited as being the prevalence of tribes in the region.

Bernt Glatzer identifies three principles of what he calls "societal organization." Economics, close kinship, and the role of the tribal system all combine to define how an Afghan lives. Glatzer suggests that economics is the most important principle, and other evidence suggests a similar conclusion, and as such, economics will be discussed later. This section will focus on the other two principles. Close kinship implies a study of family descent, and the nomadic Pashtuns Glatzer examined in his study appeared to identify kinship through a variety of vectors. The society is patrilineal (family identification through the father) and at the same time matrilateral (family ties with the family of the mother). Kinship amongst the Pashto is also affinal (relation through marriage) and as such provides a fairly extensive set of options in so far as defining a family or family group is concerned.

It is this myriad organization that makes the family unit robust and the "the only stable social unit in the society." The third principle in Glatzer's triumvirate is the tribal system. And although Glatzer himself suggests that "people consider it important even if the anthropologists can hardly observe its social relevance," the amount of ink devoted to this aspect of Afghanistan's culture by historians and political scientists (as well as other anthropologists), makes it noteworthy. Although lengthy, Amin Saikal's description of the importance of the tribe in Afghanistan is worth reproducing here:
Most political conflicts in modern Afghan history have not begun as disputes over such issues as the direction of development, religious belief, constitutional rights or social class. Rather, they have stemmed from the attempts of dominant communally based elites to accomplish a high degree of centralisation of power with the help of foreign patrons. Consciously elaborated, overt, systematic, institutionalised and dogmatic ideologies have been but a thin veneer on the traditional political culture constituted by largely implicit sets of beliefs, kinship norms, codes of accepted behaviour and hierarchies of identity.35

According to Saikal, previous attempts at governance have not successfully integrated the tribes within Afghanistan. The tribal system, and more broadly, two of the three principles of Glatzer’s societal organization, are the catalyst to Afghanistan’s history of conflict. The principle tribe in Afghanistan are the Pashtun—they are the “main state-supporting group.”36 The tribe is important.

Despite its importance, a simple definition of tribe is hard to come by as the word is in and of itself politically charged. Quite often, the tribe and its associated verb tribalism are used when the phenomenon is viewed disapprovingly while if one approves of it, it is referred to as ethnicity.37 Attempting to divest the word of its emotional baggage is a challenge, but one that both Tapper and political scientist Kenneth Christie attempt. Christie suggests that the tribe is perhaps the earliest form of human organization (predated only by the family perhaps and even then, the line quickly blurs between family and tribe). Aside from the lengthy definition offered by anthropologists (which suggests common kinship, language, self-sufficiency, mythology, et cetera)38, Christie sees the tribe as having a high degree of internal conformity and little tolerance for those external to the tribe.39 Where both Christie and Glatzer agree, however, is that modern history (especially in Afghanistan) has simply reinforced the tribe. The phenomenon seems to prosper in weak states.40
The Pashtun tribes—the most pervasive in Afghanistan—have within themselves a complex cultural organization that includes a political hierarchy as well as a system of self-regulation. The various sub-tribes within the Pashtun tribal family have pseudo-political appointments, which are known as Khans and Malik. What is most confusing is that Western scholars seem to disagree on the role the various appointments play. Glatzer suggests that the Khan is the leader of the tribe while the Malik is a representative of the tribe to other external organizations or actors.\textsuperscript{41} Dupree on the other hand, suggests that Khan (which often follows as a suffix to a Pashtun’s name) is simply a “term of prestige” while it is the Malik who is the leader of the tribe.\textsuperscript{42} There is less debate surrounding the role and meanings of the various social meetings that occur within the tribe. Jirgas and Shuras, words that are likely not unfamiliar to those who have read about the recent developments in Afghanistan, also play an important role in the country’s governance. The shura is a consultative body that meets as required at the local level while the jirga is a decisive body that meets in a more regulated manner. A jirga, convened when conflict or decisions between sub-tribes arises, is headed by a group of tribal elders who hear arguments from all stakeholders. At the conclusion of the various arguments a vote is held with weight assigned to each vote based upon status and standing within the tribes. Not all votes are equal. That being said, the decision by the jirga is binding to all stakeholders participating. The new parliament and constitution (as was the constitution of 1964) was a result of a jirga held that incorporated most of the tribal and local leadership of Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{43} The key factor here is that votes are not all counted as equal.

The Pashtuns have an intricate and ancient system of self-regulation that is not completely foreign to the Western concepts of the social contract put forth by several nineteenth-century English political theorists.\textsuperscript{44} Known as pashtunwali, it translates into “the code of the Pashtun,” and has proven to be an essential system. Without it, “tribal life would degenerate into a Hobbesian state of anarchy and war.”\textsuperscript{45} Sociologist Niloufer
Mahdi offers a clear and concise explanation of this regulatory system. In his article for *Ethology and Sociobiology*, he indicated that at its root, Pashtunwali “rests entirely with the individual.” Pashtuns therefore are not necessarily identified solely with the Muslim faith. Although religious, they still use aspects of Pashtunwali. This code is centered on the principle of honour (some argument exists over whether the term is izzat or nang, but the literature agrees that both refer to honour) and violations of this are treated seriously either through badal (revenge—usually violent) or kashunda (ostracism). Another aspect of Pashtunwali incorporates the idea of hospitality (melmastia) and sanctuary (nanawatay). According to Pashtunwali, one cannot refuse melmastia to those who need it nor can one refuse nanawatay to those who request it. Though this system conflicts with many Islamic practices—notably that of Sharia law—the Pashtuns continue with its practice, not at all troubled with the apparent contradiction. Mahdi suggests “a [Pashtun] is conditioned into accepting an identity based on action commensurate with [Pashtunwali].”

Winston Churchill once lamented “[t]heir system of ethics, which regards treachery and violence as virtues rather vices, has produced a code of honour so strange and inconsistent that it is incomprehensible to a logical mind.” Despite the qualitative assessment, “it is quite clear that its purpose is entirely utilitarian.” The Pashtuns are a complex ethnic group within and straddling the borders of Afghanistan, and Bernt Glatzer is correct in assessing the importance of kinship and the tribal organization within Afghanistan. Despite this focus on family and the collectiveness that this implies, Pashtunwali is an intensely individualistic code. Any political system must address the unique features of this particular

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**GDP Per Capita (US PPP) Comparison**

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**Regional Breakdown of Employment by Sector**

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services

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group. But there are other, broader issues that systems of governance must address in order to be and remain effective. An understanding of this system is vital, as was clearly articulated by Major Todd Strickland in a recent article in this journal. The implications are both tactical and strategic.58

Political scientist (and Afghan expatriate) Amin Saikal cited a separate triplet as a root of Afghanistan’s problems. Saikal cites foreign interference, ideological extremism and polygamy as three factors that have, taken together, destroyed the stability of Afghanistan.59 Foreign interference, as an issue for Afghanistan, is itself well documented as is the extensive ideological extremism in the Hindu Kush.60 Receiving less attention is that of polygamy and its impact upon a state’s stability. Polygamy, as a reason for Afghanistan’s instability, is a controversial one, but the evidence appears to lean in favour of Saikal’s theory. As an example, Dupree disagrees with Saikal on the gravity of the problem polygamy poses to Afghan society. Dupree goes so far as to suggest that with polygamy, “when it (uncommonly) occurs, usually serves as a cohesive factor, for the multiple wives are often close kin.”61 Dupree’s evidence of this is persuasive. He argues the traditional practice of buying brides62 makes taking many wives cost-prohibitive.63

This, however, works for the lower classes, but the traditional ruling classes of Afghanistan have had no such financial limitation and this is where Saikal’s argument begins to hold merit. Even Dupree admits that when it comes to succession of power elites, polygamy has been a problem and not at all the “cohesive force” he cited it earlier to be.64 According to Saikal, political power became personalized, not institutionalized; it was “based very much on ad hoc rather than institutionalized mechanisms for generating change or securing continuity.”65 Although common in many unstable states, the practice of polygamy—precisely possible in this case because the elites could afford multiple bride-prices—made succession in Afghanistan unclear when the charismatic leader died. Examples abound and the rule of Amir Habibullah is no exception. Ruling from 1901 to 1919, he produced some fifty potential heirs (from four wives and over thirty-five concubines) to his throne and, as his rule was personalized, his death “caused the usual simmering tensions and rivalries between different wives and sons in the royal household.”66 Polygamy was dividing the ruling class and preventing stable transitions from one leader to the next.

But this is not to say that women are without influence in Afghan society, it simply has been a very contentious issue in the past.67 Women are influential in Afghanistan and the degree of influence (and personal liberty) depends on their ethnic and tribal affiliation more than anything else. Nancy Tapper found in the early 1970s that women in the semi-nomad Pashtun tribes (at least in the particular sub-tribe she observed in her field research) had
vastly different levels of personal freedom and influence than their counterparts in the sedentary Uzbek regions of Northern Afghanistan. As an example, while the Uzbek women are under strict rules of seclusion, the women of the Durranni-Pashtun sub-tribe that Tapper observed were under no such restriction—so long as they remain within their sub-tribe (some several hundred family units). A woman may receive male or female visitors and may travel unaccompanied—all of which are forbidden practices for her Uzbek counterpart.68

Especially in the dominant Pashtun tribes, the tribes are patrilineal and as such, when a son takes a bride, the new couple reside with the husband’s family (patrilocal). That being said, Nancy Tapper noticed that a woman who bears a son who in turn marries and produces a son enjoys a certain freedom and prestige and becomes “a real force in community affairs.”69 But again, success is measured in terms of the production of male heirs, not any sort of matrilineal connection or even personal merit.

Clearly, in Afghanistan, power revolves around kinship and it forms the de facto system of government in Afghanistan. The key is ensuring the de jure system matches the de facto system. A rigid class structure of the sort found in places like India does not seem to exist in Afghanistan—but an equally rigid system of family relations has, over centuries, developed into the defining political system in Afghanistan.70 Previous attempts at modernisation have been carried out through an attempt at urbanisation. This has proven incompatible with the socio-economic realities thus far identified. Dupree recorded that when urbanised, the elderly loose their role of leader and counsellor to the tribe and the younger generation loose that same guidance. All have resulted in conflict in the confined and condensed urban environment.71 Any “effective, non-violent change can occur only when the innovators work within cultural patterns”—anything less would produce tension, conflict, and, ultimately, instability.
Economics

As a third factor, economics is closely related to the previous two. Recalling Glatzer’s three principles of societal organization along with the definition of socio-economics itself, the importance and interconnected nature of a state’s economies becomes clear. Even the most underdeveloped, violent and entropic states have an economy of some sort, and Afghanistan is no different. Despite the violence in the country and the inability for the central government to exercise control over its tribal periphery, Afghanistan has an economy that not only is active, but must also be understood in order to ensure a stable system of government. For this thesis, a study of Afghanistan’s economics will include a discussion on the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the ratios of its economic sectors, and it will conclude with a detailed examination of its most dominant sector and the structural implications of it.

The most common metric by which to measure a state’s wealth is its GDP, which is the market value of the sum of all final goods and services produced by that country over a specified period. Measured in US dollars and taking the exchange rate into account (purchasing power parity—in that it accounts for the fact a US dollar will go farther in Afghanistan than in the United States), the GDP of Afghanistan is US$21.5 billion (second-lowest in the region ahead of Tajikistan). But when population is taken into account (in that the GDP per capita is calculated), Afghanistan has just under US$700 per person—placing it 221st in the world and the worst in the region. Figure 3 illustrates comparative GDPs for Afghanistan as well as for its five neighbours: Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. For comparison, the Western average GDP per capita is offered as well. This average includes France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada (all of which are involved in Afghanistan). The discrepancy—almost US$33,000 against the Western average and over US$3,000 against the regional average—is staggering.

An economy can be divided into different sectors and especially for comparative reasons, these sectors can be very illuminating as to the nature of the society in question. Three sectors are commonly accepted for this purpose: agriculture, industry, and services. In Afghanistan, 38% of the economy is devoted to agriculture while 24% of the economy is devoted to industry. The remaining 38% of the economy is in the services sector. A common path to development has been the move away from an agriculturally based (agrarian) economy, through an industrial phase and finally “maturing” into a service-based economy. Especially when compared to the Western average, and to a certain extent even within Afghanistan’s own region (figure 4), the percentage devoted to agriculture is high. Based on these numbers, Afghanistan is clearly an agrarian society in that it has twice the agricultural sector of its regional average and over fifteen times the Western average.

First-hand accounts from anthropologists seem to agree with what the numbers are suggesting. Glatzer cited agricultural activities as the basis for the most prevalent ethnic group in Afghanistan—the Pashtuns.

The economic basis is breeding fat-tailed sheep; in addition the nomads also raise goats, making up about ten per cent of the flocks, and camels and horses for transport. Further, as stated above, some nomads also engage in dry-farming. As among all nomads, animals are individually owned, and as among most nomads, several households form herding units in order to build up herds of optimum size: that is, the maximum number of animals which can be herded by the minimum number of shepherds; also, the grazing and social behaviour of sheep and goats depends on the size of the herds . . . The average household in Jawand owned only 120 head…In fact I observed herding units ranging from two to ten participants . . . A household’s wealth in animals changes frequently . . . animal husbandry among the western Pashtuns is rather labour-intensive. The amount of labour a household can perform sets an upper limit for the accumulation of animal property.

This very detailed account brings to light an interesting phenomenon—that of what determines when a nomadic sub-tribe decides to settle. As a household reaches the upper limit of animal holdings, because it becomes so labour intensive, that family will begin to
take up land-ownership while those with fewer livestock pay the landowners for the use of their land.\footnote{76}

The focus on the Pashtun tribes may, at first, be somewhat troublesome, but they are the most expansive (and numerous) tribal group in Afghanistan and the nuances of Afghan society are best expressed through a comparison of the Pashtuns and the other, non-Pashtun tribes. Richard Tapper identifies two dimensions across which socio-political forms vary in Afghanistan. The forms, Tapper argues, vary firstly between Pashtuns and other tribes and secondly, they vary within the Pashtun tribe itself.\footnote{77} Each of these comparisons serves to identify the structure of the agrarian economy found in Afghanistan. The Pashtuns, Tapper says, are the most formalized (with their Pashtunwali and kinship systems) of the tribes in the region. He argues “Pathans had perhaps the most pervasive and explicit segmentary lineage ideology on the classic pattern, perpetuated not only in written genealogies but also in the territorial framework of tribal distribution.”\footnote{78} This formalization of the Pashtun has created a cleavage in the greater Afghan society. Pashtun will certainly cooperate with Uzbeks, Hazaras or other tribal groups, but usually from a position of perceived (or real) superiority.\footnote{79} That being said, economically, they will and do trade with other non-Pashtun.

The second form, the variances with the Pashtuns, revolves around three types of agrarian practices that historically took place in Afghanistan. The first agrarian practice was that of marginal agriculture and pastoralism. Farming, under this practice, produced inconsistent yields and shortfalls would normally be made up through raiding. The societal organization was communal and somewhat egalitarian, and this leads to a fierce sense of community and willingness to defend it. It rarely spread beyond the immediate locality of the settlement, however. It was these groups that followed Pashtunwali most closely.\footnote{80} The
second practice was sedentary agricultural which often produced large surpluses. Social stratification was common "usually with a leisured class of martial Pakhtuns owning the land and dependant groups working it."81 The third practice, an "intermediate form,"82 was essentially feudalistic in nature. Producing large food surpluses and located near the urban areas of Afghanistan, it was a practice most influenced by the state in power at the time. But it also produced a social stratification with a "chiefly class with limited powers, a broad mass of tribespeople, and a sizeable substratum of dependants."83 Settling and focusing efforts beyond subsistence farming eventually lead one to the cities or at least within reach of the state. The Pashtuns, wishing to avoid the loss of power and stature that this historically implied, tended to the first practice—that of pastoral nomadism—to maintain their independence. Tapper observed "Pastoral nomadism in Afghanistan was an economic adaptation. More important than nomadism or settlement as criteria for political or cultural affiliations were ethnic and tribal identities."84 The Pashtuns see the tribe as more important than the state. This is reflected most clearly in the economic practices as indicated by the large agricultural sector.85 One interesting feature noted by Tapper was that material gain often served as a unifying force amongst tribes.86

Dupree echoes Tapper’s findings as he cited, at about the same time (1970s), that some 2 million nomads moved across Afghanistan.87 Dupree, however, sees the relationship between nomads and settled residents of Afghanistan as more symbiotic than confrontational. He argues that sedentary farmers, semi-sedentary farmers, nomads and semi-nomads all have “functional, symbiotic relations with the villagers along the routes from grassland to grassland.”88 The relations, according to Dupree, are economic and based upon lending, barter, and exchange; some relations are even environmental in nature.89 With this in mind, Dupree recounts that past efforts to settle nomadic peoples, especially elsewhere in the region (at the time), have failed. The attempt should not be repeated in Afghanistan.90

Surprisingly, since the findings of Dupree and Tapper, not much has changed in Afghanistan. It is still primarily agrarian (as the current economic data from the World Fact Book demonstrates) and although the main crop traditionally was wheat and barley,91 since the 1990s and the brief rule of the Taliban, opium became the crop of choice for most farmers. It was simply more lucrative.92

Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid recently noted exactly how lucrative poppy cultivation had become. In 2002, a hectare devoted to poppies would fetch around $13 000 while a hectare of wheat would net only $400.93 Even though farmers would only receive about 20% of the poppy revenues (the rest went to the traffickers), it is still over seven times the revenue of traditional crops.94 Poppies are also much more robust. Rashid, after interviewing a local farmer, reported the extent to which farmers now rely on this illicit crop. In 2003 he planted poppies on his eighteen-acre farm—something he had done six times in the past ten years to make ends meet. Before winter set in, Khan would meticulously hoe his soil to uproot weeds, sprinkle fertilizer, and repair irrigation channels before sowing poppy seeds saved from the previous year’s crop. A few weeks later, thin shoots appeared and grew . . . until their petals fell away to reveal a hardened capsule.95

It was these capsules that were harvested for their opium. It grew quickly and needed little water or other care.

After 1983, the Soviet forces in Afghanistan “decided to depopulate the countryside with air power . . . gunships obliterating a village . . . while crops and orchards were doused with napalm.”96 These “destroy and search”97 operations devastated the agrarian economy and all but destroyed the delicate, intricate, and vital qanat system of irrigation canals and tunnels. Opium, a robust crop, was all that could be cultivated after the Soviet withdrawal. The civil war that engulfed the country for the subsequent ten years ensured the complete destruction of whatever agricultural infrastructure survived the Soviet scorched-earth policies.

Despite this obvious importance of agriculture in Afghanistan, other sectors do exist in Afghanistan’s economy. Afghanistan does have some natural resources including petroleum.
and natural gas, and its strategic location makes it a prime candidate for pipelines for these same resources.\textsuperscript{98} Also notable, but more for its absence than presence, are indigenous businesses.\textsuperscript{99} They are almost completely absent from Afghanistan's economic landscape, and this makes revenue collection almost impossible. In fact, taxation, or the lack thereof, has traditionally been a huge impediment to effective state management. As an example, the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement (ATTA) of 1965, essentially establishing a free-trade zone between Afghanistan and Pakistan, cost Afghanistan some US $2.7 billion dollars in 1997 in lost tax revenue.\textsuperscript{100}

At the same time that the ATTA was established, efforts by a secularist regime in Kabul to increase education began to bare fruit, but with unintended consequences. Afghans, although mostly urban, were graduating from university in larger numbers, but the prospects for employment were poor. Either a young Afghan would return to the tribe or family to farm or they could remain in the urban centers and try to find work that was scarce to begin with. With no state revenues, what civil service jobs existed paid poorly and with no private sector to speak of,\textsuperscript{101} a large group of educated youth quickly became disaffected.\textsuperscript{102} Protests and general unrest started to grip the urban centres.\textsuperscript{103} The youth, now literate in large numbers, had lost their sense of commonality with their non-literate families. Traditionally, non-literate and literate Afghans, both historically and at present, are not structured to handle an educated, middle class. The economy is agrarian, and attempts thus far to change this have missed the point. Without a service or industrial sector, and an open and functioning state bureaucracy, educated unemployment will continue—especially amongst the youth. This will (and has) set conditions that are ripe for extremism—and in the case of Afghanistan, Islamic extremism.\textsuperscript{104}

\textbf{Religion}

In constructing a socio-economic profile, the role of religion cannot be discounted. Especially when examining states that are part of the Muslim world, an understanding of Islam is essential. This next section will provide a brief primer on Islam and demonstrate how it is intimately connected with politics. It will close with an examination of the unique relationship between religion and Afghan society in general. Afghanistan is most certainly a Muslim state, but the role of Islam in this country is unique and needs to be explained.

According to Dupree, religion is the best example of the non-literate versus literate divide. Without the ability to read, one can still debate issues of religion and preach the word of which ever god one believes in.\textsuperscript{105} This is nowhere more true than with Islam. Islam “is not a simple ‘conversion or the sword’ doctrine”\textsuperscript{106} that many pundits seems to profess. Rather, is bears many similarities with Judaism and Christianity. Even amongst Muslim scholars, Christians, Jews and Muslims are all seen as ahl-i-kitab—people of the book—but for Muslims only Allah (the God) is divine. The key difference, according to Dupree, is in the role of the Christ. For Christians, Christ is the messiah, for Jews, they await the messiah, but for Muslims, Christ is simply the prophet before Mohammad.\textsuperscript{107} That Islam, meaning “submission to God”, is closely related to Christianity and Judaism, is echoed by others as well.\textsuperscript{108}

Traditionally, there are five pillars in Islam:\textsuperscript{109} Shahadat, which means profession of the faith; Salah (prayer); Zakat, that translates to almsgiving; Sawm (fasting); and Hajj, which means pilgrimage. Of these five pillars, only four (Shahadat is excluded) are seen as commandments in the Qur’an.\textsuperscript{110} Translated from Arabic into English, Qur’an means “that which is read, recited or rehearsed.”\textsuperscript{111} Recalling Dupree’s comment on the unique suitability of Islam to non-literate societies, Mohammed, who is said to have received the Qur’an, was himself non-literate.\textsuperscript{112} One who can recite the Qur’an well is called a Qari Sahib while one who can do so from memory is called a Hafiz.\textsuperscript{113} Often the Qur’an is compared to The Bible in Christianity, but it is more similar in role to the Ten Commandments in Christianity.\textsuperscript{114}

As with Christianity, a split also occurred in Islam, but it was not so much religious as it was political. The split occurred over the question of succession in the Caliphate upon the
death of Mohammad in 632 A.D. Splitting into two sects, one group saw Ali as the rightful Caliph (Mohammad’s son-in-law as he left no male heirs). This first sect became known as the Shi’a. The second sect, which sought a more orthodox heir, that from Mohammad’s own Quraish tribe—became the Sunni (meaning “custom” in Arabic). Early in the religion’s existence then, the connection between it and politics was cemented. Despite this schism, there are three broad themes in Islam. The first is that of the equality of man before Allah, the second is the belief in Allah, and the third is an equality of one’s right to exploit one’s talents. It is therefore difficult to accept the common misconception that Islam is a fatalistic religion. When a Muslim professes “it is Allah’s will,” this is not a comment on the futility of resistance, rather it is simply an advocacy of submission to a reflective way of life. Furthermore, the religion is not at all monolithic and there is striking evidence of different practices of Islam within the Muslim world.

Within Sunni Islam, there are four schools, themselves unique in their practice and preaching. A single school exists in Shi’a Islam—the Jaferi School, but a form of mystic Islam also derived from Shi’a Islam known as Sufism. In about the eighth century, Sufism began to challenge Shi’a Islam as it sought a “personal experience with” Allah. Although once considered heretical, it is now considered part of Islam and is widely practiced. For the most part, the schools correspond to different regions around the world. Jaferi is associated with most Persian states, such as Iran. Within the Sunni sect, Shafi’i is practiced mostly in Indonesia. The Hanabali School is traditionally Arabic. The Islam in Africa is mostly Maliki Islam while Hanafi is practiced in most of central Asia. The Hanafi school is the Islam that most Afghans associate themselves with and is widely considered the most moderate of the four schools. In total, of the 1.3 billion Muslims worldwide, only ten to fifteen percent are Shi’a, while the remaining are Sunni. That being said, as indicated above, the region matters and some ninety percent of Iranians are Shi’a along with over sixty percent of Iraqis. Just fewer than six million Shi’a are in Afghanistan.

It should be noted that a sub-school of Hanafi Islam is Deobandi, a response to the enlightening movements within Sunni Islam, specifically in India at the time. It was started in 1867 and sought strict adherence to orthodox Muslim teaching such as shari’a and fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). Followers of this form of Sunni Islam quickly established what became known as madrasas, twelve of which existed in India by 1879 and now boast well over 9,000 across all of Asia. It was from these madrasas, which also took root in Afghan refugee camps in the 1980s, that a cross-pollination of shari’a and Pashtunwali occurred.

Most of these madrasas were in rural areas and in Afghan refugee camps; they were run by semi-educated mullahs whose reading of the shari’a texts was heavily influenced by the tribal code of the Pashtuns . . . What was taught, and what the young rootless Afghans who were to become the future cadres of the Taliban imbibed, was often far removed from the original reformist ideology of the Deobandi school.

One such mullah became the leader of the Taliban and quickly became a household name in 2001—Mullah Omar.

Although accused by some of being an Orientalist, Bernard Lewis has attempted to find the cause of one aspect of this greater disaffection, that of the animosity felt by many Muslims towards the West. In short, Lewis argues that many of the benefits of Western civilization did not translate to the Muslim world. For the most part, Lewis said, “Western-style economic methods brought poverty. Western-style political institutions brought tyranny, even Western-style warfare brought defeat.”

Samuel Huntington offers yet another possible source, that being a greater, longer-term struggle between civilizations.

Conflict along the fault line between Western and Islamic civilizations has been going on for 1300 years. After the founding of Islam, the Arab and Moorish surge west and north only ended at Tours in 732. From the eleventh to the thirteenth century the Crusaders attempted with temporary success to bring Christianity and Christian rule to the Holy Land. From the fourteenth to the seventeenth century, Ottoman Turks reversed the balance,
extended their sway over the Middle East and the Balkans, captured Constantinople, and twice laid siege to Vienna. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as Ottoman power declined Britain, France, and Italy established Western control over most of North Africa and the Middle East.\textsuperscript{126}

Clearly there has been tension between the various religions and the brief history that Huntington offers echoes Lewis.

But this is not to say that Muslim and Christian cannot, or have not in the past, lived together. Moorish Spain in the 8th century, with such cosmopolitan cities as Grenada, Cordoba and Toledo, flourished as centres for culture and education where Christianity and Islam coexisted until the reconquests of the 13th and 15th centuries by the Hispanic Christian kingdoms.\textsuperscript{127}

There is clearly a link between politics and religion within Islam. Lewis goes so far as to suggest that Mohammad "was not only a prophet and teacher; he was also the head of a polity and of a community, a ruler and a soldier. Hence his struggle involved a state and its armed forces."\textsuperscript{128} Even the definition of key terms in politics differs between the religions. In Christianity, the people are sovereign while Islam teaches that only Allah is sovereign.\textsuperscript{129} A key tenet to Western governance is the separation of Church and State,\textsuperscript{130} but this does not hold true in the Muslim world. The more fundamentalist amongst the Muslims have "attributed the social and political corruption prevailing in [Muslim countries] to the separation of political power from the imperatives of Islam."\textsuperscript{131} Political change therefore implies changes to the religious order in the Muslim world.\textsuperscript{132} This can prove challenging under the best of circumstances.

Afghanistan in particular has had a history of taking on just this type of challenge. Abdur Rahman Khan, who ruled Kabul and most of Afghanistan for almost 21 years starting in 1880,\textsuperscript{133} sought to use Islam as a unifying force for his disparate collection of tribes and ethnicities that he called Afghanistan. But the Islam practiced by the tribes and the Pashtuns in particular are very different from what is practiced in most literate, urban, Muslim centres.\textsuperscript{134} In short, Afghan culture has been used to peacefully subvert shari’a without really subverting Islam itself.\textsuperscript{135} For example, the jirga, the council held with village leaders, is often held in Mosques\textsuperscript{136} and many of the tenets of Pashtunwali actually runs counter to conventional Islam, notably the notions of \textit{badal} (revenge) where the \textit{Qur’an} states killing as revenge is forbidden.

It behoves not a believer to kill a believer unless it be by mistake. He who kills a believer by mistake shall free, or procure the freedom of, a believing slave, and provide blood money to be handed over to the heirs of the person slain . . . Whoso kill a believer deliberately, his reward shall be hell, wherein he shall abide, and Allah will be wroth with him . . . and prepare him for great punishment.\textsuperscript{137}

According to Dupree, practices such as Pashtunwali predate the arrival of Islam to the tribal areas and as such, both the religion and older tribal practices have evolved and meshed into mysticism not unlike the Sufism of Shi’a Islam.\textsuperscript{138} One side effect of this mysticism is a belief in predestination, again, one that is counter to the teachings of Islam, and has caused many Afghans to believe that Allah has a plan and that this plan is immutable.

Religion is a factor in understanding any culture. In the Muslim world, with an inextricable link between religion and politics, religion is of vital importance. A unique form of Islam emerged over several decades in Afghanistan, one that combined pre-Islamic tribal traditions with the Deobandi sub-school of Sunni Hanafi Islam. This, coupled with acute societal issues and a predisposition to fatalism as a culture, led to a form of religious fundamentalism that would rule harshly, briefly and ultimately with brutal consequences for Afghanistan. But Islam can also serve to unite. Islam is a classless religion—one that can be practiced anywhere and with pillars such as zakat, sawm and salah, encourages charity and equality.
Afghanistan’s Socio-Economic Profile

Thanks to centuries of conquests and civil wars, Afghanistan has become a rentier state. A harsh climate with frequent droughts and scarce farmland, Afghanistan is also in the unenviable position of having a large youth population and heterogeneous ethnic mix with strong tribal heritage. With ninety percent of Afghans engaged in farming, the vast majority in simple subsistence farming, the normally harsh climate, drought and war have devastated what economic capacity existed. Finally, Islam, with its inseparable connection to politics, demands a special consideration to both political and social reforms that if ignored, lead to instability.

Geography makes any agricultural endeavour in the country fragile at best. Water is scarce and sporadic, making control of it (rather than the amount) problematic. Decentralisation of settlements, rather than centralisation, is a survival trait in Afghanistan, which has encouraged localisation. Even Afghanistan’s geographic location has been a source of instability. Located in an historically significant part of the world, first as a node in the lines of communication between England and her colonies, then as a buffer between Communist and Capitalist, and finally as battleground against religious extremism, Afghanistan’s simple geographic lot has made it both significant and fragile.

Along with geography, the population of Afghanistan is a mosaic; a collection of very diverse ethnicities that often have little in common making nationalistic attempts difficult. The population is young, with almost half considered of dependent age making the workforce comparatively small. The population, partly because of its age and partly because of a lack of accessible, formal education systems, is predominantly non-literate with a strong oral tradition. Cultural norms, therefore, are subject to bias and interpretation of a small, literate elite (in the case of Afghanistan, the Mullahs).

The localization brought on by geographic necessity has encouraged a tribalization that is strong to this day. This societal organization has produced a classless, but intensely kinship-based culture. The family has become the most important political system in Afghanistan. This implies a certain degree of social immobility as one is often expected to continue with whatever the family business may be. National issues have little impact upon the tribes in the rural areas and the issues of concern for the tribes have little resonance in the urban centres. When kinship-based sub-societies attempt to urbanize, the older generation lose its role and the youth lose the guidance leading to unrest and a sense of rootlessness.

With almost forty percent of Afghanistan’s economy devoted to agriculture (most of it subsistence) and an enormous illegal opium problem, legitimate economic development is sorely needed. But sedentary farming, especially when farmland is scarce, is not going to be the economic engine that is needed in Afghanistan. Many Afghans are nomadic and this has proven to be a symbiotic relationship with the sedentary farmers. This relationship is vital. Unemployment, even in the developing world, and especially in Afghanistan, is another source of instability. Education, although part of the solution, cannot improve the economy without jobs. Underemployed and unemployed youth, with fresh degrees from the Kabul University, ensured the rise of a pro-Communist regime in the 1960s and 70s and the Taliban in the 1990s. The educated need jobs.

Completing the profile is the unique role of religion. In the Muslim world especially, religion and politics are inseparable. In Afghanistan, Islam has a unique role as the tribes, the most dominant cultural force in the country, practice Islam albeit in a modified form. Almost a form of mysticism, the Islam practiced by the tribes merges pre-Islamic tribal beliefs with a non-literate interpretation of Islam that blends Pashtunwali with the Qur’an. However, many Islamic ideals also reinforce the cultural organization, such as the emphasis on kinship, and in many ways, Islam can serve as unifying feature of the socio-economic profile of Afghanistan.

The geography, demographics, societal organization, economy, and religion all serve to illuminate the socio-economic realities of Afghanistan. This profile clearly indicates
that Afghanistan has a decentralized, agrarian population, which leads to a localization of the society, manifesting itself most clearly in through the tribes that dominate the region. Furthermore, the population is predominately non-literate, leading to a rich oral tradition, with a relatively new focus on Islam. Cutting across all these characteristics are the myriad differences between the various localized cultures, creating a heterogeneous society as well.

**Applying the Socio-Economic Profile to the Current Operation**

The Afghan Compact, the Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS), and Canada’s interpretation of them provide a solid foundation for change in Afghanistan. However, without further modification they will be no more successful than previous attempts. That being said, and to borrow the language of the I-ANDS, two cross cutting thrusts need to be addressed in order to make these policies consistent with the socio-economic profile of Afghanistan. The first thrust suggests that the stated adherence to Afghan Islamic values must be followed through with. The second revolves around the issues of security imposed by the use of force and that, although important, it will not bring real security without simultaneous development of the legitimate economy and government in Afghanistan. Figure 5 proposes a new framework that is consistent with the socio-economic profile of Afghanistan and will more readily produce the lasting stability sought by both the Afghans specifically and the international community in general.

![Kabul Road Network](image)

Islamic values for Afghanistan do not simply mean that Afghanistan will be a Muslim state; rather it implies that all Afghan values—including those of the rural tribes—must be adhered to. This means that the unique blend of certain elements of Pashtunwali along with Islam must be followed. It also means that Western-style gender equality is unlikely to succeed. Both the Afghan Compact and the I-ANDS seem to contradict themselves when they state that the Afghan Islamic culture will be maintained yet gender equality (a traditional deficit in Islam) will also be encourage. Again, the historical record is clear on this point, as a regime’s legitimacy has been questioned when adherence to the perceived Islamic values were not kept. Development must occur in Afghanistan, but it must be consistent with the existing Afghan culture—not clash with it.
The second thrust revolves around the issue of development and the role of security imposed by force. Lasting security, that which is sought by the policies laid out in the *Afghan Compact*, the I-ANDS, and also by Canada’s position on these policies currently places an inordinate amount of resources and attention upon the imposition of security by force and does not adequately address the link between economic well-being, good governance, and lasting security. Education, although required, will not provide security. Imposing security by force alone is an unending task, referred to in some circles as simply “mowing the grass.”142 Only when the citizens of a state see that their future is better within the state’s apparatus will security be achieved. The current policy only alludes to this and the interdependent requirement is not clear.

The policies outlined by the *Afghan Compact*, the I-ANDS, and Canada’s current direction are a good starting point. Seeking stability in a state has been one of history’s most pressing and continuous concerns. Suggestions that call for the acceptance of a culture that may be unpleasant to Western sensitivities and a de-emphasis on security through the use of force when soldiers, developers, and citizens continue to be killed in Afghanistan are certainly difficult to accept. But without these suggestions, the requirement for the use of force will never end and the society will continue to be at odds with a regime that is inconsistent with its own values.

A strategic shift is no doubt required to affect the changes outlined in Figure 5. That being said, there are several things that can be done by the military within the existing framework that would still achieve some of the effects described in Figure 5. First and foremost, the emphasis must be placed on the development and maintenance of a cooperative and consultative system that integrates the efforts of not just other federal government departments, but also those from other levels of government (provincial and municipal, in their own areas of expertise) as well as non-governmental aid agencies. This is currently achieved by the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT) for Canada—in effect, the operation of the Whole of Government approach to nation building. This organization must be maintained and made a priority not just for the government of Canada, but also for the military operations in Kandahar province. The KPRT has the potential to deliver the kind of development that will lead to the virtuous circle outlined in Figure 5. Emphasis on the KPRT must translate into resources for the KPRT and that includes giving it the assets it needs to put its developers—both civilian and military—in the field in a persistent manner.

Secondly, elements within the KPRT must be able to bring about discriminate, focused force in a precise manner. Despite the technological achievements demonstrated over the past two decades by various western armies, the most precise weapon, in any theatre of operations, remains the well-trained and well-led soldier empowered to make judgment calls on the spot as to whether or not to apply force. As a trade, the infantry has this capability by definition. However, other trades within the army have the potential to be employed as precision fire systems. This must be cultivated and maintained both during training and while deployed. This is especially important in an environment such as what the KPRT finds itself in today. With finite force protection resources, reliance on the infantry for the infantry-specific skill-sets described above will simply limit the required operationalization of the Whole of Government approach. All military members of the KPRT must be able to bring about precise, discriminate fire when required. Unfocused use of force simply pushes the local population further into the arms of the insurgent—precisely the opposite effect desired in figure 5. Having all deployed military members confident in their personal weapons skills and confident in their rules of engagement will act a force multiplier.

Finally, all members of the Whole of Government team must understand the socio-economic profile of the country in which they are operating. Failing to do so will undermine the efforts of all involved. From the selection of projects that are consistent with the culture and the existing economic system, to the appropriate style of interaction with the local population, all members who deploy outside the confines of the compound or camp must understand the country. Projects that do not reinforce or complement the culture will fail and social gaffes, at their worst, can insult the local population, again driving them closer to the insurgent.
Taken together, in that Canada’s Whole of Government approach is applied in the field and resourced appropriately, that focused use of force is applied, and that all members have an understanding of the socio-economic profile of the country will lead to success. The adjustments to the existing policy outlined in this article will improve Afghanistan’s chances for a lasting solution. The western effort in Afghanistan is going on seven years and the hope of a stable Afghanistan is still achievable, but the patience shown thus far by all stakeholders is not infinite and wearing thin.

About the Author...

Captain Breede enrolled in the Canadian Forces in 1998 and graduated from The Royal Military College of Canada in 2002. Serving as an Infantry Officer in 2nd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment, he deployed to Haiti in 2004. In 2006 he was posted to the Tactics School as the Operations Officer and returned to 2nd Battalion as the Rear Party Adjutant for TF 1-07. He completed his Master’s Degree in Political Science at the University of New Brunswick in 2007, submitting a thesis on nation building in Afghanistan. He will be deploying to Afghanistan as the KPRT Force Protection Company 2IC for TF 3-08.

Endnotes

4. Ibid.
5. When “socio-economics” was queried in Wikipedia, it identified sociology, economics, history, psychology and others as key areas for enquiry. Taken from www.wikipedia.org/socio-economics, accessed 25 Aug 07.
9. Spelling, when translating from the Indo-European to the Germanic or Romantic family of languages, is traditionally problematic. In Dupree’s foundational work on Afghanistan, the peak is spelled Naorchak. (Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p. 1) Variations in spelling exist throughout English works on the greater Middle East.
10. Louis Dupree (1925-1989) is widely considered one of the foremost scholars on Central Asia. His works have been compared to those of Sir Olaf Caroe even Mountsaert Elphinstone in terms of depth and breadth. That his work on Afghanistan is so often cited in this chapter is consistent with other modern works by Angelo Rasanyagam, Amin Saikal and others.
11. Ibid, p. 3.
12. Ibid.
16. For this chapter, the Western average was calculated with data from Canada, the United States, United Kingdom, Germany and France.
17. The regional average includes Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
24. Ibid, p. 75.
25. Ibid, p. 82.
28. Ibid.
29. Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p.xix. Dupree goes so far as to map this theory in chart form on p. 344 of his tome.

31. Richard Tapper wrote that “It should be stressed that the ability to unite usually rested on the hope of material gain and the absence of material cause for conflict, as much as, if not more than, on any ‘tribal’ notions of common descent, or religious or other ideology of unity.” (Tapper, ed. *Conflict of Tribe and State*, p. 50). To reinforce this point one only need to look to the newspapers to read stories of the “material gain” reaped from Afghanistan’s booming opium production. (Abrashi, “Afghan Opium Production Explodes, Globe and Mail, 27 Aug 07).


34. Ibid.


36. Ibid, p. 19. Saikal offers the example, later in his book, of Nadir Shah and his attempts at extending the legitimacy of the central government beyond the gates of Kabul (the traditional challenge in Afghanistan). He did so only by engaging the tribes surrounding the city. (Ibid, p. 100-1).


38. Ibid, p. 5.


40. Christie suggests that tribalisation is a reaction to a state’s inability to govern its people (Christie, p. 7) while Tapper says that the tribe is not simply some archaic form of societal organization, but rather a reaction by the citizens of a weak state (Tapper, p. 31).


42. Dupree. *Afghanistan*, p. 188.


44. Niloufer Q. Mahdi suggests in his “Puktunwali: Ostracism and honor among the Pathan Hill tribes” (*Ethology and Sociobiology*, vol. 7, no. 3, pp.151) that the pashtunwali compares to the social contract put forth in Hobbes’ *Leviathan* and Locke’s *Second Treatise on Civil Government* in several ways.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid, pp. 149.

47. Ibid, pp. 297.


50. Ibid, pp. 3 01.

51. Ibid, pp. 300.

52. Ibid, pp. 301.

53. Ibid.


55. Ibid, pp. 304.


57. Mahdi, “Pukhtunwali”, pp. 149

58. In this article, Major Strickland identifies that pashtunwali could explain some of the more brazen tactics employed by the insurgents in Afghanistan while at the same time advocating that understanding this code can avert strategic blunders as well. Todd Strickland, “The Way of the Pashtun: Pashtunwali” *The Canadian Army Journal*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2007), pp. 53.


60. Most works of history on Afghanistan devote extensive space to the impact the Great Game had upon all of South West Asia and the destabilizing influence, especially in after the Soviet withdrawal in the late 1980s, of extremism upon Afghanistan. Steven Tanner’s *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban* and Angelo Rasanyagama’s *Afghanistan: A Modern History*, both offer good examples of the impact these two factors had on the region.


62. Although a well-documented practice throughout history, this bride-price is still a very large part of the Afghan “life-cycle”. See Graeme Smith, “Fifteen years for love”. *The Globe and Mail*, 18 Aug 07.


64. Ibid, p. 188.


67. Both historians and anthropologist agree that many of the attempts at modernization—especially
around the liberation of women—have resulted in fierce (and often violent) backlash from various elements of Afghan society. During a European tour in late 1927 and early 1928, King Amanullah (himself personally turning his back on the practice of polygamy) raised the ire of Afghan traditionalist by allowing his wife, Queen Soraya to appear at state dinners unveiled. See Richard Tapper, Conflict of Tribe and State, p. 37, Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 450 and Saikal, Modern Afghanistan, p. 76.

70. Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 188.
71. Ibid, p. 189.
72. Ibid, p. 82.
73. Known as the GDP per capita, this is the Gross Domestic Product divided by the population of the country. In this case, the Average Afghan makes about US$674 each year. This figure accounts for the exchange rate and differences in purchasing power. All economic data is taken from the CIA World Fact Book, accessed online at www.cia.gov.
76. Ibid, p. 219.
77. Tapper, ed. Conflict of Tribe and State, p. 43.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid, p. 44.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
85. Not only does this match with the economic data from the CIA World Fact Book (www.cia.gov), but Angelo Rasanayagam drew the same conclusion— but qualified it by saying that subsistence farming was the main employ for most Afghans. Angelo Rasanayagam, Afghanistan: A Modern History, London; I.B. Taurus, 2005, p. 57. Dupree agrees, suggesting most Afghans farm as a way of life. Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 133.
86. Tapper, ed. The Conflict of Tribe and State, p. 50.
88. Ibid, p. 166.
89. Although odd at first, it is quite logical—droppings from passing caravans actually keep the marginal grasslands and fields well fertilized. Something the sedentary farmers actually welcome. Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 166-8.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid, p. 44.
94. Ibid, p. 326.
95. Ibid, p. 318.
96. Tanner, Afghanistan, p. 255.
97. Ibid.
98. Rasanayagam, Afghanistan, p. 53.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.
102. Ibid.
104. Rasanayagam, Afghanistan, p. 50.
105. Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 95.
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
111. Ibid, p. xiii.
112. Ibid.
114. Ibid, p. 100.
117. Ibid, p. 78.
118. Ibid, p. 80.
122. Ibid.
124. Professor of English at Columbia University, Edward Said coined the term *Orientalism* in his 1978 book of the same name (*Orientalism*. New York: Random House, 1979). In it, he argues that some scholars have superimposed Western values upon the study of Eastern cultures. Lewis has been accused by some of doing just this.
130. Recall Thomas Jefferson’s speech where he proclaims “Divided we stand, united we fall” when it comes to the relationship between religion and the state (Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage” *Policy*, pp. 17).
133. Khan, known as the Iron Emir, was one of the first to have any sort of success at creating a unified state of Afghanistan. Saikal, *Modern Afghanistan*, p. 35.
135. Ibid, p. 82.
137. *Qur’an*, Sura Al Nisa 92-94 (Khan, *Qur’an*, p. 87)
141. King Amanullah, ruling Afghanistan in the 1920s, consistently clashed with the conservative Muslims within his country who saw reforms—including gender reforms—as anti-Islamic...The King, so the country was told, ‘had turned against Allah and Islam!’” Dupree. *Afghanistan*, p. 450.
142. The term “mowing the grass” was used by Australian Colonel John Frewen to illustrate the unending nature of using force to counter an insurgency. Unless the base of support is addressed, best achieved through development, the insurgent can always reconstitute after a military defeat. “Contested Nation Building: The Challenge of Countering Insurgency in Afghanistan” *Australian Army Journal*, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 33.
SOVIET THIRD WORLD INTERVENTION POLICY: THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN

Michael Stocker

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979-1989) is widely viewed as one of the most decisive events of the Cold War. Owing to the American experience in the Vietnam War and the challenges that counter-insurgency warfare posed to a conventionally-dominant military superpower; many Western observers questioned the wisdom and motivations of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. In light of the Soviet experience (owing to its failure, the intervention was subsequently known as the Soviet Vietnam) contemporary observers cast doubt on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) stabilization operations in Afghanistan. Observers argue that if a military force of the size, disposition and skill of the Soviet 40th Army could not achieve stability, then the chances of the current NATO deployment doing so are even less. However, this argument fails to appreciate the much different circumstances within which the Soviets, and later the United States and NATO, opted for intervention despite some enduring facts-on-the-ground such as continued political disunity, ethnic and religious conflict and a collapsed economy.

To this day, scholars continue to debate the motivating factors which drove the Soviets to intervene in Afghanistan. These arguments can be roughly divided into two camps of opinion. The alarmist camp argues that the Afghan invasion was just one more step in a Soviet “grand design” that sought to counter American influence in South Asia and the Middle East by a process of ever more aggressive military expansionism. The pragmatist camp takes a more nuanced view of the Soviet action, arguing instead that the pressure of events in a state with long-standing socialist ties to the Soviet Union precipitated a limited military intervention. Neither argument is wholly erroneous; however the alarmist argument relies on a set of assumptions which divorce the military aspect of the deployment from the broader contextual environment within which intervention took place. Most importantly, the grand design proponents fail to relate Soviet foreign activity to the internal decision-making processes of the Politburo which, at the time of invasion, was evolving into a more pragmatic version of its Khrushchev-era counterpart.

It can then be argued that rather than being one element of a broader geostategic initiative, the Soviet intervention was a defensive reflex-action to an evolving internal Afghan crisis and, as such, had more to do with non-military, proximate factors rather than grand strategy. The Soviet military option was considered viable because an atmosphere conducive to interventionist thought and policy existed within the ideological and bureaucratic structure of the Soviet government. Accordingly, policy-makers within the foreign relations, military and intelligence organizations increasingly viewed military force as being the most effective means to combat internal Afghan instability. Moreover, with the collapse of détente, Soviet policy-makers saw little international resistance to or repercussions stemming from an invasion of a country beyond the borders of the Warsaw Pact. Effectively, this near-total absence of internal or external constraints on Soviet behaviour allowed new thinking (concerning Third World intervention policy, in support of national liberation movements) to gain traction at the highest policy-making levels.

When placed within this much broader decision-making and ideological-bureaucratic context, one can more readily identify how Soviet policy-makers arrived at and viewed the potential costs and benefits of an intervention in Afghanistan. To them, the costs of doing nothing were enormous: instability along its southern border, loss of international prestige and the abandonment of a long-time friend, amongst others. At the same time, efforts up
until this point, while providing for Afghan infrastructure and a puppet ally, were clearly insufficient in establishing broad popular support for the Afghan government and camaraderie with the Soviet Union. None of these realities was indicative of some grand design; rather, it was clear that the Soviets were swayed more by immediate, on-the-ground realities. While compelling, these realities might not have been so convincing if it were not for the existence of a decision-making and ideological-bureaucratic environment which was more receptive to interventionist thought and policy than at any other point in the Cold War era. Understanding the motivating factors which drove Soviet decision-making at the end of the 1970s requires a sophisticated appreciation of context and perspective; therefore, this essay will place the intervention within an ever-narrowing Soviet decision-making context. Such an analytical method will demonstrate the utility of context and perspective in establishing a set of motivating factors for the Soviet intervention and will also provide a simple and effective argument structure. At the broadest level, the Afghan crisis occurred during a period of rapidly deteriorating relations between the Cold War superpowers. The state of the East-West rivalry therefore had an impact as to how the two superpowers defined Afghan security within their wider geopolitical and regional interests. Within this context, Soviet decision-making was affected by perceptions of its ideological responsibility to the socialist-oriented Third World and to what extent Soviet military power ought to be employed in support of struggling socialist liberation movements. At the lowest level of analysis, Soviet decision-makers had to interpret the significance of on-the-ground realities when considering the potential costs and benefits of a military intervention.

The Collapse of Détente

While much of the Cold War was characterized by mutually aggressive competition in the spheres of international political, economic and military affairs, a period of relaxed tensions and peaceful coexistence known as détente existed throughout the 1970s.
President Nixon sought to replace confrontation with “an era of negotiation” in pursuit of “a structure of peace.” The 1972 Nixon-Brezhnev Summit ushered in a period of optimism which, for a short time at least, overshadowed persistent competition for influence in the Third World and military-nuclear superiority. While a whole host of cooperative ventures followed this summit, sceptics in both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. had to at least consider the possibility that détente might exacerbate the East-West rivalry by providing only a disarming illusion of an alternative form of relations.

From the Soviet perspective, it appeared as though U.S. containment efforts had continued unabated as the U.S. fostered ever-stronger ties with Soviet enemies including Iran and China and continued to embark on “imperial wars of aggression,” namely in Vietnam. Similarly, American hawks pointed to a troubling pattern of Soviet involvement in the Third World, particularly in regards to Soviet support of revolutionary groups in Yemen and Ethiopia. As well, the Soviets increased their transfer of arms and technical assistance to western hemisphere Third World proxy states including Nicaragua and El Salvador and employed Cuban troops to support insurgent activity in Angola.

In disarmament talks, which were the focal point of East-West engagement in Europe, the superficiality of military détente was made obvious. The U.S. Senate refused to ratify the second round of the Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT) Talks (1977-1979) arguing that it failed to meet the criteria laid down in the first round of talks in 1972. The result was, not surprisingly, Soviet indignation and anger which ultimately led to a retroactive reappraisal of the Carter Administration’s policies and broader American aims. The NATO deployment of a new class of intermediate range nuclear missiles in Europe and the reluctance of the American senate to ratify the SALT II agreement removed any final concerns some Politburo members had over the potential repercussions a Soviet intervention may have had on détente. The collapse of what could have been the foundation for future bilateral security agreements was surely viewed with disappointment and was perhaps a portent of things to come. In seeking a negotiated solution to U.S.-Soviet nuclear parity, the U.S. signalled an implicit admission that its previous nuclear superiority, which had been a powerful lever of influence in moderating Soviet designs and activity beyond its borders, had by the late 1970s been eroded. It was not until the Reagan administration that the United States would regain the upper hand with a massive arms build-up. Finding themselves at an impasse, then, the superpowers turned to the other major venue of a collapsing détente, East-West competition in the Third World.

As a result of the intensification of competition in the Third World détente, though initially envisioned as a means towards peaceful coexistence between the superpowers,
was increasingly viewed as a means towards more active (though less public) competition. The invasion of Afghanistan on December 25, 1979 destroyed what was left of the détente structure and the associated era of optimism and instead reconciled the superpowers to a period of heightened competition. Whether it was a failure stemming from basic differences in the conception of détente, or the failure to use collaborative measures or to define a code of conduct for the superpowers, Garthoff explains that the implicit goals of détente were never achieved:

When Nixon and Kissinger developed a strategy of détente to replace a strategy of confrontation, the underlying expectation was that as the Soviet Union became more and more extensively engaged in an organic network of relations with the existing world order, it would gradually become reconciled to the order [and] ideological expectations of global revolutionary change would become attenuated and merely philosophical rather than actively political.7

The Geopolitical Significance of Afghanistan

Geo-strategically speaking, Afghanistan’s value as an object of military and economic control is at best dubious. For centuries European and Asian armies struggled with varying degrees of success to conqueror a country which marked the dividing line between north, east and south Asian civilizations. Like Pakistan, the Soviets viewed the territory of Afghanistan as a strategic buffer zone; for Pakistan, it represented an area of possible sanctuary from the Indian threat; and for the Soviets, it served to insulate Soviet central Asian republics from the religious and ethnic conflicts which raged in South Asia. It is an easily defensible country where temperature extremes and mountain ranges divide the country into a series of plains and plateaus that contain most of the country’s sparse economic activity. Populating these regions are myriad tribal and ethnic groups which have long resisted centralized control. As described by British author Sir Henry Rawlinson in 1875 (during the British colonial period):

The nation consists of a mere collection of tribes, of unequal power and with divergent habits, which are held together, more or less closely, according to the personal character of the chief who rules them. The feeling of patriotism, as known in Europe, cannot exist among the Afghans, for there is no common country. In its place is found a strong, turbulent love of individual liberty, which naturally rebels against authority and would equally be impatient of control, whether exercised by English or Russians or Persians […]8

Owing to these characteristics, Afghanistan throughout the Cold War, though a “socialist-oriented” country, adopted a strategic hedging type of foreign policy by playing the U.S. and U.S.S.R. off against each other.9 The majority of foreign economic and military assistance came from the Soviets; however in the spirit of neutrality it also accepted aid and military advice from the U.S. This was the status quo until the Soviet invasion, though even following the overthrow of President Mohammed Daoud Khan in 1978, the U.S. maintained modest goals, seeing its regional interests lying in the preservation of regional stability and not in seeking to replace Soviet influence with American, Iranian or Pakistani influence.10

This is not to say the U.S. took no interest in Afghanistan prior to the invasion. American concerns for Pakistani security had been the main context within which Afghan security was examined. As an ally of the West and member of CENTO (Central Treaty Organization, formerly the Baghdad Pact), Pakistan had an interest in a centralized and stable Afghanistan and, linked with similar concerns for Iranian security, these countries formed an American-backed bulwark against Soviet penetration. To this end, greater regional cooperation was encouraged by the U.S., with the ultimate goal being a strong President Daoud, inclined towards the West with a much reduced dependence on the Soviets.11

Afghanistan in the Soviet Grand Design

Within this narrow geopolitical perspective, alarmist observers in the West envisioned the Soviet invasion of 1979 as a climactic event in a replay of the classic Great Game,
a geostrategic competition that existed between Tsarist Russia and the United Kingdom throughout the nineteenth century. The alarmist observers offer some credible reasons why there were significant strategic gains to be had by invading and holding the territory of Afghanistan, however these reasons are superficial, overly romanticized and fail to stand up to scrutiny when examined in detail.

United States Secretary of Defence Casper Weinberger became one of President Reagan’s most vocal advocates of aggressively confronting the Soviet Union in its drive for Third World allegiances. Reflecting back on the Soviet invasion, he argued for increased American defence appropriations to create “mobile and flexible forces which [are] needed to counter the rising threat of Soviet power in the Third World.” He went on to argue that because of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Libya, Syria and South Yemen, “the Soviets have, in effect, nearly encircled the Persian Gulf region” and noted that “the Soviet Union has pushed its traditional policy of global expansionism to a new dimension.”

As one scholar observes, “in this interpretation, the objective of Soviet policy in the Third World is to outflank NATO’s defences in Europe and disrupt Western access to vital sea routes, markets, and deposits of energy and raw materials.” This thesis, “with its imagery of falling Third World dominoes, pliant Soviet proxies and a risk-prone Soviet leadership pursuing an offensive strategy from a position of military superiority” is flawed for a number of reasons.

For example, one argument which gained traction was that a real or potential Soviet oil shortage would suffice to justify a desire to seize the Persian Gulf. Occupying Afghanistan first, it was argued, would place the Soviet military in a superior striking position to threaten the entire region. Even U.S. President Jimmy Carter can be cited for at least publicly acknowledging this theory when in January 1980 he said:

The Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet military forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Straits of Hormuz—a waterway through...
which most of the world’s oil must flow [...] The Soviet Union is now attempting to consolidate a strategic position, therefore, that poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle east oil.16

Epstein and Dunn argue that such a theory ignores the difficulties a Soviet strategist would face including:

- **Readying the Soviets’ twenty-eight divisions in south-western U.S.S.R. who stand at Category III readiness,17** which would require at least one month to do, could not be done in secret and would then give the U.S. ample time to respond.

- **Attacking the Gulf through Iran which would require the crossing of the Khoransan desert and Zagros mountains, a route which would take at least one month, has few roads and rail links and which regardless would be all susceptible to U.S. aerial bombardment and Iranian guerrilla attacks.**

- **Providing tactical air support to advancing armoured columns and spearhead airborne units which would be nearly impossible as only the Su-24 Fencer might have the range capable of covering this area, regardless of whether they are flying out of the U.S.S.R. or Afghanistan.18**

A second argument of the alarmist camp was based on the Soviet desire to secure a warm-water port. No doubt this had been a longstanding objective of the Soviets but to suggest the invasion of Afghanistan was a step in direct pursuit of that long-term goal ignores several strategic developments since the end of the Second World War. In that period, the Soviets had made tremendous advancements in air transport, the overall naval balance and their level of maritime technology which suggests that a new warm-water port was less than critical for Soviet operations in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.19 Moreover, accessing a warm-water port would require it to attack and take over existing port facilities in either Iran or Pakistan. This would entail very high military-strategic costs, not the least of which would be a likely direct U.S. military response to any such encroachments. In fact, the Soviets already had access to anchorage or bases at Aden, Socotra and on Dahlak Island in the Red Sea. According to one Indian scholar: “the plain truth is
that the Soviets now possess a sizable, modern and self-reliant navy whose efficacy does not depend on physical control of warm-water ports [...] It has been operating in the Indian Ocean since the late 1960s without any visible handicap.²⁰ The issue, then, is not whether such facilities would be nice to have; the issue is whether the Soviets invaded Afghanistan to obtain them. That intention is much less clear then the alarmists made it out to be.

Finally, one must examine how the Soviets allocated their defence spending. If the invasion of Afghanistan was part of a long-term military objective, then one should expect to find a correspondingly sufficient amount of money going to the provisions of power projection capabilities. The Soviets, like all militaries, had to rank their defence preferences according to their stated core and peripheral military functions. What one finds is that, from a military standpoint, Third World intervention including the development of appropriate power projection capabilities is ranked last among a half dozen or so defence priorities. According to an assessment by Edward Luttwak, the Soviet military’s core functional priorities were, in order of importance:

- the strategic nuclear balance with the U.S.;
- conventional forces domination of Eastern Europe and linked to the previous objective;
- conventional and nuclear deterrent forces for use against Western Europe;
- maintenance of the nuclear and conventional forces along the Sino-Soviet border; and
- conventional military power projection that can be used in contiguous Third World states, primarily Iran and Afghanistan.²¹

The implications of this defence preference ranking are quite significant. Even during a period of major increases of Soviet defence spending (the period of roughly 1967-1977), they spent just 10% of their budget on capabilities necessary for an invasion of Afghanistan. Moreover, if one looks even closer at defence appropriation shares, the Soviet Air Force directed funds for tactical aviation and not strategic lift, the Army directed funds to its heavy units in Europe and double the number of troops on the Sino-Soviet border and the Navy directed money towards submarines, anti-submarine warfare units and anti-ship missiles.²²

Finally, a final brief word must be said about Soviet combat tactics in the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. If the alarmist argument is to be believed, then one would expect the Soviet military to have and effectively execute an operational plan that would link local security and central government support on the ground to the broader strategic objective of stabilizing the country and containing militant Islam. Although the initial invasion was “masterfully planned and well executed” with the intention to “stabilize the situation, strengthen the Army and then withdraw the bulk of their forces within three years,” the Soviets soon found that the invasion and overthrow of the government was the easy part.²³ A demoralized Afghan Army was unable to stand up to the Mujahideen resistance and the 40th Combined Arms Army (CAA) found itself being drawn into fighting hundreds of guerrilla
groups throughout the country. With this new mission hardly defined and the General Staff lacking any true leadership from Moscow (Premier Brezhnev became incapacitated by 1980) the Army’s instinct was to fight the war it had trained for, using large-scale, high tempo operations. But in fact the war was fought at the low end of the tactical spectrum and as explained by Soviet military experts Grau and Narwoz:

Faced with this imposing security challenge, and burdened with a military doctrine, strategy, and operational and tactical techniques suited to a European or Chinese theater of war, the Soviet Army was hard pressed to devise military methodologies suited to deal with the Afghan guerrillas.

The absence of an effective counter-insurgency doctrine meant that the 120 000 troops of the 40th CAA (and independent regiments) strained to provide security for the 29 provincial centers, as well as myriad industrial and other installations. Extending this security to the thousands of villages, hundred of miles of communications routes and key terrain features that punctuated and spanned that vast region was even more difficult, and the inability of the Soviet military to win the war decisively condemned it to suffer a slow bloodletting. Grau and Gress point to several key failures which when put together account for the Soviets’ poor operational performance in Afghanistan:

The massive experience that Soviet forces gained in their fight with the Basmachi movement was simply forgotten. The more recent experience of Fascist Germany during the Second World War and the experience of other armies that conducted counter-guerrilla actions in local wars were practically ignored. Therefore, the Soviet forces in Afghanistan had to use trial and error to formulate a new military art to combat their unaccustomed foe. This decreased the effectiveness of their combat actions and resulted in unwarranted casualties.

Had the Soviets planned this invasion and occupation as though it were one of its principal objectives in its grand strategic design for the Middle East and South Asia, then it is unlikely they would have so mishandled and misunderstood the nature of the resistance they were likely to face.

The objective of the previous exercise was to counter some of the conventional wisdom which otherwise obstructs an analysis of prime motivating factors in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This was a necessary step because an honest evaluation of the situation requires one to empathize with the “enemy” force and see the prevailing circumstances from that opposing perspective. To that end, the argument of the alarmist camp is weak and is for the most part unsubstantiated, as a case-by-case analysis of grand design motivations
reveals an argument based on faulty or illogical strategic calculations. Furthermore, many of the previously noted scenarios, such as invading Afghanistan for the purposes of seizing Middle East oil or holding a warm-water port confuse effect with motive. That is, there are many minor political and military benefits which the Soviets would gain from a prolonged occupation of Afghanistan, but none of them seem important enough to have had a motivational role. Moreover, the absence of adequate funding for power projection capabilities and the poorly adapted military doctrine employed on the ground provide evidence that an invasion of Afghanistan was given neither the budgetary consideration nor the military attention that one would expect if the invasion was a part of some Soviet grand design.

Evolution of Soviet Third World Assistance and Intervention Policy

Soviet relations with Afghanistan, like other Third World states, were guided by the Marxist-Leninist tenets of socialist/communist revolution in support of "national liberation movements." In either respect, these movements were geared towards defeating the imperialist West and dismantling a colonial system which had politically repressed and economically exploited the Third World. To that end, the Soviets, since Stalin and through the Khrushchev and Brezhnev tenures, increasingly looked upon the Third World as an area of competition with the West. Indeed, the Soviets and in particular the KGB and International Department, clung to a "belief that the Cold War could be won in the Third World."28

During the Khrushchev period, the Soviet Union defined itself and the world in terms of three positions: the socialist camp, the imperialist camp and the non-aligned camp. In fact, this was a departure from what had been Stalin's strictly dichotomous view of the world as being divided into two camps, the imperialist and the socialist. Khrushchev's conception of the world was thus a result of a creeping realism in Soviet foreign policy which, by the time of the invasion of Afghanistan, had had a significant impact on the disposition of Soviet foreign policy.29 Up until this time, the Soviets viewed Third World allegiance as but "a bonus in
foreign policy” and thus limited their involvement to non-military forms of assistance. They feared military involvement in a Third World crisis could inadvertently trigger another World War, this one likely to be nuclear. They therefore kept their involvement limited to economic aid, international moral support and, in some few instances, military-technical assistance but, in general, eschewed direct intervention with their own forces.

The Soviets found an anxious market for their various forms of foreign aid. Third World rulers were eager to emulate the Soviets’ alternative method of economic development, that of “rapid industrialization,” seeing their own economic backwardness as a direct result of imperial exploitation. The Soviets then saw how they could link economic aid to other issue areas, the goal of which would be to promote good will and solidify friendly relations, promote economic and hence political dependence of the target country upon the donor, cultivate an ideological ally and eventually obtain a local military advantage over the West. The case of Afghanistan provides the prototypical example of this strategy. Not surprisingly then, the Soviet military entered and mobilized itself in theatre by using the same highway system, the Herat-Kandahar-Ghasni-Kabul highway, that it had helped build in the 1960s.

By the 1970s though, the Soviet’s military-strategic linkage between local proxy war and superpower war had been broken by a series of Third World crises. The experience of the Arab-Israeli wars, for example, demonstrated to the Soviet leadership that even intense Third World wars were unlikely to draw in the superpowers, as both had mutually realized that any move up the escalation latter (in this case military intervention on behalf of a client state) could quickly and inadvertently spiral out of control. Moreover, the Khrushchev era of Third World “optimism,” which had cost the Soviet economy untold billions of dollars, had given way to a more pragmatic Brezhnev policy. A series of setbacks in Africa and Indonesia as well as the “loss” of Egypt infused within the Soviet foreign policy a more realistic, flexible approach which had much more modest goals than those of Khrushchev’s global socialist revolution. Focus would instead be placed on forming a revolutionary party in the target country, strengthening the armed forces and central government, strengthening links to the masses by penetrating education and labour organizations and assisting target countries in developing stronger ties with other socialist states.

Viewed within this evolving Third World policy construct, the case to intervene in Afghanistan becomes much clearer. The Soviet Union had made a large ideological investment in Afghanistan (to say nothing of its significant economic and military assistance programs) and although not technically obliged to intervene under the prevailing Brezhnev Doctrine, the shock to Soviet prestige and the international allegiance of socialist-oriented
states would have been substantial if non-communist forces, rather than Soviet sympathizers, had overthrown President Hafizullah Amin.

**Military Thought and Third World Intervention**

Just as Soviet Third World policy underwent an evolutionary development process, so too did the military’s thinking about the use of force in support of national liberation movements. The Soviet military witnessed a period of significant growth, especially during the Brezhnev era and there was thus a strong desire to derive political utility from this newfound power. The organizing principle for the military was the belief that military parity, vis-à-vis the U.S., meant the “correlation of forces” which heretofore conditioned Soviet adventurism had finally tilted in favour of the Soviets. The works of the Soviet military intellectual community reflected this changed belief. Throughout the 1970s a plethora of military-authored and -oriented doctrinal writings emerged which emphasized the need, often cast as “duty,” to employ the vast capabilities of the Soviet military in support of progressive movements. These works, whilst written by and directed towards a military audience, no doubt influenced Soviet leadership. Of particular interest was a new interpretation of the traditional correlation of forces precept. As the writings would show, this intervention litmus test was increasingly discussed in a way that divorced military power from its broader social and political context. Accordingly, this evolution in military thought emphasized the utility of military power in non-military confrontations and, in turn, resulted in a kind of militarization of Soviet foreign policy. While this new field of military concern did not supplant the overarching U.S. (NATO)-Soviet security situation, it did raise the concept of Third World intervention from a low priority to an important, secondary level.

Examining a selection of Soviet doctrinal writings from this era provides an insider’s look at how the military believed it could contribute to national liberation movements. The first major work which reflects this new interest in the use of force was Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky’s often cited book, *Military Strategy*. The third edition of this work, written at the height of the Vietnam War, stated: “the U.S.S.R. will render, when it is necessary, military support as well to people subject to imperialist aggression.” This work, by one of the military’s most well known intellectuals, paved the way for the authoritative *Marxism Leninism on War and Army* which was written by a dozen or so top Soviet military intellectuals. Among its many themes was the concept of Third World intervention:

> In their struggle for the noncapitalist road of development [...] these people rely on the compressive assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, including also their help in setting up and developing their national armed forces and in organizing the armed defence of their countries against imperial aggressors. The Soviet Government has repeatedly declared that it has always given and continues to give various assistance to peoples fighting against imperialist intervention in their affairs, and will assist victims of imperialist aggression by all, including military, means. In modern conditions, when
the relation of forces in the world continues to change in favour of peace, democracy and socialism, while imperialism intensifies its aggressive ventures, the defensive might of the USSR and other socialist countries, [and] the combat efficiency and readiness of their armed forces are a most important factors in securing historical progress.\textsuperscript{36}

Other works examined the deterrent value of Soviet nuclear forces in support of liberation movements as did Colonel V.M. Kulish in \textit{Military Force and International Relations}:

At the present time the principle means for re\[s\]training imperialist aggressors in all regions of the world is the ability of the USSR to deliver nuclear missile weapons to any point on the earth's surface […] However this form will not always be effective in those situations that could develop into limited wars […] In connection with the task of preventing local wars and also in those cases wherein military support must be furnished to those nations fighting for their freedom and independence against the forces of internal reaction and imperialist intervention, the Soviet Union may require mobile and well-trained and well-equipped armed forces. In some situations the very knowledge of a Soviet military presence in an area in which a conflict situation is developing may serve to restrain the imperialists and local reaction.\textsuperscript{37}

By the early 1970s still other writers, such as Marshall Grechko, declared that “defending the entire socialist community and the worldwide historical values of socialism” was a new mission for the armed forces. Three years later and as a full member of the Politburo, Grechko stated that the functions of the Soviet armed forces were not limited to the defence of the socialist world:

In its foreign policy activity the Soviet state purposefully opposes the export of counterrevolution and policy of oppression, supports the national liberation struggle, and resolutely resists imperialists’ aggression in whatever distant region of our planet it might appear.\textsuperscript{38}

Later works in the 1970s emphasized the role of collaboration with other Socialist forces, while still others dealt with the role of sea power in defending the Soviet Union and its fellow Socialist states. The important conclusion to be drawn is that clearly a new thought was proliferating throughout the Soviet High Command with regard to the use of force in the Third World. Furthermore, and as a consequence of the couching of armed intervention in terms of Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, the purpose of such activity when conducted by the West was inherently reactionary and evil, while such activity by the Soviets was of course progressive and moral by definition.

In a final twist for Western observers of Soviet military thought, the Red Army’s effort to study at great lengths the American intervention in Vietnam may have had the ironic, though unintended, consequence of \textit{inducing} the Soviets to intervene in Afghanistan. Zimmerman and Axelrod, who undertook a massive content analysis of Soviet literature on the Vietnam War, argued the following:
The lessons the Soviets drew, however, did not warn them of the dangers of such an intervention by Soviet forces. On the contrary, the frequent assertion that aid from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries had been important in Vietnam may have increased their propensity to intervene in Afghanistan.39

Therefore, Soviet analysis of the Vietnam War focused on the technical and tactical aspects of the U.S. intervention40 and ignored important non-military aspects such as gaining the popular support of the people, understanding the nature of internal resistance groups and understanding the impact such interventions had on regional stability and international relations in general. Of the many lessons American observers learned from the Vietnam experience, the need to understand the nature of the conflict from the perspective of the target population was the most critical. In the case of Vietnam, the Vietnamese people saw the conflict as principally a political struggle, partly a competition to gain the loyalty of the people but also to defeat what was seen as a new, post-French, colonial power. Of course this contrasts sharply with the American perspective which saw the conflict as just one more battleground in the superpower competition for the Third World.

These non-military lessons seem to have been lost to Soviet strategists who, as the content analysis suggests, saw the cause of the failed American intervention as being primarily a tactical and logistical breakdown. Unlike the American operation in Vietnam, the Soviet operation in Afghanistan would occur close to Soviet military bases in Central Asia thereby reducing the logistical burden. This fact, coupled with a mistaken belief in the strength and skill of the Afghan resistance, put the balance of effort into military aspects of the intervention (which seemed relatively straightforward and simple). The promise of a quick and easy military victory would completely overshadow efforts to understand the political and cultural dimensions of the Afghan crisis. As such, the Soviet intervention would suffer a fate similar to that of the United States in Vietnam.
The Bureaucratization of the Afghanistan Crisis: KGB, the International Department and the ‘A’ Committee

As has been mentioned earlier, Soviet interest in the Third World began to accelerate during Khrushchev’s premiership. But when Khrushchev took office his enthusiasm for the prospects of Third World revolution was not shared by the various under-funded arms of the Soviet bureaucracy. In the early 1960s, he and his government undertook a full-scale revamping of Soviet institutions which serviced the Third World. Khrushchev shared the belief of the Soviet Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Oriental Studies which, following the Twentieth Party Congress (1956) stated that its work:

[…] had been greatly harmed by a failure to understand the nature and depth of the contradiction existing between the forces of imperialism and internal reaction, on the one hand, and those of national progress in the non-socialist Eastern countries on the other.

This reorganization effort centered around two arms of government: the intelligence services and the foreign affairs departments of the Central Committee. In particular, both the Committee for State Security (KGB) and military intelligence (GRU-Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff) were given specific geographical briefs relating to Third World information gathering. As well, the International Department and the Department for Relations with Communist and Workers’ Parties of Socialist Countries (later called the International Liaison Department) were created by a reorganization of the Central Committee’s international work. These two arms of government would eventually develop into the principal mechanisms for carrying out Soviet Third World policy and their activities during the Afghan crisis are of particular relevance to this study.

While conventional wisdom might suggest that responsibility for the Soviet policy in the Third World was the purview of the Foreign Ministry and its venerable Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, in actuality it was the KGB and the International Department which took the initiative in the global struggle against imperialism. Gromyko “was a cautious man who opposed any serious confrontation with the West [and] he believed that events [in the Third World] could not influence [their] fundamental relations with the United States.” It then stands to reason that bureaucratic initiatives by these two symbiotic bodies played a major
role in the development of the Afghan crisis. Exploring this aspect of the crisis is made possible by the work of the Cold War International History Project which, with the documentation provided by ex-KGB archivist and defector Vasili Mitrokhin, provides a unique insight as to how these two organizations worked to further Soviet interests in Afghanistan and, perhaps inadvertently, were at least partly responsible for the invasion.

According to Mitrokhin, the KGB had been alerted well in advance of the April 1978 coup by two of the Afghan Army’s senior military leaders, both of whom were Soviet agents. Once his ascent to power had been assured, then-President Nur Muhammad Taraki claimed the socialist revolution could have taken place sooner had it not been for the hesitancy of Soviet leadership to authorize more “active measures” by the KGB. Taraki himself had been in contact with the KGB for over thirty years. Upon assuming leadership of the PDPA (Afghan Communist Party) he dropped his official contact with them but still provided intelligence, scouted for KGB talent and assisted the KGB in its on-going operations against the U.S. and Chinese embassies.46

The KGB had also been well aware of the split within the PDPA which divided the Party between Taraki’s Pashtun-speaking Khalq group (the Masses) and Karmal’s Persian Parcham group (the Banner). The KGB repeatedly argued that Taraki showed little grasp of the problems associated with establishing communist rule in an Islamic state such as Afghanistan. Among the criticisms of Taraki were his reforms aimed at land distribution, education of women and the denigration of Afghanistan’s 320 000 mullahs, all of which failed to take into account Afghanistan’s historical resistance towards centralized government and the predominance of the tribal system.47 While at the same time browbeating the Soviets for being too slow and cautious with regard to his reforms, Taraki was almost wholly dependent on his Soviet advisory teams as the purge which followed his ascension to power removed the most competent and experienced members of the civilian and military bureaucracy.48 Therefore, Taraki was increasingly viewed as a puppet of the Soviets and thus galvanized Islamic opposition to the PDPA and its Soviet backers.

Taraki also struggled with internal challenges to his rule. Hafizullah Amin, then leader of the Khalq group of the PDPA, repeatedly clashed with Taraki. Eventually his challenges pushed Taraki to implore the Soviets to send their own military forces to help him consolidate his rule. This meant that he wanted the Soviets to assassinate Amin who, upon learning of this request, had Taraki killed upon his return from Moscow on September 1, 1979. The KGB was even more distrustful of Amin, and in the months following Taraki’s assassination repeatedly blamed Amin for the collapse of communist rule in Afghanistan. He was described as “a smooth talking fascist” whose brief and clandestine meetings with American officials made the Soviet leadership fear he might “pull a Sadat on us” (as occurred with Egyptian President Muhammad Anwar El Sadat) and defect to the American camp.50 Following the Iranian revolution, the KGB found itself preoccupied with trying to link instability in Afghanistan with American efforts to replace its lost position in Iran with Afghanistan.50

Prior to the assassination of Taraki, Brezhnev had delegated all policy responsibility for Afghanistan to a Politburo committee which included such influential figures as Andrei Gromyko, Yuri Andropov (head of the KGB) and Defence Minister Dmitry Ustinov. After several inspections of the country, the committee—known as the “A” committee (owing to issues of secrecy)—increased general aid and military advisory teams to re-equip and boost the morale of the Afghan National Army who, up to this point, had struggled to contain increased insurgent activity. As the situation began to deteriorate, Andropov repeatedly approached Brezhnev with recommendations to send a limited intervention force to Afghanistan. Thus far, Andropov could have been accused of employing “active measures” himself as he had been providing the Politburo with misleading intelligence reports.51 As well, and in collusion with Ustinov, Andropov sought to narrow the field of participation in the decision-making process to a minimum so as to ensure that the intervention decision was not delayed by the formal submission of reports from various government departments.52 In defending his actions, Andropov was quoted as saying to a subordinate “should we just give over Afghanistan to the Americans?”53 He was “once again economical with the truth”54
when he met with Brezhnev in late 1979, exaggerating the dangerous potential of a West-leaning President Amin:

We have been receiving information about Amin’s behind-the-scenes activities which maybe mean his political reorientation to the West. He keeps his contacts with the American chargé d’affairs secret from us. He promised tribal leaders to distance himself from the Soviet Union [...] In closed meetings he attacks Soviet policy and the activities of our specialists. Our ambassador was practically expelled from Kabul. These developments have created on the one hand, a danger of losing the domestic achievements of the Afghan revolution, and, on the other hand, a threat to our positions in Afghanistan. Now there is no guarantee that Amin, in order to secure his personal power, would not turn to the Americans.55

Fortunately for Brezhnev, Andropov had a ready solution:

Recently we were contacted by a group of Afghan Communists residing abroad [...] they informed us officially that they had worked out a plan for moving against Amin and for forming new state and party organs [...] we have two battalions stationed in Kabul, so we can provide certain assistance if there is a need. However, just for an emergency, for extreme circumstances, we need to have a group of forces stationed along the border.56

By December 12 of that year, Brezhnev and the Politburo had given authorization for a limited military intervention under the impression that the whole operation would take but a few weeks, immediately after which “the real communists in Kabul could take over” and the Soviet role could be minimized.57 The Central Committee then turned to Andropov and the KGB to launch the spearhead of the invasion, a 700-man KGB Special Forces group which stormed the Presidential palace and killed President Amin.58 The follow-on invasion was carried out by Ustinov with minimal interference from other members of the Committee.

Given these assumptions, Brezhnev was willing to bear the international costs of the invasion. But what he could not have known was that Afghan communism had already self-destructed by the summer of 1979, well ahead of the actual invasion date. As such, Mitrokhin’s unique account of the events surrounding the invasion of Afghanistan provides historians with an immensely useful type of information. Internal documents which illustrate the decision-making process show that a government department notorious for aggressive paranoia and the strong personality of key government figures ultimately exercised disproportionate influence over the decision-making process which eventually led to a military intervention in Afghanistan.
Conclusion: The Cost-Benefit Calculus of Military Intervention

It was initially posited that the Soviet grand design argument was insufficient to explain the most significant motivational factors which influenced Soviet decision-making in the years leading up to the 1979 invasion. Unlike this simplified thesis, the decision to intervene in Afghanistan was in fact a defensive, knee-jerk reaction to an evolving internal Afghan crisis and, as such, had more to do with non-military, proximate factors rather than grand strategy. The Soviet military option was considered viable because an atmosphere conducive to interventionist thought and policy existed within the ideological and bureaucratic structure of the Soviet government. Accordingly, policy-makers within the foreign relations, military and intelligence organizations increasingly viewed military force as being the most effective means to combat internal Afghan instability. Moreover, with the collapse of détente, Soviet policy-makers saw little international resistance to, or repercussions stemming from, an invasion of a country beyond the borders of the Warsaw Pact. Effectively, this near-total absence of internal or external constraints on Soviet behaviour allowed new thinking concerning Third World intervention policy to gain traction at the highest policy-making levels. This analytical framework, which emphasizes the importance of policy-making context, permits a more nuanced appreciation of the stresses and demands which Soviet policy-makers had to contend with while working to develop appropriate responses to the Afghan crisis.

The basic intervention decision faced by Soviet policy-makers in the closing years of the 1970s was a simple cost-benefit calculation. While a straightforward process in principle, the internal chaos of Afghanistan meant policy-makers had to base their decisions on imperfect information. Adding to the complexity of the situation were the differing per-
spectives and opinions of myriad government bodies including the military, the intelligence services, the International Department and the executive committee of the Politburo. Each saw realities and events in a slightly different way and often attached a sense of immediacy to each new turn in the crisis. It is not surprising then that, unconsciously or not, the costs of intervention were downplayed while the benefits were exaggerated.

In terms of the constraints facing the Soviet Union, one could argue that the Soviets did not need to worry too much about domestic displeasure with the invasion. As in most authoritarian countries, only the most potent displeasure with government policy could actually effect a change in policy. The other constraint facing the Soviets was the potential implication of inaction. One could consider the effect Soviet non-intervention played in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, where the defeat of a long-standing Soviet ally pushed Egypt into the Western camp for good. Alliance considerations likely weighed heavily on decision-makers and they likely viewed the impact on Soviet international prestige and credibility to have been significant, if not fatal to international socialism. Another major concern must have been the potential for instability in Soviet Central Asia. The prospect of an amorphous and dogged militant Islamic movement spreading into Soviet territory and undermining years of domination and control undoubtedly put the fear of national disintegration in the minds of policymakers.

Finally, the Soviets would have been unlikely to intervene had there been any credible chance that they would have been met with direct American military resistance. As was mentioned previously, this fear had weighed heavy in the past and likely influenced the final decision to invade. Absent any direct American interests in Afghanistan, an invasion, they calculated (correctly), would go unchallenged (although President Carter stopped grain shipments to the U.S.S.R. and boycotted the Moscow Olympics). The collapse of the SALT II talks also meant the Soviets had little to lose on the international stage and the Carter Administration’s preoccupation with the collapse of the Shah’s regime (in Iran) would also dissipate any desire on the part of the Americans to interdict a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
The Soviets perceived that the benefits of invasion were roughly counter-balanced by the costs of invasion. Success in Afghanistan would give a much desired boost to their international credibility as a guarantor of international socialism and may have even encouraged a few defections from sympathetic countries in the Western world. A successful invasion could also be held up the public at home and distract the people from their economic hardships and lack of political participation. Another major reason, one which Brezhnev himself endorsed, was the removal from power of the tyrannical President Amin whose questionable loyalty was of the highest concern for the KGB. It was precisely the fact that Amin was not (and had never been) a KGB source in Afghanistan that so concerned the security service. It was likely argued that the Afghan people would rise up in support of a Soviet force whose primary objective was the installation of a more moderate and populist national leader.

The military also believed it had a necessary role to play in effecting political change in the Third World and likely viewed its role as a tipping agent in the American defeat in Vietnam as being easily reproducible in a conflict in Afghanistan. This belief was probably shared by the Soviet executive committee in charge of Afghan policy believing, like the military, that the invasion would be a quick and easy affair. They would rely on the same strategy that brought them earlier success in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, although this ally was thought even weaker, making a victory even easier to achieve. Committee Chairman Andropov, one of the key proponents of using military force to put down civil uprisings, was repeatedly described as suffering from “Hungarian Syndrome” and this earlier experience undoubtedly made invasion seem a sure-fire means to success. Even if one were to reverse the cost-benefit calculation for invasion, the likely argument for invasion was that the costs of inaction would far outweigh the political, economic and military costs of intervening with military force.

The evolution of the Afghanistan crisis and the military intervention which followed, like other Cold War hot spots, was an exceedingly complex set of events which took place over the course of many years and involved the participation of dozens of foreign entities and domestic actors. Owing to this, the crisis, invasion and occupation defy simple explanation, not the least of which is the argument put forward by alarmist American policymakers. While it is quite right to characterize much of Russian history as fluctuating between periods of territorial expansion and contraction, the contextual environment within which the Soviet intervention occurred cannot be simply ignored as a null variable. Adding to this complexity is the fact that there are many different contexts, all of which were dynamic and interactive, and as this essay has attempted to show they must all be considered if events and realities are to be properly understood. Reductionist theories like that of the Soviet grand design exaggerate threat, obscure intent and cast Soviet actions as being guided by policy-makers whose omniscience borders on the infallible. One the great Sovietologists of our time, Henry Kissinger, has cogently described the realities of assessing Soviet foreign policy intent:

> It is always tempting to arrange diverse Soviet moves into a grand design. The more esoteric brands of Kremlinology often purport to see each and every move as part of the carefully orchestrated score in which events inexorably move to the grand finale. Experience has shown that this has rarely if ever been the case. From the Cuban missile crisis [...] to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, there has been a large element of improvisation in Soviet policy.

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**About the Author...**

Michael Stocker is currently completing his Masters of Arts degree in War Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada.
Endnotes

2. Ibid., p. 2.
3. Ibid., p. 2.
4. Ibid., p. 10.
5. Ibid., p. 826.
11. Ibid., p. 938.
13. Ibid., p. 130.
15. Ibid., p. 131.
18. Menon, p. 198-120.
24. Ibid., p. xxiii.
26. Ibid.
31. Andrew and Mitrokhin, p. 5.
32. Triska and Finely, p. 251.
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42. Ibid., p. 68.
43. Ibid., p. 68.
44. Andrew and Mitrokhin, p. 10.
45. Ibid., p. 10.
46. Ibid., p. 387.
47. Westad, p. 308.
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55. Westad, p. 319.
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58. Andrew and Mitrokhin, p. 402.
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COURAGE AND REWARD IN THE WAR OF 1812

T. Robert Fowler

On June 18, 1812, the United States of American declared war on Great Britain, and the inhabitants of British North America found themselves facing a bitter struggle that would fully test the extent of their courage. During the next three years, Upper and Lower Canada would face invasion, and the farmers and merchants of these western territories would be called to leave their families and to take up arms in defence of their entire way of life. That Canadians chose to leave all that was dear to them to defend their homes in the War of 1812 showed great tenacity and courage. Yet the rewards they received for doing so and for defending Canada were somewhat lacking, overshadowed by the politics and events of the great battles being fought simultaneously at that time in Europe. The situation has since raised many questions about both courage and reward in the War of 1812, and this article examines the relationship between these two subjects in greater detail.

The Great War in North America

Only forty-nine years earlier at the end of the Seven Year’s War (1756-1763), French Canada had become a British possession. The population of this new territory was only about 60,000 inhabitants, the majority of which were located mainly east of Montreal. West of that town, only a few frontier settlements existed, scattered along the waterways in a wilderness travelled only by Indians and fur traders. This picture began to change, however, twenty years later as a result of the American Revolution. At the end of that war in 1783, those who had remained loyal to Britain in the new United States became unwanted residents and were forced to leave. Thousands of refugees struggled across the border into Canada, beginning a population growth that over the next fifteen years transformed the shores of the St. Lawrence and Niagara Rivers, and of Lakes Ontario and Erie.

In 1791, Canada was divided into two separate provinces. Of these, Lower Canada remained the dominant province, with a population that grew to 330,000 inhabitants by 1812. The province remained largely French speaking and retained its French civil laws and customs. Many of the original French aristocracy had accepted the transfer of power to Britain, continuing in their role as seigneurs in French-Canadian society. Most of these men had long family traditions of military service and they now gained officers’ commissions to fight for the British army in the latter years of the 18th century. For example, Francois Vassal de Monviel, who became Adjutant-General of Militia in Lower Canada during the War of 1812, had served in the British army during the Revolutionary War, then in Holland under the Duke of York, and finally as a captain in the Royal Canadian Volunteers.¹ The courage and dedication to duty of these men would now be needed more than ever as their homes came to be threatened by invasion.

In the western province of Upper Canada, the population also grew, reaching 90,000 by 1812, with principal towns located at Kingston, York (Toronto) and Newark (Niagara). As in Lower Canada, this population remained basically rural, with largely uneducated settlers continuing to devote their efforts to looking after farms. Larger landowners—typically former officers in the army—and merchants in the towns had begun to form an upper class in this colonial society. These men remained very loyal to Great Britain and the King, many firmly believing that the British form of government was superior to the chaotic republicanism of the United States. From a practical point of view, they were keenly aware that their source of wealth and status came from the main industry of supplying the British army garrisons. This loyalty was passed on to their children who would be educated in the few private schools in this frontier society, where they were taught the British upper class ideals of duty, chivalry and courage.
Peace had returned to North America in 1783 following the Revolutionary War, but the new United States of America was a restless country and many irritants remained between governments. The American rebels had already invaded Canada during the past war and, as a result, defence of the remaining British North American colonies was a continuing concern. Traditionally, even back in the French colonial period, arrangements for defence of the colony had been built around a small force of regular troops backed up by a militia composed of all adult male inhabitants. This approach continued in Lower Canada under the British regime and was instituted in Upper Canada in 1793 when the first militia act was passed, dividing the new province into militia districts each with its own regiment. However, the militia’s organization and training remained poor. Men were mustered for only one weekend in April, at which time their arms would be inspected and a few drills carried out. After this, everyone usually gathered in the local tavern. Officers were commissioned from the more influential gentry and merchants, and too often colonels were appointed based on political patronage. Fortunately, among these men, some former British army officers could be found in both Upper and Lower Canada and these provided competent leadership to some of the militia regiments. Overall, however, defence of the colonies continued to depend primarily upon the small British army garrison.

Following the outbreak of war in 1793 between Great Britain and revolutionary France, relations with the United States began to deteriorate. The Americans became angered by the imposition of British laws that required all trade with France to first pass through British ports; they became infuriated when British ships began to intercept U.S. ships on the high seas. On the continent, American settlers in the western territories blamed their continuing conflicts with the Indians on British practices of trading with these tribes, identifying in particular the post at Fort Malden on the Detroit River as a source of unrest. Thus, when members of the U.S. government began to preach that America had a God-given mission to take over the entire continent, it was only a matter of time before they put these beliefs into action a few years later.

**Courage in 1812**

Warfare in this early age of gunpowder weapons was a fearsome experience. In some battles in Europe, as many as half of the men going into battle could be killed, wounded or captured. Now, facing such a war in their own land, Canadians would have to find a different kind of courage than that previously needed to tame the wilderness.

The regular British soldier had long established a reputation for courage. But this soldier was also called “the scum of the earth” by Wellington, and for good reason. The typical British soldier came from the lowest classes of society, usually uneducated, fond of drink, inured to hardship. Lacking in imagination, he expected nothing more than to fight Britain’s wars for the full period of enlistment, usually twenty-one years. With such raw material, brutal discipline was imposed to produce a soldier that would obey orders instantly under any condition. Some degree of apparent courage, or ability to overcome fear in battle, would result from training to mindlessly follow the drill instilled in them. Such courage, however, had no initiative and could evaporate if leaders were not present to inspire the men.

But was it only fear of flogging made the British soldier stand firmly upright in the face of dreadful fire? To face deadly circumstances with courage and zeal requires more than discipline. To fully understand this quality, we would have to look back into the mind of a 19th century soldier to see what inspired him. But from the memoirs that exist, we can identify...
some themes that seem to be universal: loyalty to one’s comrades, pride in the regiment, sense of national superiority, attainment of glory, determination to do one’s duty, and a fatalistic attitude to danger.

The first factor that has inspired the common soldier throughout history has been the comradeship of the primary group. Because enlistments in this period lasted for over twenty years, men who had served much of their adult life together in the regiment would have developed close personal links with their comrades and would need to maintain their respect to survive. The constant drilling which taught platoons to act as a common body would have reinforced this relationship. One soldier of the 71st Highlanders described how this sense of community helped bolster him in his first battle in 1808:

In our first charge, I felt my mind waiver; a breathless sensation came over me. The silence was appalling. I looked along the line. It was enough to assure me. The steady, determined scowl of my companions assured my heart and gave me determination.3

At the siege of Fort Meigs in 1813, a fierce battle took place as the Americans marched out to capture the British artillery. Private Shadrach Byfield and another soldier of the 41st Foot were in a safe place when they saw the American advance.

...my comrade said to me, “We can stop here, we have no need to go back to the fight,” but I replied, “What! See your comrades fighting, and not go back to help them; if you don’t go back, I will shoot you.”4

While a soldier could easily relate to the primary group, comprising the soldier’s platoon or company, the regiment in 1812 provided a great motivation to courage. Upon enlisting, the regiment became a soldier’s home for the rest of his service life. Loyalty and pride in the regiment came to represent an almost spiritual symbol of past glory that present members were responsible to uphold. Within the British army itself, members of one regiment were determined they would show themselves as more courageous than other regiments. The historian John Keegan tells of an incident at the battle of Waterloo, when an explosive shell fell in the middle of the 52nd Regiment’s square.

The shell burst and seven poor fellows were struck by fragments. Men who flinched were reproved: when a shell passed over a column of the 52nd, the men ‘instantly bobbed their heads;’ Colborne, the commanding officer, shouted, ‘For shame, for shame! That must be the 2nd Battalion (who were recruits), I am sure.’ In an instant, every man’s head went as straight as an arrow.5

The inspiration to act courageously would also come from the 19th century’s high regard for glory. This had always been a motivating factor for the upper class. Now, however, with the American and French Revolutions, the common man had become conscious that he could share in attaining this mark of esteem in the eyes of others. Barbara Ehrenreich has argued that glory was “democratized” in this era, most obviously in the American and French Revolutions when men began to feel a personal dedication to the state to which they now felt some allegiance.6

Infantry of the line would normally have little opportunity in the 19th century to gain glory through individual acts of gallantry because of the rigid battle tactics followed. However, doing his duty rigorously without complaint under dreadful conditions could bring him his share of honour at least in the eyes of his peers. This attitude bolstered the morale of a private of the 71st Highlanders during his first battle: “After the firing commenced, a still sensation stole over my whole frame, a firm determined torpor, boarding on insensibility. I heard an old soldier answer, to a youth like myself, who inquired what he should do during the battle, “Do your duty.” Soldiers would make sure that others also did their duty. Shadrack Byfield of the 41st Foot described an incident at the siege of Fort Meigs, the attacking British force was being decimated by enemy fire. “Our men, generally, were determined. I saw one of them turn round, his comrade observed it, and said, if he did not face the fire, he would run his bayonet through him.”8
The British soldier, no matter how lowly his origin, was also sustained in battle and often inspired to act courageously by a fierce dedication to his country, which he felt was superior to all others. In contemporary times where democratic ideals inspire people, this could better be described as "belief in the cause." Two hundred years ago, however, unwavering dedication was simply to King and country. Private John Shipp felt this when he entered a life of military service, thinking "my ambition was to make a name for myself, and if I were to fall I could not die in a better cause than fighting for my King and country. All this lay at the back of my mind ...."9 An officer of the 71st Foot, when ordered to attack against impossible odds, sought to inspire his men by calling out to them, "Mind your duty lads; onwards, onwards. Britain for ever."10

The British soldier's sense of superiority also came from having confidence in his weapon and his ability to use it effectively. Lieutenant Gleig pointed this out when he pointed out that "when the two lines oppose each other, very little depends upon the accuracy with which individuals take aim. It is then that the habit of acting in concert, the confidence which each man feels in his companions, and the rapidity and good order in which different movement can be executed are alone of real service."11

Some have said that the soldier of these times lacked imagination, because of his harsh upbringing and lack of education, and therefore was less sensitive to fear. In a brutal age, men learned not to expect too much and live only from day to day. From whatever reason, men of this period seemed to have developed a more fatalistic attitude to death than in present times, which sustained their courage even in the mouth of a cannon. A veteran passed this attitude on to a new officer at the siege of Montevideo, where the shells of the enemy were falling, often near where I stood; one, in particular, seemed as if it would fall at our feet. A young officer ran backwards and was, as if he would hide himself, an old soldier said to him, with all the gravity of a Turk, 'You need not hide, Sir; if there is any thing there for you, it will find you out.' The young officer looked confused, stood to his duty, and I never saw him appear uneasy again: so soon was he converted to the warrior's doctrine.12

Repeated successful experiences in combat allowed a soldier to show more courage in battle. Firstly, through giving him more confidence in his weapons and ability, but also through that psychological process whereby a soldier's sensitivity to fear is not only raised but pushed back in his mind—a "numbing" that might inhibit the fresh recruit. After many battles in Spain, a soldier of the 71st Regiment reflected this process, on crossing the Pyrenees into France, when he described that the day's service had been very severe, but now I took it with the coolest indifference. I felt no alarm; it was all of course. I began to think my body charmed. My mind had come to that pass I took everything as it came without a thought.13

If the private soldier had little chance to display individual courage, an officer on the other hand had the opportunity and sought to display it as the highest mark of esteem in his profession. In the 19th century, officers came mainly from the upper classes and were expected to show respect for personal honour, courage and unselfishness—the qualities of a gentleman.14 Gentlemen typically had a privileged upbringing, had been educated at private schools, and expected obedience from those they commanded. From this training, they viewed war as an adventure and an opportunity to enhance one's reputation. In Lower Canada, upholding the military honour of one's family tradition was perhaps even more important than in Upper Canada. An officer who had just joined the Canadian Voltiguers received a letter from his father, stating, "I am delighted that you have made the choice for arms, to serve the King, our Religion and your Country. It is the most honourable profession in which a young man of valour and courage can win distinction and make his way..."15

The old traditions of chivalry, where the achievement of "glory" was the main object of warfare, still motivated behaviour for this class. Historian John Keegan writes of the "Homerik
ideal of heroism, in which the hero seeks the challenge of single combat in order to display his fearlessness, particularly to other men of equal social rank. This motivated officers in the 19th century and could only be achieved by being visible on the battlefield, where courage could be demonstrated by acts such as disregarding enemy fire or continuing to perform one’s duty even when wounded. On the other hand, showing fear or even admitting to fear was unacceptable and considered a mark of dishonour that could ruin a man’s life, be it by officer or common soldier. A French officer in the Russia campaign rationalized his need to face death rather than fear it, by thinking:

This is what gave me the coolness under fire which is so essential. I said to myself: “It is a lottery whether you survive or not. One has to die sometime. Would you rather live in dishonour or die with honour?” I had no difficulty in making my choice....

Display of courage by senior officers was in fact an obligation, regardless of rank. The display of courage by an officer was recognized as especially important in motivating the rank and file. In all wars, courage has been infectious, as seeing their officer acting coolly under fire would steady and encourage the common soldier. At Lundy’s Lane in 1814, Lieutenant-Colonel William Drummond of the 104th Foot did not attempt to avoid the enemy fire, but remained “seated on his war horse like a knightly man of valour as he was exposed to a ragged fire from hundreds of brave Yankees ....” When ordered to lie down to avoid the enemy fire, a private of the 104th refused, replying that “Wall sir, do ye no see Co[j]onel Drummond sitting on that great horse, up there amongst the balls—and safe I be laying down, sneaking when he’s exposed—No I wunt!” It would be dishonourable to show fear when the commanding officer did not.

Such leadership was expected not only of the company commander but also all the way up to the commanding general. Indeed, the general could significantly influence the battle by inspiring courage at the critical point and change defeat into victory. John Shipp wrote of a battle for a fort in India during this period, in which the attackers were faltering under fire. When this happened, “our courageous little General dashed through the water, and in an instant was up on the breach among the men, cheering them on to still fiercer efforts. With this new impetus the enemy were driven back into the fort and we gained possession of the outwork.” At his trial after his defeat at Moraviantown in 1813, one of the charges made against Major-General William Proctor was failing to “rally or encourage” his men. Providing such leadership did take great courage, for the risk of death was very real despite the inaccuracy of individual muskets, and officer casualties in battles were often high. For example, in Europe, Napoleon’s army lost twelve generals killed and thirty-seven wounded in 1812 in one of the battles of great armies at Borodino.

While the above factors can help explain the courage of a soldier in the regular British army, where would an officer or private soldier of the militia find his strength? They would not have any regimental tradition to bolster them because militia regiments had really been more in the nature of social organizations up to this time. Many militiamen would not have any deep sense of national pride to inspire them; these were simple uneducated settlers whose main struggle was to survive from one growing season to another. To them, the conflict was really between remote Great Britain and the republican Americans. In addition, officers in the militia had little in common with British officers who usually obtained their commissions through purchase, which ensured that only “gentlemen of good breeding” would become leaders. In the Canadian militia, this system was not employed, since there was no aristocracy to draw from. Instead, officers were appointed from those men who had the highest social status in each area, usually wealthy landowners or merchants, many of whom had only achieved this elevation in the colonies.

In the War of 1812, only a very small portion of the population became involved in actual combat—that is, those men who joined fencible regiments or the incorporated militia, or volunteered for the flank companies of the sedentary militia. This group would have represented that segment of the population who felt pride in being part of the British Empire and, as a result, held a strong sense of duty. In Upper Canada, these men were most likely to be found in the rustic towns, where British traditions were practised, such as wearing
powdered wigs and engaging in the sport of fox hunting (even if it was on the ice of York harbour). In Lower Canada, the source of this sense of duty was more complex since the predominantly French-speaking population had only recently come under British rule. Despite Prevost’s reservations, the Lower Canada militia responded well, as one observer noted on coming across several regiments on the march:

“They marched merrily along to the music of their voyageur songs, and as they perceived our uniform as we came up, they sent up the Indian War-whoop, followed by a shout of Vive le Roi along the whole line.”

Even in the colonies, war could now provide an opportunity to enhance one’s honour through display of courage. One’s reputation was so critical in the 1800s that any presumed insult could lead to a duel where honour could be retrieved by a display of fearlessness toward danger. For example, the Attorney-General of Upper Canada, John Macdonell, felt the need to fight a duel with the Treasurer of the Law Society of Upper Canada in 1812 because of what he felt were “insults which as a gentleman I cannot submit to.” Now, by responding with a sense of duty and perhaps having the opportunity to show courage in battle, honour could be obtained on the field of battle.

The best examples of courage, however, came from those men who had what one would describe as natural fighting spirit. Such men, for one reason on another, looked forward to battle to satisfy a natural urge for action. Their need to overcome an enemy was greater than their threshold of fear, accepting the danger without reservation. Daniel Baxter must have been such a man—he travelled all the way to York from the Eastern District to enlist in the Incorporated Militia, only to be immediately discharged because he was 63 years of age. Private Thomas Ross showed stubborn determination to carry on after being severely wounded in the attack on Ogdensburg, by sitting down upon a log and continuing to fire until an enemy musket ball smashed his weapon. Perhaps the most outstanding example of such a man was John Norton, who led the warriors from the Six Nations fighting in the war. Norton was not Iroquois but, being the son of a Cherokee father and Scottish mother, felt at home on the Grand River and was adopted as a “nephew” by Chief Joseph Brant. On the outbreak of war, Norton had no doubt that honour demanded they actively support the British side. While the Mohawk Council remained neutral in face of the United States numerical superiority, he assembled what warriors would join him and led these to join Brock at Detroit with the belief that:

“as Numbers did not always ensure victory, so the Lack of mine should never dishearten me from trying the Enemy—even when good Cause encouraged me to trust in him above who decides the Event of Battles.”

For the remainder of the war, he was involved almost constantly in the fighting in the Niagara area, including the battles of Queenston Heights, Fort George, Stoney Creek, Chippawa, Lundy’s Lane and Fort Erie, as well as numerous reconnoitring expeditions. In these actions, he led his warriors with such initiative that General Sheaffe appointed him “Captain of the Confederate Indians.” His fighting spirit was such that, on learning of the plans to attack Fort Erie in August 1814, he told his men that

“although we had received no directions to join in the attack, I could not consent to lie inactive, whilst our friends the Red Coats were going to undertake an arduous contest—that if any were inclined to follow they should prepare and be in readiness to move forward...”

Thus, on the eve of war, the Canadas would be defended by a handful of British and fencible troops, few in number but superbly trained. And with them would stand the most dedicated men from the militia and native peoples. While the bulk of the sedentary militia was poorly trained and motivated, there was a sufficient core of dedicated men who strongly felt that it was their duty to defend their homes and families, as well as the British system under which they lived. Courage would be found in these men the coming war.
British Honours and Awards in the War of 1812

At the time of the War of 1812, only two awards were available to recognize officers in the regular army who had served with distinction and courage—the Order of the Bath and the Army Gold Medal. The Order of the Bath had been created in 1725 by George I as a Military Order of Knighthood and, in the wars over the next seventy-five years, came considered a prestigious award. It had become so well-regarded that Nelson, on being told that he might be appointed a baronet for his role in the naval victory off Cape Vincent in 1797, replied that "if they want to mark my services it must not be in that manner. If these services have been of any value, let them be noticed in a way that the public may know of them, by appointment to the Bath."

The number of appointments to the Order of the Bath, however, was limited to thirty-five members. Thus, as the war with Napoleon dragged on, more military and naval officers became eligible for recognition for distinguished service than could be appointed to the Order. In January 1815, this problem was solved by extending the Order into three classes: the most distinguished being Knights Grand Cross (GCB), limited to seventy two members with rank of major-general or above; followed by Knights Commander (KCB), limited to one hundred and eighty members with rank of colonel or above; and Companions (CB), with no limit regarding numbers but restricted to those officers who had received a "Medal, or other Badge of Honour." Later, appointments were allowed if the officer’s name had been cited in The London Gazette for distinguished service in battle.

Another means increasingly used to recognize merit was by promoting a worthy officer to a "brevet" rank. In the British military system at that time, commissioned ranks were obtained normally by purchase in a specific regiment. An officer could be temporarily promoted, however, to a rank higher than that authorized in his regiment. This means of reward began to be used frequently by Wellington in his Peninsula Campaign.

The final means of recognizing merit in the British system was by being mentioned in the commander-in-chief's despatches. While this did not provide any tangible mark of honour, it did ensure that any exceptional performance of an officer was brought to the attention of his peers and the public. Because the Order of the Bath and the Army Gold Medal were restricted to senior officers, a mention in despatches was the only reward a junior officer could hope for. Non-commissioned officers or private soldiers would unfortunately never be considered for even this limited honour.

What Canadian soldiers were recognized with such awards for their actions in the War of 1812? This question immediately poses a problem in defining what a “Canadian soldier” was. A strict definition might restrict this to only the militia. However, a sovereign state of Canada as such did not exist and, in Upper Canada at least, there was very little feeling of allegiance to the territory. Even in the militia, many of the senior officers had arrived only in the past thirty years. Consequently, restricting a definition to only those who were born and raised in Upper or Lower Canada would result in an unreasonably short list of names. For the War of 1821, we will leave the definition loose to include those who have some attachment to the provinces, through birth, residence or other tie of reasonable duration.

In January 1814, the Prince Regent decided that the battles at Detroit, Chateauguay and Crysler’s Farm warranted granting of honours to participants, and he directed Prevost to provide a list of officers who had "merited this high distinction by the Conduct and Valour displayed by their Actions." As a result, a number of appointments to the Order of the Bath were made for service in the Canadas. Four of these deserve some mention.
Major-General Sir Isaac Brock was the first of these. Two months after the capture of Detroit and only days before he was killed at Queenston, he was appointed an extra Knight of the Order for “singular judgment, skill and courage.” While General Brock was an officer of the British regular army, he could be considered a resident, having been stationed in the Canadas for ten years, serving not only in military but administrative positions. His actions in the critical opening months of the war had gained so much respect from loyalist residents, that he was effectively adopted as a compatriot. One writer described him as being “more popular, and more beloved by the inhabitants of Upper Canada than any man they ever had among them.” At the end of the war, the Upper Canada Legislature approved a motion giving him the title of “The Hero of Upper Canada.” In 1824, his remains were moved from Fort George and re-interned in a monument built on Queenston Heights in a procession that took three hours to travel the seven miles.

Another officer to be recognized was Lieutenant-General Gordon Drummond, the last administrator and military commander in Upper Canada during the war. He was born in Quebec City in 1772 while his father was employed there as an administrator but returned to England two years later. When seventeen years old, he joined the army as an ensign in 1789. Appointed in December 1813 to command the forces in Upper Canada, he established a record as an aggressive and courageous leader in some of the fiercest fighting of the war.34 In 1813, he also showed sympathy and generosity to the suffering of civilian population of the province by donating his share of the booty from the capture of Fort Niagara to the relief efforts of the Loyal and Patriotic Society of Upper Canada. As a result of his appointment as Knight Commander of the Bath on 2 January 1815 for service in Upper Canada, he is therefore considered to be the first Canadian-born soldier to receive that honour.

Lieutenant-Colonel George (“Red George”) Macdonell was appointed Commander of the Bath on 5 February 1817, for his actions at Chateauguay. He also had a Canadian connection, being baptised in 1780 at St. John’s Newfoundland where his father, a professional British officer, had been stationed.35 Coming from a Highland background, he also had special ties to the Scots in Eastern Upper Canada and in 1812 was put in charge of recruiting the new Glengarry Light Infantry Fencibles. Being a Highlander also meant that he was likely Roman Catholic and this may have helped him in forming a special relationship with the fourth officer with a significant Canadian connection who received the Bath, Charles-Michel de Salaberry.

Lieutenant-Colonel Charles-Michel de Salaberry was appointed Commander of the Bath in 5 June 1817 for his actions at Chateauguay. Born in 1778 in Beauport, Lower Canada, to a family with a long military tradition, he had joined the British army at the age of fourteen. Recognition for his victory at Chateauguay, however, almost eluded him due to poor personal relations with his superior, Sir George Prevost. Prevost attempted to downplay de Salaberry’s role in the victory, giving the major credit to Major-General...
De Watteville, commander of the defences south of Montreal. But through many other channels, such as his father’s close relationship with the Duke of Kent, his true role in the battle was presented to the authorities in London. The Duke confided to the elder Salaberry that he had discussed the issue with the Duke of York and he was sure the Commander-in-Chief would properly reward his son. However, when the final list of honours was being finalized in 1818, Salaberry’s name was not included. By fortunate coincidence, “Red George” Macdonell happened to be in London at that time and had an opportunity to see the list. Macdonell immediately protested, declaring that he had been an eyewitness, and he managed to influence the authorities to have Salaberry’s added at the last minute.36

But only a limited number of appointments to the Order of the Bath were possible. When the wars with Napoleonic France dragged on for many years, the numbers of officer deserving recognition eventually grew excessively large as they awaited vacancies in the Order. The need now became apparent for a more appropriate reward in addition to the traditional Orders of Knighthood or an occasional gold chain. To address this problem, following the battle of Talavera in 1808, a medal of a standard design was created for use in the rest of the conflict. The Army Gold Medal came in two sizes: a large one measuring 54 mm in diameter for general officers; and a smaller one of 35 mm for field officers in command of battalions or similar posts. This medal would become the chief means of rewarding senior officers during the remainder of the Napoleonic wars.

In May 1814, Sir George Prevost provided the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army with a list of names of men he recommended receive an Army Gold Medal. This resulted in eleven large and nine small gold medals being awarded for Detroit, two large and eight small for Chateauguay, and seven large and thirteen small for Crysler’s Field. Despite the intention that the Army Gold Medal should only be given to senior officers, the scale of operations in North America resulted in officers of junior rank receiving awards. For Detroit, three militia lieutenant-colonels received the large gold medal (John Macdonell, Brock’s Aide-de-Camp; Matthew Elliott of the 1st Essex; and Robert Nichol acting as Quartermaster-General of the Upper Canada Militia), while another received the small (William Elliott of the 2nd Essex Militia). For the battle of Chateauguay, unique in that it was fought entirely by Canadian units, two large gold medals were awarded to both Lieutenant-Colonels de Salaberry and Macdonell. Most of the small medals went to officers of fencible corps—such as the Canadian Voltigeurs, and the Canadian and New Brunswick Fencibles. On the other hand, all awards for the battle of Crysler’s Farm went to British regular officers since that action was predominantly a British affair.

But Fort Detroit, Chateauguay and Crysler’s Farm were not the only battles fought with distinction. When Sir George Prevost replied to the Duke of York with his recommendations for these battles, he felt compelled to propose that other battles should be recognized as well, detailing his recommendations for Ogdensburg (27 February 1813), Stoney Creek (6 January 1813), and Fort Niagara (19 December 1813). In doing so, he recommended that Major George Macdonell be awarded the gold medal for Ogdensburg, but “should a difficulty arise respecting this suggestion, it is humbly recommended the distinction be bestowed upon him for the affair of Chateauguay”—for which he actually received the award. The names recommended for the other additional battles were all British regulars.37

It is perhaps representative of the insensitivity of the British honours system that, in the end, Macdonell was appointed to the Order of the Bath not for Ogdensburg but for Chateauguay where he only commanded the reserves. Although he received both the Companion of the Bath and the Army Gold Medal for Chateauguay, “Red George” remained unsatisfied, in that he had not received any recognition from London for what he considered his most successful and courageous action at Ogdensburg. Prevost also recommended that the capture of Ogdensburg be made a medal day, but the Secretary of State for War replied that the list had been closed and could not be re-opened. Macdonell must have received some satisfaction, however, when, on 8 March 1813, the House of Assembly of Upper Canada passed a vote of thanks to him and his men.38
Some time later, the omission of another significant battle, Queenston Heights, was questioned by Major-General Sir Roger Sheaffe, who had become Administrator and Military Commander of Upper Canada following Brock’s death. During the battle, he had been Brock’s second-in-command and had led the reserves in the final successful attack on Queenston Heights. On 13 October 1815, he felt compelled to write Prevost, providing a list of officers who he felt should be rewarded for their performance at Queenston. Besides naming several British officers, the list included three Canadians: Lieutenant-Colonels Johnson Butler and Thomas Clark who had commanded the Lincoln and Norfolk flank companies respectively, and Captain John Norton who had led the Grand River Indians. Unfortunately, these recommendations were not accepted and these men went unrecognized.

The “Upper Canada Preserved” Medal

The British system of awards was rather arbitrary and designed to reward only senior officers. An attempt to correct these flaws came about in Upper Canada as a result of the formation, in 1812, of a benevolent organization which proposed, as one of its objectives, to reward bravery exhibited by men of the armed forces in that province.

At the beginning of the first winter of the war, some of the prominent men in York recognized that many militiamen called away to the Niagara frontier, as well as their families, were in financial distress. To provide warm clothing to the men, and financial assistance to their wives and children, the community responded readily to the call for help and The Loyal and Patriotic Society of Upper Canada was formed. Not only in York but also from other districts, residents subscribed to an annual donation “to show the fighting men that others are concerned by their welfare.” Going even further in its enthusiasm to show support for the war effort, the Society soon decided to add one further objective to their constitution. To encourage the fighting spirit of the men on duty, the Society would:

reward merit, excite commendation and commemorate glorious exploits by bestowing medals or other honorary marks of public approbation and distinction for extraordinary instances of personal courage or fidelity in defence of the Province by individuals either of His Majesty’s Regular Forces, seamen or Militia.40

The Society’s request for contributions was well received and, by the end of the year, over 8,000 pounds had been subscribed from various districts in the Province, as well as from Montreal and Quebec City. While the Society’s attention turned first to helping needy families whose bread-winners were on the frontier, it also approved, in January 1813, a design for a medal to meet its objective of rewarding merit. One hundred pounds was allocated to place an order to produce silver medals which were two-and-a-half inches in diameter in size, with the words “PRESENTED BY A GRATEFUL COUNTRY FOR MERIT” on the obverse face. On the reverse, the words “UPPER CANADA PRESERVED” encircled an engraving that represented the Niagara River flowing from Lake Ontario to Lake Erie. On the left side, a beaver was to be shown busily working alongside a recumbent English lion. On the opposite shore, a soaring eagle was symbolically checked from seizing the beaver by the presence of the lion.42

An order was placed with an engraver in England and, at the end of 1814, fifty medals were received. Unfortunately, the medals were found to have an unacceptable flaw: the lion and beaver were engraved on the American side of the river while the eagle was on the Canadian.43 Despite this problem, the directors decided to proceed with identifying worthy recipients. A letter was issued to all officers commanding militia regiments, asking them to submit lists of “individuals whether officers or others who have distinguished themselves in
the Regiment under your Command by particular acts of exemplary bravery and intrepidity since the commencement of this present War."

 Replies from eight militia regiments, the Incorporated Militia and the Commander of Forces in Upper Canada were received within a few weeks. One hundred and forty seven names were put forward, covering the battles at Fort Detroit, Ogdensburg, Presqu’ile, Goose Creek, Lundy’s Lane, and the sieges of Fort Meigs and Fort Erie. The capture of Ogdensburg still held the attention of the militia corps of the Eastern District, which submitted the names of six privates, the largest number of submissions for a single action. The Eastern District also submitted the largest total number of any area—nine recommendations. Disappointingly, only one regiment replied from the Niagara District, where the most intense fighting of 1813 and 1814 had occurred. On the other hand, the commanding officer of the Incorporated Militia Battalion, a corps which had fought at Lundy’s Lane and the siege of Fort Erie, recommended all the officers and 86 non-commissioned officers and privates of his regiment for the medal. Apart from the Incorporated Battalion, eight militia regiments submitted a total of twenty-eight recommendations overall, comprising seven private soldiers, one sergeant, six junior officers and fourteen senior officers.

 Now, with more recommendations submitted than medals available, the Society faced the problem of making a selection from the replies received. To add further difficulty, not all recommendations were supported by satisfactory explanations. For example, the commander of the Dundas Militia submitted the name of an officer with the brief rationale that his “conduct has been on all occasions that of an active and deserving officer.” General Drummond similarly submitted a list of names of staff officers simply “for their assiduous exertions, and meritorious conduct.” Facing these difficulties, the Directors appointed a committee consisting of Attorney General John Beverley Robinson and Lieutenant-Colonel William Chewett to review and make recommendations on the submissions. Robinson had been a lieutenant in the 3rd York Militia at Queenston Heights while Chewett was the regiment’s Commanding Officer.

 On 1 May 1815, the Committee submitted its report, in which each submission was discussed with reference to the conditions sent out in the original circular letter. Of the twenty names submitted by the militia regiments, fourteen were considered to be well supported with documentation concerning the acts meriting recognition. These included eight privates, one sergeant and five officers of the 1st and 2nd Essex, 1st Norfolk, 1st Glengarry, Stormont and Hastings Militias. The Committee expressed concern, however, that they had not received any recommendations from four of the five Lincoln Militia regiments. They were convinced that, because this District had been “almost constantly the seat of war,” there must be many “other claims to merit, equally well founded with many of those reviewed ... in the report.”

 At the same time, the Committee was not pleased with the submission received from the 5th Lincoln. Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew Bradt had stated only that, at Lundy’s Lane, Major Richard Hatt, and Lieutenants Robert Land and Joseph Birnie had “behaved with every mark of intrepidity.” At the same time, Bradt had for some reason added the ambiguous comment, “saving the Major, who was severely wounded in the early part of the engagement, which obliged him to leave the field....” Robinson and Chewett left it to the Society whether these explanations seemed sufficient.

 They were equally uncertain about the submission from Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Fraser of the 1st Dundas Militia who had submitted the largest number of names. Fraser had declared, with perhaps excessive pride, that the conduct of his regiment had been “such as to make it difficult to say which individual is most deserving of praise—Every man has done his duty.” Regarding three officers named for the battle of Presqu’Isle, Robinson and Chewett felt that one recommendation was “too general” and two others were, while “more explicitly pointed out, though, perhaps not so much as might be wished.” The fifth recommendation concerned Private Thomas Servos who, Fraser noted, “at the taking of Ogdensburg, behaved with great bravery and notwithstanding the loss of a leg he still continued for some time to fire at the enemy.” Unfortunately, this latter claim was disputed.
by Lieutenant-Colonel McLean of the neighbouring 1st Stormont Militia who claimed that Servos actually belonged to his regiment and had received his wound too early in the action at Ogdensburg to have distinguished himself in that action! The Committee chose to stay out of this argument and left it to the Directors of the Society to arbitrate.

General Drummond's submission regarding seven staff officers was more delicate. Besides being Commander-in-Chief of the Forces, Drummond was a patron of the Society and had donated a significant sum after the capture of Fort Niagara. The Committee therefore diplomatically observed that, while the officers named were no doubt “meritorious in their conduct,” such a general recommendation did not come within the scope of the Society’s intentions. They could only assume that the General had either overlooked the guidelines for making recommendations or omitted the details of “some extraordinary instance of personal courage” of which only he was aware.

Lieutenant-Colonel Glew had created a more complicated problem as a result of him recommending 119 officers and men of his Battalion of Incorporated Militia. Simply rejecting this submission as having insufficient documentation regarding each individual would not have been possible because the battalion had played a significant role in some of the heaviest fighting of 1814. Instead, the Committee was quite sympathetic with the submission, observing that “they have usually heard [reports of] the conduct of almost every officer named in the return... spoken of with approbation.” In the end, the Committee argued that, the fact that all men in the Incorporated Militia had voluntarily enlisted for full-time service for the duration of the war showed “a patriotic sense of duty, and a faithful attachment to their Country,” deserving of recognition. The Committee put forward the proposal that recognition for all should be considered either by award of the medal or by another special “mark in some way ... of the honorable notice of the Society.”

Despite the problems in deciding how to distribute the medals, this initiative of the Loyal and Patriotic Society is an important event in the historical evolution of honours and awards by calling for names of both “Officers or Soldiers who have distinguished themselves by particular acts of exemplary bravery.” Rewarding individual private soldiers for bravery was a significant departure from the British army’s tradition of recognizing officers only. From the beginning of their efforts, the Society’s concern had been with the militia, as family members and neighbours marched off to war. The war had come to be seen not only as the defence of a British constitutional government, but of one’s own home. Some influential inhabitants of York had become so caught up in patriotic emotion that they began to eulogize the role of the militia. The Reverend John Strachan was most outspoken, beginning with the capture of Fort Detroit, when he wrote: “never, surely, was greater activity shown in any country, than our militia have exhibited, never greater valour, cooler resolution, and more approved conduct.” A generous distribution of medals regardless of rank would serve to enhance the image being portrayed of the militia and would find easy acceptance in this North American society where democratic ideals were beginning to take hold. Thus, the recommendations received included the names of 59 privates and 34 non-commissioned officers in addition to 49 officers. Robinson and Chewett were even moved to admonish Colonel Ferguson of the 1st Hastings Militia for recommending only officers. They observed that he appeared “by the language of his report to have erroneously imagined that he was called upon to report the merits of officers of his Regiment only, not of Non-commissioned officers or Privates.”

Robinson and Chewett concluded their report by presenting their arguments for an expansion of the numbers of awards available. They first made a case for rewarding the militia who had volunteered to accompany Brock to Fort Detroit in 1812. As they put it, these militiamen “obliged implicitly the summons of General Brock ... left with alacrity their families, and their homes, and marched to the extremity of the Province.” It might be unfair to note that John Beverley Robinson had been one of those volunteers and thus was recommending himself.

The Committee then presented their own list of nine additional names of men they felt had been overlooked, including: Sir Isaac Brock and Lieutenant-Colonel John Macdonell, both killed in action at Queenston; General Sir Gordon Drummond; several Royal Navy
officers; and Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Bostwick of the Oxford Militia who had taken a lead role in putting down an uprising by American sympathizers in his District in 1813. They also raised the question whether it "would not be proper and just" to present a medal to the family of Tecumseh for that Chief's loyalty, which led to his death at the battle of Moravian-town. Finally, and surprisingly, the Committee recommended medals be given to two militia officers, Lieutenant-Colonels Thomas Clarke of the 2nd Lincoln Militia and Robert Nichol, the Quartermaster-General, for their "indefatigable zeal and warm interest ... in all matter connected with the defence of the province"—as vague a reasoning as the Committee had been criticizing other submissions.

Robinson's and Chewett's report was tabled and unanimously approved at the general meeting of the Society on 1 May 1815. With the memory of the war still fresh in their minds, the members were enthusiastic in accepting recommendations that would result in more awards than originally anticipated. They readily approved an authorization of funds, not to exceed one thousand pounds, to procure additional medals: five hundred smaller silver medals for privates, fifty gold medals for general and field officers, and twelve large medals, presumably for the most notable men. Medals already received (although flawed) would be set aside for non-commissioned officers. With this funding secured, an order for additional medals at a cost of 759 pounds was placed with the London firm of noted medal engravers, Leonard Wyon, and the remaining 250 pounds reserved by the Treasurer for possible later purchases.

The Society, with ample cash still in their account, then carried on with their main task of relieving the suffering of wounded militiamen and widowed families, as well as residents whose property had been destroyed in the conflict. Strangely, in the following two years, no further word of any action regarding the medals was recorded. Finally, on 17 October 1817, with only 445 pounds remaining in their account, a general meeting was called to close the Society's operations. At this time, the Treasurer reported that the additional medals were expected to arrive in the near future and reminded members that 250 pounds was still available for further purchases. When the medals arrived, however, no further decisions were taken regarding their distribution and they were given to William Robinson, John Beverley's brother, for safe-keeping.

Several more meetings of the Society were held in late 1819 and early 1820 as a result of the belated arrival of a large donation that had been collected in London, England. On 23 February 1820, a proposal was put forward regarding the disposition of the balance of funds. A general hospital was to be built in York and the directors argued that supporting such a facility would fit within the Society's mandate. After some discussion, recommendations were accepted in June 1820 to grant the entire balance of funds to support the construction of the York General Hospital.

The resolution went further and also tried to deal with the 612 medals that were still being held in storage. The Directors appeared to have become so frustrated with their inability to deal with the distribution that they proposed to sell the medals as bullion and add this to the donation to the hospital. Although the proposal was accepted, for some reason it was not acted on. At the same time, no further decisions made regarding the medals and the directors refused to discuss the issue openly. A stalemate seems to have occurred in, what one writer described as, the "medal war."

As the Directors procrastinated in dealing with the problem of distribution, the competing interests, arguments and jealousies seemed to grow more complex. One writer believed that some members felt that only British regulars should be rewarded for "heroism." Agreeing to such an argument would have been particularly aggravating to some leaders, like the Reverend John Strachan, who had vigorously promoted the myth that the militia had been the main force in winning the war. Others argued that Robinson and Chewett's recommendation to reward the militia who went with Brock to Detroit would be unfair to the militia of the Western District who also readily volunteered to join the attack on Fort Detroit. Furthermore, if only the militiamen that went to Detroit were rewarded, some might feel...
personally insulted from the implication that Robinson and Chewett were getting special preference. As for the argument for rewarding all the men of the Incorporated Militia—if this were justified, then why wouldn’t the Glengarry Light Infantry Fencibles, which had been involved in as many hard-fought battles, be similarly recognized?

Faced with such insuperable arguments, the medals were finally transferred into the vaults of the Bank of Upper Canada in 1822 and nothing further happened for many years. But the subject could not be forgotten. As questions continued to be raised but left unanswered, the Legislative Assembly of Upper Canada appointed a Select Committee in January 1840 to attempt to review all aspects of the issue. Several of the surviving directors of the Society were called to testify, but even this committee could not make much progress. No books or records existed regarding Society business conducted after October 1817. The memories of the former directors failed when asked if any of the original submissions for awards were still available. The most troublesome witness was John Strachan, now Bishop of Toronto, who simply offered the excuse that no medals were distributed because of “the extraordinary lists sent in by the Commanding officers [that made it] next to impossible for the directors to decide upon the number who should obtain medals.” William Allan went further, adding that nothing was done because of “the difficulty that appeared to occur in making a distribution without causing jealousy and discontent...”\(^{57}\)

Alexander Wood protested against the legislature’s involvement, arguing that, since the Society was a “voluntary private association of a number of Gentlemen,” the Assembly had no authority over it.\(^{58}\) The Committee countered that the Society’s activities of charitable works and the award of medals were, in effect, public matters. On 10 February 1840, the Select Committee tabled its final report, recommending that the medals be distributed according to the original intention of the Society—that is, to the militia entitled to them or to the children of those who were deceased. The report concluded by requesting the Speaker of the House inform the Society of this opinion.\(^{59}\)

Upon this resolution being carried out, a group of the surviving directors viewed the Assembly’s involvement as an inquisition that had to stop. They therefore met in Toronto on 7 July 1840 and unanimously agreed to finally put into effect the resolution of the Society passed twenty years earlier on 22 February 1820. “Resolved that Messrs Allan and Wood do accordingly, without delay, dispose of the medals for the best price that can be obtained for them.” Alexander Wood, William Allan and Thomas Ridout withdrew the medals from the Bank of Upper Canada and, with a smaller number that had been in the possession of Chief Justice Scott, brought them to Alexander Wood’s garden. Here 61 gold and 548 silver medals were smashed, one by one, on an anvil by a local blacksmith. The bullion was then sold to two watchmakers and the proceeds donated to the Toronto General Hospital. As one writer noted, the medals that had originally cost 850 pounds were, in the end, worth only 395 pounds.\(^{60}\) The destruction of the medals was a great loss for many veterans in exchange for a trivial donation to the Hospital.

Thus ended the drama of the “Upper Canada Preserved” medal. The Society’s original intentions appeared to have been honourable and would have fulfilled a need to recognize acts of courage when the existing honours system was unsatisfactory. The innovation of awarding medals to all ranks would have shown that the Canadas had men of vision with praiseworthy democratic ideals. However, those involved in the drama were not up to the task.

Historian George Sheppard, after exhaustively examining the archival records, believes that the medals were never awarded because of narrow self-interest. He argues that the key organizers had always expected that they or their friends would receive a share of the awards in recognition of their zealous support of the war effort. They even refused to release the names of the actual nominees and, after delaying for many years, finally chose to destroy the medals rather have them go to others who they deemed “unworthy.”\(^{61}\)

The mystery of what really blocked the directors was never solved and many citizens remained bitter about the outcome for years. Charles Kirk Clarke expressed this bitterness as late as 1913 by putting forward his supposition that the directors had destroyed the medals simply to avoid “the possibility that the poor militiamen might after all get them.”\(^{62}\)
Thus ended the remarkable story of the Upper Canada Preserved Medal. The idea of creating a military reward based on merit alone and not on social status was far ahead of its time. Although most Upper Canadians felt pride that they were part of the British Empire, it was a sign that a democratic spirit was being nurtured in this remote province where men were creating a new life far from the traditional centre of power and traditions. It took courage to leave comfortable surroundings in the British Isles or the centres of commerce in New York or Boston, and create a new life out of the forests of Upper Canada. As the Canadian frontier pushed westward, this independent pride would continue to be a source of courage for future generations that would march off to face wars in the years to come.

About the Author...

T. Robert Fowler was raised in Windsor Ontario. His interest in the military began when he became an officer in the local army cadet corps and the senior cadet in the air cadet squadron. During this time he also served in the Essex Scottish Regiment and today continues to be a member of the Essex and Kent Scottish Regimental Association. These early experiences gave him a strong, lasting interest in the Canadian military. Following his retirement from a thirty-three year career in the federal civil service as a management consultant and financial analyst, he returned to his main interest in life by writing about Canadian military history. He has had two books published, Valour on Juno Beach in 1994 and Valour in the Victory Campaign in 1995, as well as a number of magazine articles published in Canadian Military History Magazine.

End Notes

7. Ibid., 2.
13. Ibid., 97.
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17. Brett-James, 1812, 219.
25. AO, Strachan Papers.
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46. Sheppard, 177.
47. James Errington, The Lion, the Eagle, and Upper Canada (Montreal, 1987), 23, 73, 80.
49. Errington, 6, 15, 36, 43, 47
50. PAC, May 1817 Report of the Loyal and Patriotic Society, 166
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53. Clarke, 23.
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55. Sheppard, 203.
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60. Clarke, 29; PAC, Explanation of the Proceedings 1841, Appendix 3, 33-35; Sheppard, Plunder, 244-6.
62. Clarke, 32.
ARMY BIOGRAPHY:
PRIVATE LEO MAJOR, DCM AND BAR

T. Robert Fowler

Editor's Note—
On 12 October 2008 a grateful nation said adieu to one of its highly decorated soldiers. Born in 1921 and a veteran of both the Second World War and the Korean War, Private Leo Major served with the Régiment de la Chaudière and then later the Royale 22e Regiment. He was twice decorated with the Distinguished Conduct Medal for gallantry in the face of the enemy, an award that at the time was second only to the Victoria Cross. In 1996, Mr. T. Robert Fowler wrote an article detailing Major’s actions, for the Canadian Military History Journal Vol.5 No.1 issue. It is reprinted here by kind permission of both the editors of CMH as well as the author.

Of all the British gallantry decorations, the Distinguished Conduct Medal must be considered the most prized because it is so seldom awarded. In the Korean War, only eight such awards were made out of a total of 205 honours and awards to Canadian soldiers. In the Second World War, the DCM was even more rare, making up only three per cent of all honours and awards. Thus, the award of the DCM and bar, spanning both wars, to Léo Major is a remarkable accomplishment.

Léo Major, a native of Montreal, was 19 when he joined the Canadian army in the summer of 1940. He was a fellow of medium size, described as sociable, somewhat happy-go-lucky and, as he was to prove in the war, fearless. He may have learned this latter trait, so valuable to a combat soldier, along with his survival skills, while growing up in a working-class district of Montreal during the depression years.

Major went overseas in 1941 with Le Régiment de la Chaudière and, with his independent character, naturally gravitated toward the scout platoon. He landed with the Chaudières on D-Day and, in the fierce fighting in the early days in Normandy, was wounded in the face by a grenade, leaving him with partial loss of sight in his left eye. Disregarding this disability, he insisted on remaining with the regiment, claiming that he needed only his right eye to sight his rifle.

In early 1945 he found himself in the Rhineland and, in late February, was again wounded when the carrier in which he was riding was blown up on a mine. All passengers were killed except Léo who found himself in a British hospital in Belgium, suffering from two broken ankles and a damaged back. Again, he refused to be shipped back to England and managed to return to the regiment before he was fully recovered, for the final advance into the Netherlands. Thus, on April 12, with a patch on one eye and still suffering discomfort from his back injury, he was with the Chaudières when they took up position before Zwolle in central Holland.

Zwolle, a town of 50,000 people, was a main transportation centre and the last bastion of the German “ijssel Line.” The 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade was preparing to assault the defences, but had little information on enemy dispositions and strength. A request went out for volunteers to make a night patrol into the town, and Léo Major and Corporal Wilfrid Arsenault volunteered.

At about 2300 hours on 13 April, the two scouts attempted to slip into the suburbs but encountered a German outpost which resulted in the death of Corporal Arsenault. Despite
this, Major decided to carry on with his mission, carrying two Sten guns and a sack of grenades. He arrived in the centre of Zwolle at about 0100 hours and found the streets silent and deserted. Here, he spotted a German machine-gun nest which, since the crew was sleeping, he promptly attacked and eliminated. He then found a German scout car and forced one of the Germans, who he had captured, to drive through the streets with the lights on, flying a white flag. For several hours, Major moved through the streets in this manner, shooting at any target he could find, making an impression that a large Canadian force had arrived.

The citizens were awakened but were afraid to come out of their houses. By a stroke of luck, Private Major came across the head of the local resistance, Frits Kuipers, and three of his men. By now the Germans appeared to have fled the city in panic. The group therefore returned to the town hall and the resistance fighters brought the citizens out into the streets. The local radio station was used to announce that the town had been liberated.

Major was exhausted but he had to complete his mission by bringing back the body of his comrade, Wilfrid Arsenault, to his lines. The resistance fighters arranged for a car to transport the body back, but were fired on by outposts of the Chaudières. Major was furious and climbed onto the top of the car so that he could be easily seen from a distance. In this manner, he returned to the Canadian lines to report the result of his mission to his commanding officer.

Major's citation for the DCM concluded:

The gallant conduct of this soldier, his personal initiative, his dauntless courage and entire disregard for personal safety, was an inspiration to all. His gallant action was instrumental in enabling the mopping up, on 14 April, to be done without a shot being fired.

For his actions, Private Léo Major was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal.

At the end of the Second World War, Major returned to Canada and finally had an operation on his back, which had bothered him since it had been damaged near the Hochwald. Following his recuperation, he settled into civilian life in his old trade as a pipe fitter. However, on 25 June 1950, war exploded again, this time on the other side of the world in Korea. Within five weeks, the Canadian Government made the decision to raise a volunteer force to join the United Nations in repelling the Communist invasion. Recruiting went into full gear to form a brigade group built around battalions of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, Royal Canadian Regiment and Royal 22e Régiment. Jacques Dextraze, a veteran of the Second World War, was called back to lead the latter regiment’s contribution. The 2nd Battalion, R22eR turned out to be a unique unit since Dextraze was given a free hand in recruiting picked veterans. One of these, contacted through a network of former officers, was Léo Major.

By the late spring of 1951, the battalion was in action in Korea and Major’s abilities were recognized as he found himself in the Scout and Sniper Platoon, a unit made up of men with special characteristics. As described by a former officer of the regiment, they were “individualists in their nature and indeed tough. Tough in the sense of endurance. All of them could live on a bottle of water and a couple of slices of bacon...at times out [in no-man's-land] for days.”

Truce talks with the Communist forces began in the summer of 1951 and dragged on throughout the rest of the year with no resolution. The ground forces of both sides continued...
In His Own Words...

Leo Major on the Liberation of Zvolle

I didn’t have any emotion that night in the process of liberating Zvolle because it was the same scenario that I went on a patrol or raid during the war. I made a bunch of money. That was my way of combating fear and not taking anything seriously but to succeed in all my enterprises. I first took an interest in the Canadian Army Journal on the 6th of June 1944, and took the same attitude every day until my last day in Korea.

To survive so many days of war without losing my mind...

On 12 April, early in the evening, there was a call to get together Colonel Trencher Walker, who became a friend of mine later on, was there with the brigades commander. They were waiting for two volunteers who would try to reach the outskirts of Zvolle and then report back to us. It was the first time we were asked to go inside the city and get to know the people as much as possible about the strength of the enemy. They added that those who go will have very likely never come back again. All the time the C.O. was speaking, he was fixing me.

When I saw nobody was willing to take a chance, I said Colonel, you get me again. And Willy, who was a very good pilot of mines, didn’t let me go alone, so he volunteered to come along with me. All the units were very scared to see us go. To them we were going to execution. That’s when I mentioned: Don’t worry boys, we will liberate that city.

We began the patrol at 2100 hours on the 13th of April. We notice an outpost beside the road. We were able to get the German machine guns in an area of Zvolle and then reach the last German outpost before the outskirts of Zvolle. From there we met Hupbrink and his wife who were hidden in the cellar. At that time they were very afraid of us. But they quickly understood we were not Germans. They were the last ones to see my friend alive. We tried to learn something from them using English, French, alsosigns, but to no avail. They were also very nervous. So I told them I scared, I guess. After nightfall when we were just about to leave the farm, I noticed how much Willy’s hands were shaking. It was a sign of total fatigue. I said to him if you don’t feel well, stay here and wait for me. I will go and leave the city alone. Nothing doing he said. We stayed together until the end. Those were his last words.

Shortly after around 200 hours, I went across the truth to lie down beside a road and call distance away. Willy tried to do the same through the railroad crossing to join me but I made a little noise with his use of grenades and that’s when the German got him with a fine of the fire. With my experience I knew right away he was dead. I was very sad at the Germans but also at myself for letting him come with me. I always felt sorry for the mistake I made there.

In a few seconds I got rid of the one who was responsible for his death. After that I had one fixed idea, it was to liberate Zvolle. It was no matter what I was going to meet the streets. A thousand Germans or much less I didn’t care. My heart was beating but I was full of courage. I went back to Willy to grab his machine pistol and his grenade. After that I went to a park and sat down to decide how I could manage to liberate a city that big. If I could get in touch with the resistance that would make things easier for me. But I know it’s impossible as the occupying force, that I knew for sure. Therefore the only people I would meet are Germans. So I presume the best way to get them by surprise and to let them know the attack is coming inside the city. On each one I must find a way to get them by surprise and to let them know the attack is coming inside the city. I have to keep them guessing and let them know there is a group of allied soldiers attacking Zvolle.

Before leaving for this patrol, the Colonel had promised me all the fighting companies to occupy the farm lands that are close to the city at 0000 hours on the 14th of April. Having that in mind, I decided to wait until that time in case I get caught with some prisoners in my hands and not knowing what to do with them as I mentioned earlier. It’s not like Normandy where there were no prisoners taken alive. They were still, I was already inside Zvolle so I decided to go inside a house. I wanted to study more completely the big map of Zvolle which I had inside my jacket. I knocked at the back of a few houses. Nobody was ready to let me in, I guess they were too frightened. I had a shield with me and my camouflage jacket I could easily pass for a real Nazi. Therefore knowing I was in a house and not in a house I had to force myself in one house. Young couple in their 8th and children shared a bed. They saw Canada. It was like magic, those should patches. It seems Germans. Though I had made new friends.

After going over the city map, I left the house to start my plans for getting the upper hand against the enemy. My first encounter - I was advancing cautiously on a road leading out toward the country. Finally I came across what I could see was an enemy position. I could see clearly with my right eye that night like always, I was an expert at night fighting. There were soldiers in trenches manned with machine gun. I came before them in complete surprise.

In a flash, with three grenades and a burst of my machine pistol, I killed two prisoners which I walked away to one of our leading companies.

I came back by the same road now having in mind to go everywhere in Zvolle. I was still early that night when I explored 12 stragglers in one of the streets. A burst of fire, a couple of grenades and a lot of loud noise. That was my aim. Of the 12 stragglers, 3 were civvies (sold). Again I walked back and got rid of them by giving them to another of our fighting companies. Again I went back inside the city doing one street after another. Four more times during the course of the night I had to force myself in a house.

Each time the same story, the people were afraid off me but in no time I was able to prove who I was and I quickly made life-long friends. When I went in houses like I did, it was to rest and recuperate and to give me more strength to go forward. In each house I didn’t stay more than a few minutes. I remember then I would continue patrolling the streets.

The big church and the river were my reference points. That’s how I could get everywhere and come back quickly without getting lost. On a road near the river, I caught my last bunch of stragglers which again I brought to an outpost that was much nearer the railroad crossing. On my way back to the city I met Fritz Kiesers, a tall policeman and two other men from Mr. Printz’s shop, who spoke fairly good English, and a few words in French, I learned the four men were from this resistance.

I was very happy to learn that. They were unarmed but I quickly remedied that. Then I told them all: Your city Zvolle is completely liberated from German. I know very well I was the one who made all that noise during the night. That must have frightened them. I then asked them to come with me to the middle of the city and pass the word around to the whole population to come out of their houses. I ask them to just go free to do what they like. In a very short time, I was surrounded by a very huge crossroad. There I met the mayor and the city town leaders. With a small German staff and the help of the four Dutchmen I brought back Willy to Colonel Trencher Walker. He told him you may bring in front of the parade. The city was completely liberated. He couldn’t be, because he was waiting for an order from High up before he could make any moves. Many of the citizens were crying and for the first time during the war I was crying. I went back inside the town alone and an hour later the entire brigade entered the city to join in the celebration.

* * *

excerpted from Back Door to Now: A Personal Diary, an unpublished manuscript by Hugh D. McGill
to launch limited offensives to secure favourable high ground in case a final cease fire might be declared. In mid-November, as the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group moved up to relieve British forces near the south bank of the Imjin River, an agreement seemed close at Panmunjom.

The Brigade was to hold the right flank of the 1st Commonwealth Division’s front, with the R22eR on the extreme right flank. Here they would link up with the 3rd US Infantry Division on the east who held Hill 355, again, nicknamed “Little Gibraltar.” At this point, the front line curved southward around the height, requiring the R22eR to hold an awkward position with "A" and "D" Companies on the western slopes, separated by a small valley from the remainder of the battalion. "D" Company was the most vulnerable as it occupied the most northerly position, a saddle between Hill 355 and Hill 227 to the west, exposed on both the northern and western fronts.

As the R22eR prepared to move into its new positions, Lieutenant-Colonel Dextraze issued a statement, that “in the event the battalion is attacked, there will be NO withdrawal, NO platoons overrun and NO panics. All would be expected to perform their duties in a typical ‘Vingt Deux’ manner.” Dextraze’s statement was prescient because, unknown to him, his regiment was marching into the face of a determined Chinese assault that would test its determination.

The Chinese sensed that the truce talks were coming close to an agreement which would lock each side into their present positions. They were determined to make a final
attempt to seize the most favourable terrain on the western side of the front. Hill 355 was
the prize, commanding the terrain for 20 miles around. With some momentum, the Chinese
might even roll the United Nations line back across the Imjin River, gaining a great morale
advantage in the final talks.

Thus, as the R22eR were settling into their new positions on 22 November, the 64th
Chinese Army opened up with a massive artillery barrage, engulfing Hill 355 along with the
R22eR. On 23 November enemy attacks intensified, with elements of the Chinese 190th
and 191st Divisions directed against Hill 355, and one battalion of the 190th attacking “D”
Company. For the next two days, desperate fighting occurred as the Americans first lost Hill
355, then fought to regain it after hastily gathering a counter attack force.

As soon as they had captured Hill 355 on November 23, the Chinese were able to
occupy Hill 227, uncovering both flanks of “D” Company. This left the Company practically
surrounded, but it managed to drive off all enemy attacks. The midday hours of 24 November
brought a lull to the fighting but, late in the day, the Chinese launched a new attack with two
companies from Hill 227 focussed on “D” Company. By 1820 hours the left flank platoon,
No. 11, had been overrun. When, in addition, the Chinese again recaptured the slopes of
Hill 355, the remainder of “D” Company came under attack from all directions.

The situation was serious. However, Dextraze coolly assessed the regiment’s position
and refused to consider giving up any ground. While the Americans assembled a counterat-
tack force on his right, Dextraze decided to launch his own counterattack to regain No. 11
Platoon’s position and thus relieve the pressure on “D” Company.

His best reserve was the tough, aggressive scout platoon. He used it to assemble
an assault group under the command of Léo Major, including a signalman to maintain a
link directly to himself. Major equipped a large portion of his men with Sten guns and,
wearing running shoes to mask the sound of their movement, they set out at midnight over
the snow-swept hills. Proceeding slowly, in small groups, they followed an indirect route in
order to come onto the objective from the direction of the enemy’s own lines. Once near the
summit, at a signal from Major, they opened fire together. The enemy panicked and by 0045
hours Major’s force had successfully occupied its objective.

However, about an hour later, the Chinese launched their own counterattack and
Dextraze ordered Major to withdraw from the hill. Major refused, saying he would pull back
only 25 yards to some shell holes which offered the only cover he could find. From here,
he directed mortar and machine-gun fire onto his attackers. This continued throughout the
darkest hours and bitter cold of the morning, with the mortar fire raining down almost on top
of defenders.

The commander of the mortar platoon, Captain Charly Forbes, later wrote that Major
was “an audacious man…not satisfied with the proximity of my barrage and asks to bring it
closer…In effect my barrage falls so close that I hear my bombs explode when he speaks to
me on the radio.” Forbes increased his rate of fire until the mortar barrels turned red from
the heat. He finally had to cease fire as the heat had permanently warped the tubes.

As the citation described:

...So expertly did he direct the fire of supporting mortars and artillery that the platoon
was able to repulse four separate enemy attacks. Running from one point of danger
to another, under heavy small arms fire from his flank, he directed the fire of his men,
encouraging them to hold firm against overwhelming odds. By dawn, Major’s force had
withdrawn 200 yards to the east, reporting that “nothing is left there to occupy… not a
bunker or slit trench.”

However, despite being attacked by superior numbers, Major’s group had repulsed all
attacks and succeeded in denying possession of No. 11 Platoon’s position to the Chinese.
Léo Major’s small force remained in position for three more days, holding their gains
securely, as the Chinese made several last attempts to gain some ground.
Major’s citation for the Bar to the DCM concluded:

Against a force, superior in number, Corporal Major simply refused to give ground. His personal courage and leadership were beyond praise. Filling an appointment far above his rank, he received the full confidence of his men, so inspired were they by his personal bravery, his coolness and leadership.

No further major attacks were experienced in the sector and Major’s counterattack ended what Charly Forbes called “the epic of Hill 355.” The Chinese had failed in gaining their objective and, on 27 November, agreement was reached for a tentative demarcation line to be established on the present positions.

Through the Second World War and Korea, the Canadian Army gained a reputation for being a tough, effective fighting force, based on ordinary citizens who rallied to the call to duty. Léo Major, through the award of the DCM and Bar, has been recognized as one of the best examples of the kind of man who established this reputation. One of his former officers summed it up best: “What type of soldier was Léo? He was tough minded...a man of action...always ready to undertake any task assigned to him with courage and determination.”

About the Author...


Endnotes

3. Correspondence from Lieutenant-Colonel J. Charles Forbes (ret’d), January 1996.
7. Correspondence from Lieutenant-Colonel O. Plouffe (ret’d), February 1966.

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http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/
“You jammy bloke,” my aggrieved colleague said as we looked out over the bare, wet branches of a wood in Aldershot one grey morning last winter. “I get sunset over the rooftops of Swindon and you get Lake Ontario!”

We had both just been picked to attend the Territorial Army Command and Staff Course (TACSC) in Summer 2008. There are only 45 places on the one course run each year and each one is hotly contested. However, up to seven students each year are considered for attendance on the equivalent French and Canadian courses. To my delight I had been offered a place on the Primary Reserve Army Operations Course (AOC) run at the Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College (CLFCSC), Kingston, and decided that my destiny lay somewhere over the pond. It was clearly a good omen. 2008 celebrates the 100th anniversaries of the founding of the AOC, the Territorial Army, as well as my home formation, 145 (South) Brigade.

TACSC is the last of four stages in the United Kingdom Territorial Army (UK TA) staff training program, and a pre-requisite for promotion to lieutenant colonel in the British Army. The stages of this program are identified as follows:

**Stage 1: Military Knowledge 1 (MK1).** MK1 is a modular, distance learning programme. Its aim is to deliver the underpinning military knowledge required by junior captains, and the structure of MK1 requires approximately 27 hours of study time. Students should be mentored throughout their study, under unit arrangements, and assessed on completion of the course. It must be completed before an officer can be promoted to the substantive rank of captain.

**Stage 2: Junior Officers Tactics Course (JOTAC).** The aim of Stage 2 is to prepare officers to be junior captains by raising their awareness of combined arms operations. It is structured to have TA and Regular officers attend JOTAC together. Regular officers complete a three week long course whilst TA officers will join the course at the end of the first week, utilising the first and middle weekends of the course, as required, as catch-up.

**Stage 3a: Junior Staff Course (TA) (JSC(TA)).** The aim of the first part of stage 3 training is to provide the TA officer with sufficient knowledge of relevant staff procedures to be capable, under supervision, of fulfilling the role of a staff officer at senior captain level. JSC(TA) is simply structured as a nine-day residential course.

**Stage 3b: Military Knowledge 2 (MK2).** Stage 3b delivers the additional underpinning military knowledge required by senior captains and junior majors. MK2 is a modular, distance learning programme for substantive captains who have not attended JSC(TA). MK2 requires approximately 50 hours of study time. It is due to replace JSC(TA).

**Stage 4: TA Command and Staff Course (TACSC).** The aim of TACSC is to develop the professional knowledge and understanding of selected TA officers, in
preparation for unit command and staff positions, primarily at Staff Officer Grade 1 level. The structure of TACSC comprises 2 centralised weekend training periods, a distance learning package, a centralised 2 week course and a battlefield run, spread over May to September.

However, the rules for TACSC also identify the following option:

**Overseas Staff Training**

**Canada.** There are two courses available to TA officers in Canada:

- **Joint Reserve Command and Staff Course.** There are usually 2 vacancies offered to Royal Navy Reserve (RNR), Territorial Army (TA) and Royal Auxiliary Air Force (RAuxAF).

- **Primary Reserve Army Operations Course.** There are normally 4 vacancies, offered on a tri-Service basis.

**French Reserve Staff Course (ESORSEM).** The ‘Ecole Superieure des Officiers de
Reserve Specialistes d’Etat Major’ (ESORSEM) trains French Army reserve officers to fill staff positions in headquarters and military organisations, both in France and on operations. The course is run annually in August at the ‘Ecole Militaire’ in Paris and it offers one place annually to the British Army on a reciprocal basis.

**TACSC Equivalence.** Attendance at the Canadian PRAOC, the Canadian JRCSC and the French ESORSEM will count as passing TACSC for qualification for promotion.

**Selection.** Selection for training (either TACSC or for overseas courses) is by merit. Overseas nominations are taken on merit from the Board’s scores. This ensures that high quality representatives are sent abroad to what are recognised as prestigious and demanding staff courses.

In Canada, both the Primary Reserve and Regular Force Army Operations Courses are the same except for the manner in which they are delivered. Regular Force officers are posted to CLFCSC and complete a home study package prior to attending a full-time 15-week long course at the college. Primary Reserve officers complete the same material and exams, but on a part-time basis over the period of nearly a year. Whereas Canadian regular force officers complete tutorial 1 of the course over distance learning and tutorials 2 and 3 in residence, primary reserve officers will complete tutorials 1 and 2 through a combination of distance and on-site learning, and tutorial 3 in residence. Both regular and primary reserve officers must complete Ex FINAL DRIVE before graduating from the course.

Foreign reserve army students do not participate in either tutorial 1 or 2. I arrived at Fort Frontenac at 1800 hours on the Tuesday preceding the start of tutorial 3, a stunningly beautiful evening with bright sunshine reflecting off the small waves rippling up the Cataraqui River, the Royal Military College skylined perfectly on the other side. My first impression was the ease with which I had entered the barracks. The taxi from the city airport had simply driven in through the archway and stopped. No barrier or armed guard checking identity cards. I was immediately intrigued, being a military police officer myself, and returned to the matter of security and the potential threat several times in conversation with course members over the following weeks. The results of those conversations, however, are best saved for another forum.

The next three days comprised orientation for the eight foreign students—four British, two French, one New Zealander and a US Marine—who were to be distributed evenly amongst the eight syndicates, numbering eighty students in total. The rest of the Fort was empty for this period, so the eight of us shook ourselves out, studied and worked through the Orders of Battle (ORBATS) of the Canadian and enemy forces we were to be using, and recce’d the locality. It was a very pleasant few days, though rather odd to be assessing key bits of kit used by the British army—AS90 artillery and Warrior AFV—for enemy combat power whilst we learned about friendly Leopards, LAVs and LUVs.

It was therefore a major shift to find the dining hall full at breakfast on the first Saturday of the two week course, having had the place to ourselves for a few days. All of a sudden our USMC colleague in his pixellated combats was no longer in the minority. Our Combat 95 pattern kit seemed oddly old fashioned next to CADPAT, though our different Corps, regimental and tactical flashes added colour.

Week one of tutorial 3 was focused on getting to grips with the operational planning process (OPP). It has clear parallels with the ‘7 Questions’ approach favoured by the British army. With a combination of whole course lectures and syndicate work, our two syndicate DS took us through several OPP evolutions at brigade level, each one increasing the intensity and speed. It was at this stage that the foreign students had the biggest gap to close, learning a complex process and applying it on unfamiliar ground against unfamiliar forces with unfamiliar kit. Meanwhile, our Canadian colleagues were continuing operations against an enemy and on ground covered during the previous nine months during Tutorials one and two of their staff training. That’s not to say they had it any easier. We all bore the burden of scrutiny from the Directing Staff. I reflected that some distance learning for the foreign students before the course would perhaps have enabled us to focus on the OPP...
learning rather than wondering where in the Lemgoan order of march the Rice Bag locating radar appeared. However, the patience and collaborative spirit of the Canadian soldier was demonstrated to the full and by the start of the CPX phase at the end of the week, we were all primus inter pares.

Back in the UK the students had at this stage met for two extended weekend blocks and then the first week of the main course during which the Principles of War, Functions in Combat and the spectrum of operations were studied in depth, and then applied in a series of map exercises, firstly at battalion and then at brigade level. Individual working papers had been prepared and submitted and syndicate work delivered and assessed. For the second week, as in Canada, attention shifted to the Command Post Exercise (CPX) phase.

Week two of PRAOC meant a change of scenery as the course decamped daily several clicks up the road to the Directorate of Land Synthetic Environments for Exercise FINAL DRIVE. The focus of this seven-day block was on the application of the OPP at brigade level in a realistic virtual environment, with a heavily resourced, very experienced, hicon-locon function. Initially the eight syndicates were combined to form four, allowing twenty brigade staff appointments to be played out in each of the four new brigade headquarters. As the exercise progressed there was further consolidation down to just three brigade headquarters as well as several Battlegroups. The addition of specialist augmentees at this stage, such as a G3 Aviation staff officer, added extra realism and the opportunity for students to practise in a real-time environment.

As in the previous phase, appointments were moved around after each OPP cycle neared completion and the SALs—student appointment lists—were eagerly anticipated to learn where in the G1 to G9 spectrum the next challenge would come from. Tempo and battle rhythm increased proportionally and the tension as H Hour approached for Op VIBRANT was palpable. Inevitable comparisons were made when snippets could be gleaned regarding the other syndicates. “They’ve gone there? Why?... Have they taken any casualties...?” and so on.
Throughout all this the DS were ever present with their ubiquitous blue pads, jotting down notes on each student. Periodically, they would appear *en masse* for briefings, representing the Divisional staff, headed by the College Commandant. It was a dynamic workplace. Never enough time—crack on. *Fight through the friction* as one DS put it. Graphically illustrated by the last decision brief in our syndicate: just as we were about to launch I was passed a scrap of paper with the words “causeway identified inside bridge” scribbled hastily on it. It completely altered our primary objective. Ah well...

One offensive operation and one contingency operation later and we had completed the OPP and CPX phases. All that remained were some operational updates from Kandahar and other briefings on counter-terrorism. Our UK colleagues meanwhile were getting into joint operations, perhaps going one step further. Then again, they didn’t have Lake Ontario to sip beer by. A day of de-briefing, photographs, packing up and finally the splendid mess dinner. What a blast. The band had even learned my regimental march.

The whole experience was put into perspective by the Commandant who, in his final address, remarked that by passing PRAOC, not only had each student demonstrated sufficient capability to operate in a formation headquarters, but that there was every likelihood that that expertise would be used for real in an operational theatre.

Having had the privilege of learning with the Canadian Army, I would not hesitate to operate alongside you in the future. I just hope there’s a Timmy Hortons nearby (which there apparently is).
Nancy Teeple

Effective counterterrorism (CT) initiatives require an understanding of the motivations, attitudes, and methods driving terrorist organizations. Al Qaeda and its associated movements follow an ideology, doctrine, and methodology which outline its strategic and operational objectives, as demonstrated by a number of captured narratives and essays composed by the intellectual leadership of various jihadist movements. These primary sources provide CT specialists with a first-hand perspective on how jihadis perceive the conflict with the West (i.e. the U.S. and its allies), in addition to providing a template for how Islamic jihadists conduct operations against their enemies. Strategic analysis of these unique sources provides CT specialists with the necessary tools to predict and prevent terrorist activities and track down the leaders directing the movement's operations.

This review evaluates three books which are complementary sources on the Salafi jihadist movement. These books comprise the findings of the Terrorist Perspectives Project (TPP) conducted by the Institute for Defense Analysis and Joint Advanced Warfighting Division under the auspices of the Joint Force Center for Operational Analysis and U.S. Joint Forces Command. The goal of the TPP study is to provide the policy community with Al Qaeda and its associated movements' (AQAM) strategic thought by knowing the enemy "as he knows himself in terms that he would recognize."3

These books are best read in the order presented below, since the first outlines the strategic and operational views of the movement, the second is a collection of jihadist writing by ten terrorist thinkers, and the third presents an Islamic jihad manifesto compiled by one of the more prolific writers introduced in the second book. In presenting the point of view of the movement's members, these volumes provide an understanding of Wahhab inspired Salafist ideology which drives jihadist activity and their ultimate goal of restoring the Islamic Caliphate. Quotes and references of prominent individuals of the movement figure throughout the texts, namely Sayyid Qutb, Abdullah, Azzam, Osama bin Laden, Abu Musab Zarqawi, and Ayman al-Zawahiri, among others.

THE TERRORIST PERSPECTIVES PROJECT: STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL VIEWS OF AL QAIDA AND ASSOCIATED MOVEMENTS

Prepared by the Institute of Defense for the U.S. Joint Forces Command, this research analyzes the writings of terrorists, both leaders and foot soldiers, to provide for more effective combative measures against the enemy. This text is a collaborative effort by the following: Mark Stout, a researcher at IDA, who formerly served at the Department of the Army, Department of State, and CIA (with contributions provided by JAWD); Jessica Huckabey, a researcher at IDA, an information officer in the Navy Reserve; John Schindler, who not only served with the National Security Agency (NSA) as an intelligence analyst and CT officer, but also published a great deal on terrorism, and is currently a professor of national security studies at the U.S. Naval War College; Jim Lacey, an IDA analyst, former U.S. Army infantry officer, and journalist with Time magazine.

The TPP outlines the lessons that have shaped AQAM’s strategy and conduct in the global war on terrorism (GWOT) for use by U.S. civilian and military policy officers, and educators at professional military institutions. This study is a useful information resource.
for the intelligence community attempting to understand and disrupt AQAM operations. The principle behind this study follows Sun Tzu’s philosophy to “know your enemy.”

This book identifies two major sources of data contributing to knowledge of the enemy, namely captured documents (found in al Qaeda training camps and safe houses in Afghanistan, and from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s base in Iraq) and open source materials, dealing with tactical aims and weaponry, in addition to the strategy, political philosophy, theological foundations, and methodology in the conduct of jihad. Interestingly, the authors indicate their initial concern that open source documents would be untrustworthy, as potential sources of disinformation to mislead analysts of CT efforts. However, it is concluded that attempts to mislead “infidel” analysts might also succeed in misleading members and potential jihadi recruits. Therefore, the experts have safely concluded that open source jihad literature, for the most part, represents a reliable source of doctrinal information.

The authors deliver a logical framework assessing various aspects of the movement in conjunction with alternative perspectives provided by foreign media (e.g. al Jazeera), the views of the jihadists, moderate Islamists, the general Muslim population—many of whom are adamantly opposed to Salafist Jihadism—and the political leadership (i.e. the “apostate” regimes who collaborate with western Zionist-crusader invaders), comprising the cultural context within which the movement emerged. These perspectives are often neglected in traditional intelligence and strategic analysis, possibly due to prior inaccessibility of such texts.

The discussion presents a solid organized evaluation of various aspects of the jihadist movement in which each chapter concludes with a concise summary of the points discussed, looking forward to the next chapter which builds upon the previous analysis. Each chapter is preceded by one or more quotes by jihadists or CT experts, appropriately providing an introductory augmentation to the subject matter presented in the chapter, and are often further analyzed in the discussion therein. Many chapters contain information boxes to clarify foreign concepts, such as wahhabism or dawah, or to provide a side discussion adding value to the topic of aspects of terrorist operations, attitudes, and perspectives. This research provides extensive references in the form of endnotes at the conclusion of each chapter, providing information sources as well as additional insights to the discussion by expanding upon discourse not elaborated upon in the main text. Also helpful is a glossary and index located in the back to assist the reader in understanding and identifying certain foreign concepts. The text also contains numerous visual examples, such as diagrams, propaganda pictures and materiel collected from AQAM recruiting media. Notably the discussion provides lessons learned component to demonstrate how AQAM are adapting to the global security environment and concludes with implications for establishing policy to counter the adapting threat.

THE CANONS OF JIHAD: TERRORISTS’ STRATEGY FOR DEFEATING AMERICA


Lacey proposes that the best way to understand jihadists is to look at what they say to each other, to capture the essence of the beliefs and avoid the common problem of mirror-imaging prevalent in a great deal of intelligence analysis. This volume is comprised of writings
The Canons of Jihad: Terrorists' Strategy for Defeating America

by intellectuals of the Salafist jihadi movement. Lacey's introduction provides a brief explanation of the contents in each sample to clarify certain poorly constructed texts, which are difficult to read. The prose has been edited to make it more readable. Regarding content, Lacey indicates two separate yet related themes: a focus on the "near enemy", which represents the governments of the Middle East, which are viewed by the jihadis as unjust and apostate; and the "far enemy", which represents the United States' support of those apostate governments. The goal of the jihadists therefore is to eliminate the U.S. in order to eliminate the apostate governments. The outcome would see the reinstatement of the Caliphate and true Islam in Muslim lands.

Each chapter following the preface presents a sample of writing by some of the most prolific leaders in the global jihadist movement. For instance, chapter 1 presents Osama bin Laden's declaration of jihad against the U.S. issued three years prior to 9/11. Chapter 7 comprises Sheik Abdullah Yusuf Azzam's call to join the militant Islamist movement. Most chapters contain a brief biography of the writer to provide the reader with the author's background prior to reading essay.

Notably, these texts serve as instruction guides and explanations for the motives and operations of AQAM, such as why they oppose the west, their political game, the Qur'anic concept and strategy for war, and a plan of action and movement. These writers are well-versed in theories of war, and include details on guerrilla and resistance tactics, attributed to Mao. They understand the value of information operations, specifically psychological operations, and the requirement for effective intelligence gathering. Their strategy for winning hearts and minds, not only the Muslim community, but also non-Muslims opposed to Western CT efforts and counterinsurgency campaign in the Middle East, relies heavily on psychological factors. The jihadist's propagandist style of writing demonstrates a blatant manipulation of facts intended to sway the reader's perception of events. For instance, al-Suri downplays the U.S. contribution and effect in the 1980s war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, by twisting accounts to portray the U.S. involvement as more of a hindrance than as a valuable ally. A common theme in the texts is the expression of confidence by the jihadis that they will ultimately win against the West, not only because the mujahedeen were able to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan, but also because God sanctions their jihad.

However, this reviewer feels that these intellectuals might not have considered that some themes may have an adverse effect on their less-impressionable readers. Some arguments lose credibility as they appear to contradict other notions within the text, such as arguing that violent jihad is required of all Muslims and sanctioned by God, but then attempts to win over the ummah (i.e. the global Muslim community), while demonstrating zero tolerance to moderate Muslims. On the other hand, Brigadier-General S.K. Malik, who provides a persuasive and well-informed discourse on the Qur’anic concept of war, argues that humanitarianism lies at the very hear of the Islamic approach to war, and instructs against the torture and massacre of enemies and hostages. Therefore, although contradictions do exist in some texts, if appears that terrorists (or enemy mujahedeen) do in fact have a code of ethics in the conduct of war.
In this volume, Lacey presents al-Qaeda mastermind Abu Musab al-Suri's jihad manifesto *The Call to Global Islamic Resistance*. This is a condensed translated version of the original text, which outlines the doctrine, history, beliefs, criticisms, and recommendations for the modern jihad movement arranged into nine chapters. In his introduction Lacey provides a brief synopsis and analysis of the content of the text, describing al-Suri's background, his involvement with al-Qaeda, his relationship as top aide to Osama bin Laden, and instructor to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq).

In his analysis, Lacey notes al-Suri's unusual perspective in this jihad manifesto in comparison to other works of jihadis. In particular, he discusses the movement’s successes and failures, providing criticism on how jihad has been conducted (e.g. 9/11) with the result that the movement faces extinction and therefore must alter its entire method of operation to avoid being easy targets for CT initiatives. Notably, Lacey demonstrates how al-Suri unintentionally presents the West with a variety of CT options, as a result of evaluating al-Suri's “how-to” manual for a new al-Qaeda in the post 9/11 world.

*The Call* begins with al-Suri's perception of the conflict between the *ummah* and its enemy, the Zionist-Crusader alliance and the apostate regimes of the Arab-Islamic world, as a “war of ideas.” In a topically organized discourse, the detailed and somewhat repetitive discussion presents the history of the perceived western assault against the Islamic world and the emergence of the Islamic resistance against the West, with the requirement that Muslims must join the jihadi resistance in accordance with *sharia* law. In this account al-Suri asserts that there must be a universal ideology to unite the global Islamic community with the goal of repelling the “Crusader assault”, but he does not seem hopeful. Too many factors are working against the movement's initiatives, such as the success of CT efforts in the post-9/11 global environment and the American-led GWOT that resulted in the capture of many of the movement's leaders. Al-Suri indicates that the number of Arab *mujahedeen* captured or killed in Afghanistan amounts to 1600 of the 1900 believed to comprise the resistance.

It would have been interesting to read al-Suri's perception of historical events from the fall of the Roman Empire to the 20th century, however, this section had been cut from the publication because Lacey believed that it offered little insight into the jihadi movement. This version of history might have provided a background to the jihadi perspective in how the movement interprets past events, such as the Crusader conquests to which al-Suri makes reference throughout the text. Notably, al-Suri attempts to persuade his readers of each argument with an example or lessons learned scenario from past experiences or mistakes in operational conduct. For instance, he identifies a number of errors in jihad conduct, structure, and methodology, which has cost the movement support, personnel, and security. One such error is the unilateral and elitist approach to the jihadist message, making it unappealing to the masses, resulting in loss of support and recruits. Ultimately, a code of conduct with a set of principles, ethics, and roles is encouraged in order to win the hearts and minds of the *ummah*. 
Contrary to the perspectives other terrorist writers, al-Suri presents an alternative viewpoint to the effects of a large-scale offensive against the West. For instance, al-Suri argues that 9/11 has caused more harm to the movement, by loss of support throughout the Islamic world, and the fragmentation of al-Qaeda and other mujahedeen groups, as well as the capture and killing of mujahedeen and leaders. In his manifesto, al-Suri laments that the movement is weak and must adapt to the changing global security environment.

The translation of the text is well done, indicating that al-Suri’s writing skills and prose must have been decent. Ultimately, Lacey exercised good judgment in restricting the content to only material relevant to understanding the ideology of Islamic terrorism.

Concluding Remarks

It is remarkable that the writings of Salafist jihadists demonstrate a logical construct in otherwise fanatical thinking. The assumption that these movements are guided by irrational religious zealots can be discredited by the rational dialogue put forward to convince its followers and recruits that jihad is the right action against oppression. Indeed, it makes it difficult to intellectually dismiss an enemy who can reasonably apply the strategic principles of Western military theorists, such as Carl von Clausewitz and Basil Liddel-Hart, to jihadist concepts. AQAM’s understanding of international relations and political power plays demonstrates its own willingness and ability to understand its enemy and how to best strike at its weaknesses.

Although these publications are aimed at the U.S. strategic community, they would provide academics, policymakers, military and civilian strategists of all NATO countries with an invaluable tool for the study terrorist motivation and conduct. These books should be on the reading list for security intelligence specialists in terrorism, counterterrorism, and WMD proliferation.

Endnotes

1. Islamic revival founded upon the literal understanding of Islamic law as outlined in the Qur’an and Sunna, inspiring the 20th century Islamic Awakening, leading to a global jihad movement—Stout, Mark E.; Huckabee, Jessica M.; Schindler, John R.; & Lacey, Jim. The Terrorist Perspectives Project: Strategic and Operational Views of al Qaeda and Associated Movements. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008. p. 2. Out of the three main branches of Salafis, two are significant to this discussion: politico/reformists (Muslim Brotherhood), and jihadis (AQAM)—Stout, et al. p. 4.
3. Ibid, p. xi.

SOLDIERS OF REASON: THE RAND CORPORATION AND THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE

Major Andrew B. Godefroy, CD, PhD

Despite the tremendous victories over both Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, at the end of the Second World War the United States (USA) found itself confronting yet another dangerous foe—its former wartime ally, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Knowing that science and technology had made invaluable contributions to the allied defeat of its wartime enemies and that such instruments would play a crucial role in any future war against the Soviet Union, steps were immediately taken by the United States to institutionalize and expand this knowledge. Through the creation of specialized organizations later known as ‘think tanks’, some of the best and brightest minds in the USA were brought together to work on challenges then
confronting American national security. Perhaps the most legendary of these Cold War think tanks was the one called ‘Research and Development Inc.’ or simply RAND.

In his most recent work, Soldiers of Reason: The RAND Corporation and the Rise of American Empire, author Alex Abella has produced a gossipy yet entertaining history of the think tank from its earliest days to the present. Though not the first history of the ‘shadowy think tank that shaped the modern world’ as the book’s dust jacket claims, Abella has nevertheless delivered a reasonably well rounded tale that is both broad in its scope and detailed in its narrative.

Taking the reader through RAND’s earliest days when its halls were dominated by physicists supporting U.S. Air Force’s (USAF) planning for atomic warfare, Abella shows how the search for rationality in complex decisions about nuclear war eventually led to its application to problems beyond military affairs. Arguing that RAND’s expansion in the 1960s and 1970s to tackle problems of economic and social research were subjected to the same rational approaches, Soldiers of Reason suggests that the think tank’s influence within American policy making ultimately led to reshaping American society writ large.

For Abella, RAND’s devotion to systems theory, game theory, chaos theory, as well as other operational research approaches in influencing government policy had far-reaching implications. RAND shaped the course of national security in the early Cold War period, restructured American foreign policy, shaped critical historical events such as the Vietnam War, and eventually chose the paths pursued in domestic economic and social policies. In following the careers of several legendary figures including Herman Kahn, Albert Wohlstetter, Kenneth Arrow, and Daniel Ellesberg, Abella demonstrates how these and other remarkable men and women left their stamp on nearly every aspect of American government, society, and culture.

The book’s strength is its ability to present a readable overview of RAND’s entire six-decade history supported by numerous recent interviews with many of the think tank’s pioneers. Its main weakness is Abella’s tendency to gloss over or bend facts to make a point. Like many outsiders looking into the defence community, he is too quick to suggest conspiracy or incompetence when he does not understand an issue in its entirety, and is too often prone to quip liberally on matters when his lack of knowledge shows through in the writing. Far from being well-placed commentary, his failed attempt at witty riposte is distracting from an otherwise well written book.

Still, Soldiers of Reason builds on the range of current literature examining American defence intellectuals with new interviews and perspectives on how Cold War security concerns eventually led to the shaping of American post war society as a whole. As a simpler read or for those not already familiar with the subject, Abella offers a cursory overview of RAND that stimulates further investigation of the topic.
CROSS OF IRON: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GERMAN WAR MACHINE, 1918-1945

Robert Engen

Dr. John Mosier is a man who enjoys myths. An English professor and film critic, Mosier has now written three major works exploring and “overturning” the supposed myths of twentieth century military history, the most recent of which is Cross of Iron: The Rise and Fall of the German War Machine. As a study of the development of the German military between 1919 and 1945, it can be read as a sequel to two of his previous books, The Blitzkrieg Myth and The Myth of the Great War, both of which were also exercises in historical “myth-busting.”

Mosier is one of several writers who in recent years have taken to challenging the legitimacy of the discipline of military history. This collection of non-specialists includes Dave Grossman and James Bacque, who along with Mosier take as a basis for their works the assumption that military historians are either hiding the truth or are grossly incompetent in their own field. They believe that military history as “traditionally” written is full of grievous errors and misunderstandings that historians have perpetuated, and that only they have the vision or determination to dispel. As Mosier blithely remarks, “the one lesson that military history teaches us is the imperviousness of its students to evidence.” Not an attitude designed to endear his work to historians, clearly, but the proof is in the pudding, and quality research and convincing arguments can make credible even the most belligerently revisionist works. Unfortunately, the research underpinning Cross of Iron is very problematic, and the book’s arguments are not convincing. Although Mosier’s ideas are sometimes worth listening to, there are good reasons to treat this work with a degree of skepticism.

Dr. Mosier’s book claims to be an examination of the German army from the end of the First World War to its final collapse in 1945. It vacillates between looking at the grand strategic picture and the remarkably minute tactical details, exploring why the German army maintained its edge during the interwar period and was so effective in the early years of the Second World War. It weaves themes from his previous two books on the First World War and the “blitzkrieg” strategy of the Second World War with a more detailed discussion of Germany’s war making capabilities during the inter-war years and its combat performance between 1939 and 1945. Cross of Iron presents nothing less than a new narrative on how the German Wehrmacht developed into the force that it did. It covers a surprisingly large amount of material in a small space. Accordingly, one of the major problems it encounters are that some of its most important and controversial points are inadequately documented and pale in comparison to other works.

The book makes little attempt to disguise Mosier’s clear anti-Bolshevik stance, and he has nothing charitable to say about the Soviet Union or the Red Army. In fact, he clearly attributes Soviet success only to American intervention, both in material aid and in opening up various second fronts in Western Europe. Mosier resists any notion that the Red Army was able to learn or improve to any significant degree during the war, and goes so far as to claim that the Germans still had the Soviets “on the ropes” and close to defeat in late 1944, at a time when the Red Army was tearing apart the Wehrmacht on the borders of Germany. Every “traditional” Russian victory in the war Mosier seems to disparage as a stalemate at best, bloated by Soviet propaganda that historians have dutifully repeated. This is in stark contrast to other recent work on the Soviet-German front, particularly by historian David Glantz, whose 2005 book Colossus Reborn examines the same events and timeframe as Cross of Iron’s chapters nine and ten. Glantz’s famously meticulous research in previously unopened Soviet archives presents a different argument: despite
horrific losses and setbacks in the first thirty months of the war, the Red Army managed to transform itself from an inadequate force to a powerful military instrument capable of defeating the Wehrmacht. Mosier’s argument may hold more appeal for those who worship the Wehrmacht’s military prowess, but in terms of scholarly credibility Glantz’s accounts seem more likely and are the product of exponentially better research in both English and Russian archives.

Likewise, Mosier’s portrayal of Adolf Hitler presents a problem. Although he stresses at length that he believes Hitler was an evil man, Mosier also manages to lionize the Nazi dictator, portraying him as a bastion of strategic genius amidst a sea of more technically-minded individuals. Mosier uses the word “shrewd” in almost every description of the dictator’s actions, and ascribes to him traits such as a “keen nose for public decorum (as well as an understanding of women).” Now, the goal of portraying Hitler as a sane, calculating human being rather than a monstrous lunatic is a worthwhile one. However, Mosier’s portrayal of the man as a bonafide military genius and foreign policy mastermind rings false and only serves to show Mosier’s own imperviousness to evidence. One of the recent definitive biographical works on Hitler, historian Ian Kershaw’s well-researched two-volume Hitler: Hubris and Nemesis, also explores the dictator’s humanity. Kershaw does not portray Hitler as insane, but finds abundant evidence of an extremely broken personality at work, and very few hints of outstanding military genius. Mosier goes so far as to dismiss Kershaw’s biography at one point as being too flattering to the Soviets, in the process misrepresenting what Kershaw actually says. But Kershaw’s exhaustively-researched work is a more authoritative account than Cross of Iron, as Mosier offers little evidence that would compel the reader to buy into his own sympathetic portrayal of Hitler. While the dictator was certainly a human being, and while his reputation as a military leader was certainly slurred by his army commanders both during and following the war, the grounds for Mosier’s assessment of his innate genius are questionable.

To lend substance to such claims, a scholar could, reasonably, need to produce a large amount of research, but it is here, sadly, that Cross of Iron is at its weakest. The book is poorly documented, with little or no cited source material for many of its key contentions. It would have made a favourable impression, for example, if Mosier had, every time he expressed how “we have too much documentary evidence” for his argument not to be the case, cited some of this documentary evidence to support his claims. There is no indication that Mosier has undertaken any archival or primary-source research at all; his facts and data are drawn exclusively from secondary sources, as are, by and large, his previous works.

There are also a number of arguments presented in this book that are simply incongruous. One particularly curious contention of Mosier’s is that Stalin was to blame for the brutal treatment of Soviet prisoners of war at the hands of the Germans, claiming that “it was Stalin who was responsible for the failure of the Soviet Union to sign the Geneva Conventions; doing so would have forced the Germans to treat Russian prisoners of war as they did the Allied prisoners, or at least to pay lip service to the concept.” How precisely it would have “forced” the Germans into doing anything is not elaborated upon. As another example, earlier on, Cross of Iron emphasizes the central place of the German Freikorps to the inter-war army, and discusses how virtually every German senior officer in the Second World War had been a part of the Freikorps. But Mosier then describes at length how the inter-war German army was staffed with “a remarkably naive group of technicians” that Hitler “dazzled, coddled, and manipulated” instead of the seasoned, bloody-minded veterans of the Freikorps. Some of Mosier’s points contradict themselves, seem to be tangled in a knot, and could use clarification or, perhaps, reconsideration entirely.

This is not to suggest that Mosier is entirely incorrect. His contentions about the war guilt of the German Wehrmacht are well-founded. His belief that the “blitzkrieg” German victories have little to do with German superiority and everything to do with the moral failure of the Allies is likewise highly plausible. Cross of Iron has good points to make, and is clearly aimed at stirring up controversy. But despite its pretensions to “demystifying” history it merely presents a controversial interpretation of the narrative, and brings no
significant new evidence or research to the discourse. In some cases there are better-written works with a much firmer grounding in the documentary evidence available that one could recommend over Cross of Iron. This book seems overly informed by its vicious anti-communist prejudice and its desire to “overthrow” the established history. Perhaps the current historiographical paradigm needs to be shaken up or even overturned, but Cross of Iron, heavy on speculation but very light on evidence, is not the book to do it.

Endnotes

5. Mosier claims that Kershaw “opines that the idea of attacking the Soviet Union alone is in itself sufficient grounds to question Hitler’s sanity,” and adds in an endnote how Kershaw is “always at pains to paint the Soviet Union in the most flattering light” and cites Kershaw’s Hitler: Nemesis for an example. But while Kershaw indeed refers to Hitler’s assessment of Soviet strength as a “crass underestimation,” there is no indication whatsoever in Nemesis that Kershaw takes this as a measure of Hitler’s sanity, or that Hitler was “insane” in any sense. Mosier, Cross of Iron, 147, 283; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 335-337.

KORAN, KALASHNIKOV AND LAPTOP: THE NEO-TALIBAN INSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN

Arnav Manchanda, MA

In his latest book Dr. Antonio Giustozzi, a researcher at the Crisis States Research Centre of the London School of Economics, examines the rise of the ‘neo-Taliban’ following the US-led invasion of Afghanistan and the ousting of the old Taliban regime in late 2001. His central hypothesis is that the Taliban were able to recover and rebuild by exploiting numerous factors, including a weak and corrupt Afghan government under Hamid Karzai, an inadequate number of international troops, a safe haven in Pakistan, and faulty counter-insurgency strategies. By doing so, they established a presence throughout the country and gained legitimacy amongst the Afghan population. Giustozzi warns that if the insurgency is allowed to develop it could resemble the anti-Soviet war of the 1980s: leaderless, chaotic, and ultimately leading to defeat for foreign forces.

In late 2001, the seeds of a sophisticated insurgency were sown with the flight of core Taliban commanders into a receptive environment provided by the Pakistani government and intelligence services. The neo-Taliban proceeded to adopt a more flexible approach to certain technologies, tactics and goals compared to their predecessors, for example in their embrace of the media, military techniques, and foreign theories of insurgency. They took advantage of opportunities presented when the new Afghan government alienated potential allies by empowering strongmen and ‘warlords’ in the regions. The neo-Taliban was only too happy to incorporate the disenfranchised into their networks. Furthermore, the lack of basic services to meet rising public expectations and rampant corruption led many Afghans into the hands of the neo-Taliban, who provided some basic services such as law and order. The neo-Taliban also drove a wedge between those who supported the government and the rest of the population by targeting the former as collaborators.
The neo-Taliban does not lack new recruits. The refugee camps, madrassas (religious schools) and tribal regions of Pakistan provide a ready stream of volunteers. The author also argues that the weakening of the traditional tribal system in Afghanistan leads many young men to join the insurgency to satisfy their craving for prestige, giving the neo-Taliban a cross-tribal base of support and strength. Recruits also come from those disenfranchised and excluded from the patronage networks of the Afghan government in the regions. Networking with xenophobic clergy across Afghanistan gives the neo-Taliban a truly national network and operational milieu in a country marked by fragmentation. In addition, the ability of the Taliban to portray themselves as in the fight for the long haul, in comparison to the finicky interveners, gives them additional credibility on the Afghan street.

Giustozzi demonstrates that the neo-Taliban leadership is largely centralized in terms of financial control and ideological cohesion. However, he also notes that considerable autonomy is given to field commanders. Interestingly, Giustozzi does not spend much time on the funding received from narcotics for the Taliban, noting that it is at best a secondary source; and this can definitely be disputed. Neo-Taliban troops also operate according to a simple rulebook, and Giustozzi makes a noteworthy point that these fighters do not intentionally target civilians, but instead choose to attract retaliatory fire into civilian areas, discrediting the international forces and Afghan government.

The author argues that the neo-Taliban follow a ‘grand strategy’ of sorts, one which is largely imported from abroad. He explores differing interpretations of this strategy. One is ‘fourth generation warfare,’ where the insurgents use all means possible—economic, military, social and political—to convince their opponents’ political decision-makers that the fight is not worth pursuing. Another is Maoist doctrine, which calls for the creation of staging areas in order to launch a final offensive against the opponent. A third possible interpretation is that of the ‘war of the flea,’ where the opponent is attacked in various locations, and retaliation by the opposing force incurs civilian casualties and the resentment of the local population, leading to frustration and an eventual withdrawal.

The author argues that the neo-Taliban strategy draws from all three explanations. However, it remains unclear what the ultimate end-goals of the neo-Taliban are. Rather than wanting to establish an autonomous state or government, Giustozzi postulates that the ultimate goal could be political incorporation into the government, and that the insurgency is meant to establish the neo-Taliban as a credible negotiating force.

Giustozzi does not devote much space to the military tactics of the neo-Taliban, but does provide a useful overview of their evolution. He notes the use of improvised explosive devices, suicide bombers and greater flexibility in battlefield communication and movement. The ability of the Taliban to field a sophisticated informer network in order to plan ambushes and other operations is also quite striking. The neo-Taliban have weaknesses, including a lack of radio discipline, a commitment to ideology over military proficiency, and a vulnerability to air power and the superior technology of the international forces.

Giustozzi makes some valid and rather damning observations on the counter-insurgency effort. His main critique is that the neo-Taliban was ignored as a viable opponent until 2005, and that much was lost in not establishing an international presence on the ground—in the villages and districts—during the early stages of the mission, especially in the south. The author argues that a mix of patronage-based counter-insurgency and special operations forces could have stemmed the tide of the neo-Taliban early in the conflict. Giustozzi also criticizes international forces for lacking an intelligence capability to match the insurgents’ networks of informers. He also notes that the ability to accumulate local knowledge and familiarity, and to pass that information on through subsequent troop rotations, is extremely important.

This reviewer is aware that many of the shortcomings of the counter-insurgency effort identified by Giustozzi are already being remedied: the use of airpower is being curbed, lessons learnt from one rotation to the next are being transmitted, and a greater effort is being made to integrate civilian and military aspects of the mission. Indeed, Giustozzi
does not examine innovative concepts such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams or other capacity-building projects for Afghan governance and security.

Whatever progress there is, however, does not excuse the fact that the counter-insurgency effort lacks a comprehensive strategy on the ground. There are disagreements within the NATO coalition over issues such as opium eradication; negotiating with the Taliban; the desired end-goals; the imposition of caveats on the use of national troop contingents; and differing approaches to counter-insurgency.

In conclusion, this timely volume is a comprehensive overview of the rise of the neo-Taliban. However, it can be both overwhelming in its detail and imprecise when it delves into policy analysis and recommendation. Nevertheless, this work should be on the bookshelf of anyone who wishes to better understand the current conflict in Afghanistan. Indeed, this reviewer is encouraged that the book is already on the reading list of Canadian commanders in Kandahar.

THE DAY OF BATTLE: THE WAR IN SICILY AND ITALY

2Lt Thomas Fitzgerald, MA, LLB (2IRRC)
In the second volume of his “Liberation Trilogy”, Rick Atkinson continues his fascinating and vivid account of the Allied 1943-1944 Sicily/Italy campaign. In The Day of Battle he expands on his theme of a maturing army, its military leadership, and a country at war. In his first book, An Army at Dawn, Atkinson details a military and a country ill-prepared for the rigors of war. From the almost comic-opera landings during OPERATION TORCH (the invasion of North Africa, to the defeat at Kasserine), the author chronicles with enormous detail a military command often at war with itself and with its political leadership and which had no consistent overall plan to defeat the enemy.

The amateurish ability of the American high command is on display during the campaign in Sicily; from the near annihilation from “friendly fire” of the 82nd Airborne Division during a combat drop preceding the invasion (OPERATION HUSKY), and the inactivity of the Seventh Army once ashore at Gela, to the inexplicable strategic mistake of not capturing the port of Messina, thereby allowing almost 120,000 German and Italian troops to escape and fight again. This lack of combat acuity is again demonstrated during the landing at Salerno when Lt. General Mark Clark positioned a corps boundary along a river, creating a seam in his defensive line, a mistake quickly exploited by the German panzers with near disastrous results. Also, during the landing at Anzio, the invading force failed to seize the surrounding hills, thereby bottling themselves up for months. Atkinson is unsparing in his criticism of these blunders.

In the face of these military missteps, one is left to wonder: how did the Allies succeed in what, in the broader scheme of things, was a sideshow? The author has two theories: first, the growing industrial might of the United States allowed quick replenishment of lost matériel. While regrettable in terms of loss of life, the losses in transport, tanks and other vehicles were easily replaced. By 1943, American war production was quickly becoming more efficient in turning out the necessary instruments of war. Second, the determination of the simple combat soldier to win the war and go home safely more than made
up for poor generalship. Even in the face of almost certain death, the American soldier remained eternally optimistic as he learned to become more professional, more determined, more remorseless in his relentless war against the enemy. Atkinson is able to portray the American soldier in this fashion by his frequent use of news reports, memoirs, diaries, letters and in the words of the soldiers themselves. In a letter home to his sister, an Army captain wrote, “I will have done my share to make this world a better place in which to live. Maybe when the lights go on all over the world, free people can be happy and gay again.”

The cast of players in the Italian campaign from the well known (Churchill, Roosevelt, Eisenhower, Patton, Clark and Montgomery), to the less well known (Truscott, Lucas, McCrerry and Biddle), is objectively analyzed with their mistakes and successes equally catalogued.

This, then, is “The Day of Battle”, the story of bravery and of blunder in the classroom of war called Italy. The soldiers and generals who learned these hard lessons would later put them to good use in Europe following D-Day, events to be described in the final volume of the trilogy. With its focus on the American efforts, this book is not a general history of the Italian campaign, so it lacks an overall strategic context to ground it. Anyone looking for more than a superficial examination of the other allied combatants will be disappointed. The Canadian battles, for example, are cursorily analyzed (disappointingly, the map for Ortona has the present national flag, not the Red Ensign marking Canadian troop locations). At times, Atkinson perhaps, due in part to his journalistic background, displays a tendency for melodramatic phrasing and purple prose interspersed with words which have the reader reaching for a dictionary. That said, “Day of Battle” is a story needing telling and one well told.

Endnote


GERMAN V-WEAPON SITES, 1943-45

Major Andrew B. Godefroy, CD, PhD

The fortress series of Osprey Publications continues to deliver strong products in concise, well-written and illustrated packages. Among the most recent additions to this series is Steven J. Zaloga’s German V-Weapon Sites, 1943-45, an examination of the locations from which Germany planned to employ their most advanced flying bomb, rocket, missile, and supergun technologies against the allies in the latter years of the Second World War.

Zaloga is a well-known and respected author of subjects associated with military technology. A previous author of over a dozen Osprey publications, his latest work focuses on the development of installations, launch sites, and mobile launch platforms for Germany’s V-1 flying bomb, V-2 missile, and V-3 millipede multi-stage artillery supergun. Following the standard Osprey format, he presents solid sections on weapon design and development, the sites at war, allied attempts to destroy the sites, an analysis of the effectiveness of the V-weapon programs, and the ultimate fate of these sites today.
Although detailed illustration is a standard employed throughout all Osprey publications, the nature of the subjects in the Fortress series of books truly benefit from the modern digital artwork methods now being employed. Most of the V-weapon sites were mammoth underground structures that can only be fully appreciated with the accompaniment of detailed 3-D cutaway illustrations. As well, given that few of these sites were completed before being bombed or captured, the digital artwork allows the reader to see what many of these sites might have looked like had they gone into combat operations. Needless to say the conceptual architecture is impressive, and the broken pieces that remain visible today can only provide some idea of the magnitude of Germany’s rocket program.

Beyond the well-designed artwork and photographic illustrations by Hugh Johnson and Chris Taylor, Zaloga has provided a good concise analysis of the RAF’s campaign to degrade and destroy Germany’s V-weapon capabilities. With so much focus and debate surrounding the allied strategic bombing campaign against German population and industrial centres, it may surprise some to discover that, on many occasions, the priority of bombing effort against German missile sites overtook all other campaigns including Operation POINTBLANK, the strategic air campaign against German industry. No less than 68,913 allied bombing sorties were committed to locating and destroying German V-weapon sites from August 1943 until the end of the war. RCAF crews were engaged in many of these missions, and all of No.6 (RCAF) Bomb Group took part in Operation HYDRA, the first raid against the Peenemunde Army Research Centre on the night of 17/18 August 1943.

Zaloga’s coverage of these sites also extends to good discussion on the less well-known V-3 millipede multi-stage artillery supergun. A physically distinct weapon platform from the V-1 and V-2 rockets, it is often forgotten in examinations of Germany’s strategic weapons program or finds itself being loosely associated with the German Todt Organization coastal artillery. Zaloga has brought it back into the fold in this publication, making German V-Weapon Sites, 1943-45, a worthy addition.

SEVASTOPOL 1942: VON MANSTEIN’S TRIUMPH

Neil Chuka

The German conquest of the Crimea in July 1942 was a bloody attritional campaign launched ostensibly to remove a Soviet aerial threat to the Ploesti oilfields. In contrast to the war of manoeuvre that, up to that time, had largely characterized the war in the East, the German campaign in the Crimea was a slow, arduous battle against fixed fortifications. Centred on fourteen defensive major positions, these fortifications included some nineteen coastal artillery batteries housing naval rifles, some in armoured turrets, ranging from 100mm to 302mm in caliber. Along with conventional land, air and some naval forces, the Germans also deployed a mixed bag of “super-heavy” siege artillery and mortars, including the 800mm ‘Dora’ railway gun and several ‘Karl’ 600mm mortars. However, for all the resources consumed fielding these super-heavy weapons, they proved less-than-effective and conventional caliber support weapons provided the bulk of artillery and mortar fire for the attacking German and Romanian infantry.

Robert Forczyk, a retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel with a PhD from the University of Maryland, has four Osprey titles to his credit, with two forthcoming in the near future. His
recounting of the German Crimea campaign has successfully weaved large amounts of strategic and tactical detail into the compact Osprey format. Supported by archival research and an appropriate number of German, English and Russian language secondary sources, the result is a well-researched and articulated account of an interesting campaign. Like all Osprey volumes, this one is generously illustrated with photographs, artwork, and maps. In concert with information on orders-of-battle, command personalities, armaments, and ordnance, the illustrations provide the reader with the background material required to follow the description of operations.

This volume is a compliment to the Osprey Campaign series and recommended to those looking for a compact guide to the campaign. Its only drawbacks, such as a lack of footnotes, are part and parcel of the Osprey format. Indeed, a lengthier study by Forczyk would likely prove not only interesting but also highly useful and authoritative.

ORGANIZATIONS AT WAR: AFGHANISTAN AND BEYOND

Heather Hrychuk

Given the ongoing multinational engagement in Afghanistan, publications analyzing the application of counter-insurgency theory, decision-making and operational lessons learned are pervasive. At first glance, Organizations at War: Afghanistan and Beyond appears to be yet another work in an overwhelmed field suffering from a reliance on first person accounts lacking theoretical foundations and intellectual rigour.

In actuality, this work rises above many current publications as it applies complex organizational theories to conflict participants, explaining why unsavoury regimes can gain power and why groups appearing substantially weaker than their adversary can emerge victorious. It is academically sound, based upon primary research and statistical data, clearly thought-out and organized.

Rather than simply distilling theory into a list of practices employed by radical groups to win the long war, Sinno explains how a variety of these groups organize for war. Examining two tumultuous decades in Afghanistan, Sinno explains that groups who have outperformed and outlasted their opponents were victorious due to their successful organizational structures. In doing so, he argues that organization is a key enabler for success. Groups such as the mid 1990’s Taliban, who lack broad political appeal and appear unlikely to succeed, achieve success due to their organizational structure. Gradually becoming a more centralized and specialized entity with discipline enforcing units allowed the Taliban to defeat much more established enemies. By employing a centralized structure, the emerging Taliban were able to exploit weakness in groups who were loosely centralized and dependent on patronage and periphery support, such as Rashid Dostum’s Jumbish-i Milli. Smaller groups, operating through loose coordination and consultation councils that afforded all members equality, faltered against the emerging organization with a strong discipline structure.

Sinno also highlights the need for flexibility, lack of which has consternated radical groups in the past. Structures effective when on the offensive do not always translate to success when the group simply aims for survival. Having the ability to understand the
context in which they operate, and adapt the organization accordingly, is essential for radicals to emerge victorious.

The work falters towards the end, where Sinno diverges from his central topic, and delves too deeply into contemporary political issues. Chapter 9 focuses on Afghan conflict under US occupation, but rather than applying organizational theory to the current engagement, Sinno centres on Afghan political and social conditions and the Bush administration’s failings during the period. An in-depth analysis of Taliban remnants and the emerging Neo-Taliban structures during this period would have been of greater utility for the reader, and would have further demonstrated the need for flexibility within these organizations.

Despite this oversight, Sinno’s work is a strong, original contribution to the field of conflict analysis. Sinno clearly explains the concepts central to organizational theory while demonstrating how those concepts can be employed to determine conflict participants’ effectiveness, and in doing so, demonstrates the theory’s utility.

THE ARCHITECTURE OF LEADERSHIP: PREPARATION EQUALS PERFORMANCE

Lieutenant-Colonel P.J. Williams

One of the first things I noticed about this book was that it had no bibliography. Though this might normally be somewhat disconcerting, given that the authors were respectively a former US Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security and Commandant of the United States Coast Guard, my concerns were mostly allayed. The book is indeed a primary source of the authors’ experiences, liberally interspersed with quotes on leadership from (mostly American) leaders of the past from a variety of fields.

In the introduction to the book, the authors draw on a definition of leadership from James MacGregor Burns, who defined it in part as “. . . leaders acting . . . for certain shared goals that represent the values . . . of themselves and the people they represent.” Taking this as a basis, Phillips and Loy highlight three aspects of the definitions which are common themes throughout the book: first, that true leaders act by inspiring, rather than through coercive power, second, that leaders have a bias for action and a sense of urgency, and, third, that leaders act with respect for the values of those they represent.

The title of this short book (one can read it easily in just over an hour), suggests some framework the authors will use. The analogy of a house or building a structure sets the layout of the book. Chapters are presented as follows:

• The Foundation, consisting of Character and Values.
• The Floor, made up of the Drive to Achieve and the Capacity to Care.
- The Framework, which includes innate traits and acquired skills.

- The Ceiling, the shortest chapter and which focuses on opportunity. (Personally, I would have thought that, maintaining the building motif, "Window", with allusions to vision and the ability to see "outside the box", would have been more appropriate that the constricting Ceiling).

- The Roof, which describes Performance.

The authors take the reader through each chapter, with an explanation of the theory behind each part of the building process, and make reference to a historical (and not always military) figure who demonstrated that particular elements of the overall leadership construct. At the end of the book, the authors use the example of the US response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 as a case study in how to apply the “architecture of leadership” as described in the book.

Though I found nothing totally new on the subject of leadership, I did question some of the authors’ conclusions. For instance, they believe that “Embracing Change” and “Risk Taking” are innate and not learned traits. Further, the authors contend that innate risk aversion manifests itself in indecisiveness, which is an acquired trait, according to the book. The section on decisiveness is actually rather short, and the authors describe the leader’s classic five-step decision making process thusly:

- gather information and understand the facts;
- involve all stakeholders in the process;
- consider various solutions and their consequences;
- ensure consistency with personal policy and objectives; and
- effectively communicate the decision.

In a book which appears to be written largely for civilian readers, I was wondering at what point the subject of management would come up. Though it does, it’s in the second half of the book and is briefly described as the “how” of leadership. Many such books tend to blur this distinction between leadership and management, so it was comforting to see management described separately. For comparison, I laid the book alongside the CF leadership manual, which goes into far more depth into the theory and practice of leadership in a military environment.

The book is not written for a military audience, though military personnel, when dealing with civilian counterparts, may wish to consult it. The book will provide some insight as to what might make a civilian leader tick. In the afterword, the authors state that the book can be used either to foster better internal leadership or to create a solid leadership team from scratch. Indeed, given the plethora of laudatory reviews on the back cover, including from CEOs of several major US companies, and a 2007 Baseball Hall of Fame Inductee, it appears that the book has somewhat of a following in some circles south of the border. One wonders if a similar Canadian publication exists. Given the increasing “Whole of Government” approach to our operations in Afghanistan in particular, such a publication might possibly gain a large readership in this country.
In their efforts to win the Cold War against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the United States of America (USA) harnessed some of its best minds into highly influential and classified groups charged with solving national security problems. In addition to the creation of a number of think tanks such the RAND Corporation or the Institute for Defence Analysis (IDA), the U.S. Government discretely assembled together a much smaller and more selective group of scientists and presented them with perhaps its two greatest tasks. First, solve the country’s most difficult defence problems, and second, and much more challenging, provide objective and unbiased advice back to the government. Though the U.S. government never officially named this special organization, the group became known simply as ‘The Jasons’.

Ann Finkbeiner, a freelance science writer who teaches in the graduate program at Johns Hopkins University, has opened a Pandora’s Box of intrigue with her latest work, The Jasons: The Secret History of Science’s Postwar Elite. Revealing one of the many American clandestine efforts to gain technological advantage over their Soviet adversary during the darkest days of the Cold War, Finkbeiner traces the covert origins and evolution of this fascinating group of physicists and mathematicians from its earliest days through to the present in a format that will have some readers hooked from the very first few pages.

The Jasons were an ‘unofficial’ collective of advisors whose ranks over the years included approximately one hundred members. Of these, forty-three were admitted to the National Academy of Sciences, eleven were Nobel Prize recipients, eight had received the MacArthur Award, and one was a Fields Medal winner. Unquestionably, the Jasons composed a group of some of the best scientific minds America had ever produced.

Though group had its origins in the aftermath of the Second World War, they became more formally organized in 1960 with a rotating chair and steering committee. Meeting every summer in inconspicuous locations on the east or west coast of the United States (one summer the group worked out of a vacant girl’s high school), they would spend several weeks devoted to the study of a detailed defence problem or proposal and then write a comprehensive report for the government to consider. Defence problems would be solved, and defence proposals would be either validated or crushed. One summer, the group examined ways to improve the early warning and detection of intercontinental ballistic missiles during re-entry. Another summer was spent designing ways to improve secure communications for submarines. In the mid-1960s the group was charged with the task of designing a barrier to reduce the incursions of the North Vietnamese into the south via the ‘Ho Chi Minh’ trail. This ‘Jason’ idea rapidly evolved into the infamous MacNamara Line and gave birth to what later became known the electronic battlefield. Other assignments in the 1970s and 1980s included the development of the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) lines to detect Soviet submarines, and the debunking of many of the proposed aspects of the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) or ‘Star Wars’ program. In the 1990s and beyond the group has been involved with nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship and other post-Cold War defence challenges.

Finkbeiner is very successful in addressing a number of issues that are often associated with the subject of defence science, research, and development. Knowledgeable yet somehow nobly naïve, defence scientists are traditionally portrayed as conflicted spirits;
purely ethical creatures somehow forced into a Faustian bargain with the evil military in order to secure the resources to pursue their own pure research goals. Finkbeiner goes far to dismantle this myth. She tackles the ethics, morality, pragmatism, and patriotism of her subjects without fear. Finkbeiner accurately captures the personalities of her subjects as well as their motivations for being involved with Jason. For the most part the Jasons are a pragmatic bunch, and while she acknowledges the moral and ethical challenges the Jasons faced, we see the Jasons are uncluttered by falsely argued notions of ethical superiority. Still, both their non-Jason colleagues as well as the scientific community writ large regularly prosecuted the Jasons. Finkbeiner also explores the illogic of those prosecutions, and through the words of her subjects explains the hubris of scientific snobbery associated with those who claim they only engage in scientific research that does no harm. The historical debate presented is engaging and reflective of present day issues.

American Cold War science and technology research and development is a complex subject that remains largely unexplored. Finkbeiner has made a positive contribution to the field with this latest work, and it is recommended for those with an interest in Cold War intelligence and security issues.

THREE TO A LOAF

Colonel JP de B Taillon

Three to a Loaf tells the story of Rory Ferrall a young Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) officer of Anglo-German descent who is wounded and disfigured at Ypres. Ferrall is shipped to a convalescent hospital in Britain where he shouts out in his sleep, but unlike the other military patients on his ward, Ferrall does it in his mother tongue, which is German. This catches the ear of British Military Intelligence, who desperately need someone with Ferrall’s fluency in the German language and intimate knowledge of the culture.

The allies are anxious to find out what the Germans plan to do to break the deadlock on the Western Front, and they have captured a prisoner who just might be instrumental in helping them obtain that information. In 1914, there were twelve million German-Americans. In August of that year, nearly a thousand German-American men sailed back to the Fatherland to fight (many men from Berlin, Ontario—since renamed Kitchener—did exactly the same thing). Hurriedly trained to impersonate a captured German-American officer, who is believed to be the sole surviving officer of his Landwehr battalion, Ferrall assumes
the prisoner's identity and is sent into Germany under the guise of having made a daring escape. In an age where pay books and identity cards didn't have photographs, this ruse is believable, although risky, as a dogged German policeman thinks his story is suspicious (though for other reasons). The book goes on from this point in considerable detail, but without giving away much of a good read, Goodspeed manages to provide a compelling strategic and a social overview of both sides in the war to end wars.

Goodspeed weaves suspense, moral and personal quandaries and historical detail together in a treatment that has a realistic ring to it nearly a century later. He does this without making his characters 21st century cut-outs. Goodspeed avoids the common pitfall of making his characters modern day people with modern attitudes. The characters in *Three to a Loaf* are creatures of their time. Rory Ferrall is certainly no superman, and equally, his German opponents are not portrayed as detestable villains. The characters are well drawn, and the range of personalities on both sides in this novel will be familiar to anyone who has served in the Canadian Forces. In this respect, the context of *Three to a Loaf* has been carefully researched with original material that Goodspeed has drawn from the PPCLI museum as well as Canadian, British and German archived sources.

This is a novel worthy of study for other reasons. More than just a tale of war and espionage, *Three to a Loaf* is also an account of how the world came to be driven to adopt the 20th century's most destructive ideologies. And this is surely a theme that has a degree of significance for a broad range of today's readers, many of whom are sensitive to the sometimes conflicting demands of security and morality.

In summary, this is a great read and intelligent entertainment. I would recommend it to anyone in the Canadian Forces or anyone who has an interest in military history. It's historically accurate and it has a lot to say about the nature of the military profession and modern war. My biggest criticism of *Three to a Loaf* is that so far there is only one such book. Goodspeed's publisher promises a sequel. I look forward to it.

**CHINA’S ENERGY STRATEGY: THE IMPACT ON BEIJING’S MARITIME POLICIES**

Major J.R. McKay, PhD

Two of the hottest topics in international affairs in 2008 pertained to the effects of the growing global demand for energy (the fluctuations in the price of oil and the food crisis exacerbated by an increase in 'biofuel' production) and the behaviour of the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The 2008 Summer Olympics brought the world to Beijing despite the concerns felt in many quarters about the PRC’s behaviour in Tibet and its association with governments with poor human rights records, to wit, Myanmar and the Sudan. Many commentators offered explanations for the Chinese government’s behaviour, but some of these lacked explanatory power. This edited volume delves into the issue of a growing Chinese thirst for oil and its effects on its foreign and trade relations as well as the People’s Liberation Army—Navy (PLA-N).

The editors of this book are all academic staff at the U.S. Naval War College and three of four belong to the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) that was founded in 2006. The CMSI is a part of the Strategic Research Department of the Naval War College and is intended to increase the U.S. Navy’s knowledge of the maritime dimensions of China’s rise.
towards great power status. To that end, the CMSI’s second annual conference was the “Maritime Implications of China’s Energy Strategy”, which sought to address the following three questions:

- What is China’s energy strategy?
- What role might energy dependence play in China’s emerging naval modernization?
- What are the implications of China’s energy strategy for maritime strategy?

The book is a compilation of the papers presented at the conference. Some of the papers were also published in other periodicals, including Orbis, the Journal of Strategic Studies, the Naval War College Review and the Journal of Contemporary China.

The book contains articles written by contributors that fell into three different categories, namely economists, naval analysts and / or ‘China Watchers’. The contributors were all Americans, with one exception, with ties to the Naval War College or corporations with interests in China. The book itself grouped the contributions into four parts, roughly aligned with the aforementioned three questions from the 2007 conference:

- Energy & Security;
- Energy Access;
- Naval Developments; and
- Energy Security and Sino-American Relations

This was a logical manner to organize the contributions that matched the central theme of the book: Chinese concerns over the increasing thirst for energy sources, particularly oil from overseas, is contributing to the Chinese drive to increase its ability to protect the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) and / or deny access to other powers that might be tempted to interfere with China’s energy supplies (read as the Indian or U.S. navies). If the details in the contributions can be summarized into a single concept or catchphrase, then that is the “Malacca Dilemma”. China’s foreign-supplied oil comes from Africa and the Persian Gulf and the SLOCs for that oil must pass through the Straits of Malacca. Should a hostile power wish to interdict or cut off the oil supply that would be the best location to do so. The same comment could be made about the Straits of Hormuz, as most of the oil supply comes from the Persian Gulf. The PLA-N is primarily a ‘brown water’ or ‘green water’ navy, currently optimized for operations near the Chinese mainland. The protection of lengthy SLOCs requires more capability (at sea replenishment, long range patrol aircraft, and larger warships) than currently exists. Interestingly, the study of Chinese naval analyses on the matter suggests that, in the short term, the PLA-N’s thoughts on the matter appear to be based on two assumptions. First, the most dangerous threat would come from the power that believes most in the “freedom of the seas”—the United States. With some exceptions, it appears that if someone threatens Chinese SLOCs, the PLA-N would seek to retaliate in kind. Second, SLOCs are only one way to ensure China’s oil supply. The PRC has supported the creation of deepwater ports and pipelines linked to overland routes to China, such as the port of Gwadar in western Pakistan and ports on the west coast of Myanmar. Both of these address the “Malacca Dilemma”, but embroil the PRC into the troubled parts of South and Central Asia as well as the political problems associated with Myanmar.

The only criticism that could be levelled at the book is that it tends to overlook the PRC’s, and by default the PLA-N’s, obsession with the issue of Taiwan. The book is worth the time for anyone who wants to develop a deeper understanding of the PRC’s international behaviour, its thirst for energy and how the Chinese Communist Party and PLA-N think about such issues. Its strongest contributions pertain to the PRC’s drive to quench its growing thirst and how it does so.
The history of the First World War is as largely defined by name as it is by image. The title ‘Western Front’, for example, needs no explanation to students and scholars of military history, and many of its battles are known not by the name of some great city, but rather by that of a man-made object created specifically during the ‘war to end all wars’. Dr. Peter Chasseaud, a fellow of the Royal Geographic Society and an acknowledged expert on First World War survey and mapping, captures the subject of naming in his latest book, Rat’s Alley: Trench Names of the Western Front, 1914-1918.

Without question Chasseaud’s book is sure to become a seminal work on the subject and a must-have reference for anyone interested in this period of military history. At over 400 pages, the reader is given copious amounts of history, information, and data invaluable to other First World War research, especially anything associated with operations. Divided into two major sections, the first half of the book is devoted to the history and evolution of trench mapping and naming on the western front. Chasseaud explains the mapping systems of the various countries and combatants, as well as the difficulties in producing accurate maps during the course of the war. It is seldom appreciated that overhead observation, a critical element in gaining an accurate picture of the ground for mapping, was still a relatively new capability at the time. He discusses mistakes and lessons learned, and provides an examination of British, French, and German naming conventions each in separate chapters. Endnotes are conveniently placed at the end of each chapter, and a comprehensive bibliography of further sources and reading is also provided. The second half of the book is a gazetteer containing an alphabetical list of every known trench or named point on the western front along with its map sheet, number, and contemporary grid reference. Names now famous in Canadian military history such as Regina Trench, Desire Trench, the Pimple, Vimy Ridge, Polygon Wood, K5, Mount Sorrel, and many others, are easily located here.

This as well as Chasseaud’s other work is indicative of the high quality of research that is finally emerging on the history of the First World War. Moving away from emotive, politically charged rhetoric so common in such studies, Chasseaud has instead presented something completely original and pragmatic. Beautifully illustrated and richly detailed, Rat’s Alley brings to the forefront a critical element the western front so often presented but also so often misrepresented—the physical battlefield itself. Too often immortalized in photos as a pockmarked lunar landscape of mud, this book reveals just how complex the geography of the battlefield truly was. Far from being a random mess of defences, trenches were as much as possible logically laid out and identified as the war progressed.

Many of the First World War battlefields remain both easily visible and accessible. In some places, such as the grounds surrounding the Vimy Ridge monument, the craters, trenches, and scars of battle named in Chasseaud’s gazetteer can be seen with little effort. When combined with other tools such as physical maps and modern GPS, anyone interested in walking the ground should have little difficulty in relocating these places. For those interested in the study of this period or touring its battlefields, Rat’s Alley: Trench Names of the Western Front, 1914-1918, is a must have reference and guide.
For anyone interested in military history, and the Normandy Campaign in particular, the names “Tiger” and “Panther” are evocative of desperate times. Most tanks of the Western Allies were so outclassed in terms of protection and firepower by the heavy German armour as to be laughable. Fortunately, the British Army was able to develop a usable tank armed with a gun capable of dealing with the heavy German tanks, at least in terms of firepower if not in protection. The Sherman Firefly, the topic of this small work, was the main result of this. The importance of the Firefly is that quite simply put, it was the only Allied tank in Normandy with any hope of beating a Tiger or Panther one on one.

David Fletcher has produced a short, extremely readable account of the conceptualization, development, and production of the Sherman Firefly, the Sherman tank upgunned with a 17-pounder cannon. When a student of the period struggles to understand the consistent inadequacy of Allied army tanks (particularly those of the British), Fletcher is able to explain in layman’s terms the difficulty that the British armaments industry had in producing modern tanks at all, and emphasizes that it was not from lack of thought, but rather a lack of production capability. The British had allowed their armament capability to atrophy between the wars that when faced with the choice after Dunkirk of retooling to produce better weapons including newer more capable tanks (which would have entailed stopping virtually all production for several months), or continuing to produce their older inadequate weapons, the British quite rightly chose to produce the old stuff. After all, a poor gun is much better than no gun at all. As a result, although the Royal Artillery was formally thinking about the 17-pounder as an anti-tank gun as early as November 1940, they were still actually producing the 2-pounder, rather than the newer 6-pounder, far less the 17-pounder! Furthermore, at a Tank Board meeting in December 1941, the idea was first discussed of mounting the 17-pounder into a tank (eventually to result in the Challenger, the Firefly, the Comet, and then the Centurion), but nothing could actually be produced. This difficulty goes a long way in explaining why British tanks always seemed a step or two behind those of the Germans in terms of armour and gun power for most of the war.

For much of the war, the British Army, and the Tank Arm specifically, were also suffering from an unclear doctrinal concept of what a tank was. Was it a mobile gun used to destroy other tanks, or was it really there to support the infantry, in which case it not only had to be able to occasionally kill other tanks, but it also had to be able to fire a useful High Explosive (HE) shell so that it could support the infantry? Out of the answer to this question falls the gun and ammunition required. As Fletcher points out, the inability of the British Army to effectively decide what they wanted their tanks to do made the job of tank designers even harder. Perhaps well thought out and consistent doctrine is more important than one thinks!

But designing new tanks, particularly for the British Armaments Industry, took a long time. The Commonwealth Armoured Forces needed a well-armed tank immediately and not at some future date. Then current British tanks such as the Crusader or the Valentine were simply too small to accommodate the 17-pounder. This left the Sherman medium tank, acquired from the Americans as the only possibility, and it was also a small tank, at least in terms of its turret. Here then is the real story of the Firefly. It is the story of two Royal Tank Regiment Majors, George Brighty and George Witheridge, who, in the words of David Fletcher “were bent on improving the firepower of the Sherman.” Fletcher goes into great detail on how a 17-pounder was “crammed” into the turret of the Sherman. It took some fitting, and it seems the two majors were not too worried about how they were to achieve this. As Fletcher puts it “it would be interesting to know how he got hold of a tank, particularly one he intended to butcher to prove his point.” Suffice it to say that by modifying the
chase of the barrel (a gun term that is explained in the work), and flipping the 17-pounder on its side, it was made to fit, and there was the “Firefly”. Without it, we might still be trying to break out of Normandy.

I found this portion of the book fascinating, and can only imagine what was going through Major Witheridge’s mind the first time he fired the 17-pounder mounted in the Sherman, using a long lanyard and staying, no doubt, well away from the tank! Anyway, to make a long story short, it worked and the Firefly was born. Alas, in the words of Fletcher “the days of the enthusiastic, gifted amateur were over. From now on, the professionals would take over.” The rest of the book then discusses the formal design of the Firefly, then production (which was, of course “conversion” from standard 75 mm gunned Shermans.) Eventually around 2000 Fireflies were produced, and again, it was far more complicated than just ripping out the short 75 and putting in the 17-pounder. For a short work, the book is full of little tidbits about design issues—how does the loader escape around that massive breech filling the turret? You cut him a new hatch. No space in the turret for the radio? Mount it in an armoured box welded to the back of the turret, with a hole cut in the turret to allow the loader/radio-operator to reach into the box and manipulate the controls.

Overall I would recommend this work to anyone interested in Second World War Two operations, with the understanding that, like most Ospreys, it only scratches the surface of the story. One annoying aspect of the work is that the real crux of the story, the actual capability of the 17 pounder vice the 6 pounder or 75 mm, is not dealt with in any detail. Fletcher sidesteps the issue by saying that figures for comparison can be very misleading depending on conditions. While this may be true, an actual comparison of penetration would drive home what the fuss was about. Finally, I did find the colour illustrations to be not up to the usual standard of Osprey Publishing, being somewhat repetitive, and a bit fuzzy. Otherwise, it is a good introductory study of these vehicles.

HOW WE MISSED THE STORY: OSAMA BIN LADEN, THE TALIBAN, AND THE HIJACKING OF AFGHANISTAN


The Canadian Army’s increased interest in Afghan history tends to focus on tactical analysis of the Soviet period from 1979 to 1989; on anything that can explain tribal dynamics; or the progress of the war since 9-11. Knowledge of what happened in the intervening years generally tends to be anecdotal and derived from the personal experiences or beliefs of Afghans who work alongside Canadians. That period, stretching from the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 to the mounting of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in 2001, remains loaded with charge and counter charge of human rights violations, narcotics smuggling, conspiracy theories related to the UNCOL pipeline deal, and near-constant propaganda that the situation that confronted the West in 2001 was somehow the result of Western neglect after the Cold War ended. We now have an important resource to help us understand the post-Soviet era and a starting point to get beyond the propaganda. Roy Gutman’s How We Missed the Story is that resource.

Gutman, an experienced journalist who is best known for his work in the Balkans, is now a senior fellow at the United States Institute for Peace, and dedicated several years trying to sort out what exactly happened in the violent chaos of post-Soviet Afghanistan. What emerges is a documented and detailed portrayal of Pakistan’s interference in Afghan affairs, Saudi Arabia’s culpability in that exercise, a distracted not to mention diffuse American policy, and the exploitation of that state of affairs by Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
Most importantly, we see that the instability in present-day Afghanistan is also in part the product of choices made by Afghans.

It is clear that Gutman was initially interested in how the Clinton and Bush administrations failed to prevent 9-11, but realized during the course of his research that there were limits to American power (and attention span) and that there were other players more adroit than the Americans in their understanding of regional dynamics. The work is far from being a bleat about American lost opportunities: indeed, the behaviour of the Taliban from its inception to its regime phase to its insurgent phase closely resembles what all of us saw in the Balkans in the early 1990s—calculated ethnic cleansing, the gross abuse of human rights, and the activation of historical grievances to fuel power-driven agendas. Gutman provides substantial detail on the magnitude and scope of the Taliban agenda and its execution. It is difficult to conclude that Afghanistan in 1996 was radically different from Bosnia in 1992—there was just little or no media coverage of it at the time.

What also emerges is a more balanced depiction of Northern Alliance factional behaviour; hitherto, that behaviour was considered the moral equivalent of Taliban behaviour with atrocity rumour after atrocity rumour abounding within the media-sphere. Gutman demonstrates that the Northern Alliance leaders were no angels in their fight, but their behaviour was nothing compared to the malevolence of the Taliban agenda. Those seeking accommodation with the Taliban leadership today should take heed.

Gutman faults the Clinton administration for its lukewarm attempts to implement a proxy support approach to the Northern Alliance (similar to what it did with Croatia in 1995); but that criticism pales to his detailed criticism of Pakistan’s manipulation of the Afghan civil war to achieve its own ends. We also learn that the Taliban’s Mullah Omar did indeed have designs on Central Asia and was prepared to export radical Islamist revolution throughout the ‘Stans using Afghanistan as a base. Exporting terrorist violence was, therefore, not an exclusively Al Qaeda project; but that remained undetected by the Clinton administration at the time.

Canadians involved in present-day Afghanistan will appreciate Gutman’s discussion of how the Taliban took over the country and in particular how tribal elements change sides and under what conditions. The city-focused Taliban strategy of the 1990s is also worth contemplating in our present circumstances. Notably, the discussion on how the players in the Mujahideen “Commanders’ War” interacted in 1992-93 will provide insight into exactly why ISAF’s influence in Kabul in 2003-04 was so important. I highly recommend this book.
THE JOINT WARFIGHTING 2008 CONFERENCE, 17-20 JUNE 2008

Major Bob Near (The RCR), Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre, Joint Doctrine Branch writes…

The 2008 Joint Warfighting Conference (JW 08) took place this past 17-20 June in Virginia Beach’s ultra-modern Convention Centre. Sponsored by the US Armed Forces Communications & Electronics Association and the US Naval Institute, in coordination with US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM,) some 5000 people from all branches of the US services, the Department of Defense, and the corporate sector attended. A small number of allied officers were also present. The conference comprised both corporate and government displays of the latest US military technology, coupled with an outstanding program of keynote speeches and panels by some of the most senior leaders in the US military, both serving and retired. These included General James Mattis—Commander US JFCOM and NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT), Adm James Stavridis—Commander US SOUTHCOM, General John Corley—Commander, Air Combat Command and Air Component Commander for JFCOM, LGen David Valcourt—Deputy Commander US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), LGen (ret’d) Paul von Riper—USMC, MGen Jason Kamiya—US JFCOM J7, MGen (ret’d) Robert Scales—former Commandant US Army War College, MGen David Fastabend—G7 US Army, and LGen Thomas Metz—Director Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDE) among others. These officers all spoke to conference’s main theme, which was posed as the question: Department of Defense Capabilities for the 21st Century: Dominant—Relevant—Ready? Hence, the conference was an outstanding opportunity to hear these officers describe the security challenges they believe the United States faces coupled with their ideas and recommendations for the future development of US Joint Forces capabilities.

A constant inflection point throughout the proceedings was the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War. That the highly regarded Israeli forces—which were doctrinally structured on US Transformation concepts of effects-based operations, network-centric warfare and long-range precision fires—failed to achieve their operational and strategic objectives shocked many US observers. The Israeli debacle, coupled with the unexpected challenges encountered by US forces in Iraq, has lead to considerable introspection on the part of senior American commanders and doctrine developers. This includes questioning a number of assumptions underlying their own force development efforts, as well as abandoning or “parking” a number of concepts associated with Transformation such as Effects-based Operations (EBO), Network-centric Warfare (NCW), Operational Net Assessment (ONA,) and System of Systems Approach (SoSA.) JW 08 provided an excellent forum to hear these and other force development issues discussed.

Also very interesting was the proposition expounded by a number of speakers that the US was entering a new paradigm of conflict called “hybrid wars.” As described by Frank Hoffman of the Centre for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, hybrid wars entail a convergence and fusion of regular and irregular warfare techniques that can be employed both by states and non-state actors. No one type of warfare necessarily predominates, while a wide range of different modes of fighting, involving conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts, coercion, and criminal disorder are all used singularly or in combination to achieve synergistic effects. Hybrid war thus allows an otherwise militarily weak opponent to operate effectively against larger, traditionally structured and trained armed forces. In JW 08, several speakers viewed hybrid war as the dominant challenge facing the US for the next generation. That being the case, General Mattis and several other speakers challenged the utility of current force development methodologies based on imaginary future scenarios, considering them to be irrelevant and a waste of time.
and effort. General Mattis further urged force planners to ... "get over their next-war-itis because the future is here, now!" This requires concentrating on the immediate challenge at hand, and not devoting scarce resources to things people think might happen 10 or 20 years from now.

Another feature of JW 08 was an emphasis on the human element in warfighting. Both General Mattis and Lieutenant General Wood spoke very forcibly about this, saying that war should never be seen as an "engineering endeavour," and that over-reliance on technology is a mistake. Hence, education and training in the "art of war" must be a key requirement for US officers and for ensuring the effectiveness of the future Joint Force. This includes providing young officers with language skills and cultural awareness in the areas they will be operating in, as well as instilling in them ethical conduct and professional values.

Overall, JW 08 was a multi-course intellectual banquet, featuring honest introspection and analysis of the US military’s experiences in Iraq and the formidable challenges senior US commanders believe confront them, particularly with respect to hybrid wars and the "long war" against terrorism. The opportunity to engage with speakers and panelists at the three and four-star rank level was a particular highlight, while providing a good appreciation of where the US military is going in terms of force structures, concept development and experimentation (CD&E), doctrine, training, and inter-agency activities. Awareness of these issues and developments will enable CFEC’s Joint Doctrine Branch to undertake its own doctrine development work with greater precision and understanding to ensure the CF remains interoperable with its principal ally across the spectrum of conflict.
WHOLE-OF-SOCIETY AND THE SUSTAINABILITY OF NATIONAL SECURITY

LCdr P.R. Moller with the ABCA Program Office writes ....

“All politics are local,” as Tip O’Neill is famous for saying. If this is so, talking about amorphous global threats to Canadians seemingly preoccupied with the economy, education and crumbling municipal infrastructure will not likely capture their imagination or interest. Equally, winning the hearts and minds of the people in Afghanistan will happen only if the Afghan people think we have an honest and enduring interest in their well-being. In Afghanistan, as here, all politics are local. While we have had some successes in Afghanistan, many still seem to view the Western Armies in their country as temporary interlopers. To advance on these two fronts we may need to find a new strategic approach. Successful strategy often links together previously unrelated things in the accomplishment of an overarching, long-term objective. The common element linking success in Afghanistan and long-term support for the CF in Canada is the requirement to gain understanding and support from ordinary citizens. Shifting focus from a Whole-of-Government to a Whole-of-Society strategy may provide a single way to link success in Afghanistan and enduring support for the CF in Canada.

Engaging Canadians in Canadian foreign and defence strategy has never been more important. The Canada First Defence Strategy defined four pillars on which defence capabilities are built, specifically: Personnel, Equipment, Readiness, and Infrastructure. Readiness was defined as the CF’s flexibility and preparedness to deploy at Government direction. Missing from the definition, but equally real, is the Canadian public’s readiness to allow and support the CF’s deployment. The Canadian public will likely only support the deployment of the CF if it understands and accepts the strategic end state that is being pursued. If a strategic objective is not sustainable then the effort expended to accomplish it will have been wasted. To endure, the CF needs to find a way to connect its international employments to Canada’s local communities so that the current levels of support for the CF and its members can be sustained in the long-term.

Municipal governments provide the most direct connection to local Canadian communities. In order to ensure more robust long-term planning processes, municipalities around the country are currently working on the development of Integrated Community Sustainability Plans (ICSP). The Federal Government recently renewed the Federal Gas Tax (FGT) agreements that existed bilaterally between it and the provinces and territories. In return for receiving FGT funds, municipalities must demonstrate progress toward enhanced sustainability planning by 2010. In all jurisdictions but Ontario, ICSP are the mandated tool for demonstrating this progress. Amongst other things, ICSP are required to reflect integrated social, cultural, environmental and economic sustainability objectives in community planning to achieve sustainability objectives. In 1987 the World Commission on Environment and Development commented that, “Humanity has the ability to make development sustainable, to ensure that it meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” In most of Canada this concept has led to the development of four pillars on which sustainable development is built, specifically: Economic, Environmental, Social, and Cultural. Within these four pillars communities are striving to build understanding of the links between personal lifestyle habits and improved quality of life within their neighbourhoods. Although not yet universally applied, the concept of a safe community is embedded in the Social pillar. Community safety clearly rests mainly in the purview of local police and firefighters, but our cities and towns do not exist in a vacuum. New York, London, and Madrid all recently learned that instability in countries far removed from them can have a devastating local effect, therefore within the safety element of the Social pillar the CF clearly has a role to play. The simultaneous development of ICSP by municipalities around the country opens a strategic window of opportunity for the CF to link success in Afghanistan and enduring support in Canada through a Whole-of-Society strategy.
If the CF encourages and assists communities in Afghanistan and Canada to start building relationships it will allow us to win hearts and minds abroad, and at home. The main mechanism used to build links between municipalities is by “twinning” one community with another. Since the twinning process most often includes reciprocal visits of political, social and business leaders between the two cities, twinning cities and towns can go a long way to build understanding, trust, educational and, sometimes, economic ties between the two cities4. Included in FGT eligible projects are ones that involve “capacity building”— e.g. enhancing collaboration, partnerships, knowledge, integration, planning and policy. The enhanced cooperation and capacities that comes from twinning two communities often permeates through the two countries at large. Building lasting links between our two societies at the local level is one concrete way Canada can demonstrate our enduring interest in Afghanistan and thus increase cooperation between Afghans and Canadians working in their country.

“The main objective of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is to achieve the necessary cooperation between civil authorities and the commander in order for the commander to achieve his aim.”5 Current application of this principle sees CF personnel going into Afghan communities and assisting the community with needed projects. While there has been limited success with this approach, supporting the longer-term Canadian politico-military objectives in Afghanistan will likely require a broader approach that demonstrates Canada’s commitment to engaging and helping the Afghan people in the long term. Encouraging and assisting the twinning of cities and towns in Canada and Afghanistan would go a long way to build understanding, trust and educational ties between the two countries. Building community ties could translate into greater cooperation between CF personnel in theatre and the local Afghan communities. If the CF, or CF personnel, play a role in the twinning process it will also assist in building linkages between the CF and Canadian society. Additionally, it would provide Canadians with a tangible way to “support our troops” and engage in Canada’s international strategic efforts. Building stronger linkages between local communities in Canada and Afghanistan—and the CF—could have other benefits. If other government departments see that a Whole-of-Society approach to the strategy in Afghanistan is taking hold, they are more likely to be supportive of Whole-of-Government initiatives. It may also allow the CF/DND to build stronger relationships with other government departments in Canada that may then spread into theatre, and vice versa. Building relationships, however, is a complex task, requiring varied approaches.

Every municipality is unique. Each has its own history, demographic make-up, geographic characteristics, and economic, environmental, social, and cultural challenges and opportunities. The CF therefore should not expect to be able to develop a one-size-fits-all community approach package. In some areas there may be CF personnel who are already engaged in the ICSP development process. Seeking them out and providing them support may be the easiest first step. The CF commissions reports and studies on a regular basis, so investment in some work that provides either background documents or case studies that emphasise local benefits to twinning with other municipalities, and that link international security to local communities would give CF members more tools to use in their approach to their municipalities. In addition, there are national and provincial municipal organizations that may be receptive to approaches from senior military personnel.

As more Canadian civilians interact with both CF members and Afghans during the twinning process the reality of the war being waged in Afghanistan many seep into the Canadian psyche. It will then no longer just be the CF that recognises that we are at war, and what the enduring benefits to Canada are if we succeed in our mission. Establishing a self-sustaining democracy in Afghanistan will require long-term investment. Encouraging Canadian communities to participate in that investment will significantly increase the likelihood of success, and help the CF to fulfill our ultimate role of ensuring the long-term sustainability of Canada’s national security. Fulfilling our ultimate role requires us to constantly seize and capitalise on strategic opportunities, but if we are glued to the sound of gunfire in Afghanistan, we may not hear opportunity knocking at home, especially if it knocks softly.
Endnotes


2. Ontario municipalities are exempt for the ICSP requirement if they have a current Official Plan; however, many Ontario municipalities who have Official Plans are also engaged in developing an ICSP.


4. Given the security reality in Afghanistan today, these visits would likely be limited to Afghani community leaders visiting their Canadian twin city, with the reciprocal Canadian visit happening only after the security risk is significantly reduced. Since, anecdotally, many Afghani community leaders have not travelled outside of their province, commanders in theatre may benefit from the expanded life experience of the local leaders who have been exposed to a relatively orderly, benign, secular society.