

# The Canadian Army Journal

10.2 Summer 2007



**The 33-Day War: An Example of Psychological Warfare in the Information Age**

*Dr. Pierre Cyril Pahlavi*

**“CONTACT C”—A Forward Observation Officer with Task Force Orion**

*Captain Andrew Charchuk*

**Deploying Without an Administration Company—TF 306 BG Echelon System During Operation MEDUSA**

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**The Three Block War: Its Causes, and the Shape of the Peace**

*Mr. Vincent J. Curtis*

**Teaching Canada’s Indigenous Sovereignty Soldiers ... and Vice Versa:**

**“Lessons Learned” from Ranger Instructors**

*Dr. P. Whitney Lackenbauer*

**The Road to Hell Part 2: Canada in Vietnam, 1954-1973**

*Lieutenant-Colonel Shane B. Schreiber*

**Note to File—Afghanistan:**

**What We Thought We Knew of the Soviet Experience**

*Dr. Sean M. Maloney*

**Book Reviews**

# THE CANADIAN ARMY JOURNAL

## CANADA'S PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL ON ARMY ISSUES

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The Canadian Army Journal, a refereed forum of ideas and issues, is the official quarterly publication of Land Force Command. This periodical is dedicated to the expression of mature professional thought on the art and science of land warfare, the dissemination and discussion of doctrinal and training concepts, as well as ideas, concepts, and opinions by all army personnel and those civilians with an interest in such matters. Articles on related subjects such as leadership, ethics, technology, and military history are also invited and presented. The Canadian Army Journal is central to the intellectual health of the Army and the production of valid future concepts, doctrine, and training policies. It serves as a vehicle for the continuing education and professional development of all ranks and personnel in the Army, as well as members from other environments, government agencies, and academia concerned with army, defence, and security affairs.

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Unsolicited article manuscripts, research notes, book reviews, and points of interest are welcome. Articles should be 5000-7000 words exclusive of endnotes, research notes 1500-2500 words exclusive of endnotes, book review essays and reviews 500-1000 words, and points of interest 1000 words or less. Articles may be submitted in either official language. Authors must include a brief biography. Authors must supply any supporting tables, charts, maps, and images, and these should not be embedded in the article text. Articles may be submitted via email or regular mail. All submissions are peer reviewed and the Editor will notify contributors on the status of their submission. Further details regarding author submission guidelines are available at <http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/>.

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On the cover: Sapper Eric Eisenmenger from Edmonton, Alberta keeps a vigilant watch while on turret sentry at Forward Operating Base Ghundi Gar. Sapper Eisenmenger is part of the Hotel Company Combat Team of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion Royal Canadian Regiment Battle Group, which has established itself in this location as part of OP HADRIAN. 2 RCR BG is an integral element of the Joint Task Force Afghanistan. Combat camera AR2007-A051-0194 photo Sgt Craig Flander.

Canadian Ranger (Little) Leon Taureau of Fort Good Hope prepares his radio for a communications check. Ranger Wrigley is part of a group of Rangers from the Fort Good Hope and Tulita area that are taking part in Operation NARWHAL 07. Combat camera LX2007-0399d photo Sgt Brad Phillips.

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# EDITORIAL—THERE AND BACK AGAIN

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Major Andrew B. Godefroy CD, PhD

Even six years after the September 11 attacks, some people can still hardly believe that the Canadian Army has deployed to Afghanistan. Yet, just as the Balkans seemed an unlikely destination for the Army of the 1990s, the entry into the Afghanistan theatre of conflict has simply reaffirmed that no matter how much we try to predict the future, we must always develop concepts, doctrine and training that will allow the Canadian Army to mitigate the risks of unanticipated action as much as possible, wherever conflict may occur. When dealing with a region such as Afghanistan and its legacy of conflict, this process must include capturing and analyzing lessons learned, scrutinizing operational histories and gaining a good understanding of what has gone before. After all, since we've never been there before, the more we can learn about the place the better. But are we learning?

As one begins to peel back the layers of the onion that is Afghanistan, one quickly discovers that many Canadians have served there before 2001. Arguably these people were almost always in the service of others, but it is interesting to look back and see just how long that historical attachment extends. Take for example, Lieutenant William Bell Whiteford, a young man from Ontario who fought in Afghanistan for two years. Whiteford was born in Simcoe, Canada West, on 15 October 1849, the son of Reverend George Bell of Kingston, Ontario. On 15 July 1868, at 19 years of age, he succeeded in securing a commission in the Royal Engineers in the rank of lieutenant and a posting to Chatham, England. Whiteford served there until 15 July 1870, after which he was posted to Kirkee, India, to take command of a company in the Bombay Sappers and Miners.

At the outbreak of the Second Afghan War in 1878, Lieutenant Whiteford and his sappers were called into active service. Due to a shortage of officers, he commanded both No.2 and No.5 Company of the Bombay Sappers and Miners, then assigned as the engineer force in the Reserve Division and operating in the Bolan from January to November 1879. Whiteford's engineer force was subsequently employed on the Kandahar State Railway from November 1879 until July 1880, after which he was reassigned to become the Adjutant Royal Engineers of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division, Southern Afghanistan Field Force. Here, Lieutenant Whiteford served under General Wilkinson until October 1880, during which he accompanied General Phayre to Kandahar. After this he returned to duty on the Kandahar State Railway until the end of the war. Lieutenant Whiteford had acquitted himself well during the war and received both a mentioned-in-dispatches as well as a brevet majority. He was officially promoted to captain on 22 September 1880, and then eventually to major some years later on 25 June 1887. That same summer he returned to Canada to get married, but was soon posted back to India, where he served the rest of his days.

Further research on the subject has revealed a growing number of Canadians who served with the British Army in Afghanistan and the Northwest Frontier during this period, and many of them wrote about their experiences. Graduates of the Royal Military College of Canada who served in these theatres in the 1880s and 1890s often returned to RMC and other Canadian military associations to speak about their experiences and pass on lessons learned to colleagues who would soon make their own way there. In the days long before the Army Electronic Library and even the *Canadian Army Journal*, officers and men were publishing their accounts in periodicals like the *Canadian Militia Gazette* and later *Canadian Military Gazette* (1885-1943), the *VRI Magazine* (1894-1897), or even the *Canadian Field* and the *Canadian Defence* magazines (1909-1916). The important thing to note about all this is that the soldiers published their



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accounts, and today we are able to look back and still draw lessons from our predecessors as a result of their personal commitment to share their experiences and contribute to the historical record.

The last issue featured a guest editorial by Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hope who shared some personal observations of his service in Afghanistan (*The Canadian Army Journal*, Vol.10:1, Spring 2007, 5-9). I am still receiving messages of thanks for publishing this piece as I complete the summer issue, with many comments reflecting on its timeliness, substance, and relevance. Most importantly perhaps, people have commended its publication as a solid contribution to the record of the Canadian Army's activities in a theatre of conflict that some day will receive detailed scrutiny from future governments, professionals, scholars and academics, even the general public who through such accounts maintain a high interest in the achievements of our men and women in uniform. As a result, in this issue I have presented another article of this type, this one by Captain Andrew Charchuk, and have continued what I hope will become a regular occurrence in the CAJ. In each issue, I would like to publish one personal account giving not only the basic gears of operational deployment, but also the character of it. For, as we all know, it is the details that count, and personal observations deliver these details like nothing else.

This issue of *The Canadian Army Journal* contains a good variety of thought pieces mixed with recent experiences. In particular, we present the second part of Lieutenant-Colonel Shane Schreiber's George Bell Medal-winning study of Canada and the Vietnam War, as well as a critical examination of last summer's 33 day Israeli-Palestinian conflict by Dr. Pierre Pahlavi of Canadian Forces College Toronto. In addition, we present a number of other thought-provoking articles as well as a wide range of book reviews, plus a particularly insightful response to a book review by Ken Joyce. As always I hope you enjoy this issue as we continue to celebrate 60 years of *The Canadian Army Journal* since its inception, and I continue to welcome your comments and feedback.



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# CELEBRATING THE 60<sup>TH</sup> ANNIVERSARY OF THE CANADIAN ARMY JOURNAL

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As some of our readers already know, *The Canadian Army Journal* was first published in 1947 and was edited by Mr. J. G. DeProse until 1965, when it, along with the other two service journals, was replaced by *Sentinel* magazine. With the re-establishment of *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin*, in 1998 by my predecessor, Major John R. Grodzinski, the Army embarked upon the road back to having a proper professional journal for the sharing and debate of army ideas. By now, the *CAJ* has evolved into the leading professional military journal in Canada, and is widely recognized both within and outside of the country. In recognition of this tremendous legacy, the next issue *The Canadian Army Journal* will be sporting a 'retro' cover in honour of the first issues published sixty years ago. The issue will also feature a special section examining the origins and evolution of the journal, some of its most interesting and at times controversial moments, as well as a few reprints of articles about what the army then thought it might look like in the future. In addition to this special feature, the *CAJ* will carry its usual compliment of high quality editorials, articles, notes to file, book reviews and more. Watch for *The Canadian Army Journal* special anniversary edition coming out this fall.



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
# ARMY NEWS—COMBAT IDENTIFICATION: IT'S ALL ABOUT COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS

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Major Robert G. Hart, CD

As the Canadian Army and our coalition allies continue to battle insurgent forces in Afghanistan, incidents of “blue-on-blue” and fratricide continue. As a result, armies around the globe are investing greatly to reduce these occurrences and our own Army is intimately involved in the leading edge of coalition efforts to demonstrate both procedural and technical solutions to aid soldiers and commanders on the battlefield.

IFF (Identification of Friend or Foe)<sup>1</sup> and fratricide are the most commonly used terms when describing Combat Identification (Combat ID) issues and in the right context they are appropriate. However, the Army focus is to increase Combat ID through improving and combining situational awareness and target identification capabilities. **The end state is to increase combat effectiveness.** “Combat Identification (Combat ID, Cbt ID, or CID), is not a system or a process; it is a capability. A capability combining doctrine, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) and Rules of Engagement (ROE) and incorporating interoperable systems to increase situational awareness and enable timely identification of detected objects in the battlespace.”<sup>2</sup>



The Army's effort to improve combat effectiveness is based on four lines of operation: first, doctrine—a standard has been developed for the draft B-GL-334-001/FP-001 *Standing Operating Procedures for Land Operations* and is currently receiving operational refinement; second, training—the Directorate of Army Training (DAT) has been tasked to procure a computer-based vehicle recognition training program for the Army; third, technology development and procurement—the Directorate of Land Requirements (DLR) has two main efforts specifically related to Combat ID, the Mounted Cooperative Target Identification Device (MCTID) and Soldier System projects. Naturally, there is a tremendous amount of overlap with other projects



therefore de-conflict and unity of effort are key issues; and fourth, integration—the Army has been closely linked to the CF and our coalition partners through our active participation in the Canadian Forces Combat ID Working Group (CFCIDWG) and the NATO-Allied Command Transformation Coalition Combat Identification—Advance Concept Technology Demonstration (CCID ACTD).

## Doctrine

The soon to be published B-GL-334-001/FP-001 *Standing Operating Procedures for Land Operations* (the replacement for Unit SOP) contains a more detailed chapter on the subject. In close association with the Infantry School (then the Centre of Excellence), work was done to improve upon 2 RCR's IFF SOP. It contains subject headings which address the following areas: combat identification SOP, individual marking procedures, vehicle marking procedures and tactical aide-mémoire, which contains an educational section on common devices currently in use or close to production named battlefield target identification devices. Because the use of technology to aide Combat ID is a double-edged sword, it will always be a command decision to determine the nature of the technologies or procedures used. Commander Land Force Doctrine and Training System has directed all deploying units to utilize the SOP and the Directorate of Army Doctrine (DAD) through the Army Lessons Learned Centre (ALLC) is currently seeking operational refinement through their liaison officers currently in theatre.

## Training




Figure 1: Insight depiction of a CH-77

DAT was tasked at the 20 June 06 session of the Army Capability Development Board (ACDB) to procure an Army-wide recognition trainer. In the past, several vehicle and aircraft recognition-training packages have been created. However, technology has advanced so that computer-based training can provide a wide range of visual feeds (thermal, infra-red, etc) in different weather and light conditions, depict vehicles stationary or on the move and simulate battlefield obscurity at varying degrees. As well, they can be quickly adapted to a particular operation so that in preparation for it, or while deployed, units can adapt to different conditions. This will be especially helpful when new coalition partners arrive in theatre with different vehicles, uniforms and rank insignia. Work is continuing with our allies to make available national systems such as the US Recognition of Combat Vehicles (ROC-V) system or to look at other private sector programs such as the Insight training system.

The Army has always had Combat ID procedures, albeit by different names, as part of our battle procedure and fieldcraft. Prior to missions and operations it is imperative to establish patrol routes, boundaries, control lines,

DAT was tasked at the 20 June 06 session of the Army Capability Development Board (ACDB) to procure an Army-wide recognition trainer. In the past, several vehicle and aircraft recognition-training packages have been created. However, technology has advanced so that computer-based training can provide a wide range of visual feeds (thermal, infra-red, etc) in different weather and light conditions, depict vehicles stationary or on the move and simulate battlefield obscurity at varying degrees. As well,



Figure 2: Insight Vehicle Trainer

passwords and night recognition signals. The newer technologies will be added to the tried and true methods and SOPs will be developed to integrate them into our normal battle rhythm. The key training issue is getting the SOP and technologies integrated into the Army through education and hands-on experience at our units, training centres and schools. To do so, Comd LFDTs has appointed the Tactics School at CTC Gagetown as the Centre of Excellence for Combat ID.

The purpose of Combat ID training is to enhance the soldier's ability to quickly identify objects on the battlefield that will allow for faster decisions and increase effectiveness. To do so a number of concepts should be included in training, such as a review of principles, theory and relevant doctrine, identifying high risk fratricide situations, password and authentication procedures, night recognition signals, vehicle recognition training (tailored to the operation), battlespace management procedures, rules of engagement, fire support control measures, allied combat identification device characteristics, actions upon coming under blue (friendly) fire and post fratricide reporting.

## Technology Development and Procurement



Figure 3: An armour vehicle convoy from the U.K., U.S., Italy, Sweden, Canada and France moves toward battle position-one in the Salisbury Plain Training Area, U.K. (Courtesy of US Army Public Affairs, Photo by: Marie La Touche)

“The objective of the Mounted Cooperative Target Identification Device (MCTID) project is to procure, install, integrate and implement a mounted combat identification device on direct fire platforms and specific combat support platforms. The project will be required to comply with the common/interoperable target identification technology in accordance with NATO STANAG 4579 Battlefield Target Identification Device (BTID) which enables system interoperability with other millimetre wave-based cooperative target identification (CTI) systems planned for use on Allied ground weapon platforms and vehicles.”<sup>3</sup> Much of the work with the

MCTID Project has been in association with the CCID ACTD. In Sep 05 the Army sent a coy HQ and pl from 3<sup>rd</sup> Bn R22eR to participate in Ex Urgent Quest, a 10-nation technology demonstration in the UK's Salisbury Plain Training Area. The CCID ACTD assessed the military utility of emerging combat ID technologies in a series of operational demonstrations conducted during 2003-2005 timeframe concluding with Ex UQ (Sep-Oct 05, UK). Following the exercise, a Coalition Military Utility Assessment (CMUA) was produced and presented to a combined US Army/USMC board. The board accepted the ACTD's conclusions and the US Army/USMC is looking to invest in two of the ACTD four core technologies, the BTID and Radio Based Combat Identification (RBCI). The Army is closely monitoring their progress.

The MCTID project is but one of the many efforts at DLR and other CF organizations to improve both target identification and situational awareness capabilities. For example, one aspect of DLR 5's Integrated Soldier System Project (ISSP) states: “Situational Awareness software will be provided to support Command and Control Battlefield Combat Identification (BCID) and



Figure 4: Thermal ID Panels (TIPS)



Figure 5: Canadian soldiers with Infrared Patches / PEQ 2A (Ex Urgent Quest)

connectivity to current and future battlefield sensor technologies available to the warfighter from the Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) Project as well as new Integrated Soldier System procured soldier-portable sensors.<sup>14</sup> ISSP intends to implement a radio-based system of some type once defined. These projects are related to the Land Command Support System Life Extension, the Unit Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Night Observation (STANO), the Land Force Command System, and the LF

Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance Project, just to name a few. But it is not all high-tech; many acquisitions like Thermal ID Panels (TIPS) and Infra-Red Beacons are already fielded and are in Afghanistan. The Army is working toward a more holistic approach by bringing together the many different facets that fall under the broad Combat ID umbrella by creating an Army Combat ID Working Group to provide coordination, direction and linkages to the diverse activities within the Army and CF.

## Integration

From the Army perspective integration is a crucial element to enhancing our combat effectiveness. In the contemporary battlespace not only do we have to be able to work with the other elements of the CF, but we also must fight side-by-side with our coalition partners. Capabilities differ greatly within our current coalition structure and therefore, we must work to establish minimum interoperability standards acceptable by the member nations.

From a CF holistic perspective, the main forum for Combat ID issues resides with the CF CID WG. It has representatives from each of the environments, the technical and scientific communities and those who have projects that either directly or indirectly impact on Combat ID initiatives. Currently, DJCP 6 (CF Strategic Joint Staff) is the head of the WG and he leads the CF effort to increase our capability. As well, within the Army, the Combat ID community has been involved in assisting the LFDTS/1 CAD effort to resolve deficiencies in close air support into land operations.




Figure 6: Radio Based Combat ID Concept

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After Tarnak Farm and other fratricide incidents, NATO embarked on a series of Advance Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD) to further doctrinal, procedural and technical solutions to avoid further “blue-on-blue” occurrences. The primary objective of Ex Urgent Quest, a BG level trial, was to conduct a thorough Military Utility Assessment of the ACTD’s technologies and their associated TTP in the most realistic operational environment possible. The main technologies tested were the Battlefield Target Identification Device (BTID)<sup>5</sup>, Radio Based Combat Identification (RBCI)<sup>6</sup> and Radio Frequency Tags (RF Tags) that were built upon the foundation of low-tech non-cooperative<sup>7</sup> systems like IR and thermal markers and beacons. This demonstration was particularly useful to the Army in that it provided the technical evaluation data required for the MCTID project. Nevertheless, although the systems performed well the Army will continue to evaluate and await the final decision of the US Army before adopting a cooperative system like BTID.

Ex BOLD QUEST (Ex BQ), the second iteration of the ACTD series is to assess the military utility of emerging air-to-ground technologies. The assessment of the technologies will also incorporate other relevant fielded or emerging devices in the Combat ID-Blue Force Tracking/Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness (CID-BFT/JBFSA) family of systems. Ground-to-ground mounted technologies will continue to be employed so as to build on the lessons learned from Ex UQ. Of particular interest to the CA Army is the effort to utilize digital close air support (CAS) technologies such as ROVER.<sup>8</sup> Ex BQ is scheduled to occur in Sep 07 at Fort Irwin, California, home of the US Army’s National Training Center, and Nellis Air Force Base. With over 45 aircraft (A-10s, Tornados, Mirages, F-15s, F-16s, F-18 Hornets, F-22 Raptors, Joint Stars, NATO AWACS, E2 Hawkeyes and a B-52) from 7 nations providing CAS and interdiction to a coalition BG over a 10-day exercise window will provide an immense source of data on emerging technologies. The Army is planning on providing a Canadian-based coalition LAV company headquarters, a platoon of infantry, an anti-armour detachment and a forward air controller team.

Furthermore, it is the intent of the CF CID WG to conduct a CF demonstration within the larger exercise. By upgrading the LAV III to System Release 2<sup>9</sup>, the goal is to use BTID to identify friendly ground forces previously unknown to our situational awareness system and populate the information into the database. Then, along with our own positional awareness data, push that information to coalition ground and air forces. By doing so, we will be integrating the System Release 2 upgrade, creating solutions to the situational awareness interoperability gap and establish with our coalition partners the TTPs for the effective use of these emerging technologies.

## **CONCLUSION**

Combat ID is not just about gadgets and technology. It is about enabling soldiers and commanders to make tactical decisions quickly and correctly. The most effective way to do this is by having solid doctrinal concepts that are the baseline for effective TTP. If the Army is to become more combat effective, then we must continue to improve the quantity and quality of our training techniques and exercises. Adding low-level technical aids such as thermal and IR equipments will increase the options commanders have at their disposal, but they are tools in the toolbox and do not eliminate the need for traditional procedures—passwords, night recognition signals, boundaries, fire control measures, individual and vehicle markings etc. As cooperative (interrogation/response) solutions like BTID and RBCI become available and are accepted by our allies, they too will be adopted as required by the Army so that we fulfill our agreements for coalition operations.



Combat ID is a priority area for the Army<sup>10</sup> and this effort has been linked with our allies so that we can operate in a coalition environment and collaborate on the information gained from operations and demonstrations like Ex Bold Quest. Finding solutions to prevent fratricide is critical. By advancing on the four lines of operation—doctrine, training, technology development and procurement and integration, the Army is synchronized with the CF and with the leading efforts of our key coalition partners. Gaining operational refinement for the SOP, developing a computer-based recognition trainer and participating in Ex Bold Quest is critical to our holistic approach in addressing our capability needs. At the end of the day, it comes down to the soldier being able to identify objects on the battlefield and, if the situation and rules of engagement deem it appropriate, asking the critical question—“To shoot or not to shoot”.

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## Endnotes

1. IFF is a misnomer for the Army. The identification of a foe is not possible using current technology. Current systems can identify friends or unknowns on the battlefield. Unknowns could be a friendly with non-functioning transponder or lacking one, a neutral or an enemy vehicle.
2. CCID ACTD Operational Concepts For Combat Identification In Coalition Operations Version 2.7 dated 1 March 2006
3. Capability Investment Database—Mounted Cooperative Target Identification Device (MCTID) Project Description.
4. Capability Investment Database—Integrated Soldier System Project (ISSP) Project Description.
5. “BTID is a millimeter wave combat identification system that increases combat effectiveness by minimizing false targeting errors, thereby reducing fratricide or friendly fire combat losses. It provides a self-contained secure networking capability to support small unit blue force tracking applications. BTID conforms to NATO STANAG 4579 ensuring interoperability among similarly equipped NATO and coalition forces during joint and combined operations.”  
[www.Raytheon.com](http://www.Raytheon.com)
6. “The RBCI device provides a software upgrade to combat FM radios to provide confirmation of the presence of RBCI-equipped friendly forces in hostile fire zones. The device could be used by troops acting as fire support coordinators, or by forward observers and air controllers conducting queries as part of their fires coordination and clearance procedures.”  
[www.jfcom.mil/about/fact\\_ccid.html](http://www.jfcom.mil/about/fact_ccid.html)
7. Cooperative/Non-cooperative Systems—Cooperative systems require an interrogation and response between two systems whereas non-cooperative systems are special features on a system that enable quick identification. For example, a thermal panel on a LAV III will allow for quick recognition of a friendly vehicle by those using a thermal sight.
8. ROVER—Remote Operated Video Enhanced Receiver—links ground forces to cameras mounted on close air support aircraft and UAVs to give ground forces the ability to see what the camera sees as it flies inbound for a strike. This allows the forward controllers to quickly navigate the support to the intended target. The video is streamed onto a laptop using equipment carried by the forward controller. In assisting the pilot in locating the target, the forward controller can write on the laptop screen and the pilot will see the marks, providing visual confirmation of the target.
9. SR 2 is a systematic release of mature technologies. The release includes Situational Awareness Module 5 (SAM 5), the Medium Capacity Radio (MCR), the Operational Data Base (ODB) and Battleview.



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# THE 33-DAY WAR: AN EXAMPLE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN THE INFORMATION AGE

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During the summer of 2006, the Forces of Tsahal and those of the Shiite Hezbollah militia faced each other on either side of the border between Israel and Lebanon. The 33 days of fighting ended in political and military failure for the Israeli side, despite its clear military superiority. During the weeks that followed the end of hostilities, Western, Arab and Israeli observers were unanimous in their acknowledgement that the Jewish state had not only failed to achieve its initial objectives, but that its adversary had won a “symbolic victory” by having resisted the assaults by the world's fifth-largest military power. This 33-day war is thus added to the already lengthy list of modern asymmetrical conflicts which, like those in Indochina, Vietnam, Afghanistan or, more recently, Iraq, ended in an unexpected victory by David over Goliath.

This time again, the outcome of the confrontation raises a number of questions. The specific issue is to understand the reasons for Israel's failure to defeat a terrorist organization that was indisputably inferior in terms of military power. An explanation for this surprise result can be deduced from a combination of factors. The gaps and imperfections of the Israeli operation in terms of intelligence and logistics, the technical problems inherent in any low-intensity action against an insurrection, and Hezbollah's extremely low threshold of satisfaction are all undoubtedly relevant—and irrefutable—factors. This study will, however, focus on another dimension which undoubtedly played a crucial role in the outcome of the conflict: the psychological dimension. Our aim will accordingly be to analyze the respective capabilities of both sides on the media and public opinion front, and determine whether their respective performances in this field contributed to Israel's “failure” or to Hezbollah's “symbolic victory.” Demonstrating that information served as a weapon—in a conflict that was played out both on the battlefield and in the arena of public opinion—the argument will attempt to confirm the notion that, in the absence of a public relations strategy designed to legitimate, complement and facilitate the conduct of military operations, technical superiority today is decreasingly a guarantee of victory.

## Chronology of the 33-Day War

In order to understand the *surprising* material and psychological outcome of the “Sixth Arab–Israeli War,”<sup>1</sup> it is worthwhile recalling briefly the chronology of the conflict: following the events that occurred in Gaza in late June 2006,<sup>2</sup> Hezbollah bombarded border communities in Northern Israel, attacked a patrol, killed eight soldiers and took a further two captive. The riposte was not long in coming. On July 12, the Israeli general staff launched a major operation, including ground action, the bombing of key positions such as the Beirut airport and the imposing of a generalized blockage on all of Lebanon. The Israeli government was betting that this demonstration of force would enable it to “teach the Shia militia a lesson” and contribute to a lasting reduction of its influence and that of its Iranian allies on the regional chessboard. The outcome of events would disappoint the hopes of the Israelis.

Hezbollah met every attempt with organized resistance supported by logistical resources, the existence of which had not been suspected. The sophisticated weaponry

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provided by its allies allowed it to retaliate with massive barrages of rockets and missiles on the adjacent Israeli areas. According to Tim Garden, the Shiite militia specifically had “up to eight or nine drones produced by Iran,”<sup>3</sup>—one of these machines was shot down by the Israeli army above the territorial waters of the Jewish state.

The surprise effect produced by this riposte reveals the gaps in Israeli intelligence, such as those in tactical intelligence. Hezbollah had upgraded a whole network of fortifications and bunkers equipped with computers and high-tech video systems, with which the movements of the enemy could be kept under surveillance; a genuine fortified labyrinth, buried dozens of metres underground, which the Israeli air force proved incapable of destroying. Subsequent events also highlighted the Israeli forces' lack of preparedness and the improvised nature of the operation launched in Lebanon. All levels of the chain of command in the Army, as well as through the government and its civilian departments, appear to have been caught unawares. In some military warehouses, the shortage of equipment available for the reserve units prompted parents to collect money to buy helmets or bulletproof jackets for the troops. The Israeli passive defence was taken by surprise by the enemy shelling and at times, as in Haifa, it took a week before an alarm system was in place. The crisis management by the civilian administration also illustrates this lack of preparation: hundreds of thousands of Israelis took refuge in the centre of Israel in order to escape the salvos of rockets in the north, but found that the only support available came from charitable organizations.

While all these elements provide an understanding of how the fortunes of war turned against the Israelis, neither the impact of surprise, nor the sophisticated technological resources available to Hezbollah, nor the lack of preparation on the part of the other side can fully explain the political, military and diplomatic reverses suffered by Israel. While the strategic and economic aspects undoubtedly played an important role in Israel's defeat, the importance of the psychological dimension also seems essential to a proper understanding of the outcome of the conflict.

## **A Negative Outcome for Israel**

### **Military and materiel outcome**

In military terms, Israel was obliged to accept a ceasefire agreement far removed from the objectives it had established when operations began, which included freeing the captured soldiers and a lasting weakening of the Shiite terrorist network. The Jewish state obtained neither the unconditional release of the soldiers captured by Hezbollah, nor direct control of the Syrian-Lebanese border, nor the neutralization of the Shiite militia, nor the dismantling of or even a reduction in its network of missile launching ramps. As Mouin Rabanni, a contributor to *Middle East Report*, noted: “Hezbollah has succeeded in preventing Israel from achieving any of its strategic objectives and most of its tactical objectives as well.”<sup>4</sup> In his view, the Jewish state was obliged to continually revise its military objectives downwards from the straightforward elimination of Hezbollah, to disarming it, to confining it to the north of the Litani River and, ultimately, to the creation of a no-man's-land pending the arrival of international forces. In the final analysis, a relatively lightly armed guerrilla force checkmated a large conventional army, equipped with tanks, fighter aircraft and high-tech artillery.

Barely had the fighting stopped when it became apparent that the military failure was compounded by economic discomfiture. The initial estimates indicated that the cost of the 33-day war for the Israelis exceeded €4 billion, equivalent to 10% of the government budget, and approximately half the defence budget.<sup>5</sup> The Bank of Israel confirmed the extent of the financial disaster by adding in the losses related to industrial and tourist activity: approximately €1.2 billion, or more than 1% of the gross domestic

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product (GDP) forecast for 2006<sup>6</sup> due, in addition to material destruction, to the closing of companies located near Haifa, the drop in tourism or large-scale cancellations of orders.

### Psychological outcome

It was nonetheless in moral terms that the August war was to have the most detrimental impact on Israel. From this perspective, it can be said that the Jewish state forfeited the psychological upper hand on all fronts: domestic, regional and international.

*In Israel first*, the outcome in terms of the people was disastrous. The Lebanese war was not only experienced as a defeat and a humiliation for the entire nation, but also resulted in a loss of confidence on the part of public opinion in its political and military leaders. The ability of the leaders to define their objectives clearly and realistically was strongly questioned, as was their ability to mobilize satisfactorily the resources needed to achieve them. "Public opinion is legitimately frustrated, in the opinion of Dan Yatom, a former head of Mossad. "Virtual objectives were announced and they were believed. Israel was going to 'change the political map of Lebanon and eradicate Hezbollah', something we had not managed to do in 18 years of occupation (of southern Lebanon, 1982-2000)."<sup>7</sup> The failure to achieve these objectives gave rise to enormous disappointment among Israelis. A public opinion survey conducted by the newspaper *Yediot Aharonot* showed that most Israelis felt that their army had not achieved the objectives of the operation, that the UN Security Council resolution constituted a moral defeat for Israel and that their country had lost this war. Generally speaking, the Army came in for sharp criticism, as did the government, which was attacked for its "arrogance," the fact that it had under-estimated the resistance by Hezbollah, overestimated the power of its own forces, set "presumptuous" objectives and inadequately prepared the rear echelon.<sup>8</sup>

This opinion was broadly shared *outside Israel, in Lebanon, in Palestine and in the neighbouring countries*, where the Jewish state's failure was unanimously interpreted as a victory for Hezbollah. The failure, even perceived failure, of the Israeli operations contributed to enhancing the prestige of the Shiite movement and accentuating the impact of its propaganda among the Arab and Muslim population. This was where Hezbollah's real success lay—even though it is still difficult to assert that this was its primary operational objective. As the American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, noted in the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam war, modern counter-insurgency warfare operates in accordance with the principle that "the conventional army loses if it does not win. The guerrilla wins if he does not lose."<sup>9</sup> Barely hours after ceasefire, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, proclaimed a "historic strategic victory" over the State of Israel, simultaneously asserting its role as one of the champions of the Arab masses, including the Palestinian territories. "Whether one likes it or not, Hassan Nasrallah is a hero in the region," noted Michel Naufal in the newspaper *Al-Moustaqbal*, "for, in this conflict, he thwarted . . . Israel's stated objectives."<sup>10</sup> Among the people of the region, this "victory" placed Hezbollah in a position of strength, that of the champion capable of avenging "the humiliation" of the Arabs and ridding the Palestinians of Israel. The symbolic victory of the summer of 2006, the new spearhead of the fight against Israel, had even succeeded in overcoming the religious differences that have traditionally separated the Shiite militia and the Sunni population. This was particularly apparent among the Palestinians. From August onwards, the green and yellow flag of the Lebanese Shiite party was highly visible in the streets of Gaza, while Nasrallah was hailed as the new herald of "resistance" to Israel. The diatribes of the Shiite leader, exacerbated by pictures of explosions of Katyusha rockets over the Israeli cities of Haifa or Nahariya, raised enthusiasm and gave rise to a

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mix of incredulity and fascination among a people that had lacked either success or a “zaim” (leader) since the death of Yasser Arafat.

**At the regional level** as well, Israel suffered a major reverse in the psychological warfare it has conducted with *Iran* since the Islamic revolution of 1979. The Lebanese operation cannot be interpreted properly without seeing it in the context of a desire to contain the influence of the Mullahs' republic. The aim of the war declared on Hezbollah can be seen from this perspective. By striking Hezbollah, Tehran's mailed fist in the Middle East, Jerusalem intended to damage the centre of the network of alliances created by Iran and prevent the development of a pro-Iranian sphere in the Middle East.

The analysts were quite accurate: “This struggle will also determine Iran's position in the Middle East and its role among the Arab states,” wrote a military commentator in the newspaper *Haaretz*<sup>11</sup> during the initial days of clashes. “What is happening now in Lebanon is the beginning of the first Iran–Israel war,” commented Dr. Yevgeny Satanovsky at the same time in Moscow. He stressed the strategic importance of this conflict in the relationship between Israel and Iran: “The events in Lebanon are only a test of Iranian strength by means of its proxy, Hezbollah, before becoming a regional superpower... Iran will, in the near future, attain great political achievements from this crisis, and therefore it will continue to support Hezbollah.”<sup>12</sup> From this standpoint, it is clear that the “non-success” of the Israeli operation proved doubly counter-productive for Jerusalem. With hindsight, it appears that the *impression of failure* in the area of media/public opinion was far more fraught with consequences than failure on a conventional battlefield. Hence the fact that Tehran was one of the first capitals to claim victory for Hezbollah. This emblematic victory *by proxy* enabled it, without a shadow of a doubt, to enhance its ideological prestige, to inflict lasting harm on Israel, to divert the attention of the international community from its nuclear program, and to assert itself as one of the essential players on the regional stage. In short, however indirect this “symbolic victory” may be, history is likely to remember it as a notable shift in the balance of regional sympathy in favour of the Islamic Republic. “If the July 12 attack on the Israeli patrol was meant to provoke this confrontation,” noted Daniel Schorr in the *Christian Science Monitor*, “It has been wildly successful.”<sup>13</sup> From the Iranian point of view, Hezbollah's resistance to an Israeli offensive intended to eliminate it confirms in any event the extent to which its strategic alliance with the Party of God is a winning arrangement.

Ultimately, it would appear that the crucial fact was not so much that Tsahal “lost” this war in fact, but that public opinion was convinced that it had—both inside and beyond Israel's borders. *Vox Populi–Vox Dei*. In the age of mass media and political showmanship, the old adage is more relevant than ever.

## **Psychological Warfare: The Weaknesses of the Israeli Approach**

The irony is that Israel attempted to include the psychological dimension in its conduct of the Lebanese operation. In the face of the increasing complexity of insurgent movements, the Jewish state, like many conventional powers, had begun to adopt its approach to the phenomenon of asymmetrical warfare and to include in its military doctrines such “virtual dimensions” of battle as psychology, culture and the media.<sup>14</sup> For several years now, its political–military strategy has incorporated the concept of low-intensity conflict based on the guidelines prepared by a think tank of Reserve generals embedded in the training school for senior officers.<sup>15</sup> During the 33-day war, the Israeli Army reactivated its psychological warfare unit and engaged it in a series of psychological operations. The question thus arises why the Israeli approach to “psychological warfare” was not sufficiently effective to counter that of its opponent or, conversely, why Hezbollah's approach was more effective.

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During the war, Israel was especially active on the psychological warfare front. During the reprisal raids, the Israelis dropped anti-Hezbollah pamphlets from fighter aircraft or helicopters.<sup>16</sup> Many witnesses reported large clouds of pamphlets scattered over the port city of Sidon urging the population not to support Hezbollah and not to return to the area south of the Litani River, designated as *Hezbollahland*. The psychological warfare unit also sought to hijack telephone lines and to transmit messages urging the people to denounce the combatants and Hezbollah fighters while explaining the reasons for the Israeli operation, or simply warning civilians of imminent bombing. The Israelis also carried the psychological offensive to the Internet front by hijacking Arabic-language websites<sup>17</sup> or encouraging Israeli citizens and members of the diaspora to defend their operation in *blogs* and *chat rooms*<sup>18</sup>. Other initiatives also consisted of providing the foreign press with reports on subjects that benefited the Israeli side, such as interviews with victims of Hezbollah bombardments.<sup>19</sup>

The primary target of Israeli psychological warfare was *Al-Manar*, Hezbollah's satellite network, and that says even more about the nature of the war, since it was targeted from the very first moments of the Israeli offensive. Hardly had hostilities commenced when the air force launched its first attack (13 July), without, however, succeeding in neutralizing the media stronghold of the Shiite militia. A second attempt enabled Israeli technicians to pirate the satellite broadcast of the pro-Iranian network and to replace its news bulletin with a 90-second spot that opened with a cartoon of Sheikh Nasrallah looking at the ground. The clip was punctuated by three shots and overlaid by a caption stating: "Your day is coming, coming, coming ..."<sup>20</sup> According to one former senior Israel Defence Force official, if the aim of this spot was "to dissociate the innocent civilian from the terrorist, who is using them and abusing them, by operating in the midst of a heavily populated area," the effectiveness of the message lay more in the evidence that Israel could hijack Hezbollah's most important propaganda tool: "Destroying Al-Manar, which we all know is a platform for destroying psychological order, is one thing. But better than destroying it is using it against them," he added.<sup>21</sup>

Why, then, despite all the attempts by Israel in the area of psychological warfare, did the enemy camp so easily win the battle of information, the media and public opinion? Part of the answer lies in the fact that the psychological weapon was not used by Israel throughout its entire register, but only as a weapon to answer Hezbollah's *terrorism by terror and intimidation*. This restrictive function appears clearly in the Tsahal's official low-intensity warfare doctrine. The objective assigned by this doctrine to the psychological weapon is to "engrave in the awareness" of the enemy that the price of aggression will be exposure to physical annihilation, using persuasion through fear through a demonstration of Israel's strength and supremacy.<sup>22</sup> The psychological operations of summer 2006 were conducted in accordance with this concept. "Part of this was to instill fear" confirms a member of the Israeli Forces; this was "mostly aimed at the Hezbollah operative."<sup>23</sup> The Israeli approach with regard to psychological operations can thus be summarized as cultivating apprehension among the enemy, instilling fear in their minds so as to deter them through fear and apprehension of maximum reprisals. Israel was betting on the fear aroused, less among the non-combatant population than among its direct enemies, namely among the Hezbollah fighters.

The psychological dimension to the conflict as applied by Israel thus remained subordinate to confidence in its military supremacy. This aspect of the strategy of Israeli influence and the shortcomings that characterize it are reflected as much by Israel's information operations as by its public diplomacy program.<sup>24</sup> The emphasis on the potential of terror distinguishes the Israeli approach from the one which is prevalent today in the field of information and psychological action strategies. The most widely



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used approach currently consists of winning the support of a given population by instilling trust and sympathy. This is true not only for Israel's allies<sup>25</sup>, but also for its enemies, including the Shiite militia, which derives its strength from its ability to cultivate the support of public opinion. This introduces another explanatory factor, which is essential to an understanding of the outcome of the confrontation in the summer of 2006: the external factors, the most important of which is undoubtedly the effectiveness and success of the rival initiatives.

## **An Asymmetry That Benefits Hezbollah**

A number of factors would indicate that this psychological war was as much lost by Israel as won by Israel's opponents. The question which observers have asked, with considerable justification, is thus an attempt to understand *how a few hundred guerrillas could force their will on a regional power like Israel*. For Ron Schleifer of Bar Ilan University, the pro-Iranian militia has developed an expertise in communications techniques, formulating its message, targeting populations and methods of dissemination, thereby gaining a key advantage over its powerful adversary, despite its relative lack of brute strength. According to this Israeli political scientist, the trial of strength between Israel and Hezbollah indicates very clearly the potential for challengers, in circumstances of asymmetric psychological warfare such as this, to turn the power relationship to their advantage and to seize the initiative over the conventional power.<sup>26</sup>

In contrast to Israel, Hezbollah opted resolutely for a psychological approach to the war, which consisted in gaining, as a priority, a symbolic victory in the eyes of the various segments of public opinion. Since it lacks weapons of mass destruction, Hezbollah masters the use of weapons of mass persuasion. The Party of God has a veritable system of psychological warfare, headed by a psychological warfare unit that specializes in the promotion of the doctrine and the image of the militia. As a spokesman for the Israeli Army noted, this organization, which supervises *Al-Manar*, in particular, has in recent years acquired undeniable expertise in the art of influencing the morale of sections of the population.<sup>27</sup> In contrast to the Israelis, who concentrate their efforts on enemy combatants, this unit specializes in targeting civilian non-combatants, regardless of whether they are Israelis or Arab-Muslims. One of the reasons which could explain the fact that Israel is unable to generate sympathy and support effectively is that its rivals are simply better in the area of winning minds and influencing people. Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, for example, have demonstrated their mastery of the art of galvanizing the masses against Jerusalem through the use of regional media and opinion-makers. For David Hoffman, it is this strategy on the part of Middle-Eastern regimes of hammering anti-Western messages through the media that is today responsible for the more general defeat of America on the battle lines of public opinion.<sup>28</sup>

The *Al-Manar* cable television network is in this sense the keystone of the Shiite militia's psychological action resources. Since its launch in the 1980s, the station has clearly stated its mission in this field: "Al-Manar is the first Arab institution to produce and direct concrete psychological warfare against the Zionist enemy," as one could read on the Website of the pro-Iranian network. Hezbollah has long used its satellite network as a medium to conquer the hearts and minds and to maintain the morale of its supporters in Lebanon as well as throughout the Arab world. During the 33-day war, *Al-Manar* played a key role in the psychological warfare inventory of the Party of God. It was the first to announce the capture of the Israeli soldiers on the Lebanese border. After the ceasefire, *Al-Manar* also broadcast Nasrallah's speech claiming the "great historic, strategic victory," the "triumph" won by the Hezbollah fighters. The audience and influence it enjoys today make this network a decisive weapon in Hezbollah's

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asymmetrical warfare arsenal. "Al-Manar makes Al-Jazeera look like a *Girl Scout cookie infomercial*," comments Avi Jorisch, an expert in media-terrorism.<sup>29</sup> Miles Hughes comes to the same conclusion, noting that the Hezbollah cable network is in the process of becoming the dominant media player on the regional scene, providing its political allies with a considerable capability to influence and a decisive impact on the psychological outcome of the recent conflict.<sup>30</sup>

Hezbollah's psychological action, however, is not limited to the strictly media sphere. The militia has also made an effort to generate popularity by cultivating its ties with the masses, thus acting like a true political party—"a populist party," as its detractors claim. As soon as the fighting ended, the militant Shia Muslim group supervised the placing, on piles of debris caused by the air raids, of dozens of red banners bearing sardonic messages like "Made in the US," "smart bombs for imbeciles" or "extremely accurate targets." This type of targeted initiative was supported by a particularly effective media relations campaign, which consisted of promising money for the victims of the bombing and shelter for people displaced as a result of "Israeli aggression." Secretary General Nasrallah presented himself as the benefactor and father of the Lebanese people, declaring via the media that: "Anyone who has lost their home will receive free furnished housing from Hezbollah for one year, starting today."<sup>31</sup> Using the opposite of the Israeli approach, the strategies of the Shiite organization accordingly emphasized promoting its image and not the impression or the fear aroused by military force.<sup>32</sup> "Hezbollah is not only missiles and fighting; if it were, the people would have turned away from us long ago" stated Ghassan Darwish, one of the movement's key thinkers.<sup>33</sup>

It is interesting to note that the methods of psychological warfare used by Hezbollah are based to a large extent on lessons passed on by Iran, long a master of the art of asymmetrical persuasion and public diplomacy.<sup>34</sup> Brigadier General Mohammad-Ali Jaafari, commander of the Revolutionary Guards, recently recalled through the medium of the official IRNA news agency that: "Since the enemy is far more advanced technologically than we are, we have adopted what are called 'asymmetrical warfare' methods. We have gone through the appropriate training and our forces are now well prepared for this."<sup>35</sup> This approach is nothing new for the Iranian regime and appears to have borne fruit. As a study by the London think-tank, Chatham House, notes, Iran has succeeded in accurately and effectively making use of the crises related to the "war on terror" to affirm its position on the regional scene.<sup>36</sup> More generally, the investment in terms of influence strategy has enabled it to emphasize its role, not only in the region, but also to extend the influence of the country and of its allies well beyond their geographical borders.<sup>37</sup> Be that as it may, the assistance provided by Iran, as a model and support, undoubtedly assisted the "psychological victory" of Hezbollah in the recent conflict with Israel.

We must acknowledge that the Shiite militia successfully scored crucial points on all the fronts where it engaged in psychological warfare. The ideological support provided by Iran, its own propaganda machine, its communications tools, its arsenal of information techniques and its professional mastery of the art of persuasion, as demonstrated by its leadership, constituted decisive assets in the war in the summer of 2006. One after the other, opinion surveys conducted after the conflict revealed a notable increase in its popularity, an increase matched by a greater antipathy towards the opposing camp. If these surveys are to be believed, most Lebanese, regardless of their religious persuasion, support Hezbollah in the conflict with Israel.<sup>38</sup> Here again, instead of holding the latter responsible for the war because of the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers, a majority of Lebanese blamed Israel and the United States, who stood accused of using violence to an abusive degree: at the end of the war, only 8% thought that the United States had supported them (the figure six months previously was 38%).<sup>39</sup> Without anyone having

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realized it, the roles of David and Goliath had been reversed, indicating a new form of asymmetry for the benefit of the small Shiite militia which had, thanks to the psychological weapon, defeated the Israeli heavyweight.

## **The Front of International Public Opinion**

During 33 days of psychological warfare, the protagonists in one of the first *information wars* of the century, Israel and Hezbollah, confronted one another at the tactical, operational and regional levels, but also, as the information age dictates, globally. As in Iraq or Vietnam in another age, a decisive dimension for the outcome of the conflict was in fact the belligerents' ability to transpose their struggle onto the world chess board to obtain the support of international public opinion. Once again, it was Hezbollah that scored the most points in this game.

The ability of the Shiite movement to establish privileged working relationships with the correspondents of the international press emerged as a crucial asset, which the Jewish state was unable to match. In fact, considerable efforts were deployed by Hezbollah to influence the media coverage of events in its favour. Suspicions of manipulation weighed heavily on it, as was the case in the affairs of falsification of Reuters clips or the mistaken count of the victims of the bombing provided to the press following the incidents in Tyre and Cana.<sup>40</sup>

The primary *tour de force* by the Shiite militia was its ability to channel the flow of information to the world market. The photographers were escorted into the stricken areas, which at times clearly appeared to have been staged for the media, supplemented for example by noisy and uninterrupted convoys of ambulances which the photographers could not miss. The members of Hezbollah also censored some subjects, such as the firing of Katyusha rockets. Antonia Rados, the great reporter for Radio Télévision Luxembourg (RTLTV), testified to the pressures experienced by foreign journalists around the coverage of this episode: "They [the Al-Manar crews] he recounted, asked us about the contents of our cassettes and tried to discourage us from broadcasting the firing of Katyusha rockets."<sup>41</sup> Many journalists reported similar pressures on them in the large press centres, such as the headquarters of the BBC, CNN or even Al-Arabyia teams. Filming or photographing the Hezbollah bunkers or the human shields was prohibited, while the media broadcast photos of Israeli tanks en masse: "It's a shadow army in any case," commented the director of the photo desk in Beirut for Agence France Presse.

While it is difficult to measure the direct impact of the campaign of psychological operations by Hezbollah on media coverage of the war and on international public opinion, it is beyond question that they both evolved to the benefit of the Shiite militia, thereby contributing substantially to its symbolic success against Israel. The major media of Israel's main ally, the United States, did not hesitate to depict Hezbollah in the role of a victorious, heroic resistance with such titles as *A Disciplined Hezbollah Surprises Israel with its Training, Tactics and Weapons*; *Hezbollah Unleashes Fiery Barrage*; *Among Militia's Patient Loyalists, Confidence and Belief in Victory*. An article in the *New York Times* dated 5 August added to this image that of a charitable organization coming to the help of the Lebanese population. The Mexican newspaper *El Economista* went so far as to indicate an unflattering parallel between the Jewish state and the Nazi regime; this parallel was taken up in Europe, where the Norwegian daily *Dagbladet* printed cartoons comparing the leader of Israel's government to an SS concentration camp commandant. Elsewhere, the *Sunday Times* of South Africa or *The Age* in Australia depicted Ehud Olmert as a bloodthirsty warlord with a butcher's knife in his hand. In New Zealand, the famous cartoonist Tom Stott created an analogy between Israel and al-Qaeda. The shift of opinion and the media in favour of Hezbollah made

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certain analysts remark during the conflict that, "The Jewish state is fighting against not one enemy, but two: Hezbollah and those who peddle its propaganda."<sup>42</sup> In the four corners of the globe, the barrage was so unanimous that there was no need to be anywhere near the battle lines to realize that Israel had lost the psychological duel on the front of international public opinion.

In the months following the conflict, virulent condemnations from such influential organizations as Amnesty International as well as public opinion surveys by Institutes such as the *Pew Research Center*, *Crop* or *Zogby* showed the noticeable deterioration in Israel's international image—confirming the crushing defeat it had suffered on the symbolic level. Clearly, it is difficult to establish a firm correlation between Hezbollah's psychological campaign and the overall perception of the events of August 2006, but it is undeniable that the militia displayed tremendous dexterity in the former—an ability that undoubtedly contributed to its victory in the psychological warfare with the Jewish state.

## **The Lessons of th Asymmetrical Challenge**

In the aftermath of the confrontations, Israel's leaders embarked on a comprehensive review of the flaws in their operational approach and an analysis of the unique nature of a new form of warfare, the disturbing logic of which was foreign to their traditional concept of war.

In recent decades, the General Staff had based its strategy to a very large extent on the use of brute force and the exploitation of Israel's military supremacy. The Jewish state had been content to conduct an orthodox security policy based on the certainty that its military power allowed it to impose its decisions on so-called "weak" adversaries. For General Uri Saguy, the former head of military intelligence, this outdated concept was definitively challenged by the reverse of 2006: "This war, he hopes, should prompt our leaders to understand the limits of strength."<sup>43</sup> Many of the factors in the analysis converge in this direction. Strategically, the limitations of the systematic use of the air force were shown. The bombing did nothing to reduce Hezbollah's will to fight, despite some 5,000 sorties by the Israeli Air Force in the course of operations: on the contrary, it had the perverse effect of harming Israel's image around the world. For Robert Pape, an expert at the University of Chicago, the Israeli General Staff was forced to recognize that superiority in the air is not a panacea in this type of confrontation: "In the coming weeks," he added, "there will be a realization that the land force is no longer effective. The problem is not that the Israelis do not have enough military power available, but rather that they have failed to understand the nature of their enemy."<sup>44</sup> Tsahal is facing a new challenge, one that requires a thorough revision of its strategic concept of warfare.

In an attempt to draw the lessons learned from its defeat at the hands of Hezbollah, part of the Israeli general staff embarked on a rigorous review immediately after the events of 2006.<sup>45</sup> For Dan Yatom, the former head of Mossad, "all the strategic priorities of Tsahal need to be reviewed. [...] The objectives were wrong, as was the method. When dealing with terrorist organizations that are rooted in the population, such as Hezbollah or Hamas, the idea of "reestablishing our deterrent capability" is nonsense. These wars are asymmetrical."<sup>46</sup> This diagnosis is essential in order to understand the 33-day war. As the strategy of the weak vis-à-vis the strong, asymmetry is the product of the dissymmetry of material strength; in other words, it results from an inequality in traditional military capabilities. In a position of military inferiority, the *outsider* tries to cancel out the dissymmetry by creating an *asymmetrical* situation, ie, by shifting the struggle to another level and exploiting the other side's weaknesses to its own advantage. In this case, the Shiite militia endeavoured to compensate for its defects in the traditional areas of military confrontation by transposing the fight into the human space (public opinion, mass psychology) and the hertzien space, that of communications and the media.

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Caught off guard by the asymmetrical nature of the conflict, the prodigious Israeli war machine and its *total spectrum dominance* proved ineffective. Despite its unquestionable materiel superiority, the Israeli Army failed in its mission because it could not or knew not how to adapt its way of fighting to this intangible enemy, who based his campaign on the principles of psychological warfare and revolutionary guerilla movements. It should be noted that, in similar circumstances, this is the same conclusion of impotence to which the strategies of the French Army led during the wars in Indochina and Algeria: "Limited as it was to the strictly military sphere, the army's action was condemned to almost irremediable failure: deprived of contact with the Muslim population, deprived of intelligence, the forces of order exhausted themselves by using a battering ram in vain against an elusive adversary."<sup>47</sup> Over the past century, in a way that is both ironic and logical, asymmetrical warfare has been a corollary of the development of Western supremacy in technological and military power; the more their superiority in traditional areas of power has increased, the more they have obliged their adversaries to opt for a form of asymmetrical warfare that makes it possible to avoid a head-on battle.<sup>48</sup> This recurrent challenge has not yet found an appropriate counter-insurgency response.

## Conclusion

The 33-day war was far more than a territorial dispute or a cross-border squabble. It will remain a benchmark for the phenomenon of new, asymmetrical wars in the information age. Hezbollah's psychological triumph over Israel shows first the disconcerting ability with which this type of insurrectionist movement has managed to adapt to the new operational context of the information age and to compensate for its deficiencies in the areas of traditional power to play to its own advantage in the sphere of ideas, message and mass communications. Hezbollah has shown its mastery of the art of provoking a militarily stronger enemy in order to defeat it in the arena of public opinion. Like al-Qaeda, the Shiite militia has learned to exploit the new arsenal, born out of the mass media revolution, to conduct its struggle at the *virtual and global levels*—while its adversary was exhausting itself at the military and the local level—to mount a campaign on a scale of which the revolutionaries of Mao's generation could never have dreamed.<sup>49</sup>

What this conflict reveals is the appearance of a new form of insurrection, based on the new communications technologies and the global information market in order to achieve what Brigitte Nacos describes as *media-dependent objectives*, ie, to capture the attention of key audiences both within and outside their operational space, to attract the attention and sympathy of the greatest number to their cause and ultimately to be recognized as legitimate, fully qualified players in the international arena.<sup>50</sup> In view of the success which this type of insurrectional approach can achieve against powerful state actors, there is a strong likelihood that this form of struggle without any real front line, in which the battlefields are screens and where the stakes are not only territorial gain and control of populations but the conquest of the minds and the loyalty of the *vox populi*—will spread like a trail of gunpowder.

Beyond the defeat it experienced, Tsahal has become embroiled in a new era, where intelligence and trickery exceed the power of weaponry, an era in which the art of war has been revolutionized and is based above all on the use of information, knowledge and culture. It will have to learn to exchange, when necessary, the mindset of conquest for the conquest of minds. Through this lightning war, this powerful army has experienced the shock of the wars of the future; in other words, it has entered the realm of the wars of tomorrow which "increasingly use brain power rather than brute force."<sup>51</sup> With the development of modern means of communication, this is a dimension of



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warfare that is bound to play a crucial role over the coming century. In Bosnia, Serbia, Afghanistan or Iraq, the psychological dimension has become part of the vital data of war. The ability to tame information without controlling it, to impress the crowds, to seduce public opinion and to gain moral victories is a new challenge for strategists. It is by attempting to innovate in this area that Tsahal will capitalize on the future, and not by continuing to replicate a strategy based on police operations inherited from the colonial era.

At the start of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, in the struggle between themselves and global terrorism, conventional states will find themselves confronted with a hitherto unknown form of warfare. For their governments, their secret services and their general staffs, the challenge is great: conduct a war without fronts or borders and with no clearly identifiable adversary. These great powers note bitterly the extent to which their conventional and nuclear forces are of little use against this concealed, uncatchable and resolute enemy. They must adapt their warfare by waging it on all fronts and combining modern technology with ancient military tactics. Over 50 years ago, some French officers in Algeria strove to convince anyone who would listen to them that, in the context of a counter-revolutionary war, it is absurd and dangerous not to use the same techniques as the enemy.<sup>52</sup> The analysts realize today that, in the context of modern asymmetrical warfare in the age of global information, hesitating to respond with “an eye for an eye” is a fatal mistake.<sup>53</sup> In the face of aggression and psychological harassment—of which terror is one form—modern armies must re-learn to retaliate using psychological action. Wars are no longer decided on the battlefield alone: they are also decided in the hearts and minds of people around the world.

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## About the author...

Pierre Pahlavi is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Defence Studies and Assistant Chair of the Department of Operations and Military Planning at the Canadian Forces College, Toronto. His fields of specialization include the politics of influence (public diplomacy and psychological operations), evolving concepts of security and power, and the strategic use of new information communications technologies; he is also an expert on Iran and the Middle East. He has written *La Guerre révolutionnaire de l'Armée française en Algérie* [The Revolutionary War of the French Army in Algeria] (l'Harmattan) and *Mass Diplomacy* (PhD thesis in the process of publication).

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## Notes

1. Alexandre Adler, 2006, “Une sixième guerre israélo-arabe” [A sixth Arab–Israeli War], *Le Figaro*, July 20, 2006.
  2. On June 25, a commando calling itself the Ezzedine Al-Qassam Brigades (armed wing of Hamas) had infiltrated Israeli territory, where it had launched an attack against a military post on the edge of the Gaza strip: one Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, was captured. Three days later, Israel launched the ground operation “SUMMER RAIN” in the Gaza strip, with the intent of bringing the captured soldier “home safe and sound” and putting an end to the firing of rockets against the Israeli communities bordering the Gaza strip.
  3. Tim Garden, 2006, Chatham House, Royal Institute for International Affairs, quoted on the site of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), <http://www.iiiss.org/whats-new/iiiss-in-the-press/press-coverage-2006/august-2006/un-effet-psychologique->, consulted in November 2006.
  4. Thalif Deen, 2006, “Israel’s Military Invincibility Dented by Hezbollah,” *Inter Press Service*, 8 August 2006. Translated by the author.
  5. If one adds to the cost of the air strikes and that of the land and sea operations conducted by Tsahal, that of the damage caused by the 3,970 Hezbollah rockets that fell on northern Israel. *Yediot Aharonot*, 15 August 2006.
  6. The association of Israeli industry estimated that GDP would be reduced by 1.9%.
  7. Sylvain Cypel, 2006, “Vif débat en Israël sur la ‘faillite’ de la guerre au Liban” [Lively debate in Israel on the ‘failure’ of the war in Lebanon], *Le Monde*, 18 August 2006.
  8. The resignation of the Minister of Defence, Amir Péretz of the Labour Party, was demanded by 57% of those polled, and that of the Chief of Staff, General Dan Haloutz, by 42%.
  9. Henry Kissinger quoted by Greg Mills and Terrence McNamee, 2006, “Challenges and choices,” *Armed Forces Journal*,
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November 2006.

10. Sibylle Rizk, 2006, "Le Hezbollah: un placement fructueux pour l'Iran" [Hezbollah, a worthwhile investment for Iran] *Le Figaro*, 10 August 2006.
11. Ze'ev Schiff, 2006, "For Israel, the conflict in Lebanon is a must-win situation," *Haaretz*, 27 July 2006.
12. Dr. Yevgeny Satanovsky, Head of the Middle East Research Institute (Moscow), quoted by *Al-Watan*, 10 August 2006.
13. Daniel Schorr, 2006, "Game point: Hizbullah wins sympathy," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 4 August 2006.
14. Aware of their lack of adjustment to this type of conflict, the United States, for example, has begun to re-think its counter-insurgency strategy and to reintegrate specifically "soft" elements; see United States, 2006, Headquarters Department of the Army, *Counter-insurgency* (F 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5), December 2006.
15. Israel, Department of Defence, 2004, *Ha Imout Ha Moubal* (Limited Warfare), Tel-Aviv, published by the Department of Defence, 2004.
16. Among these tracts, one can find, for example, cartoons of the Hezbollah leader depicted as a marionette holding two missiles, or of a spider in the centre of a web, or hiding while Lebanese civilians were killed by explosives: Most of these tracts are reproduced on the site PsyWar.org, <http://www.psywar.org/israellebanon.php>.
17. One specific "grey propaganda" operation consisted of taking control of the site All4Lebanon.org and posting a page in Arabic, English and French, calling on visitors to cooperate in eradicating Hezbollah; SGM Herbert A. Friedman (Ret.), "Psychological Operations during the Israel-Lebanon War 2006," PsyWar.org, <http://www.psywar.org/israellebanon.php>-posted on 16 August 2006.
18. *London Times*, 28 July 2006.
19. Journalists in Beirut reported their annoyance with such methods. "Our telephones and computers were bombarded by explanatory, propagandistic texts, e-mails and telephone messages," declared Antoine Perruchot, a Radio France correspondent quoted in Paule Gonzales, 2006, "Les médias, l'autre arme de la guerre du Liban" [The media, the other weapon in the Lebanese war], *Le Figaro*, 11 August 2006.
20. Translated by the author. The clip continued with images of a speech by Sheikh Nasrallah—a voice in the background saying: "There is no doubt that this is the strongest air force in the region. And we cannot stand up to it"—followed by pictures of Israeli bombers hitting Lebanese targets, and the spot closed with a warning message: "Nasrallah knows the truth, but he continues, it's his way, to drag Lebanon towards destruction, to throw sand in your eyes."
21. *The Sun*, 18 August 2006.
22. Israel—*Ha Imout Ha Moubal*, p. 242.
23. *The Sun*, 18 August 2006
24. On this point, refer to Carnes Lord, 2006, *Losing Hearts and Minds? Public Diplomacy and Strategic Influence in the Age of Terror*, London, Praeger Security International, 2006, pp. 44–45; see also Eytan Gilboa, 2007, "Public Diplomacy: The Missing Component in Israel's Foreign Policy," paper given at the 48th Annual Convention of ISA, Chicago, February 2007.
25. See Canada, *Joint Psychological Operations Doctrine* (B-GJ-005-313/FP-001), 2004; US, Joint Publication 5-0, 2006; *Joint Operation Planning*, December 2006; IV-35, available at the following address: [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new\\_pubs/jp5\\_0.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf).
26. Ron Schleifer, 2006, "Psychological Operations: A New Variation on an Age Old Art: Hezbollah versus Israel," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Volume 29, Number 1, January–February 2006.
27. Olivier Rafowicz, an Israeli military spokesman, explains: "Hezbollah has a special unit dealing only in communication and psychological warfare. This unit is dealing with *Al-Manar* in the promotion of the image of Hezbollah. For many years, they have been strong, using television to try to demolish the morale of the soldiers and the population of Israel. They were filming their terror operations, for example. One team specialized in filming the operations. When they were successful, the film was given to everyone in the world," *The Sun*, 18 August 2006.
28. David Hoffman, 2002, "Beyond public diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, volume 81, no. 2, 2002; Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defence, quoted by BBCWS, 2006, "US 'losing media war to al-Qaeda'," *BBC World Service*, BBCWS, 17 February 2006.
29. Avi Jorisch, 2004, *Beacon of Hatred: Inside Hizballahs Al-Manar Television*, Washington, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004, 106 pages.
30. Hugh Miles, 2005, *Al-Jazeera: The Inside Story of the Arab News Channel That Is Challenging the West*, New York, Grove Press, 2005, 438 pages.
31. Adrien Jaulmes, 2006, "Le Hezbollah se place pour la reconstruction" [Hezbollah positions itself for reconstruction], *Le Figaro*, August 2006.
32. Hezbollah's operational strategy is so much oriented around seeking influence that even the use of the sophisticated weaponry it has acquired would be subordinated to psychological objectives. The experts agree, for example, that the drone shot down over Israeli territory during the war was used above all as a weapon for persuasion rather than destruction. Tsahal claimed in this regard that the unarmed craft "was used for propaganda" by the movement. Military experts moreover confirm that the value of these drones is primarily psychological: "These models are designed for reconnaissance and intelligence," explains Tim Garden, of the Royal Institute for International Affairs in London. "They could carry small explosive loads, but they are not built for that." They have a radius of action between 50 and 150 km, are three metres long and are "relatively slow." "Hezbollah does not try to win militarily against Israel," noted Peter Brookes of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).
33. Martin Asser, 2006, "Hearts and minds. Hezbollah wages a propaganda war in the rubble of south Beirut," *BBC*, 18 August 2006.

34. Hamidreza Assefi, 2001, "Foreign Ministry's Success in Changing World Public Opinion," *Iran* (Morning Daily), 23 May 2001; Iran, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Hamidreza Assefi, 2002, "Mass Media Play a Pivotal Role in Modern World," 15 October 2002. Available at the following address <http://www.mfa.gov.ir/News/Index.htm>; Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting News, 2004, "Leader stresses importance of news," IRIB, 11 January 2004.
35. *Asia Times*, 31 January 2006.
36. Robert Lowe and Claire Spencer (eds.), 2006, *Iran, its neighbors and the regional crises. A Middle East Programme report*, Chatham House (The Royal Institute for International Affairs), 2006.
37. Lowe and Spencer, *Iran, its neighbors and the regional crises. A Middle East Programme report*, p. 6.
38. "Poll Finds Overwhelming Majorities in Lebanon Support Hezbollah, Distrust U.S.," *World Public Opinion*, 2 August 2006.
39. Nicholas Blanford, 2006, *Christian Science Monitor*, 28 July 2006.
40. It is worth remembering the case, famous at the time, of the photographer for the Reuters agency who was accused of dealing in photographs on behalf of Hezbollah to accentuate the clouds of smoke emerging from buildings hit by Israeli strikes in the suburbs of Beirut. See specifically Eytan Gilboa, 2007, "New Media and New Conflict," 48th Annual ISA Convention, Chicago, February 2007. There were in fact numerous reports of incidents of photo retouching during this conflict, the most striking of which were perhaps those showing two shots of the same Arab woman weeping over the destruction of her house by the Israelis, in front of two different ruins a week apart (*Associated Press*), or that of the "Hezbollah fighter" near to a reportedly shot down Israeli jet, which was clearly only a flaming heap of tires (*U.S. News & World Report*). One can also mention the staging of "emotional touches" designed to accentuate the dramatic impact of the shots: at least four cases of photos were reported—published by major press agencies (*Reuters* or *Associated Press*)—of bombed sites, in front of which the ruins of toys (stuffed teddy bears, Mickey Mouse) could clearly be seen, or a bridal dress, all in immaculate condition.
41. Paule Gonzales, 2006, "Les médias, l'autre arme de la guerre du Liban" [The media, the other weapon in the Lebanese war], *Le Figaro*, 11 August 2006.
42. Tom Gross, 2006, "The media war against Israel," *National Post*, 2 August 2006.
43. General Uri Saguy, 2007, quoted in *Le Monde*, 17 August 2007.
44. Robert Pape, 2006, "What we still don't understand about Hezbollah," *The Observer*, 6 August 2006; see also R. Page, 2006, *Dying to Win: Why Suicide Terrorists Do It*, London, Gibson Square, 2006.
45. "We have to proceed to a meaningful examination of the successes and the errors. We have to extract professional lessons, as we are faced with more challenges ... This test concerns us all, from me down to the last soldier," noted the Israeli Chief of Staff, Lt Gen Dan Halutz; "Israel army chief admits failures," *BBC*, 24 August 2006.
46. Sylvain Cypel, 2006, "Vif débat en Israël sur la 'faillite' de la guerre au Liban" [Vigorous debate in Israel on the 'failure' of the war in Lebanon], *Le Monde*, 18 August 2006.
47. Raoul Girardet, 1964, *La crise militaire française 1945-1962—Aspects sociologiques et idéologiques* [The crisis of the French military 1945–1962—sociological and ideological aspects], Paris, Armand Colin, coll. Cahiers de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques, No. 123, 1964, pp. 186–187.
48. Colin S. Gray notes, "The most intelligent [insurrectional movement] will use methods of warfare which do not challenge America's strengths." In Colin S. Gray, 2005, "How has War changed since the end of the Cold War?" *Parameters*, Spring 2005, p. 21.
49. J. Mackinlay, 2005, *Defeating Complex Insurgency: Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan*, London, The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2005, p. 27. See also Bard O'Neill, 2005, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, Washington, DC, Potomac Books, 2005.
50. Brigitte L. Nacos, 2006, "Terrorism and Media in the Age of Global Communication," in *Terrorism and International Relations*, edited by Daniel S. Hamilton, Washington DC, Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2006, pp. 84–87.
51. Sylvaine Pasquier, 1994, "Entretien avec Alvin Toffler: Le choc des guerres du futur" [Interview with Alvin Toffler. The shock of future wars], *L'Express*, no. 2229, 31 March 1994, p. 46.
52. General Chassin and Colonel Trinquier quoted in Pierre C. Pahlavi, *La Guerre Révolutionnaire de l'Armée Française en Algérie [The Revolutionary War of the French Army in Algeria]*, Paris, l'Harmattan, 2004, pp. 26 and 143.
53. For a full analysis of this subject, see Roger W. Barnett, 2003, *Asymmetrical Warfare: Today's Challenge to US Military Power*, Washington DC, Brassey's, 2003.



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# **“CONTACT C”**

## **A FORWARD OBSERVATION OFFICER WITH TASK FORCE ORION**

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**Captain Andrew Charchuk**

*This document was originally sent as an email to friends back in Canada. I did not appreciate at the time the level of interest that people might have in this piece of writing. As this email made the rounds in the Canadian Forces (CF) I soon realized that I had inadvertently made an impact on many back home. As it has now been several months since this was first written I will take a few moments to “christen the ground”. On 17 May 2006, Captain Nichola Goddard, a forward observation officer (FOO) with A Battery, 1<sup>st</sup> Regiment Royal Canadian Horse Artillery (1 RCHA) and attached to C Company (Coy) Group 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (1 PPCLI) as part of Task Force (TF) Orion was killed in action (KIA) in the Panjwaii District of Kandahar province. Captain Goddard was a good friend of mine, and one of my wife’s best friends. I was deployed as a replacement quickly thereafter, and upon my arrival joined up with C Coy Group and Nichola’s FOO party in operations. Operation (Op) ZAHAR and subsequently Op AUGUSTUS, which this story reflects upon, were both part of the much larger Op MOUNTAIN THRUST that was conducted throughout Regional Command—RC[E]ast and RC(S)outh. I was fortunate to be surrounded by incredible leaders and soldiers like the Officer Commanding (OC) Major Bill Fletcher SMV<sup>1</sup>, the Company Sergeant Major (CSM) Master Warrant Officer S.D. Stevens MSM<sup>2</sup>, and the FOO party I assumed command of. As can be seen by the informal writing style, this email was intended to tell the story of my experiences during these two weeks and was never intended as lessons learned or a commentary on what went right or wrong. However, this story does illustrate that our equipment and our drills work. The Canadian soldier is second to none, period. I grew up in a military that had a pervasive attitude of what Major Fletcher referred to as “coalition envy”, but this myth was shattered during my time in Afghanistan. We were the best-equipped, best-trained and best-led military in Afghanistan, and I still feel pride when I reflect upon what the soldiers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and officers around me achieved. With that in mind I hope the reader of this story comes away with an appreciation of what the operations are like in theatre at the company level.*

### **An Email Home**

First off, I apologize for the length of this email, as it contains two weeks worth of Afghanistan fun. I am doing well and to be brutally honest, I have enjoyed this last couple of weeks. Seven years of training culminating in 14 action packed days. At first I wasn’t going to write a lot of detail about what happened, because some people might find it upsetting. However, when I got back to Kandahar Air Field (KAF) and read the less than adequate media coverage that the largest operation Canadians have been involved in since Korea, I really felt I had to write it all down.

We received word while down at our forward operating base (FOB) that we were going to be part of a full out three-day (*Ha-Ha*) battle group operation. This was going to be the largest operation Canada had undertaken since the Korean War. When we arrived back in KAF for orders we found out that we were rolling for Pashmul in the Panjawai District of Kandahar Province. That was hard for my crew to hear, as that was





the same town where Capt Nichola Goddard was killed and where Bombardier Chris Gauthier (a signaller in the FOO party before I arrived) had been injured in an ambush. Participating in this attack were A, B and C Company (Coy) Groups, both troops of artillery from A Battery plus all of the observer parties, an engineer squadron, two companies of Afghan National Army (plus all of their attached American embedded training teams—ETT), as well as a huge line-up of American and British fixed and rotary wing aircraft.

On the night of the 7<sup>th</sup> around 2200 hrs local C Company Group (with yours truly attached as their FOO) rolled for Pashmul. As we arrived closer to the objective area we saw the women and children pouring out of the town....not a good sign. We pushed on and about 3 kilometres (km) from our intended line of departure to start the operation we were ambushed by Taliban fighters. At around 0030hrs, I had my head out of the turret crew commanding my light armoured vehicle (LAV) with my night vision monocular on. Two rocket propelled grenade (RPG) rounds thundered into the ground about 75 m from my LAV. For about half a second I stared at them and thought, "Huh, so that's what an RPG looks like." The sound of an adversary's 7.62 mm fire cracking all around the convoy snapped me back to reality and I quickly got down in the turret and we immediately began scanning for the enemy. They were on both sides of us adding to the "fog of war". We eventually figured out where all of our friendlies were, and where to begin engaging in accordance with our rules of engagement (ROE). We let off bursts from our 25 mm cannon and 7.62 mm machine gun. During the fight I went to jump up





Combat Camera AS2006-0309a 01 May 2006 Helmand Province, Afghanistan

**A soldier from C-Company 1 PPCLI does sentry duty from a LAV III at a perimeter observation post at Forward Operating Base Robinson. FOB Robinson is used as a secure base to extend operations from Kandahar.**

on the pintle-mounted machine gun, but as I stuck my head out of the LAV I realized the bad guys were still shooting at us and that the Canadian engineer LAV beside us was firing 25 mm rounds from their cannon right over our front deck. I quickly popped back down realizing that was probably one of the stupider ideas I have ever had in my life. The first troops-in-contact (TIC) engagement lasted about two hours. The radio nets were busier than I had ever heard before and we realized that A and B Coys, as well as Reconnaissance Platoon had all been hit simultaneously, showing a degree of coordination not seen before in Afghanistan. The feeling amongst the company was that that was probably the end of the engagement, as the enemy usually just conducted hit and run attacks. Boy, were we wrong! We continued to roll towards our LOD and not five



Combat Camera AS2006-0311a 02 May 2006 Helmand Province, Afghanistan

**In a desert region of Helmand Province, west of Kandahar, Major William Fletcher gives orders to C-Company Group. After orders are given, the Company Group broke up to complete several missions concurrently.**

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minutes later as we rolled around a corner, I saw B Coy on our left flank get hit with a volley of about 20 RPGs all bursting in the air over the LAVs. It was an unreal scene to describe. There was no doubt now that we were in a big fight.



Combat Camera AS2006-0317a

We pushed into the town following the company commander behind the lead platoon. After traveling about 300 m, our lead platoon came under attack from a grape drying hut in the middle of what can only be described as an urban built up area. The company commander then issued a quick set of fragmentary orders and I was about to participate in my first ever company attack. He signalled for me to dismount and follow him. It was an uncomfortable feeling dismounting from the turret, as the only way out is through the top of the turret. I was standing probably 15 feet high in the air with friendly and hostile rounds snapping and cracking in the air everywhere. Needless to say I got down quick. I went to the back of my LAV and banged on the door to signal we were dismounting. As the master bombardier opened the door he went pale as we were only 20m from where they had previously been ambushed and where Nichola had died. Regardless, we soldiered on. We grabbed our radios and followed the company commander. We went into a compound that was actually the same one my friend Howie had dropped a 1,000 lb bomb on after the attack in May. We went up to a second story ledge on a mud wall, and the company commander pointed out a compound and said "Can you hit that?" I lased the building and found out it was only 89 m away. I sat down and did the math (those of you who know my mathematical skills are probably cringing right now!). I looked at him and said that in theory and mathematically we would be okay where we were, but I made him move one of the other Platoons back 150 m. A funny story: As I was doing the math, an American ETT captain working with the ANA looked down at me and said "There are no ANA forward of us" I responded "Roger", to which he said "good", fired three rounds and said "Got him". I then realized that he had asked me a question and had not stated a fact. Through all the gunfire I had missed the inflection in his voice. I looked at him and said, "Hey, I have no idea where your ANA are, you're supposed to look after them!" Luckily it wasn't a friendly he had shot at.



Combat Camera/AS2006-0319a 02 May 2006 Kandahar Province, Afghanistan

**A soldier of C-Company Group 1 PPCLI maintains perimeter security as a leader engagement is conducted with village elders in Garmabak, a remote village west of Kandahar.**

We started the fire mission with the first round landing about 350 m from my position. The noise of artillery whistling that close and exploding was almost deafening, the FOO course sure hadn't prepared me for this! The master bombardier and I debated the correction for a second and eventually agreed upon a drop 200 m, mostly because we needed to get rounds on that compound ASAP as we were taking heavy fire. The round came in and landed a bit left of the compound. We lased the impact and found out it was 105 m from us. We gave a small correction and went into fire for effect with 50% ground burst and 50% air burst. The rounds came in 85 m from us, right on the compound. Truly, I did not appreciate the sheer frightening and awe-inspiring nature of



Combat Camera /S2006-0307 July 8 2006 Zjarey district, Afghanistan

**A Canadian Forces soldier from A Company, 1 Platoon, 1st Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry patrols the perimeter within the Zjarey district, west of Kandahar, in a joint Afghan National Army and Coalition security operation to remove Taliban forces from the area.**



proximity (the air burst rounds). I then had the worst moment of my military career as one of the sections began shouting "Check fire, check fire!" on the net, followed quickly by their platoon commander saying they had casualties and to prepare for a 9 Line (air medical evacuation request). It turned out the two events were unrelated but for a while I thought I had injured or, even worse killed a Canadian. In fact, the section that called check firing was actually the furthest of anyone in the company from the shells and had panicked (which led to a lot of ribbing and jokes from their buddies afterwards who had all been closer). The 9 Line was for an ANA soldier who had been struck 5 minutes before. However unfortunate, I was definitely relieved to hear all that.

Day One carried on with several more small skirmishes and myself moving from compound to compound to set up observation posts (OPs), from which I could support the company's movement. I never thought that in my career I would literally be kicking in doors and leading a three man stack, clearing room after room to get to my OPs.

We ended the day, which had seen us in contact for 12 straight hours, by sleeping beside our vehicle in full battle rattle for about an hour with sand fleas biting us. They are the single most ignorant and annoying bug ever. The next morning started off with what seemed like a benign task. We were to clear the grape fields to the south of our objective area. Intelligence said there was nobody there and this would only take us a couple of hours. About an hour into the clearing operation we came under contact from a heavily fortified compound. Unfortunately, Cpl Boneca from 8 PI C Coy was killed early in the engagement when the infantry tried to storm the compound. They met fierce resistance, far greater than expected. (I didn't know the young soldier personally, but do recall thinking how fearless he was a week earlier when I saw him running around the Brit compound with a Portuguese flag right after England had lost in the World Cup. I was impressed by his peers and friends and how professionally they carried on after his death). After the attempted storming of the compound, the company commander decided to go after the compound with indirect fire. As I was coming up with a plan for



Combat Camera IS2006-0333 July 9 2006 Zjarey district, Afghanistan

The Platoon Commander of 1 Platoon, A Company, 1st Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry waits for further info as a compound is searched within the Zjarey district, west of Kandahar, in a joint Afghan National Army and Coalition security operation to remove Taliban forces from the area.



Combat Camera IS2006-0334 July 9 2006 Zjarey, Afghanistan

**A Canadian Forces soldier holds up a rocket propelled grenade after searching a compound within the Zjarey district, west of Kandahar, in a joint Afghan National Army and Coalition security operation to remove Taliban forces from the area.**

how I would do this, we had a call sign I had never heard before check in. Ends up he was a Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle armed with a Hellfire missile. I don't know how he knew we needed help or what frequency we were using, and frankly I don't care; he was a blessing. When the company commander asked me what the safety distance for a Hellfire was, I literally had to go to the reference manual I carry (J Fires Manual) because I had never seen one before and had no idea what it actually could do. I told him what the safety distance was and that we were inside of it. The Hellfire came in and it was the loudest thing I have ever heard. Three distinct noises: the missile firing, it coming over our heads and the boom. For about 30 seconds we couldn't see anything but a cloud of dust. Then when the dust settled the platoons started hooting and hollering. The compound barely even looked the same. (At this point our embedded journalist Christie Blatchford from the Globe and Mail had enough and left us—can't blame her, I guess.) The company again tried to clear the compound but still met





resistance. So we lobbed in 18 artillery shells 82 m from us (even closer than the day before) and then brought in two Apache attack helicopters. On the second rocket attack the pilot hit the target with his first rocket and the second one went long and landed just on the other side of the mud wall from us. It engulfed us in rocket exhaust, but thankfully no one was hurt. When the Hellfire had gone off it had started a small building in the compound on fire and suddenly we started getting secondary explosions off of a weapons cache that was in it. Everything started exploding around us, and the two guys that had not listened to me to press up against the wall got hit with shrapnel, both in the legs. One was the company commander's signaller, a crazy Newfoundlander, who was cracking jokes even with shrapnel in his leg. The medic dealt with him and I went over to the American ETT captain who was only a few feet from me and began doing first aid on him. He looked like he was going into shock, until his American sergeant came up behind me and said "Sir, that's barely worth wearing a Purple Heart for!" I was surprised how much first aid I actually remembered, and the only difficult part was trying to cut off his pant leg because American combats are designed not to tear, making them particularly difficult to cut! In the end we took the compound and captured a high level Taliban leader who was found by the infantry hiding in a sewage culvert, begging for the shelling to stop. As well, we found a major weapons cache, which the engineers took great delight in blowing up. Unfortunately the assault had cost us one killed, two wounded. A section commander had blown his knee throwing a grenade and four guys had gone down to extreme heat exhaustion.

Day Three was uneventful for C Coy and we prepared to go back to our FOB, which would have been good because I had come down with a cold—not what I needed in combat. Unfortunately, that was not to be. A British company from 3 Parachute (Para) Regiment had been isolated and surrounded by Taliban in the Helmand Province in the Sangin District Centre. They were running out of food and were down to boiling river water. C Coy was tasked to conduct an immediate emergency resupply with our LAVs.

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We headed off to what can only be described as the Wild West. The company (B Coy) of the Paras that was holding the District Center was being attacked 3 to 5 times a day. We rolled in there after a long and painful road move across the desert. When we arrived in Sangin the locals began throwing rocks and anything they could at us—this was not a friendly place. We pushed into the District Centre, and during the last few hundred metres we began receiving mortar fire. They never taught me on my LAV Crew Commander course how to command a vehicle with all the hatches closed, using periscopes in an urban environment. I truly did it by sense of touch, meaning as we hit the wall to the left I would tell the driver to turn a little right!! We resupplied the Brits and, unfortunately, it turned dark and we couldn't get out of there, so we had to spend the night. We were attacked with small arms, RPGs and mortars three times that night; I still can't believe that the Brits have spent over a month living there under those conditions. They are a proud unit and they were grateful but embarrassed that we had to come save the day. And as good Canadians we didn't let them hear the end of being rescued by a bunch of Colonials!

We left Sangin again thinking we were headed home. We made it about 40 km before we were called back to reinforce the District Centre and help secure a helicopter-landing site. As we sat there we received orders that we were now cut to the control of 3 Para for their upcoming operation north of Sangin. This was turning out to be the longest three-day operation ever!!! Enroute we were engaged by an 82mm mortar from across a valley. I engaged them with our artillery, it felt a lot more like shooting in Shilo as they were 2.8 km away as opposed to the 100 m or less my previous engagements had been. We went round for round with them in what Rob, the troop commander firing the guns for us, called an indirect fire duel. In the end he said the score was Andrew 1 Taliban 0 and there is no worry of that mortar ever firing again. We rode all through the night (with my LAV on a flat tire) and arrived right as the Paras air assaulted onto the objective with Chinook helicopters. There were helicopters everywhere. It was a hot landing zone and they took intense fire until we arrived with LAVs, and the enemy ran away. It was a different operation, as we were used to a lot more intimate support tanks to shoot the Paras in. It was impressive to watch them; they are unbelievable soldiers.


We left the operation about 25 hours later (still 3 days going on no sleep) and thought that for sure we were now done this "three-day op". But as we were withdrawing to secure the landing zone for the Brits (under fire from 107 mm rockets and 82 mm mortars) we received Fragmentary (Frag) orders to conduct sensitive site exploitation where the division had just dropped two 1000 lb bombs. Good old C Coy; leading the charge again!

I drove to the site and saw nothing but women and children fleeing the town. I thought, "Here we go again." Luckily this time I found a good position for observation with my LAV and did not have to go in on the attack. The company quickly came under attack from what was later estimated as 100+ fighters. For about 15 minutes we lost communications with the company commander and a whole section of infantry as they were basically overrun. The section had last been seen going into a ditch that was subsequently hit with a volley of about 15 RPGs; I thought we had lost them all. I had Brit Apaches check in and they did an absolutely brilliant job at repelling the enemy. The only problem was I couldn't understand a word the pilot was saying because of his accent! Luckily I had the Brit liaison officer riding in the back of my LAV. I ended up using him (a major) as a very highly paid interpreter to help me out. After about an hour-long fight, the company broke contact (but lived up to the nickname the soldiers had given us, "Contact C") and we levelled several compounds with artillery. Somehow we escaped without a scratch, truly amazing.

We were again ordered back to the Sangin District Centre with 3 Para and spent the next few days fighting with the Paras. For four days I did not get a chance to take off my ballistic vest, helmet or change my socks, etc. We were attacked 2-3 times a day, and

# RC SOUTH

Scale: 1:500,000  
 Datum: WGS 84  
 Projection: UTM



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always repelled them decisively. I also discovered during this period that exchanging rations with the Brits is a really bad idea. Not only were they stuck in this miserable place but that their food was absolutely horrible!

After saying our good byes to our Brit comrades (the enemy learnt their lesson and finally stopped attacking the place), we again prepared to go back home. Alas, it was not to be again. We were ordered south to take back two towns that the Taliban had just taken. Luckily, this time after 11 straight days in contact, C Coy was the battle group reserve. We headed to the British provincial reconstruction team (PRT). We rolled into the town to the strangest arrival yet. This was coalition country. The locals (unlike Kandahar and even more so in Sangin) were excited and happy to see us. We had kids offering us candy and water instead of begging. There were no Burkhas. The women were in colourful gowns with their faces exposed. The town was booming, with shops everywhere and industry flourishing. We went to the PRT and it didn't even seem real. I took off my helmet, Flak vest and I had a shower and changed my clothes for the first time in two weeks. I ate a huge fresh meal (until my stomach hurt), and then went and sat on the edge of a water fountain in a garden and watched a beach volleyball game between the Brits and Estonians. I laughed as I had supper and watched the BBC (British Broadcasting Company), which was reporting that we had taken back the towns, but H Hour was still 2 hours away, so much for the element of surprise. After what we had been through, it was hard to believe this place was in the same country. I slept that



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night (still on the ground beside my LAV because they did not have enough rooms) better than I think I have before in my life. The next couple of days were quiet for us as they did not need to commit us as the reserve. On day 14 of our three-day operation, we conducted the 10-hour road move back to KAF, literally limping back as our cars were so beat up (mine was in the best shape in the entire company and we had a broken differential ... again).

There are more stories I could tell of these two weeks but this email has become long enough as it is and if I did that I would have no war stories to tell you when I get home. I will end by saying that I have truly enjoyed this experience. Combat is the ultimate test of an officer, and on several occasions I did things that I didn't know I was capable of. I am so proud of my crew and the entire company group. We soldiered hard and long and showed the enemy that messing with Canadians is a really bad idea. We accomplished something in the last two weeks that Canadian soldiers have not done since Korea. The Afghan Government, elected by the Afghans, requested our assistance and we were able to help. We were the equal, if not superior of our allies in everything we did. I hope that I gave you all an appreciation of what these young brave men and women are doing over here. I will see all of you real soon.

Take care,  
Andrew

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### **About the Author ....**

Captain Andrew Charchuk joined the Canadian Forces in 1999. He completed his BA in Political Science from the University of Calgary in 2002. Upon completion of phase training, Capt Charchuk was posted to C Battery, 1<sup>st</sup> Regiment Royal Canadian Horse Artillery at CFB Shilo MB. He was deployed to Afghanistan in June 2006 as a replacement for Captain Nichola Goddard after she was killed in action. Captain Charchuk completed the remainder of the tour as a FOO with A Bty, 1 RCHA. He has subsequently returned to C Battery as the Battery Captain.

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### **Endnotes**

1. Major William Hilton Fletcher was awarded the Star of Military Valour (SMV) in February 2007 for his leadership and selfless courage during operations in Afghanistan in 2006.
2. Master Warrant Officer S.D. Stevens was awarded the Meritorious Service Medal.

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# DEPLOYING WITHOUT AN ADMINISTRATION COMPANY—TF 306 BG ECHELON SYSTEM DURING OPERATION MEDUSA

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Captain Simon Parker

During a visit to theatre by staff officers from Ottawa, I was told, anecdotally, that the reason an echelon system was not built into the order of battle (ORBAT) was due to the fact that the planners made the assumptions that only sub-units would deploy at any one time, and that these sub-units would always stage out of Kandahar Air Field (KAF) and never be deployed longer than 24 hours. During Rotation (Roto) 2, starting 2 hours after the transfer of authority from Roto 1 to Roto 2, the Battle Group (BG) deployed from KAF and never returned in more than a sub-sub-unit sized organization and for no longer than 24—48 hours. This document was originally submitted as a briefing note to the chain of command in order to initiate some sort of change with regard to building echelons for sub-units on future operations.

The 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion Royal Canadian Regiment (1 RCR) Battle Group (Task Force [TF] 306) conducted Operation MEDUSA from 02 September until the end of October 2006. During this operation the BG deployed forward in its entirety, away from its main supporting base, KAF. During this operation the National Support Element (NSE) was required to sustain the BG in combat operations 24/7 over extended and tenuous lines of communications (LOCs). This support included providing A1 and A2 Echelons to the



Combat Camera AR2006-4026-0025a 12 June 2006 Kandahar, Afghanistan

A supply convoy to forward operating base (FOB) Martello travels from Kandahar Airfield (KAF) through Kandahar city to drop off supplies to troops supporting the operating base. FOB Martello is located north of KAF in the Shah Wali Kot region.



BG and its sub-units, as well as pushing supplies to these echelons from KAF. Due to the structure of the NSE and its limited capacity to push out echelon resources, the BG's scheme of manoeuvre was limited in scope and flexibility. Indeed, the NSE is now expected to provide and perform the integral support (IS), close support (CS), and general support (GS) functions normally associated with a deployed force. The NSE, just over 300 strong, is expected to provide the personnel and equipment capacity that normally is found within the sub-unit echelon, the unit administration sub-unit, the close support service battalion and the general support battalion.

## BACKGROUND

During the deployment of the 3 RCR BG to Kabul in 2003 on Op ATHENA Roto 0, the Army decided to centralize all Combat Service Support (CSS) into the NSE and strip the Administration Company and the sub-unit echelons away from the BG. CSS had now become centralized, and this has evolved into the model for all future deployments. The success of this model is debatable and predicated upon information operations campaigns initiated by the CSS Corps and the Combat Arms. For example, the Post Operation Report (POR) for Op ATHENA Roto 0 states that the centralization of CSS was not recommended, this from the 3 RCR BG unhappy with the model. Unfortunately, this point was not pursued in other publications and so lacks impact.<sup>1</sup> Conversely, in Army Lessons Learned *Dispatches* one can find articles written by CSS officers on the success of centralization during Op ATHENA. However the fundamental difference between the Op ATHENA Rotos and the current Op ARCHER Rotos is frequently overlooked. Op ATHENA was focused upon operations inside Kabul, a city where sub-units can deploy out of the main operating base for short durations. Combat forces could and did operate out of the main base at Camp Julian. The lines of communication were short and operations were for short durations. Op ARCHER Roto 2 encompasses an entire province the size of New Brunswick with extended lines of communications that are constantly under attack. Sub-units and the entire BG deploy for months at a time.



Combat Camera AR2006-A026-0084d 12 June 2006 Shah Wali Kot, Afghanistan

Pte Mark Pinseat, a Mobile Support Equipment Operator (MSE OP) from Edmonton fills fuel containers near Forward Operating Base (FOB) Martello in the Shah Wali Kot Region Afghanistan, north of Kandahar Airfield (KAF).

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At the time of writing, one sub-unit had been deployed out of KAF for fifty three days. Despite repeated and frequent calls from combat arms units and formation level HQs to re-establish the BG Administration Company on operations, decision makers are intent on staying the course with centralization of all CSS assets for deployment. The purpose of this article, therefore, is to outline the need for re-establishing an echelon system that can fully support BG operations in Afghanistan and beyond.

The fundamental challenge facing the NSE is that it is not configured nor equipped to create an echelon system that adequately provides for the BG's needs in protracted combat operations. As well, the BG does not have the capacity or the equipment to create its own sub-unit or unit echelon system. Without this capacity the BG's scheme of manoeuvre and flexibility are restricted. Further, the added burden on the NSE to provide the A1 and A2 echelon to the BG reduces the capacity of the NSE to create the necessary sustainment effects to support successful prosecution of mission tasks. It must be remembered that the NSE must not only support the BG but the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), the National Command Element (NCE) and other Canadian personnel within RC (S) and KABUL and must also support KAF-related tasks and duties within current capabilities and capacities.

The concept of support for Op MEDUSA was for all logistical support to be a national responsibility. Indeed, support from other nations was not readily available and national restrictions impeded cross-nation support. The overall logistics effort was coordinated by the HQ NSE. The NSE provided tactical and operational level support in theatre. Maximum use was made of host nation support agreements, mutual support arrangements and commercial contracting. The NSE distributed supplies to the BG from KAF or through existing local contracts (Jingle Trucks (JTs)). While deployed forward, the BG was supported by a forward support element (FSE), generated by the NSE, that provided centralized control and coordination of all logistical efforts. The FSE resupplied the BG through affiliated sub-unit echelons detached from the NSE and the NSE at KAF resupplied the FSE by combat logistics patrols (CLP). CLPs consisted of B Vehicles loaded with commodities escorted by force protection platoon operating in RG 31s. Further, the FSE coordinated the CLP delivery forward of combat supplies to forces not able to resupply out of the FSE due to terrain and LOCs. CLPs used existing routes to rendezvous with sub-units to cross load or hot seat/hot swap vehicles with supplies for empty trucks. Empty trucks were returned to KAF for reconstitution for the next delivery. So in essence the NSE generated four sub-unit echelons, an FSE, a daily CLP (sometimes twice a day) for pushing supplies forward and performed the second line function of a service battalion, all the while receiving and processing incoming stocks, equipment and personnel from Canada.

In terms of sustainment doctrine, the distribution policy is simply that material moves from the operational to the tactical level by the most direct route. The distribution system's goals should be responsiveness to the user, having enough flexibility to cater to changing conditions, and the economical use of facilities, transport, manpower, and other resources.<sup>2</sup> As we shall see this is not the case for TFA R2 during Op MEDUSA.

The NSE had the following capacity for building an echelon system for Op MEDUSA:

- ◆ Heavy Lift Vehicle Wheeled Material Handling Crane (HLVW MHC) x 12 (9 during the first 3 weeks of the Op. 3 were broken, i.e. vehicle off road [VOR] throughout).
- ◆ Heavy Lift Vehicle Wheeled Troop Carrying Vehicle HLVW TCV x 1.
- ◆ Trailer Forward Area Refueller (TFAR) 2500 L x 2 (one used for gas).

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- ◆ 7000 L FAR x 3 (1 was unarmoured and could not leave KAF).
  - ◆ 10000 L Refueller x 2.
  - ◆ Medium Lift Wheeled Vehicle (MLVW) x 2 (used for KAF duties).
  - ◆ Pallet Loading System (PLS) x 8 (4 were VOR throughout).
  - ◆ Heavy Mobile Repair Team (HMRT) x 4.
  - ◆ Bison Mobile Repair Team (MRT) x 3.
  - ◆ Bison Ancillary MRT x 2.

There were only 3 x Water Trailers in theatre (1 at the PRT for the kitchen, 1 in FOB MARTELLO for hygiene and 1 other) The BG did not have dedicated resources or personnel to build an echelon system. Indeed the sub-unit echelon consisted of the company, squadron or battery quartermaster (CQ/SQ/BQ) and usually one or two others without vehicles.

Within CSS doctrine, the fundamentals of sustainment include flexibility, economy, and cooperation.<sup>3</sup> Although the NSE exemplified these principles within its planning process in support of BG operations, limited resources and manpower reduced both the flexibility of CO NSE and CO BG in terms of manoeuvre. While supporting BG tasks, the NSE was forced to reduce support levels in other areas. For example, in order to provide the vehicles and crews to build sub-unit echelons and deploy a forward support element (FSE) to conduct command and control (C2), elements of the NSE at KAF were temporarily shut down. Specifically, reception and issue (R&I) and repair and disposal (R&D) were closed down in order to shift personnel around to accommodate tasks, while the task-fulfilling capacity of other sections was greatly reduced. Of course, this was also before manpower reductions due to special mission leave (SML/HLTA) occurred. As well as the burden of losing personnel to SML, NSE platoons lost their platoon commanders at various times as these people deployed individually to the FSE in order to coordinate support forward.

The two tenets of sustainment that are impacted upon by limited echelon resources are “forward supported” and “support not to hinder the commanders plan”.<sup>4</sup> Without the ability to generate a proper echelon system to support the BG forward, the NSE found itself pushing resources forward at the expense of other NSE tasks. Conversely, the current resource limitations in theatre can and do hinder commanders’ plans. During the planning for Op MEDUSA, BG planners developed four courses of action (COAs). Of those four COAs, one option was completely unsustainable from the NSE’s perspective, as the resources needed were not available. BG planners had preferred this COA over all others. During Op MEDUSA, call sign GRIZZLY 6 operating in support of the BG had to postpone his H Hour 12—24 hrs for a deliberate river crossing under fire when the parts for a Dozer could not be delivered forward due to a limitation in echelon resources. Parts were readily available but the resources to move it forward were not as they resided forward with sub-units.

The tactical level of replenishment, or integral support (IS), is the support available from unit resources. IS is accomplished through the echelon system.<sup>5</sup> The tactical replenishment system must be capable of delivery to the A Ech of the sub-unit.

Currently the BG has no integral resources or personnel to conduct tactical level replenishment. During Op MEDUSA the NSE had nine HLWV MHC vehicles of which six were pushed with NSE crews to the sub-units. The remaining three were used to push supplies forward to conduct nightly re-supply through distribution points (DP). This means that only three of five major sub-units received an echelon. As a minimum the



Each section in turn of Bravo Company of the Task Force 3-06 Battle Group (TF 3-06 BG) are getting their rations and water for the next 48 hours during a re-supply run at Patrol Base Wilson (PBW). The PBW is used as a staging area during OP MEDUSA.

sub-units needed four HLWV MHCs to hold and move supplies and the NSE would have needed all nine of their vehicles to push supplies forward. With these vehicles and crews in constant motion around the clock, traveling routes under the constant threat of attack by ambush or improvised explosive devices (IED), the stress on vehicles and crews was extremely high. Vehicle maintenance suffered due to the pace of operations. Further, the artillery battery had no echelon capability at all. Due to their deployment location (AMA ORTONA), they had a requirement to keep all commodities on wheels. Had they been attacked and forced to move, stocks on the ground would either have had to be blown in place or left behind for the enemy. An attempt was made to use pallet loading system (PLS) trucks from the United Kingdom, but this met with limited success due to distances, force protection issues and UK national issues.

IS also applies to repair and recovery. At the time of the operation the NSE did not have the resources to provide each manoeuvre sub-unit with a mobile repair team and maintain a robust maintenance capability in KAF. Further, during MEDUSA the FSE pushed forward with a maintenance team that could provide repair and recovery capability to the BG close to the forward edge of battle area (FEBA). This was a drain on NSE maintenance resources and could not be sustained beyond initial combat operations. Maintenance also includes the requirement for land communications and information systems (LCIS) technicians, fire control systems (FCS) technicians, and weapons technicians. Once SML started critical trades such as FCS were pulled from the sub-units and LCIS and Weapons techs were in short supply. There were not enough of these vital skills within the NSE to provide adequate coverage to all manoeuvre sub-units. At one point during the clearance of objectives, two of four LAVs tasked as the BG reserve became inoperative when their turret systems went down and could not be repaired for at least 48 hours. The one available FCS and LCIS technician worked around the clock at the exclusion of other vehicles. With a proper echelon system in place these stressors could have been reduced.





Members of 2<sup>nd</sup> platoon Bravo Company take position to storm a compound where Taliban are hiding. They will be moving as soon as the artillery is finished with their fire mission.

Close support or (CS) is the level that is provided at formation level to satisfy unit level demands. The unit's combat supplies are replenished by the maintenance load carried by supply and transport platoon (PI).<sup>6</sup> However, during this operation, trucks that would normally carry the maintenance load were detached to the BG for use as A1 and A2 ech. This limited the available lift resources for supply and transport PI to hold and deliver supplies forward. Further, the crews for these trucks were provided by the NSE. Once SML/HLTA started, combined with the requirement to undertake other NSE tasks on KAF, the availability of personnel to crew these vehicles dissipated. The BG had no capacity amongst its soldiers to crew these vehicles. Rifleman, sappers, gunners and LAV crews would have had to abandon their primary task in favour of crewing echelon vehicles. Frequently, attached vehicles would sit without crew and stationary while soldiers operated in their primary role. Soldiers in the companies that had the necessary qualifications to operate these trucks were generally more senior soldiers who were employed as LAV drivers and gunners. This shortage became even more critical when replacements came in for casualties. These replacements were brand-new soldiers, straight out of battle school and did not have driver qualifications of any sort, so they had to be employed as infantry. Therefore, those soldiers who could crew MHCs were required more than ever to drive and fight LAVs.

The basic load is the amount of supplies normally held by a unit (IS Level) and calculated as the requirement to sustain that unit in operations for a specific period of time without replenishment. Doctrinally, the normal holdings are a three-day basic load of combat supplies and 15 days of supply (DOS) of repair parts, general and technical stores.<sup>7</sup> Without lift capability permanently attached to the sub-units and the unit, then, flexibility in operations is restricted. The lack of an echelon system within the BG impedes its ability to hold the basic load. Constant regrouping must occur between the NSE and the BG to ensure that each sub-unit has some type of resource to carry the basic load. Since the current theatre holdings in terms of cargo trucks was limited, not



every sub-unit had vehicles to hold the basic load which hinders the sub-unit commander's scheme of manoeuvre. The artillery battery and even the ISTAR squadron did not have the ability to hold the basic load as they had no A1 or A2 echelon and nor did the NSE have vehicles or crews to provide this function. The manoeuvrability of the artillery battery and ISTAR squadron was limited due to the fact that their supply lines of communications were tenuous at best. Had these elements been cut off for an extended period of time, their ability to sustain themselves would have been questionable, with disastrous results in the offing.

Meanwhile, the maintenance load is the amount of supplies held on wheels at GS/CS level in either the independent brigade group CS service battalion (svc bn) or the division's DISGP transportation battalion to replenish the unit's basic load. It is normally one DOS of combat supplies.<sup>8</sup> In the absence of the CS svc bn, the NSE represents this function. First off, the NSE is neither designed nor resourced with the manpower or equipment to function as a svc bn. If the majority of the NSE's lift capability is detached to the BG, the NSE cannot hold the maintenance load on wheels ready to support the BG. By earmarking vehicles to hold the maintenance load, the NSE is limited or prevented in its ability to support its other dependencies such as the PRT or the NCE and KAF. Crucial vehicles would be tied up while other tasks fall by the wayside. This problem was compounded when the NSE took on greater tasks related to the operation of KAF and the loading and unloading of supplies, equipment and personnel from and to Canada. The NSE is just not configured to act as the GS battalion, the CS battalion, the administration company and five sub-unit echelons all at the same time.

The replenishment system must be designed to respond to the needs of the most forward combat forces, providing supplies and services when and where they are needed. Proper echeloning pushes sustainment forward. Unfortunately, neither the BG nor the NSE had sufficient vehicles and manpower to establish a proper echelon system. If all sub-units were given an echelon, the NSE would not have any resources left to



Combat Camera AR2006-G007-0122 8 September 2006 Zhanj District Center, Afghanistan

The crews of 29 and 29A getting ready to eat breakfast close to the front line just after Task Force Grizzly moved forward.



An American Chinook helicopter is landing just outside the wall of Patrol Base Wilson. The dust that was blown by the rotor covers completely the Patrol Base.

deliver supplies forward. Further, neither the BG nor the NSE had the manpower to crew all these vehicles.

Trailer forward area refuellers (TFARs) and water buffaloes may not seem an important piece of equipment but these two pieces would have been worth their weight in gold. They would enable sub-unit commanders to plan with greater freedom in terms of manoeuvre. As it was, all refuelling operations had to be conducted by MHC configured as a jerry can truck, or individual LAVs had to return to forward operating bases (FOBs) to refuel from forward area refuellers (FARs) and SWANs. Without a TFAR, sub-units are tied to FOBs. Reconfiguring MHCs is problematic when they are a scarce resource in the first place. Lacking water buffaloes, sub-units had no way of carrying bulk water. Sub-units were forced to rely upon deliveries of bottled water which took up valuable room on resupply trucks. Further, without bulk water for washing, hygiene became an issue when deployed away from a FOB for extended periods of time. Local water wells were generally unusable. This was compounded by a gastro intestinal virus that was transmitted by poor sanitary conditions. Soldiers became casualties due to the severity of the stomach illness and having a water buffalo on hand could have assisted in alleviating this problem by providing a washing capability.

## Comparison of Theatre Assets/Doctrinal Requirements

This chart depicts the current holdings by the BG sub-units, compares the doctrinal requirements for an A1 and A2 echelon and details the actual holdings of the NSE.<sup>9</sup> Note that current in-theatre assets are armoured HLVW MHC. However, due to the IED or ambush threat an echelon system should be mainly, but not exclusively, composed of armoured Bisons for force protection, flexibility and manoeuvre. The Army On-line Equipment Browser (OLEB) was consulted but it only depicts wire diagrams and does not go into specifics about vehicle holdings. Note the ISTAR squadron and the HSS company do not exist doctrinally.

Sub-unit	Current A1/A2 Ech	Doctrinal A1 Ech	Doctrinal A2 Ech <sup>10</sup>	NSE Resources Available for Sub-unit Ech
A Coy	1 x CQ 1 x 2IC 2 x Stmn 2 x MLVW 2 x ML Tlr Att MRT Att Amb	1 x Tn Sgt 5 x Cpl/Pte 2 x Ammo Veh 1 x POL Veh 2 x MRT 4 x Techs 1 x Amb 2 x Med Tech 2 x Cpl/Pte	1 x CQMS 7 x Cpl/Pte 4 x Vehicles for POL, Ammo, Baggage, Cbt Sups, Stores	2 x HLVW MHC with crew 1 x MRT
B Coy	1 x CQ 1 x 2IC 3 x Stmn 2 x MLVW Att MRT Att Amb	1 x Tn Sgt 5 x Cpl/Pte 2 x Ammo Veh 1 x POL Veh 2 x MRT 4 x Techs 1 x Amb 2 x Med Tech 2 x Cpl/Pte	1 x CQMS 7 x Cpl/Pte 4 x Vehicles for POL, Ammo, Baggage, Cbt Sups, Stores	2 x HLVW MHC with crew 1 x MRT
C Coy	1 x CQ 1 x 2IC 2 x Stmn 2 x MLVW Att MRT Att Amb	1 x Tn Sgt 5 x Cpl/Pte 2 x Ammo Veh 1 x POL Veh 2 x MRT 4 x Techs 1 x Amb 2 x Med Tech 2 x Cpl/Pte	1 x CQMS 7 x Cpl/Pte 4 x Vehicles for POL, Ammo, Baggage, Cbt Sups, Stores	2 x HLVW MHC with crew 1 x MRT
ISTAR Sqn	1 x CQ 2 x Stmn 1 x MLVW No MRT Aval Att AMB	No Doctrinal Model Aval	No Doctrinal Model Aval	1 x MRT
Engr Sqn	1 x CQ 2 x Stmn No vehicles No MRT Aval Att AMB	No Doctrinal Model Aval	No Doctrinal Model Aval	
HSS Coy	1 x CQ 1 x Stmn No vehicles No MRT Aval	No Doctrinal Model Aval	No Doctrinal Model Aval	

Arty Bty	1 x BQ 3 x Stmn No Vehicles No MRT Aval No Amb Aval	No Doctrinal Model Aval	No Doctrinal Model Aval	1 x Ancil MRT
TUAV Tp	1 x Stmn No vehicles No MRT Aval	No Doctrinal Model Aval	No Doctrinal Model Aval	
BG HQ	Shares ISTAR Sqn CQ and ML No MRT Aval	No Doctrinal Model Aval	No Doctrinal Model Aval	
Remarks		Doctrinal A1 Echelons are based upon Armd Bisons for mobility and force protection		NSE has a total of 12 x HLVW MHC aval for all ech tasks

## Recommendation

The recommendation is clear. The BG needs an echelon system that sustains it well forward and does not limit freedom of manoeuvre while at the same time alleviating the resource burden on the NSE.<sup>11</sup> In the absence of a deployed service support sub-unit integral to the BG, two courses of action to create a sustainable echelon system are recommended. The first COA would see the NSE holdings and personnel increased. The second COA would see the BG receive an increase in personnel and resources that would allow it to create its own echelon system. Due to limited CSS personnel in Canada, the first COA is not recommended. The second COA is more preferable as it provides the BG with greater freedom of movement and flexibility in terms of sub-unit and unit operations across a complex and expansive battle space.

The sub-units need vehicles robust enough to travel on gravel or dirt tracks as well as pavement. Echelon vehicles need to be capable of keeping up with LAVs on the move. Echelon vehicles need to have capacity to carry all the necessary commodities required to sustain combat forces for protracted periods of time (up to 53 days if necessary). Further, crews of these vehicles should primarily be drawn from the trade of the sub-unit. This would provide more depth in the sub-unit when it suffers casualties or loses personnel to SML/HLTA. This would also limit the draw on CSS personnel in Canada.

The increase would see the following delivered by CEFCOM to the BG:

Sub-unit	Personnel Increase	Vehicle Increase
A Coy	12 x Cpl/Pte (Inf) 2 x Veh Techs 1 x Wpns Tech 1 x FCS Tech 1 x LCIS Tech 2 x Med Tech	A1 Ech (1 x Ammo Veh, 1 x Cbt Sup Veh, 1 x POL Veh, 2 x MRT Vehicles, 1 x Bison Amb) A2 Ech (3 x Vehicles for POL, Ammo, Baggage, Cbt Sups, Stores, 1 x Water Trailer)

B Coy	12 x Cpl/Pte (Inf) 2 x Veh Techs 1 x Wpns Tech 1 x FCS Tech 1 x LCIS Tech 2 x Med Tech	A1 Ech (1 x Ammo Veh, 1 x Cbt Sup Veh, 1 x POL Veh, 2 x MRT Vehicles, 1 x Bison Amb) A2 Ech (3 x Vehicles for POL, Ammo, Baggage, Cbt Sups, Stores, 1 x Water Trailer)
C Coy	12 x Cpl/Pte (Inf) 2 x Veh Techs 1 x Wpns Tech 1 x FCS Tech 1 x LCIS Tech 2 x Med Tech	A1 Ech (1 x Ammo Veh, 1 x Cbt Sup Veh, 1 x POL Veh, 2 x MRT Vehicles, 1 x Bison Amb) A2 Ech (3 x Vehicles for POL, Ammo, Baggage, Cbt Sups, Stores, 1 x Water Trailer)
ISTAR Sqn	12 x Cpl/Pte (Armd/Inf) 2 x Veh Techs 1 x Wpns Tech 1 x FCS Tech 1 x LCIS Tech 2 x Med Tech	A1 Ech (1 x Ammo Veh, 1 x Cbt Sup Veh, 1 x POL Veh, 2 x MRT Vehicles, 1 x Bison Amb) A2 Ech (3 x Vehicles for POL, Ammo, Baggage, Cbt Sups, Stores, 1 x Water Trailer)
Engr Sqn	12 x Cpl/Pte (Engr) 2 x Veh Techs 1 x Wpns Tech 1 x FCS Tech 1 x LCIS Tech 2 x Med Tech	A1 Ech (1 x Ammo Veh, 1 x Cbt Sup Veh, 1 x POL Veh, 2 x MRT Vehicles, 1 x Bison Amb) A2 Ech (3 x Vehicles for POL, Ammo, Baggage, Cbt Sups, Stores, 1 x Water Trailer)
HSS Coy	4 x Cpl/Pte (Any)	2 x Stores/Baggage Veh
Arty Bty	14 x Cpl/Pte (Arty) 2 x Veh Techs 1 x Wpns Tech 1 x FCS Tech 1 x LCIS Tech 2 x Med Tech	A1 Ech (2 x Ammo Veh, 1 x Cbt Sup Veh, 1 x POL Veh, 2 x MRT Vehicles, 1 x Bison Amb) A2 Ech (3 x Vehicles for POL, Ammo, Baggage, Cbt Sups, Stores, 1 x Water Trailer)
TUAV Tp	1x WO/Sgt (Stores NCO) 4 x Cpl/Pte (Any)	1 x Ammo Veh, 1 x Stores/Baggage Veh



BG HQ	1 x WO (CQ) 1 x Sgt (Tn Sgt) 10 x Cpl/Pte (Inf) 2 x Med Tech  BG HQ needs its own CQMS staff and should not share with ISTAR	A1 Ech (1 x Ammo Veh 1 x POL Veh, 1 x Bison Amb) A2 Ech (3 x Vehicles for POL, Ammo, Baggage, Cbt Sups, Stores)
Remarks	Preferred trade is in accordance with (IAW) the parent sub-unit for commonalities	Preferred veh is armoured Bison in most cases for force protection and mobility in a complex and dangerous battle space. Note there must be a water trailer with each sub-unit given the medical and hygiene issues associated with extended deployments in austere conditions.

## Conclusion

The TFA R2 BG and NSE are attempting to conduct combat operations in an extremely complex and large battle space. The resources available now are not conducive to freedom of manoeuvre and flexibility, particularly in terms of planning and executing protracted operations. In order to empower both the CO of the BG and the CO of the NSE, an echelon system must be created and implemented in the BG. This problem was identified on TFA Roto 1. The Army acknowledges this formally in the ALLC Lessons Learned Report 06-032, which states that "Provision of a suitable A1 and A2 echelon (for IS) capability is essential in order to provide a component to each sub-unit deploying for COIN operations having long LOC."<sup>12</sup> Maintaining the status quo will only extend the problem and continue to limit the prosecution of combat operations across the area of operations and achieving Canadian mission goals.

It is imperative that at no time during Roto 2 did the BG run out of any commodity nor did it have to ration or restrict usage of commodities. At no time did the BG want for anything. The NSE performed miracles when it came to sustaining the BG. But at what cost? Convoys ran the gauntlet of ambushes and suicide bombers every day without rest. Crews wounded one day by suicide bombers were out literally days later running the same routes to bring supplies forward. The limited amount of vehicles suffered immense strain since dedicated maintenance could not be achieved as the vehicles were constantly on the move. Crews suffered higher levels of stress due to the increased tempo of operations. Had there been a cohesive echelon system, the NSE convoys could have been reduced and, consequently, casualties and threat to lives. Unfortunately the successes of the NSE soldiers leads to a false belief that this model is successful and should be continued. Referring back to an earlier comment made in this document about information operations, some will trumpet this model as a success, but at what cost?

## About the Author ...

Captain Parker is an infantry officer posted to the First Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment as 2IC Foxtrot Coy. He was deployed on Op ARCHER Roto 2, attach posted to the NSE


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as 2IC CSS Coy and the TF BG S4. He has completed a BA in Political Science and Philosophy at the University of Victoria, Victoria BC, and joined the Reserve Force in 1995 as a platoon commander. After completing infantry officer phase training he transferred to the Regular Force and was posted to 1 RCR in Petawawa. While with 1 RCR I was employed as a rifle platoon commander, Reconnaissance Platoon commander, 2IC Rifle Coy, Technical Adjutant and Training Officer. In 2004 he was employed as OC Echo Company and finally 2IC Foxtrot Coy. His previous operational experience includes a deployment to Kosovo in 1999 as the Reconnaissance Platoon commander. During Operation MEDUSA he commanded the first CSS forward support element to deploy forward in support of the BG on protracted combat operations.

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## Endnotes

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# THE THREE BLOCK WAR: ITS CAUSES, AND THE SHAPE OF THE PEACE

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Mr. Vincent J. Curtis

*Peace, Order, and Good Government*

From Section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

Three Block Wars (3BW) are a new kind of phenomenon in the history of conflict. They did not formally occur until the 1980s, when western militaries began to be used to assist humanitarian relief efforts in failed states. Such conflicts are especially political because of the diversity of aims and ambitions that prevail in the failed state and in the court of international opinion. The politics of combat is a dominating feature of 3BW, and impinges upon operations in the field.

The thesis of this paper is that a prolonged period of injustice in the failed state is a necessary precondition for 3BW, and that the final peace settlement lies in the establishment in the state of a just, limited government that is committed to the equal treatment of all citizens and the respect of all their natural rights, that rules with their consent and that possesses a monopoly of coercive force. It is for this very kind of settlement that the Canadian Forces (CF) are currently deployed in Afghanistan.

The 3BW is the kind of conflict in which the CF will be engaged well into the future.<sup>1</sup> It should, therefore, be useful to understand the causes of 3BW, and the peace settlement that the war ought to confirm. The peace settlement is the overriding aim of military operations in war, and understanding the ultimate aim can help the fighting soldiers and commanders navigate the political shoals of 3BW. The tactical commander has the force at his command to compel certain political arrangements and to forbid others in the area he controls, and is therefore in a position to ensure political development follows the proper course to the final settlement in view.<sup>2</sup>

Once the shape of the final settlement is reached, it becomes a matter of time for the settlement to become sufficiently well established that it resists corruption and reaction. Making the new political arrangements is often the easy part; resisting corruption and reaction is the difficult and time-consuming part of 3BW.

The paper will begin by defining what is meant by 3BW, and discover the corollaries that follow upon the definition. Then, following a review of the preliminary ethics, a description of the politics of states will show why a prolonged period of injustice can cause the collapse of the central government of a state, leading to 3BW and will also show the kind of government that is necessary to establish a lasting and just peace. The veracity of the theory connecting injustice to 3BW will be established through analysis of the most important examples of 3BW to date. Finally, what the foreign military forces involved in 3BW can do to promote a lasting peace is explored.

## The Three Block War

The paper that first described the concept of the Three Block War was published by General Charles C. Krulak in the Marine Magazine.<sup>3</sup> Krulak defined 3BW as *military operations other than war (OOTW) combined with a mid-intensity conflict*. Krulak believed that because of increasing urbanization, the conflicts of the future would require that military operations take place primarily in cities. He explained that in 3BW the entire spectrum of tactical challenges, ranging from humanitarian assistance, to peace-keeping, to traditional warfighting, can be encountered in the time frame of a few hours

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and within the space of three contiguous city blocks. Krulak holds that urban areas will likely be the “battlefield of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.”

Krulak listed Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti as examples of Three Block Wars. To that list may be added Iraq and Afghanistan. The crisis in Darfur, Sudan, could develop into a Three Block war if foreign militaries enter the country in force to bring about peace.

The proper rendering of Krulak’s definition is ‘a combination of mid-intensity conflict and OOTW’ because the essence of the phenomenon is combination—of war and something else. Because the essence of the total phenomenon is combination, the military aim in 3BW is ambiguous. In mid-intensity conflict, the military aim is to destroy the enemy; but the military aim of the something else is to bring peace by means other than combat. Only one component of 3BW is actual war; hence the conflicting aims of military operations.

Krulak’s definition of 3BW contains no necessity that it happens primarily in cities, even if he thinks it will. Nor must all three of the “blocks” actually be present for the war to be classed as 3BW, for peacekeeping and offensive military operations are themselves sufficient to meet Krulak’s definition of a Three Block War—OOTW combined with mid-intensity conflict. The likelihood indeed is great that disturbances to the civil peace will take place in cities because the complex terrain of cities provides opportunity for many kinds of partisan violence. But it is not necessary that cities become the “battlefield of the 21<sup>st</sup> century” for his theory of 3BW to hold.

As a rule, 3BW occurs within the territory of a single state after western militaries are sent into it. This is so because only western militaries and coalitions led by them are presently able to engage in OOTW and mid-intensity conflict at the same time; and it is the collapse of an individual state that brings calls for foreign militaries to intervene under colour of international law for the protection of humanitarian missions and for peacekeeping.

From the definition, 3BW does not formally begin until the foreign militaries engage in mid-intensity conflict with the militias in the failed state, because both mid-intensity conflict and OOTW must occur for an intervention to become 3BW. In addition, 3BW formally ends when one of the two components of the combination formally ends. It also follows that 3BW is engaged in at the choice of the foreign intervening power. 3BW is not forced upon it. *Choice* is the other necessary condition of 3BW.

Krulak’s nomenclature, “Three Block War,” can be retained as the name of the phenomenon even though the essence of it is combination, not war, because the name 3BW is well entrenched, and Krulak is not trying to establish a philosophical system, as many other military writers are apt to do. Krulak’s 3BW is a generalization of the intervention in the Somali civil war, the most famous incident of which was “Black Hawk Down.”

Full Spectrum Operations (FSO) is name of the operational content of 3BW that is provided by the Western militaries operating in the failed state. For the spectrum of operations to be truly “full,” it must include offensive operations—and the natural objects of the offensive operations are partisans. The object cannot be the organized military of the failed state for a state that can field an army against an invader is hardly “failed.” Offensive military operations not in support of some government are obviously purposeless.

From the list of examples of 3BW, a common libretto emerges. A prolonged period of injustice preceded the collapse of the central government. The injustice was the denial of the natural rights of large numbers of people within the state, including denial of political liberty, denial of equal treatment under law, and being subject to unauthorized



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acts of violence by the government. People were deprived of the economic conditions of a good human life. Though the oppression was general, the injustice exacerbated the natural divisions of the society along ethnic, religious, racial, tribal or other lines. The civil service and the judiciary became identified with and were corrupted by injustice by having to enforce it. The military was too weak or divided for a strongman to emerge and restore a kind of order and peace. An unexpected spark caused the central government to collapse, and the country dissolved in a welter of mistrust, hatred and competing factions. That history of injustice and the fear of more injustice underlay the fighting in the state that followed the collapse of the central government. Ordinary people everywhere want to live in peace, earn their daily bread and enjoy the pursuits of leisure such as the society they live in can afford. In the midst of chaos and incipient civil war, warlords who can offer these emerged and gained adherents: a leader for the times with a good program is followed. Foreign powers sent their militaries into the failed state to protect humanitarian assistance or to keep the peace generally, and involved them in the civil conflict.

A coalition of foreign states that sent their militaries into a situation such as this have a choice to make among four options:

- (1) they can allow the political situation to fester and merely ensure that the necessities of life are supplied to the people of the state;
- (2) they can support one faction or another and impose a despotism that at least brings about civil peace and a restoration of order;
- (3) use their own might to create and support a central government founded upon the principles of justice; or
- (4) withdraw.

A coalition employing FSO, by its definition, is embarked on course (2) or (3). The danger in following course (2) is that a new despotism is what results, and the civil peace will be disturbed through the use of unauthorized force against its rivals by the faction the coalition supports.

The aim of FSO in course (3) is to act in the interests of the common good of the society as a whole, and, ultimately, the common good between that society and the countries contributing to the coalition. FSO are undertaken in support of the newly established central government that is pledged to act justly, and against those who would thwart the coalition's will. Having adopted course (3), the coalition, in other words, acts in a manner befitting course (2).

Civilian Military Cooperation (CIMIC) operations are acts in support of the common good of the society of the failed state. Conceived properly, these ultimately serve the common good between the community and the coalition. CIMIC ops are not a necessary component of FSO for FSO as a whole to be in the interests of the common good. Mid-intensity combat itself is aimed at restoring and maintaining the civil peace and order of the society, and civil peace and order are the most important components of the common good.

## **The Ethical Basis of Politics**

No more eloquent and concise an expression of the relationship among ethics and politics, justice and war could be written than this passage from the American Declaration of Independence:

*We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these*

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*are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the Governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.*

In 1776, the American colonists were roused to rebellion at the imposition of a new tax. Wearying of the expenses of protecting the colonies with the Royal Navy and British army, the British House of Commons tried to get the colonists to help defray the costs their own defence. But the American colonists had no representatives in the House of Commons. Under Benjamin Franklin, the colonists had tried to get elected representatives sent to the House, but they were rebuffed. Thus the colonists were being subject to taxation and to changes in the law without consideration of their opinion and without their consent. Such a despotic state of affairs has been a cause of rebellion among the English since the barons forced King John to sign Magna Carta in 1215.

After the thirteen colonies secured their independence from Britain through war, and after a brief and unsuccessful period of governance by confederation, representatives from the colonies met in Philadelphia in 1787 to ordain and establish a new constitution "...in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity..."<sup>4</sup>

The sentiments of the Declaration of Independence, the causes of the American Revolution and the aims of the United States Constitution are not an expression of a cultural affectation peculiar to Americans, or to English speaking people generally. Resentment against despotism is common to human beings everywhere; the emergence of 3BW results from the explosion of these same sentiments in other countries and among other peoples in the context of the current structure of international relations and modern communications. Where American colonists shook themselves free from the despotism of British rule, 3BW occurs in countries that are already independent but were, nevertheless, governed by despotism, or worse. It is the aim of this section to show from the discipline of ethics, the real human need for governance by a political structure that meets the aims expressed in the preamble of the United States Constitution and of Section 91 of Canada's Constitution Act, 1867 (peace, order and good government); and why violent rebellion against despotism is justified.

The ethical demonstration begins with the observation that all people belong to the same biological species. Being members of the same biological species, they have the same biological properties, the same basic native capacities, the same dispositions and needs that are proper to a species. Their minds are essentially alike. The specific nature of all human beings is the same; the differences that obtain are superficial—differences in degree not in kind.<sup>5</sup>

Humankind has species-specific needs, some of which are shared with the lower animals and others that are unique to humans. All people need clean water, fresh food, health, shelter, sleep and pleasure; they also need freedom, love and friendship, honour or dignity within their society, knowledge, a modicum of wealth and civil peace. The goods that satisfy the natural needs of humans are called in ethics "real goods." Other goods, apparent goods, are things we want to possess because our possession of them we think will make our lives more enjoyable; but these wants are particular to individuals and possession of wants is not truly necessary for an individual to live well. All people have a natural right to the real goods that satisfy their species-specific needs—a natural

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right that all people possess equally because each individual human being is as human as any other human being. The differences that obtain between any two individual human beings, in attainments, in intelligence, in talents or in any other way are differences in degree, not in kind. This is the same as saying that despite differences in race, ethnicity, sex and religious beliefs individual human beings are equally human and therefore equally entitled to the real goods that human beings need to live well.

Real goods are also common goods because they are the same for all human beings, being responsive to needs inherent in the species-specific nature of human beings. There are two senses to the expression common good: common in the sense that it is the same for all individuals, and in the sense that all members of the community can participate in it. This latter sense of common good is referred to in the passage quoted from the U.S. Constitution as the general welfare, and the general welfare is what government is created to promote.

People naturally seek their own happiness. Ethics has refined our understanding of this human need to seek happiness as an ultimate end. "Happiness," ethically conceived, is not to be confused with a temporary state of psychological contentment that arises from a momentary satisfaction of needs. Happiness, ethically conceived, is a whole life well lived by the successive attainment of the really good things that a human being needs. Happiness is not a means to something else.

Associated with the ethical conception of happiness is the concept of the *totum bonum*. The *totum bonum* (or total good) are the real goods that people are supposed to seek over the course of a life well lived. The *totum bonum* is the complete good that leaves nothing more to be desired and is sought for its own sake and nothing else. The American Declaration of Independence refers to this human drive for the *totum bonum* as the pursuit of happiness.

Individuals are not able, by their own efforts, to obtain most of the goods of the *totum bonum*. Because humans are social creatures, they are able to cooperate with each other towards getting the common goods of the *totum bonum* they all seek and need individually. For example, one of the most basic of human needs that cannot be obtained by the effort of the individual alone is civil peace of the society in which they live. Civil peace is a common good; civil peace is a component of the general welfare of a well governed society. A government that protects the civil peace of society provides one of the most basic of human needs. Society and government are good because they are *means to a good end*. It follows that, if society and government fail to be means to a good end, they are worthless to the individual and they ought to be changed so that they become means to a good end.

## The Just State

In political philosophy, a state is defined as follows:

A state is an association of human beings—a community or society—that:

- (1) extends its membership beyond the bounds of consanguinity;
- (2) has autonomy or independence, and includes families, may include tribal or village communities and even includes subordinate political communities that are sometimes called "states;"
- (3) is populous enough and sufficiently advanced in technology to provide economic conditions of a good human life for some or all of its members;
- (4) aims or serves, in some measure of effectiveness, the good of the whole human life, again either for some or all of its members; and

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(5) through the institutions of the rule of law or constitutional government, provides the status of self-governing free people and equals for some or all of its members.<sup>6</sup>

Conditions (3), (4) and (5) are the important differentia for the 3BW because they pertain to the justice of the state, and 3BW occurs in states that are unjust for long periods of time. The justice of the state can be measured by the degree to which the common good of the state is offered to its members equally. Justice consists in treating equals equally, and injustice always involves the deprivation of some good. The struggle that can become 3BW begins when a substantial number of the members of the society, totally deprived of one or more natural rights, withdraw their consent to the form of government under which they lived because the injustice they suffer becomes intolerable. Bad economic conditions, while not necessary to the breakdown of the state, deprive the state of one of the values of its existence.

Government is different from the state. Government is the means by which society and the state make decisions and achieve the concerted action for the good commonly aimed at by the society. Building a highway system, an electrical grid, a system of publicly funded schools, a centralized system of potable water, sewage disposal, maintaining a monetary system and so forth would be impossible without the decisions and the concert of action that government brings to human endeavour. Government is also indispensable for the maintenance of peace within the community. Government provides rules to live by. Disagreements and conflicts inevitably arise about matters of public and private concern. Good government possesses the machinery to peacefully adjudicate disputes and the authorized force to implement the decisions of its tribunals if it is unable to persuade.

Governments can be classified by the injustices to which they are prone. Because it is in our nature to be free, the restraints that government imposes to regulate conduct ought to be as light a possible. The aim of government in this respect is to maximize simultaneously equality and freedom, with justice being the adjudicating criterion. Humans are by nature political, which means that being social and desiring freedom, people need to have a say in the rules under which they live lest they feel aggrieved by a sense of injustice. Hence, there is a distinction between *de facto* and *de jure* governments: the former designates the kinds of government that that are constituted and rule without consent in violation of the natural rights of the governed to be governed as free people and equals and rule by unauthorized force; the latter derive their authority from the consent of the governed and functions with their suffrage and participation.

There are three kinds of *de facto* government: despotism, tyranny and totalitarianism. Despotism commits the injustice of denying the governed the right to be treated as free people and equals, and therefore, to be governed with their consent and participation. Despotic government may be just in respect of some natural rights of man—to the possession of goods other than political liberty, to a decent minimum of economic goods and civil peace. To the degree to which despotism fall short of tyranny, despotism may have some tincture of justice because some rights are recognized. However, despotism always tends towards tyranny.

A tyranny differs from despotism in that the ruler operates to benefit himself at the expense of the governed. The governed are reduced to the status of slaves, the property of the tyrant. No rights of the citizens are respected. Though civil peace may appear to prevail in a tyranny, this is an illusion for the civil peace of society may be disturbed by the tyrant himself at any time. For example, Totalitarianism is the usurpation by government of powers that properly do not belong to it.

The kinds of *de jure* government may be classified as oligarchical republics and democratic republics. (Monarchical government in which the sovereign possesses no



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real political power, such as Canada and the United Kingdom, may be classed as one of these two.) An oligarchical republic is a form of constitutional government in which a large number, but by no means all, of the citizens are politically enfranchised. A member of the enfranchised class is able to vote and to hold public office. The oligarchy that controls the political life of the state may operate to the benefit of all, or may seek to exploit the political underclass for its own benefit. The United States prior to the abolition of slavery is an example of an oligarchical republic.

A democratic republic corrects the injustice inherent in oligarchy by extending the franchise to all or most of its citizens. Canada and the United States became democracies after women became politically enfranchised in the 1920s. True political equality for all did not obtain in the United States until the civil rights movement of the 1960s. It required nearly two hundred years for the aspirations and pledges of the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights to be completely fulfilled in fact in the United States, a testament to how difficult it can be to bring about true equality and justice even in a society that pledges those ideals.

While just, *de jure* government is not free from injustices. A *de jure* government can be unjust by exceeding its constituted authority. Attention is called to two specific cases that pertain to 3BW. (1) The application of unauthorized force by government is an act of violence that justifies violence in self-defence. By exceeding its authority to use force to sanction its laws and decisions and to maintain civil peace, government itself breaches that peace and warrants further violation of it. (2) The second case involves the use of deadly force. The right to life makes murder wrong. A *de jure* government might sanction unprovoked killing by its police officers or by its soldiers in the field on the ground that such action in the performance of their duties is not murder. This is not a position a *de jure* government can take, for in so doing, the government would be sanctioning murder and would exceed its authority by trespassing on a moral truth about which there can be no reasonable disagreement. Thus, excessive force and unjustified killing by its agents constitute acts of violence by the government, are breaches of the civil peace, and justify violence in self-defence.

A third way a *de jure* government can be unjust is by failing to provide a means for citizens to resist injustice by the government and to enable citizens to alter or reform the laws and the government itself if necessary in order to rectify wrongs the government commits. People have right of redress of grievance. A minority has a right to protection against the tyranny of the majority. Without a juridical means of resistance and redress, as well as a juridical means to rectify injustices in the constitution itself, citizens acting in defence of their natural rights have no course open to them except violence, and with it the loss of civil peace. When juridical means are available, people can defend their rights by means of peaceful dissent and civil disobedience. If that is not available, the only means people have to defend their rights is violence, and violence amounts to a withdrawal of their consent to government.

The coercive force that government uses to compel obedience can be either authorized or unauthorized. Coercive force is authorized when it is used to implement the regulations and decisions that the government has the right to make. When coercive force is employed without right, as when a government exceeds its authority and tries to enforce compliance with rules or decisions it is not authorized to make, that unauthorized force is violence. Authorized force can belong to government alone, and therefore government ought to have a monopoly of coercive force in the state. This does not mean that government always will have a monopoly of force, and a private militia may challenge the force a government can muster. This is why private militias are intolerable in a just state—justice cannot be enforced against them if they refuse to be persuaded and the force the private militias use is unauthorized. (*De facto* government by its nature

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has no authorization to make law or to apply authorized coercive force because it rules without consent.)

In a society torn by civil war, absent the belief in the inherent equality of all human beings and of equal justice for all, the creation of a government truly just in fact will be difficult to achieve. The operation of just government is easily impaired because in the midst of civil war the government lacks the monopoly of coercive force that only just government ought to have. A coalition engaged in FSO is committed to gaining for the new government the monopoly of force a just government ought to have. The coalition is therefore morally committed to ensuring that the government it defends is just, for otherwise it fights for the imposition of injustice upon a society that is in rebellion against injustice.

## **Application of the Theory to Specific Cases of Three Block War**

The aim of this section is to apply the theory elaborated above to specific examples of 3BW to establish that the theory can properly account for the phenomenon. The specific cases that will be examined are: Yugoslavia, Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq and the Sudan.

**Yugoslavia.**<sup>7</sup> Yugoslavia was created by the Versailles Conference in 1918 by amalgamating Serbia with remnants of the defunct Austro-Hungarian Empire. Conceived as a 'Greater Serbia' in reward for Serbia's services to the allied cause in the Great War, Yugoslavia was ruled as a kingdom until conquered by Nazi Germany in 1941. After a nasty guerrilla war, Josip Broz Tito, a Croat, emerged in control of the country at the head of the communist guerrilla force in 1945. Tito ruled as dictator until his death in 1980, and the Communist Party continued to rule the country without his charismatic leadership until the collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe. Lacking the external pressure of the Soviet Empire, Yugoslavia began to break up, each ethnic group carving out for itself an ethnically pure homeland. An economic crisis that preceded the break-up became a humanitarian crisis from the violence, uncertainty and the shifting of the populations. Foreign forces intervened in Bosnia to put a stop to the violence, to assist with humanitarian relief, and eventually engaged in mid-intensity fighting. Fourteen years after Yugoslavia began to disintegrate, Montenegro separated from Serbia, and the break-up of Yugoslavia became complete; only the status of Kosovo needs to be decided. It is fair to say that the war is now over.

Never in its history did Yugoslavia really form a single community or society that was ruled by limited, constitutional government with the consent of the governed. The totalitarian communist dictatorship could not make *with the consent of the governed* the kinds of political adjustments necessary to ease ethnic tensions, promote the ideal of equality of all regardless of ethnicity and cultivate a single cohesive society. Yugoslavia was not a "community or society" at the moment when the governed were finally free to make political choices for themselves. The moment it became clear that international recognition would attend the creation of an ethnic homeland, and that Serbia alone was not strong enough to impose national unity by force, the fate of Yugoslavia was sealed.

Although ethnic cleansing, which is defined as the enforced separation of ethnicities into ethnic enclaves, was unjust, it did create countries in which civil peace and the justice of equality did prevail. The members of the ethnic society were equal in the sense they were all possessed of the same ethnicity, and ethnic tensions abated with the expulsion of those not belonging to the ethnic group. The inability of the new states to provide the means of subsistence for its members (condition 3 of the definition of the state) was made up by humanitarian assistance.

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Thus a country that was a state in name only broke up and in its place came several smaller states in which the justice of equal treatment, civil peace and order did obtain. The Dayton Accords created two ethnically based sub-states within the framework of an over-arching Bosnian republic.

**Somalia.** Somalia was created in 1962 by the amalgamation of British and Italian Somaliland. A General, Mohammed Siad Barre, seized power in a coup in 1969 and ruled the country as a tyrant until 1991, when his dictatorship was overthrown by insurgent forces. War lords emerged and struggled to seize power. A humanitarian crisis ensued in the chaos, and war lords interfered with relief efforts because of the political advantage to be gained by controlling of the food supply. Foreign militaries intervened to protect the relief efforts and became embroiled in the conflict, the most famous incident of which was "Black Hawk Down." That intervention ended in 1995, and with it, the formal period of 3BW.

No leadership group has to date gathered the military strength or the trust of the people of Somalia that would enable the formation of a national government in fact, not just name. As many as four separate republics have proclaimed themselves over portions of Somali territory, none officially recognized. It is notable that these governments as well as many minor warlords offer civil peace and order over the regions they govern. Recently, an amalgamation of extremist Muslim groups calling themselves the Islamic Courts Council (ICC) and proclaiming Sharia law as their policy, seized control of the old capital of Mogadishu. A vicious imposition of Islamic rule cannot be the basis of *de jure* government. Non-Muslims will resist with either fight or flight, and the success of this group in forming a nation-wide government of Somalia depends upon force, not persuasion.

In late December, 2006, as forces loyal to the ICC seemed on the crest of victory, Ethiopia intervened in the conflict with about 4,000 troops. In four days, the ICC forces were utterly routed and the leadership of the ICC made haste out of the country. Those ICC "fighters" who did not throw away their weapons returned to their former role as defenders of their clans and neighbourhoods. The Ethiopian intervention showed that the appeal of the ICC lay not in their program of Sharia law and harsh Muslim rule, but that they appeared to be a force strong enough to bring a kind of law and order to Somalia. When contact with the organized military of Ethiopia proved that an even stronger organizing force existed in Somalia, support for the ICC disappeared. By fleeing the country, the leadership of the ICC revealed that they were neither Somali patriots nor devout Muslims but rather political opportunists.

**Afghanistan.** Afghanistan was created in 1747 by Ahmend Shah Durrani through the unification of the Pashtun tribes. A brief experiment in democracy ended in a coup in 1973, and was followed in 1978 by a communist counter-coup. The Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan in 1979 to support the communist dictatorship which was about to collapse. It withdrew ten years later. A civil war erupted between mujahedin factions following the fall of the communist regime in 1992. The Taliban, a hard-line Pakistani-sponsored movement, emerged in 1994 and ended the country's civil war and anarchy, except for a small part of the of the northern region in 1998. With the help of the United States military, the Northern Alliance overthrew the Taliban regime in 2001, and a democratic process was created for the political reconstruction of the country. As of this writing, a new constitution has been adopted, a president elected, and a national legislature inaugurated. Nevertheless, the Taliban continues to operate in Afghanistan, and western militaries, including Canada's, are engaged in offensive operations aimed at destroying the Taliban's military forces, and in peacekeeping operations aimed at protecting the fledging government and the civil population from Taliban violence. The Taliban aims at re-imposing a vicious conception of Islam upon the country.

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The fundamental problems for Afghanistan lie in its poverty and in the political appeal of Islam, which denies the equality and the natural rights of all human beings. Condition (3) of the definition of the state requires that a state must be able to provide the economic conditions for a good human life for some or all of its members. Afghanistan is poor, and relies on the illicit drug trade for much of the foreign exchange it needs to make its way in the world. At the insistence of its Western backers, the new central government opposes the drug trade, and that opposition places it at odds with the economic well-being of many of its citizens. Significantly, the Taliban did not disturb the drug trade when it held power despite the strictures of the faith it professes to believe.

Islam does not clearly and sharply distinguish between religion and politics.<sup>8</sup> Proclaiming one code of law for the regulation of human affairs, Islam holds that religion and politics are not really different. The beliefs of the religion are the polity of the state.

The religious tenets of Islam inform the political outlook of Muslims, and these religious tenets do not recognize Muslims on the one hand and infidels, apostates and non-believers (as they are called) on the other, as equals in the eyes of the law, or for that matter, Muslim men and Muslim women as equal in the eyes of the law. Since the Taliban appeal to the Islamic preconceptions of Afghans, and the new political leadership, supported by western, traditionally Christian countries has to uphold a contrary view, the Taliban continue to command support throughout the country despite their record of self-indulgence, viciousness and brutal repression when they held power. Rapidly improving economic conditions would enhance the standing of the new government.

**Iraq.** Iraq was carved out of the Ottoman Empire that collapsed at the end of the First World War. Starting as a League of Nations mandate under UK administration, Iraq attained the status of an independent kingdom in 1932. The kingdom was overthrown and a republic proclaimed in 1958. The country was ruled by a series of strongmen, the last of which was Saddam Hussein. The country was ruled by the Baath party for thirty-five years and under Saddam for the last twenty-five of those. When coalition forces invaded an Iraq weakened by thirteen years of ruinous economic sanctions, and overthrew the regime of Saddam Hussein, the central government of Iraq, completely dominated by the Baath party, utterly dissolved. There was no one to whom the coalition forces could hand over political control of the country. Rather than see Iraq collapse into chaos, the coalition created a temporary governing authority with the aim of building a constitutional democracy. For a while, Iraqis saw their central government change from a tyranny to a despotism run by foreigners.

The invasion did not create the bad blood that filled Iraq, but it did release it and since the invasion Iraq has been engulfed in nihilistic violence. Though no humanitarian crisis gripped Iraq, coalition forces have been engaged in peacekeeping operations aimed at stopping sectarian violence; and in offensive military operations aimed at destroying organized and militarily powerful resistance forces that disrupt the civil peace in order to bring down the government that emerged under coalition protection. The most serious criticism of the new government of Iraq is its inability to bring about the conditions of civil peace.

Iraqi society tolerates the pathology of revenge and honour killings (i.e. murder), and so there is lacking a useful restraint on violence in that country. Overlying the domestic causes, Iraq is surrounded by countries that have a strategic interest in stoking and spreading the violence in Iraq, and they have provided money, technical support and manpower towards that end. Not enough trust yet exists in Iraq for the Sunni minority to believe that the new government running Iraq will not use the power of government to take murderous revenge against them, for it was upon the Sunnis that Saddam relied



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largely for his support. Private militias have infiltrated the police forces and the cover of government authority is commonly used as a trick to abduct, torture and murder rivals and enemies. The government of Iraq lacks the monopoly of coercive force that was enjoyed and wrongfully exploited by the Saddam regime. Fearing the new political order, Sunnis and former Baathists seek to undermine the new government by continually disturbing the civil peace, one of the most fundamental benefits of government. The social pathologies of Iraq and the facilitation of violence by foreign powers will make the restoration of civil peace difficult for the new government. Nevertheless, the only way forward for a united Iraq is under a government committed to equal treatment for all under the law, to freedom and to democracy. The emergence of a religious or military leader might bring about a civil peace of the kind experienced under despotism, but he would eventually return Iraq to a tyranny similar to life under Saddam Hussein. In other words, the murderous violence in Iraq would be more targeted, less random and less destructive of infrastructure.

**Sudan.** Sudan is an old country, dating from the time of ancient Egypt. It emerged most recently as an independent country in 1956, and military regimes favouring Islamic-oriented governments have dominated national politics. Sudan was embroiled in two prolonged civil wars, one starting in 1972, followed by the other starting in 1983 and still ongoing. These conflicts were rooted in northern economic, political and social domination of largely non-Muslim, non-Arab southern Sudanese. To date, no western militaries are operating in Sudan. If they were, they would face a humanitarian crisis and would have to engage in peacekeeping and offensive military operations to end the armed violence and protect the civil population.

The crisis in Sudan is brought about because a large segment of Sudanese society believes that all human beings are not created equal. Some human beings are made to be exploited; they are lesser human beings because they are Christian or are black. When beliefs like these are combined with coercion, the exploited can either submit or resist with violence themselves. And the exploited are fully justified in meeting violence with violence. Sudan will be a state in name only until equal treatment under law becomes fact, the government of Sudan promotes the general welfare for all its citizens and the coercive power of government is not used or withheld as a means of imposing a vicious Islamic rule.

**Sharia Law.** Sharia law needs to be discussed because its imposition is a past, present and future stimulus of 3BW. Sharia is a body of law that was elaborated by Islamic scholars from the sacred and immutable texts of Islam. Beginning with Iran and Pakistan, "Islamic republics" have sprung up throughout the Islamic world claiming to be guided by Sharia law. Radical Islamic movements are pushing the adoption of Sharia law beyond the Islamic world.

Sharia law can never be the basis of law in a *de jure* government or constitutional republic. For law to be *de jure* it has to be enacted in the prescribed constitutional manner by the duly chosen representatives of the politically enfranchised members of the society. In addition, the law has to be amendable in a similar manner. Because Sharia is divinely ordained law elaborated by scholars, it was not enacted by human representatives and cannot be amended by them. Sharia law thus fails a crucial test necessary for a law to be accepted as *de jure*.

Sharia fails a second crucial test of justice. Sharia does not treat people equally before the law. Sharia law divides people into classes of worthiness. In declining order of importance, these are:

- (1) Muslim males;

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- (2) Muslim females;
  - (3) Christian and Jewish males;
  - (4) Christian and Jewish females;
  - (5) people not “of the book.”

Sharia law is capable of adjudicating disputes justly among Muslim males and among Muslim females. But Sharia cannot adjudicate justly between a Muslim male and a Muslim female because of the differing legal status it holds between the sexes. Moreover, Sharia, being a product of the Muslim faith, offers very little to Christians, Jews, and people “not of the book.” In a country that is 99% Muslim, the fundamental injustice of Sharia law may not be readily apparent. But behind every application of Sharia law is a cleric who is answerable to no one, but who conceives himself to be the conduit of divine justice. These are not the conditions for *de jure* government—even in a Muslim country. Since injustice is an underlying cause of 3BW, the nations that are helping to rebuild a state shattered by injustice have to be on their guard against the vicious imposition of Sharia law, regardless of how democratically Sharia may at first appear to have been adopted.

**The Ethnocentric Predicament.** Existentialists, sociologists and cultural anthropologists hold that objective judgments about cultures are impossible.<sup>9</sup> These theorists say that any judgment we make about a culture other than our own will assume the soundness and validity or the mores and values of our own society or culture as premises in the value judgment. They would hold that the criticism made here of the use of Sharia as the basis for law in a democratic republic and the description of certain practices in Iraq as social pathologies, as expressions of the prejudices inherent in the ethnocentric predicament. Indeed, the holding of the democratic republic as the most just state and therefore, an ideal for which to aim, would also be held by them as an expression of a western cultural prejudice.

The ethnocentric predicament of different value systems might hold water if all value systems were relative. But the ethics and value system elaborated above was founded upon the proposition that all human beings, belonging to the same biological species, were essentially alike, differing only superficially in degree of characteristic human traits. It based nothing on race, religion, cultural characteristics or the society in which an individual happened to be born. Consequently, it provides a standard above the value systems of diverse human cultures. It is universally applicable because it is founded upon what is present in all societies and cultures—human beings and the sameness of specific human nature.

Since this standard rises above the cultural, it is possible to judge objectively a society or culture as good or bad, better or worse. One can judge objectively that one system of government is better than another by the justice inherent in that system. One can judge objectively whether a culture or society is good or bad or has made progress or not by the degree to which that culture or society allows its members to make a really good life for themselves, and the degree to which it helps some or all of members in their pursuit of happiness. And one can judge a society or culture to be bad to the degree to which it prevents or interferes with the pursuit of happiness by some or all of its members.

If the ethnocentric predicament were true there would be no basis for criticism of the barbaric practices of female circumcision, suttee, honour killings, human sacrifices, child labour, slavery and cannibalism, to name a few. It is precisely because we know what is good or bad for ourselves that we are able to judge what is probably good or bad for others.

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## Analysis

In all the examples of 3BW, actual and potential, cited above, not one of the countries experienced anything like a modern political democracy in its history, except for the brief period of Afghanistan before 1973. The common element is the denial of the members of the society of enfranchisement, of the right to have a say in the making of laws and the decisions under which they live and in the choosing of a government. Such denial, combined with economic conditions that failed to provide the means for a good human life, created awful political and social conditions within the country. The machinery of government was compromised by being too closely identified with the government whose despotic acts it enforced, and became corrupted under the prolonged regime of injustice. When the central government collapsed, the entire machinery of the state collapsed with it. Without a government and the machinery of the state to regulate private and public affairs in the state, civil war broke out and a humanitarian crisis ensued in some cases. In the case of Yugoslavia, the mismanagement of the economy by the totalitarian regime caused a humanitarian crisis that actually preceded the collapse of government. In a democracy, political pressure is relieved by replacing the government; in despotism relief is gained by overthrowing the government.

The restoration of peace requires the creation of a new government and new machinery through which government guides and regulates private and public affairs. The creation is the easy part; finding the leadership for the new government to be conceded that monopoly of coercive force a just government ought to have, to rebuild the state machinery so that the government can function smoothly and actually provide for the general welfare, and to overcome reaction and resist corruption, is the hard part. Overcoming pathologies in the society can be time-consuming: the United States required nearly two hundred years for the pledges of its Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights to be made good in fact.

When western militaries intervene in a failed state to restore order and bring about civil peace, they must cooperate with the society to establish a new government. That new government can be either just or unjust, depending on whether it functions with the consent and the participation of the governed. Imposing a despot is futile in a 3BW environment because the despot lacks the resources to enforce his rule, and he will rely on the coalition for his support. Thus, as a practical matter and as a matter of moral obligation, the coalition has to act as mid-wife to a just form of government.

Why are western countries like Canada morally obligated? The people of Canada have a right to expect that if Canadian blood is to be shed and Canadian treasure is to be expended for the benefit of some foreign country, it has to be for a good cause; and the imposition of an unjust government does not measure up to the standard of a good cause. Besides, and in respect of the Canadian blood shed, to impose an unjust form of government is also futile; unjust governments are unstable.<sup>10</sup>

Just government can be imposed successfully upon countries that have never known western culture. General Douglas MacArthur imposed a constitutional democracy on Japan, which before him was practically feudal in its politics. Referring back to the conditions necessary for a just state, we can see that by forcing conditions (4) and (5) upon Japanese society and helped by an economic revival that ensured that condition (3) was met, MacArthur advanced the Japanese political culture five hundred years in five. The political stability of Japanese democracy, as well as of the democracies of South Korea and Taiwan, demonstrates the innate *human* need for justice and equal treatment. Germany, the newly free states of Eastern Europe, Spain, Portugal and South Africa, are other examples of countries adapting quickly to the idea

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of political democracy. It is a sign of pathology for a society to resist, in today's world, a truly just form of government.

One tried and true method for ensuring that a government that is supported by a coalition acts in the best interests of all the people is indirect rule. Indirect rule was the method by which the British ruled India for three hundred years and which Col Collins employed briefly in Iraq. In a 3BW case, indirect rule means that a coalition political officer, preferably a commander, ensures that right be done by the government that the coalition supports. If the leadership who rely on coalition support fail to do right and refuse to reform, they are replaced. This is not a disguised form of despotism, but an assurance of justice; and justice is the common good aimed at by the coalition and needed by ordinary people of the society.

Indirect rule is justifiable in a 3BW situation. If a foreign coalition fails to actively ensure that the government it supports does right, it may appear to support the unjust acts of a central government that rests on the strength of foreign bayonets, coalition bayonets. FSO aims at the common good of the society and of the coalition. FSO makes war upon those who would thwart the coalition's will, and these may include people who misuse the power they obtained under the coalition's protection. FSO aims at establishing order and maintaining the civil peace, and the coalition countries benefit from that peace and order. If a political officer is vigilant in his duty of ensuring good government, failures and injustices remain small and correctible.

### **Civilian Military Cooperation, Full Spectrum Operations, and the Common Good**

CIMIC operations, defined here as the building of infrastructure by or with the aid of the coalition military, are a direct contribution to the common good of the community. CIMIC ops are what a government is supposed to do. As such, the CIMIC projects are natural objects for destruction by the militias opposed to the government that is supported by the coalition. A good thing from one competitor cannot be allowed to stand by another. Resentment from the destruction of a CIMIC project does not always occur in the community if the project is seen as a gift which the local community had no investment in producing; or as a bribe for support. The good thing was not produced by their government and their labour. CIMIC projects can lead to a sense of entitlement on the part of locals, or to a belief that CIMIC projects are a kind of atonement by western powers for the injustice of their possessing great wealth.

To alleviate these perceptions, the common good of the projects need to be emphasized: common in the sense of the local community and of the foreign military power. The well is dug for the benefit in the first place of the foreign troops when they pass through the town, and secondarily the locals. Roads and bridges are built in the first instance to suit the military needs of the coalition, and secondarily they benefit the locals. The military benefit of schools is that they keep children off the streets and out of the way of military operations. Projects that do not benefit in some way the coalition, such as reconstruction after a battle, should be the responsibility of the new government. A common good is obtained by the cooperation of parties, and destruction of an element of the common good is suggestive of a failure to cooperate with the coalition, and of a desire to thwart coalition will.

The common good of the state and the foreign military power is also found in FSO. By assisting in the creation of a just and therefore stable government, Canada benefits by not being attacked or seeing its allies attacked using the state as a base and by the general benefit of peace in the world. Foreign interventions are always subject to suspicion of ulterior motive, for no country sheds its own blood and treasure to benefit

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strangers. The common good that obtains from the intervention supplies a good ulterior motive. From such an ulterior motive actions that defeat the common good between the society and the coalition are logically seen as a failure to cooperate on the part of those the coalition tries to help, and those are the people against whom FSO is directed.

Countries that send their militaries into foreign countries for FSO are not expected to do so out of love, and should not expect gratitude in return. The shedding of blood requires that a national interest be at stake, and that national interest is a common good between that nation and the society of the failed state. Pure humanitarian operations, such as the relief of areas of Indonesia devastated by the 2004 tsunami, are understood as a benefit conferred by one country on another out of friendship. Peacekeeping is seen as a duty a nation performs to the common good of the world. FSO is of an altogether different order, and is not done out of love, friendship, duty to the world or desire for gratitude. The war component of 3BW is made upon those who would thwart a nation's will.

## Summary of Findings

- ◆ 3BW is a combination of mid-intensity conflict and OOTW, such as peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance. 3BW are presently waged by western militaries and coalitions led by them because it is only western militaries that, at present, are able to engage in mid-intensity conflict and OOTW at the same time. Because the essence of 3BW is combination, the military aim is ambiguous: the destruction of the enemy in mid-intensity combat, and providing for the general welfare of the society by means other than combat. FSO is the operational content of 3BW supplied by the Western power that chooses to become involved in the conflict.
- ◆ 3BW occurs within the territory of a single state, the central government of which collapsed. It formally begins after foreign powers choose to intervene to reduce suffering, and then embroil themselves in the civil conflict. 3BW formally ends when the foreign powers cease FSO.
- ◆ The collapse of the central government of the state is invariably preceded by a prolonged period of injustice against a substantial segment of the population of the state. Bad economic conditions that affect the well-being of most of society add to the political pressure. Having to support the injustice—a denial of natural human rights—corrupts the civil service and the judiciary of the state. The prolonged injustice of despotism creates mistrust and hatred among the ethnic, religious, racial or other divisions of the society. The climate of mistrust and the existence of militias make it nearly impossible for a new central government to emerge that possesses a monopoly of coercive force, whether authorized or not.
- ◆ The reference “full” in Full Spectrum Operations means that offensive military operations are able to be carried out. The offensive military operations are aimed at those who would thwart the will of the foreign power intervening in the conflict.
- ◆ 3BW is waged by foreign militaries in support of a new central government of the state constructed, if not by them, under their protection. Mid-intensity conflict waged not with the aim of supporting a new government is aimless.
- ◆ The ethical and political explanation for a nascent 3BW is found in the second paragraph of the American Declaration of Independence.
- ◆ The ultimate aim of FSO is to bring about peace, order, and good government in the failed state.
- ◆ Suspicion about the further misuse of government power, such as acts of unau-



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thorized violence, by one ethnic, religious, tribal, racial or other division of the society against another undermines the cooperation necessary to form a new central government. Good leadership is indispensable in overcoming these suspicions and divisions.

◆ Ordinary people everywhere want to live in peace, be able to earn their daily bread, and enjoy such pursuits of leisure as the society they live in can afford. In the midst of chaos and civil war, a warlord who can offer these will gain adherents. Leadership for the times with a good program is followed.

◆ FSO is undertaken by a western country for the common benefit of itself and the society of the failed state. Because common goods are acquired by cooperation, actions against the common good imply a failure to cooperate with the coalition, and represent an effort to thwart its will. The same applies to the goods of CIMIC operations. Cooperation with the coalition means civil peace, order, equal treatment and just government for the society.

◆ It is one thing to establish a new government under the protection of foreign militaries; it is another to protect it from corruption and reaction, especially in old societies. The United States required nearly two hundred years to fully meet the pledges of the Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights in fact. Western countries engaged in FSO should not expect to wait that long before requiring the new government and its leadership stand on their own.

◆ Any kind of unjust government is unstable, and to impose an unjust form of government is ultimately futile. The people of Canada have a right to expect that if Canadian blood is to be shed and Canadian treasure is to be expended for the benefit of a foreign country, it has to be in a good cause and ought also to bring some benefit to Canada. The imposition of an unjust government does not measure up to the standard of a good cause.

◆ States and governments are means to a good end, the common good that society can provide to its individual members. Chief among these goods is civil peace. The absence of central government means that civil peace cannot be protected, and a state of war and chaos inevitably erupts in a society where the government has collapsed. Although particular states, forms of government and political regimes come to be and pass away, the state *as such* and government *as such* will continue to exist so long as human beings have need for civil peace and other elements of the common good, which is to say, so long as the species survives. Contrary to what some military writers say today, the natural direction of human political progress is, if anything, towards world government, not towards chaos and a permanent state of low intensity conflict.

◆ Indirect rule is justifiable and sometimes necessary in a 3BW situation. It is justifiable on the grounds that if foreign militaries fail to actively ensure that the new government does right, they may appear to support the unjust acts of a central government that rests on the strength of their bayonets. FSO aims at the common good of the society and of the western countries, and the coalition force has a stake in the common effort to create just government. FSO makes war upon those who would thwart the coalition's will to provide good government, and that may have to include people who misuse the power they obtained under the coalition's protection.

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
## About the Author ...

Vincent Curtis is an independent scholar and writer, and a regular contributor on theory and strategy of warfare to the Canadian Army Journal.

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## Endnotes

1. Comments by then MGen Andrew Leslie to the Couchiching Conference of 2005 indicate that the Canadian Forces will be fighting in Afghanistan for twenty years.
2. Tim Collins *Rules of Engagement* Headline Press, London 2005. Chapters 8-19 are especially useful as they show how Col Collins handed the politics of the areas he controlled during the Iraq war of 2003 and used the force at his command to oblige the local government to look after the common good of the community instead of allowing factions to use the powers of government to take revenge on rivals.
3. Gen. Charles C. Krulak "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War." *Marines Magazine*, Jan. 1999.
4. Preamble to the Constitution of the United States.
5. For a full philosophical exposition and defence of the ethics elaborated here, the reader is referred to: Mortimer J. Adler *The Time of Our Lives* Fordham University Press, 1996. A common man version of the ethics is contained in: Mortimer J. Adler *Desires: Right and Wrong* Maxwell-MacMillan Canada, 1991.
6. Mortimer J. Adler *The Common Sense of Politics* Fordham University Press, 1971.
7. These thumbnail sketches of states are made with information drawn from the CIA World Fact Book.
8. Bernard Lewis *What Went Wrong?* Oxford University Press, 2002. See p 53 and 82-96
9. Adler *Common Sense of Politics* Loc cit.
10. Tyrannies and despotisms will adopt a policy of hostility against the west as a means of diverting attention from the injustice their people are suffering. See Natan Sharansky's *The Case for Democracy*, published by This is not parallel. I think the section needs an introduction that separates it from the above country examples.



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# TEACHING CANADA'S INDIGENOUS SOVEREIGNTY SOLDIERS ... AND VICE VERSA: "LESSONS LEARNED" FROM RANGER INSTRUCTORS<sup>1</sup>

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Dr. P. Whitney Lackenbauer

For sixty years, the Canadian Rangers have served as the "eyes and ears" of the armed forces in remote areas, providing a military presence in isolated, northern and coastal regions of the country that cannot be practically or economically covered by other elements of the Canadian Forces (CF). As non-commissioned members of the CF Reserve, these lightly-armed and equipped volunteers hold themselves in readiness for service but are not required to undergo annual training. Their unique military footprint in coastal and northern Canada, managed on a community level, draws on the indigenous knowledge of its members, rather than "militarizing" and conditioning them through typical military training regimes and structures. The Rangers represent a flexible, inexpensive and culturally inclusive means of "showing the flag" and asserting Canadian sovereignty in remote regions.<sup>2</sup> There are currently 4000 Rangers in 168 patrols across the country, from Newfoundland to Ellesmere Island to Vancouver Island, making them a truly national force. Aboriginal people make up more than sixty percent of the Rangers' overall strength, reflecting a strong and enduring Aboriginal-military partnership rooted in cooperation and camaraderie.

Ranger instructors are critical to this important group of Reservists. Based upon a series of interviews conducted with Canadian Ranger Patrol Group personnel from 2000-2006, this paper provides a pioneering exploration of the roles, responsibilities and "lessons learned" by Ranger instructors—the regular and reserve force non-commissioned officers (NCOs) who train the Ranger patrols in their communities and areas of operations. The primary purpose of this paper is to identify the personality traits and leadership skills that facilitate successful instruction of Ranger patrols, with a particular emphasis on Aboriginal communities. In simple terms, the standard approach to training of regular and reserve force units in the south would not suffice, so a flexible, culturally-aware approach is developed by instructors who are willing to acclimatize and adapt to the ways and needs of diverse communities. Far from being an extended "hunting and fishing trip," the professional soldiers who volunteer for postings as Ranger instructors are tasked with tremendous responsibilities in a tough physical environment and they must learn to teach and build trust relationships with patrols in an adaptive manner that transcends cultural, linguistic and generational lines. Their reflections on training Aboriginal peoples in this unique element of the CF warrant serious attention.

## Background on the Canadian Rangers

Despite being one of the most unknown formations in the Canadian military, the Canadian Rangers have a long history of service. The Rangers were officially established as a component of the reserves in 1947, based on the template of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers in British Columbia during the Second World War. Rather than requiring the government to station regular force troops in northern and isolated areas, the Rangers represented a cost-effective solution to Cold War sovereignty and security concerns that drew upon existing human resources in local areas. Civilians, pursuing

their everyday work as loggers, trappers or fishermen, could serve as the military's "eyes and ears" in areas where demographics and geography precluded a more traditional military presence. The plan was to recruit individuals who would not appeal to other units for age, health or employment reasons and thus would remain in their local area in both war and peace. With little training and equipment, the Rangers could act as guides and scouts, report suspicious activities and (if the unthinkable came to pass) delay enemies using guerrilla tactics. The only equipment issued to each Ranger was an obsolescent .303 Lee Enfield, 200 rounds of ammunition annually and an armband. This has since grown to include a sweatshirt, ball cap, t-shirt and a trigger lock. From the onset, the force structure was decentralized, and variations in roles, location and terrain made it impossible to create a "standard establishment." Each Ranger platoon (which is now designated as a patrol) was operated and administered on a localized basis.<sup>3</sup>



Combat Camera AS2006-0460a 10 August 2006 Shingle Point, Yukon Photo by: Sgt Dennis Power

Ranger Mike Taylor, a member of 1 Canadian Ranger Patrol Group (1 CRPG) keeps an eye on the coast of the Beaufort Sea during Operation Beaufort. Taylor is one of eight rangers occupying an observation post at Shingle Point, reporting on activity in the area around the clock to their headquarters in Inuvik.

Through the second half of the twentieth century, the Rangers survived a rather tumultuous course of waning and surging strategic interest in the North. By the mid-1950s, units were established across the territorial north and remote coastal regions, but the Rangers largely vanished from the official military radar when Canada and the U.S. turned to technological marvels like the Defence Early Warning (DEW) Line to address the Soviet strategic threat. Although the Rangers were left to "wither on the vine," they survived—mainly as a result of their negligible cost. When the *Manhattan* voyages of 1969 spurred renewed military interest in the arctic, the "Northern" Rangers were resuscitated as a sovereignty-bolstering measure. Another surge of sovereignty concerns following the voyage of the *Polar Sea* in 1985 has propelled more dramatic growth of the Rangers over the last two decades.<sup>4</sup>

Both of these periods of renewed interest followed "alarmist" sovereignty threats vis-à-vis the Northwest Passage, but part of the impetus was the rise of a new security

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discourse that did not divorce military activities from socio-economic, cultural and environmental health. In the late 1980s, for example, Inuit Circumpolar Conference president Mary Simon repeatedly called for the demilitarization of the Arctic on social and environmental grounds, and construed the military presence as a threat to Aboriginal peoples' security. These ideas encouraged governments to assess programs according to both state-centred security criteria and broad social and political forces. Thus, over the last two decades, explicit government statements have increasingly stressed the socio-political benefits of the Rangers in Aboriginal communities. Confrontations during the 1990s, from Oka to low-level flying to Gustafsen Lake to Ipperwash, all reinforced the need to foster positive military-Aboriginal relationships. In this context, the Rangers have been politically and publicly marketable as a military success story in community-building, merging traditional and human security considerations in a domestic context. Given these considerations, it is not surprising that the Rangers have increased dramatically over the last fifteen years, particularly in remote Aboriginal communities.

Although official statistics are not kept on the ethnic background of the Rangers, the membership tends to be generally representative of host communities and regions. Five Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups (CRPGs) co-ordinate the activities of Rangers in their respective areas of responsibility. 1 CRPG is based in Yellowknife and is responsible for patrols in the Yukon, the Northwest Territories, Nunavut and northern British Columbia. The membership in Nunavut is almost entirely Inuit, and most operations are conducted in Inuktitut. In communities like Talaoyak or Pangnirtung, where a high proportion of Rangers do not speak English, instructors must work through interpreters. This slows down training, but is a practical reality that must be accepted.<sup>5</sup> The patrols in the Northwest Territories reflect the geographic and linguistic dispersion of Northern peoples: most patrols south of the tree-line are comprised of Gwich'in, Dene, Métis and non-Native peoples; north of the tree-line, most of the patrols are Inuvialuit. Although most Rangers in the Yukon are non-Native (as is the territorial population), Aboriginal people make up the majority of several patrols. 2 CRPG covers Quebec, with the vast majority of Rangers of Inuit descent in Nunavik, Cree along James Bay, and Innu (Montagnais) near Schefferville. 3 CRPG spans northern Ontario, where most of the Rangers are Anishnawbe or Cree. 4 CRPG includes Aboriginal communities in British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba. 5 CRPG covers Newfoundland and Labrador, where Inuit and Métis make up a sizeable percentage of the Ranger force in Labrador. Working with these peoples requires an acceptance of diversity, adaptability to local cultures and geographical conditions and awareness of local priorities and practices.

The Rangers' operational tasks remain centered on the basic premise that low-cost, localized, "citizen-soldiers" help to assert sovereignty and security in remote and isolated areas. Official tasks in support of sovereignty include: reporting unusual activities, such as unusual aircraft and unusual ships or submarines and unusual persons in the community; collecting local data in support of regular force military operations; and conducting surveillance and/or sovereignty patrols (SOVPATs) in accordance with Canadian Forces Northern Area's (CFNA's) surveillance plan.<sup>6</sup> Within their capabilities, the Rangers directly assist CF activities in a number of ways: providing local expertise and guidance; advising and instructing other CF personnel on survival techniques, particularly during Sovereignty Operations (SOVOPs); providing a locally-based and inexpensive means of inspecting and monitoring the North Warning System (NWS); supporting the Junior Canadian Rangers program; and providing local assistance to Ground Search and Rescue (GSAR) and disaster relief activities. Most of the time, therefore, the Rangers are accomplishing their mission while they are out on the land in



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their “civilian” lives. Each patrol’s sector of operations comprises an area with a radius of 300 kilometres, centered on the patrol’s home community.

The operational focus now clearly prioritizes sovereignty assertion, disaster relief and emergency response, and community development. The days of the Ranger as peacetime “guerrilla” soldier standing ready to engage and contain a small-scale enemy invasion in advance of regular troops is gone. The recent disavowing of this former role reflects a more sober assessment of the practical realities of the Rangers’ potential contributions. After all, Canadian Rangers are an atypical volunteer militia. To join the force, the only formal requirements are that an individual be at least eighteen years of age, be in sufficient physical health to undertake activities on the land, have a good knowledge of the local area around his or her community (or be willing to learn), and have no criminal record. They have no obligation to serve, and can quit the force at will.

The Rangers are distinct from other Canadian Regular and Reserve Force units in other salient respects. The average entry age is over thirty, and in some communities potential recruits must await the departure of their elders for an open position. Furthermore, there is no upper age limit (except in 5 CRPG, which imposes mandatory Ranger retirement at sixty-five), and a few Rangers have served continuously for forty and even fifty years.

## **Ranger Instructors and Training**

*The premise behind the Canadian Rangers is that they are well equipped, experienced outdoorspeople, who need only minimal instruction in order to redirect their skills to benefit the community and the Canadian Forces. Consequently, Canadian Rangers receive only basic training, which seeks to augment their highly developed knowledge of how to survive on the land.... Canadian Ranger Patrol Leaders are responsible for the training and good conduct of all the Canadian Rangers in the patrol, and are the point-of-contact for the Canadian Ranger Instructors from each of the CRPG (Canadian Ranger Patrol Group) Headquarters.<sup>7</sup>*

Ranger instructors are members of the Regular Force (1 CRPG) and Primary Reserves (all other CRPGs) who train and administer the Rangers across the country. They do not receive any formal training to become instructors, but the vast majority are combat arms specialists with extensive training and skills, such as navigation and weaponry. Once in the field, Ranger instructors bear tremendous responsibilities. There is extensive paperwork and liaison work with communities prior to Ranger training exercises; budgeting for cash, ammunition, weapons, equipment, and rations; and extensive preparations and planning for field training exercises. Plans and estimates are based upon the practical, learned experience of instructors rather than formal trials. Once in the community, the instructor’s work is non-stop from arrival to departure, from purchasing petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL), to sorting out rations, to teaching up to thirty Rangers for ten-days (in contrast to 8-10 personnel in a typical section in the south). The logistical and administrative responsibilities are much more onerous than for the typical combat arms sergeant stationed in southern Canada and are designed to place the burden on the instructor rather than the patrol itself. They are expected to be everything in one, from paymaster to quartermaster “to padre when a guy is not feeling so well.”<sup>8</sup> Sergeant Joe Gonneau (2 CRPG) explained that instructors needed to be self-sufficient—there is very little outside support on the ground, and an instructor could not simply drive to stores if something failed to arrive. “When I am up there, it is just me.”<sup>9</sup> At the end of annual patrol training or an exercise, the instructor also must record all that has happened so that future instructors can plan to reinforce strengths and correct weaknesses in the patrol. This is important, given the annual nature of training and the short timeline available to each instructor to work with each community.



Ranger Norman Simonie sends a report from his observation post on Devon Island to his Command Post in Iqaluit 150 km away. Operations in the Arctic usually cover large areas and great distances between patrols and their headquarters, making good communications vital.

Because the structure of an individual Ranger patrol is rooted in the community, it operates on a group (rather than individual) basis. The local commander is a Ranger sergeant, seconded by a master corporal, both of whom are elected (in all but 5 CRPG) by the other patrol members.<sup>10</sup> Patrol NCOs are the only members of the CF who are elected to their positions. As a result, Ranger instructors must be aware that the Ranger leaders are directly accountable to the other members of their unit in a unique way. Rank is not achieved but held on a conditional basis. Patrol elections, held in the community on an annual or periodical basis in most CRPGs, exemplify the self-administering characteristics of the Ranger force.

Although “hierarchical” on paper, the “command” in practice can be less rigid than would appear. Decision-making in most Aboriginal communities is based upon consensus, and this is reflected in the patrols themselves. For example, instructors explained that when they ask a Ranger sergeant a question in some Nunavut communities, he (all are male in that region) will turn to the elders in the patrol for guidance prior to responding. In this sense, while the sergeant is theoretically in charge of a patrol, the practical “power base” may lie elsewhere. In Igloodik (1 CRPG), one particularly respected elder (described to me as “the” elder in the community and “the king of the community”) is “just” a Ranger. On paper, therefore, the Ranger Sergeant has power and influence, but in practice, this Ranger “leads” in most aspects. The distinction between formal and informal leadership structures is particularly salient.<sup>11</sup> Given these considerations, instructors must be prepared to present their plans to the entire patrol, and the patrol may not be run in the traditional military sense.<sup>12</sup> In practice, Ranger patrols are not tasked out of an expectation that each individual can do everything, but that at least one member of each patrol can do anything that is required. Therefore, trying to evaluate individual Rangers as if they should be expected to know everything (as per standard individual assessments in the south) is less useful than

assessing patrols as functional units. It is their collective ability to draw upon the myriad skills possessed by the group that makes them effective.

The military's acceptance of these unorthodox practices, which are rooted in Aboriginal values but diverge with general depictions of a rigid, hierarchical, unbending military culture, indicates a capacity for flexibility and accommodation that is seldom recognized by scholars. I have argued elsewhere that the Rangers represent a form of "post-modern" military organization predicated on inclusiveness and acceptance.<sup>13</sup> This spirit of cooperation and accommodation ensures mutual intelligibility between the military and Aboriginal communities, and also facilitates reciprocal learning. "Just treat everyone with respect," WO Pete Malcolm (4 CRPG) explained, "and recognize that everyone has something to contribute."<sup>14</sup> It is also noteworthy that Rangers in the eastern arctic have unilaterally added the word "voice" to the official motto: they consider themselves the "eyes, ears and voice" of the CF in their communities and in the north more generally.<sup>15</sup> The Rangers themselves have internalized their ownership of the force, which validates its status as a grassroots volunteer organization as well as a national military formation.

Due to geographical, demographic and operational realities in different regions, as well as the voluntary nature of the Rangers, the training regime is remarkably flexible. "Canadian Ranger training is not mandatory other than the initial ten-day orientation training for new members," the Rangers website explains. "Specialist training may also be offered to assist Canadian Rangers [to] master and practice a new skill." The explicit emphasis is on self-sufficiency and leadership, "as well as traditional skills—which are uniquely defined according to the cultural and historical practices in the local community."<sup>16</sup> Given that Ranger NCOs have not taken courses like their counterparts in other CF units, and are not bound by the same education requirements, they also must be taught about how the military functions. This training allows the patrols to



Combat Camera IS2004-2125a 20 August, 2004 Pangnirtung, Nunavut, Canada

MCpl Brian Durelle (left), from the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment (2RCR), and Canadian Rangers, Tommy Qaqqasiq (center) and Roger Alivaktuk (right), discuss the route they will take for a patrol during Exercise NARWHAL, taking place August 13-24 in the Cumberland Peninsula area of Baffin Island.

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perform their official tasks in support of sovereignty, to assist other CF units as guides, teachers and sources of local intelligence, and to serve their local communities in search and rescue and disaster response.

At the same time, Ranger instructors recognize that the training they offer not only serves the CF's domestic mission, but also facilitates the trans-generational transfer of critical life skills within Northern communities. The importance of the time on the land to practice and reinforce traditional land skills has been highlighted in recent reports and media articles. "An emerging development that could impact on future Ranger operations is a noticeable decline in the transfer of skills necessary to live on the land," the 2000 Canadian Forces Arctic Capabilities Study reported:

It is becoming gradually apparent that younger members of the Canadian Rangers are less skilled than older members in some aspects of survival in the Arctic wilderness.

The reason for this can perhaps be found in cultural changes in the aboriginal communities but the impact for CFNA today, and into the future, is an increasing training requirement for the Rangers if they are to remain effective.<sup>17</sup>

If traditional Aboriginal survival skills are allowed to atrophy, not only will Rangers' skills weaken but the CF's already limited ability to operate in the North will sunder. Ranger activities thus represent an important means of sharing knowledge of traditional survival skills within indigenous communities. The potential loss of these skills, which are inextricably linked to Aboriginal identities, is a persistent but growing worry amongst Northern peoples. While most Rangers over the age of forty possess some knowledge of traditional practices, most of the younger Rangers have not had the same level of previous exposure. As a 31-year old Ranger sergeant in northern Baffin Island explained in the mid-1990s: "Often traditions are no longer passed on to the next generation in the North. Until I joined the Rangers five years ago, I could barely build an igloo."<sup>18</sup> In this respect, the structure of the Rangers provides for the transfer of indigenous knowledge amongst members of a patrol, and thus, the retention of traditional knowledge within a community. By extension, the Ranger instructor's role to encourage the trans-generational transfer of traditional survival skills is vital to the future operational integrity of the CF which relies upon northern residents for guidance and survival training.<sup>19</sup>

## **Ranger Training**

The course training package designed for the Canadian Rangers is really a framework that befits a flexible program. As a result, it is delivered differently in the various regions of the country. Various working groups have tried to devise a standard training regime for Rangers, but tremendous cultural, geographical and regional variations make standardization difficult. For example, Ranger instructors have found that Aboriginal communities in regions across the country demand different approaches to training. Yukon patrols with a largely non-Native membership enjoy army hierarchy and direct command, meet on a regular basis even when the instructors are not in town and provide periodic reports to headquarters. By contrast, Nunavut patrols comprised almost entirely of Inuit will not respond favourably to authoritarian leadership and are less likely to get together without clear incentives.<sup>20</sup> Most Ranger instructors stress that top-down command structures do not work in Aboriginal communities, where egalitarianism is a fundamental principle and communal approaches to decision-making are the cultural norm.

Studies on Aboriginal cultural practices and cross-cultural relations help to explain the principles that Ranger instructors associate with effective Ranger training and positive relationships in patrol communities. Rupert Ross, a lawyer who worked closely with Ojibwa and Cree elders in northern Ontario, has explored "Indian reality" and Native-non-Native interpersonal relations. He outlines five "rules of traditional times" or





Canadian Rangers wait outside the Pangnirtung community center prior to a joint patrol with Canadian Forces (CF) soldiers during Exercise NARWHAL, taking place August 13-24 in the Cumberland Peninsula area of Baffin Island.

“ethical commandments” in traditional Aboriginal culture. The “ethic of non-interference” suggests that to interfere with other people is rude and culturally inappropriate—it is a form of confrontation. In short, you are forbidden to advise or to comment on another person’s behaviour unless asked to do so. Anger is not to be shown, and open conflict and displays of hostility should be avoided. Furthermore, Ross explained, “the



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traditionally proper way to show appreciation was to ask the other person to continue with his contribution rather than offer vocal expressions of gratitude” or individual praise. Communal praise was preferable in that it did not embarrass people by singling them out and could not be viewed as a threat to community harmony by raising one individual above the others.<sup>21</sup>

To understand how Native people prepare for action in a dangerous or stressful situation, Ross identifies the “conservation-withdrawal tactic” whereby a person intentionally slows down “to conserve both physical and psychic energy” and carefully reflects on the situation until committing to a particular course of action. While the Euro-Canadian cultural response is to take immediate actions, the traditional Aboriginal approach eschews ill-considered or frenzied responses, which corresponds with traditional survival strategies. Finally, the notion that “the time must be right” for action reflects traditional subsistence and spiritual life-way. In a hunter-gatherer society, Ross explained, “he who fails to anticipate, to adjust and to strike when conditions are most promising will come home empty handed. That, in the survival context, could be extremely dangerous.” Traditional Aboriginal values stress the need to take time to contemplate various options, collect information and weigh opinions before making a decision, which is ideally based upon consensus.<sup>22</sup>

Although Ross’s reflections are based upon a particular region and cultural group, broad generalizations about Aboriginal culture suggest similar principles. Many of these insights are reflected in the observations made by Ranger instructors, who have learned ways of working constructively with Aboriginal communities and individuals. Rather than forcing their “lessons learned” into a formal analytical framework, they are best reflected upon in a less formulaic manner that is more in tune with the spirit of the information that they provided in interviews and their experiences with the Rangers.

The tempo of northern operations is much slower than in temperate climates, and time estimates and planning must accommodate this reality. Simply put, one cannot force the operational pace of the south onto the arctic. Equipment failure rates are higher, and all activities require careful contingency planning. Cold casualty rates increase when troops stop after having been overworked to the point of sweating. Personnel carrying survival gear in cold temperatures burn off calories at an accelerated rate, and require time to eat compensatory meals that can take longer to prepare and consume. Of course, the stakes are uncharacteristically high in the arctic:

The Canadian North in winter ... is not neutral: **it is an enemy**. Given the half a chance it will cripple or kill a soldier as efficiently as an artillery burst... The wise commander must minimize his own “non battle casualties” if he is to remain operationally viable. Before soldiers can be expected to fight in such an environment, there are two important steps they must take. First, they must learn to live there; secondly, they must learn how to work there. Only when this learning curve is complete, is the soldier in a position to apply his trade and actually fight there.<sup>23</sup>

Soldiers’ survival skills are developed through experience and expert guidance. Unless one has spent time in the North, Ranger instructors suggested, practical preparations are somewhat academic. Combat arms training provides a pivotal foundation, but soldiers must experience the North and be trained to live, move and work in its unique climate and environment.

The basic rationale for the Rangers is that they are local experts because of their indigenous knowledge of the environment and climate. Accordingly, instructors must be careful not to press the patrol members to do things with which they are not comfortable. If an instructor is too insistent on going out on the land or sea, even when conditions are unsafe, the Rangers will probably do so against their better judgment. Significant

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anecdotal evidence suggests that this can put the patrol members and the instructor in serious danger. Success in northern and remote operations more generally depends upon awareness that uncertainty requires contingency planning, an acceptance of unanticipated delays and attentiveness to local wisdom. It is critical for new instructors to learn that, while they are professional soldiers with much to teach, they are likely the



Combat Camera IS2004-2134a 21 August, 2004 Pangnirtung, Nunavut, Canada

Canadian Rangers listen to a range safety briefing prior to zeroing their .303-calibre Lee-Enfield rifles during Exercise NARWHAL, taking place August 13-24 in the Cumberland Peninsula area of Baffin Island.

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biggest burden—and often the weakest link—in terms of survival when they are out on the land for exercises or operations. “As a guest in their area,” WO Pete Malcolm (4 CRPG) reflected, “Who am I to tell them how to survive and get around?”<sup>24</sup>

The key for instructors is to learn how to become better listeners—to appreciate how Aboriginal decision-making differs from non-Native practices, and does not involve clear recommendations telling another person how to act. Aboriginal Rangers are not forthright with suggestions, WO Malcolm noted: “you need to draw everything out of them.”<sup>25</sup> Decision-making often involves lengthy discussions that engage an issue from multiple perspectives and the subtle emphasis of particular facts, but do not involve clear statements of points of view and reach conclusions only after a prolonged “distillation” process.<sup>26</sup> As Sergeant Joe Gonneau (2 CRPG) explained to me, you cannot have a rigid schedule: “we run it at their pace.”<sup>27</sup>

New instructors are challenged to be flexible and patient. When stationed with southern Regular Force units, Army sergeants are trained to have their commands met without debate and on time. There is an inherent rigidity in the philosophy of command and strict obedience. This “hard army” approach does not work with the Rangers. Instructors cannot yell at patrols according to standard drill techniques, “dress down” and embarrass individuals who make mistakes, or demand unquestioning and immediate responses. There are cases where longstanding Rangers, and even Ranger sergeants, have quit on the spot when faced with an over-zealous and insistent instructor. Some “infamous” instructors are alleged to have demanded push-ups from Rangers who arrived late to training—something that commentators characterized as “stupid” given the requirement for equal treatment and the number of elders in Ranger patrols. In short, WO Malcolm explained, an instructor needs to display tact, particularly in Aboriginal communities.<sup>28</sup>

While the Rangers have important skills, they also enjoy working with Ranger instructors because they can learn a lot from the military. For example, in many communities Rangers navigate through memory. They know the land through rock piles, snow drifts and ice patterns, but do not possess the techniques to navigate outside of their traditional territories. Instructors teach them map and compass, GPS and communication skills that expand the breadth of area in which they can comfortably operate. Furthermore, annual field exercises provide Rangers with an opportunity to go to parts of their area of operations that they otherwise might not visit, and they are involved in planning these activities to suit local interests. Sovereignty patrols, enhanced sovereignty patrols, mass exercises, leadership training, and shooting competitions also provide Aboriginal Rangers with opportunities to meet other people from their patrol group, and also to visit new parts of the country. These experiences can be profound. Sgt Bill Lapatourelle (1 CRPG) described how one of the Rangers from Resolute Bay had never seen trees before heading to Yukon with the Rangers. The Ranger went on to complain that there was “no scenery down south” because he could not see for miles around him: he had to get back to the tundra because he felt claustrophobic.<sup>29</sup>

Ranger instructors need to have humility—an appreciation that they do not know everything. The first thing that WO Pete Malcolm (4 CRPG) did when he met Kenny Johnson, an Aboriginal Ranger at Kitkatla, B.C., was ask him to let him know if he was “doing something stupid”—breaching any cultural etiquette. When he first went in to the community, Malcolm was the only “white guy” in the village. But after a while he got to know people. He made a point of staying with the patrol commanders (particularly because there was no hotel in the community at the time), so he lived with them and got to know them. Soon Malcolm was invited to village ceremonies at the local school and filled with food and gifts. He played bingo with the community at fundraising events. He was also struck by how many local Aboriginal elders served in the world wars, reinforcing that the community had a long history of service with the CF.<sup>30</sup> “You’re there to teach them, and they’re there to teach you,” 5 CRPG Training WO Dave Gill sagely noted.<sup>31</sup>

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Instructors must also have an open mind and must be prepared for a tremendous learning curve. Sergeant Dan Hryhoryshen (4 CRPG) described the “culture shock” he experienced when he set up the Kitkatla patrol. After a helicopter dropped him off in a ball diamond in the community and he offloaded his large load of equipment, he felt very isolated. “All of a sudden, the tables were turned on me,” Hryhoryshen later reflected. “I am the White guy in town, in a combat uniform, representing the federal government.” He quickly learned to relax, be rather informal and focus on building trust. “It is all about developing relationships with these people,” Hryhoryshen explained. “You cannot behave like a bureaucrat.”<sup>32</sup> Sergeant Cyril Abbott (5 CRPG) offered similar advice to be flexible and accommodate their needs. “I find with these people, you’ve got to listen to them,” he stressed. “They know the weather, and they know the local conditions.” Rather than barking military orders at the Rangers, he advised that instructors show “ask them to do something, you never tell them.”<sup>33</sup>

Sergeant Todd MacWirtter, a Ranger instructor with 5 CRPG, noted that Labrador Rangers do not follow fixed timings, so typical military schedules are problematic. On his first visit to Postville, for example, more than half of the patrol showed to training an hour late. When they heard the plane arrive soon thereafter, they promptly left to get their mail, returning at lunch as if nothing had happened! “Forget everything that you learned in the military,” he advised, “from punctuality to direct orders.” If the Rangers want to take six lunches in a day, do not make this an issue if they still get the job done. They do not “rush” like southern military forces. It was also imperative to learn about patrol members, and vice versa. He explained that Inuit patrols took time to “warm up” to an instructor, and that openness and a respect for their limitations went a long way. If there are older Rangers in a patrol, forced marches are not well advised. Furthermore, instructors need to learn to adjust their approaches to teaching, recognizing that not all Rangers have the levels of education expected of Regular or Reserve CF Force recruits. Instructors cannot rush through explanations, and should be prepared to take more time to explain themselves. “Just be yourself,” MacWirtter explained, “be one of them, and try to explain it to them on their terms.” Finally, he stressed that instructors needed to be open to the Rangers’ ways of doing things, given their expertise and local knowledge. Explain what you want to accomplish in terms of end results, and solicit their opinions. Instructors who proved unwilling to change and clung to an “old military background” approach to training did not last long.<sup>34</sup>

A sense of humour is also essential to work with the Rangers. Sergeant J-F Gauthier’s (2 CRPG) first training exercise in January 1998 was most memorable for a joke played on him by the Inuit Rangers in Salluit, Nunavik. After leaving town for their field training, the group stopped for tea. Gauthier asked if he could go for a pee, and the Rangers said this was fine. He walked away from the group, and when he started to urinate, someone behind him yelled: “What are you doing, this is the land of our ancestors!” Gauthier apologized profusely, and was told to take a plastic bag and a knife to clean up after himself. “This land is very important to us,” the Rangers insisted. When Gauthier knelt down and started to clean up, everyone in the group fell down on the ground in hysterical laughter. When they returned to town five days later, everyone in Salluit seemed to know the story—the Rangers had reported it back in advance by radio. En route back home, when the plane stopped in Kuujuaq, someone there teased him about the story. Gauthier could not believe it, but this confirmed in his mind that word gets around quickly in the north. Even when he visits Salluit today, someone still reminds him of this episode. Gauthier takes it in the fun spirit that it was intended.<sup>35</sup>

Good instructors must also be careful never to embarrass Aboriginal Rangers. Teasing and cajoling are ways the Inuit and other northern peoples teach their children and one another, but embarrassment is much more serious than in the south. Silence and “soft-spokenness,” rather than casual “babble” and loud commands, resonated in



these patrols. While Rangers fully expect a new instructor to “act like a white man” on his first patrol, the relationship must evolve on a more personal level thereafter. Furthermore, because Inuit peoples teach by doing, you “have to watch like a hawk” to learn. Although you can ask the Rangers questions (and they will answer), they will never ask an instructor to do anything. As one instructor explained, “if you don’t learn something it’s your fault, not their fault.”<sup>36</sup>

A flexible, culturally-sensitive approach and a willingness to become acclimatized to the ways of diverse groups of people are similarly essential. Most instructors stress that mutual learning, credibility and trust are crucial to effective relationships with patrols. The best way to approach any challenge with the Rangers, WO Kevin Mulhern (1 CRPG) explained, was to sit down and discuss it with them. He suggested that the “mission-focus” mentality often should be reversed when dealing with the Rangers—it was often better to explain what the military wanted to accomplish and then figure out with them what should be done in terms of a mission.<sup>37</sup> In order to be effective, Ranger instructors need to accept that compromise is a source of strength, not a display of weakness. This same spirit needs to be instilled in the Rangers: trying to mesh Army culture with local culture requires mutual compromise.<sup>38</sup> No two patrols are alike, neither are the Rangers in a patrol a homogenous group. “The diversity is always there, no matter what the patrol,” WO Gill (5 CRPG) explained, and the Ranger instructor “cannot be the one stiff person; they need to be adaptable and flexible.”<sup>39</sup>

Cultural differences between instructors and the Rangers require mutual learning and flexibility. Former Ranger instructor Dave McLean (1 CRPG) explained that culture could impede communication, but that a policy of “firm, friendly and fair” worked well. He shared several examples of considerations that challenge conventional military norms in the south. In Inuit communities, there is a basic concept that “no man has the right to tell another man what to do.” While it is bewildering to see a group of Rangers stand around while another struggles with his sled, “teamwork” is not prescribed in their cultural practices in the southern sense.<sup>40</sup> Thus, although Rangers possess individual



Combat Camera IS2004-2138a 21 August, 2004 Pangitlung, Nunavut, Canada

Canadian Rangers walk to their targets after firing their .303-calibre Lee-Enfield rifles during Exercise NARWHAL, taking place August 13-24 in the Cumberland Peninsula area of Baffin Island.



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skills suited to their local areas, instructors provide patrol members with training on how to work as a group.

Development of this skill is important because the Rangers often represent one of the only organized groups available locally to help coordinate and participate in emergency response. “Canadian Rangers provide a range of specialized services to the peoples in their area,” the commander of the Northern Ontario Rangers explains, “including humanitarian assistance, local search and rescue, rapid response for disaster situations, such as aircraft crashes and support for evacuation in natural emergencies, such as forest fires and floods.”<sup>41</sup> They act first and foremost as members of their communities, seldom waiting for an official tasking before heading out to look for lost hunters, or helping villages cope with major disasters. On 1 January 1999, for example, members from eleven of the Ranger patrols in Nunavik responded immediately to news of a massive avalanche in Kangiqsualujuaq. For days they made vital contributions by supporting local authorities in rescue efforts, securing the area and assisting with funeral preparations. Additional support was provided from patrols as far away as Coral Harbour (nearly one thousand kilometres to the west), where Rangers harvested and shipped fresh caribou to the disaster site. The Chief of the Defence Staff later noted that “without their dedication, the toll in human suffering would surely have been higher... The leadership and moral support the Rangers provided in the face of this crisis was invaluable.”<sup>42</sup> For this extraordinary effort, 2 CRPG was awarded a Canadian Forces Unit Commendation.<sup>43</sup>

“If you are closed and don’t want to open your mind, you will fail,” Sergeant J-F Gauthier (2 CRPG) explained to me in a telephone interview in May 2006. “If your attitude is to learn and share, then you can succeed.” Instructors thrive when they do not prejudge the Rangers or their communities according to their own cultural assumptions. Northern communities are plagued by problems—from high suicide rates, to violent crime, to alcoholism and substance abuse—amply documented in scholarly and government reports, and often linked to colonialism and imposed cultural change. Ranger instructors need to recognize that going into a community and insulting people about the source of these problems is not conducive to goodwill, and will not bring about meaningful change. Instructors need to take a longer-term view, acknowledging they can help to lay the groundwork for constructive social engagement by being open to different cultures, communities and ways of life, rather than by coming in thinking they know all “the answers.”<sup>44</sup>

## **Final Reflections**

The Canadian Rangers serve a vital function in Aboriginal communities that transcends military, socio-political, economic and cultural realms. They demonstrate that military activities designed to assert sovereignty need not cause “insecurity” for Aboriginal peoples. Managed on a community level, a Ranger patrol draws upon the indigenous knowledge of its members, rather than “militarizing” and conditioning them through the regularized training regimes and structure of other CF components. This flexible, cost-effective, and culturally inclusive part of the Reserve Force represents a significant example of a military activity that actually seems to contribute to sustainable human development amongst Aboriginal peoples. The Rangers are symbolic, practical and rooted in partnership: all important variables for sustainable, integrated management in an era of much speculation but continued uncertainty.

The threat of enemy invasion on Canadian territory remains remote, as it has for more than a century. Nevertheless, the tempo of military operations in the Canadian North has begun to increase in recent years, and the new government’s election promises assert that it will continue to increase in the future. Climate change raises the potential for increased shipping activity; resource development initiatives, foreign

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tourism and commercial over-flights are expanding; and the potential for terrorists, organized crime, illegal migrants and contraband smugglers to operate in the region have all highlight the need for a greater military focus on remote areas. The CF must maintain a positive working relationship with Aboriginal peoples in order to conduct sustained operations and credibility is essential. The Ranger instructors who liaise with the Rangers in their communities serve as the most common interface between the CF and the local populations, and it is their professionalism that has secured the trust relationships that prevail with northern communities. As the Rangers organization continues to mature, it is these CF representatives who will ensure that it evolves in a manner that is appropriate to the military and to these communities.

In the summer 2002, historian Marc Milner wrote in the *Canadian Military Journal* that "few Canadians ever see a Canadian soldier, much less actually know one."<sup>45</sup> This is not true of the many Aboriginal communities that boast a Ranger patrol. Chances are that everyone in the community knows a Ranger, and communities are well aware of the Regular or Reserve Force instructors who venture there on an annual basis. Training and exercises provide the Rangers with an opportunity to exercise their unique abilities and skills and to increase the collective capabilities of their patrols. By extension, the Rangers' positive role and presence means that their military training also supports the health and sustainability of their communities and cultures. Serving as a vital link between these "indigenous sovereignty soldiers" and the military, Ranger instructors deserve acknowledgement for their unique contributions to sovereignty and CF operational effectiveness in northern, isolated and coastal regions of Canada.

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## About the Author...

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## Endnotes

1. This article could not have been written without the support of 1 CRPG, 4 CRPG, and 5 CRPG, as well as the Rangers staff and instructors who shared their time and knowledge. Professor Jim Miller, the Canada Research Chair (Native-Newcomer Relations) at the University of Saskatchewan, and a St. Jerome's University Faculty Research Grant supported this research in 2003-04 and 2005-06 respectively. A SSHRC Queen's Fellowship and the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies funded preliminary research in 2000.
2. For a fuller elaboration of these themes, see P. Whitney Lackenbauer, "The Canadian Rangers: A Post-modern Militia That Works," *Canadian Military Journal* 6/4 (Winter 2005-06), 49-60. For an introduction to the Rangers, see the official website at [www.rangers.dnd.ca](http://www.rangers.dnd.ca).
3. J. Mackay Hitsman, "The Canadian Rangers," DND, Army Headquarters, Historical Section, Report no. 92 (1 December 1960), National Defence Headquarters, Director of History and Heritage, Ottawa, Ontario.
4. On this period, see Kenneth Eyre, "Forty Years of Defence Activity in the Canadian North, 1947-87," *Arctic* 40/4 (December 1987), 292-9, and Robert Taylor, "Eyes and Ears of the North," *Star Weekly Magazine*, 22 December 1956, 2-3. The author is currently writing a full history of the Rangers from 1947 to present.
5. DND Backgrounder BG-99.047, "The Canadian Rangers in Nunavut," 5 March 1999; interviews, Col Pierre Leblanc (CFNA) and Capt Don Finamore (1 CRPG), 20 March 2000, Sgt Dave McLean (1 CRPG), 22 March 2000, and MWO G.R. Westcott (1 CRPG), 26 February 2004; telephone interview, Sergeant J-F Gauthier (2 CRPG), 11 May 2006.
6. The aims of sovereignty operations are to: (a) demonstrate Canadian sovereignty by deploying forces to the Territories; (b) exercising the Army's basic operations in any season; (c) exercise and evaluate the issued equipment in arctic climates; (d) develop a cadre of soldiers experienced in northern operations; and (e) provide challenging leadership situations. "Canadian Forces Activities in the NWT and Yukon 1997/98," 21 May 1997, Annex A, NDHQ f.4500-1 (G3). For more information on roles and responsibilities, see Rangers website at [www.rangers.dnd.ca](http://www.rangers.dnd.ca).
7. "Canadian Rangers Training," [http://www.rangers.dnd.ca/pubs/rangers/training/rang-train\\_e.asp](http://www.rangers.dnd.ca/pubs/rangers/training/rang-train_e.asp) (last accessed 13 June 2006).

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8. Interviews with MWO G.R. Westcott and WO Kevin Mulhern (1 CRPG), 26 February 2004.
  9. Telephone interview, Sgt Joe Gonneau (2 CRPG), 5 May 2006.
  10. In 1999, a fourth rank, that of Ranger Corporal, was created for two reasons. It allowed for the creation of patrols with representation in several communities or "detachments." It was also created out of Junior Canadian Ranger program requirements; at a minimum, it is the corporal who looks after this program in a community. Interview, Finnamore.
  11. Rob Marois, Ops O, 1 CRPG, Rangers Briefing, 26 Feb 2004.
  12. Interview, WO Kevin Mulhern (1 CRPG), 26 February 2004.
  13. Lackenbauer, "Canadian Rangers."
  14. Interviews, Sgt Jeff Gottschalk (1 CRPG), 27 February 2004; Sgt Denis Lalonde (1 CRPG), 2 March 2004; Sgt Bill Lapatourelle (1 CRPG), 1 March 2004; WO Pete Malcolm (4 CRPG), 14 July 2005.
  15. Peter Kuniliusee, quoted in an interview with Petty Officer Paul Smith (formerly 1 CRPG), 20 February 2006.
  16. "Intro – Canadian Rangers Training," [http://www.rangers.dnd.ca/pubs/rangers/training/intro\\_e.asp](http://www.rangers.dnd.ca/pubs/rangers/training/intro_e.asp) (last accessed 13 June 2006).
  17. Commander's Assessment, CFNA FY 2004/2005 Level 1 Business Plan, 27 Oct 2003, 1-2. See also Bob Weber, "Rangers less at home on their range," *Globe and Mail*, 9 August 2004.
  18. Ranger Sgt. Levi Barnabas, quoted in "Defenders of Canada's North," *Reader's Digest* (1997), quoted in The Ranger Report (30 October 1997), 13.
  19. For a scholarly example, see Richard G. Condon, Peter Collings, and George Wenzel, "The Best Part of Life: Subsistence Hunting, Ethnicity, and Economic Adaptation among Young Adult Inuit Males," *Arctic* 48.1 (March 1995), 31–46. The transfer of traditional knowledge is also a central tenet of the Junior Canadian Rangers programme, which will not be discussed in this paper. For an introduction, see the official website at [www.rangers.dnd.ca](http://www.rangers.dnd.ca).
  20. Interviews with 1 CRPG staff and instructors, 2004.
  21. Rupert Ross, *Dancing with a Ghost: Exploring Indian Reality* (Markham: Octopus Books, 1992), 12-35, 41.
  22. Ross, *Dancing with a Ghost*, 35-40. See also Rosalie Wax and Robert Thomas, "American Indians and White People," *Phylon* 22.4 (1961), 305–17. Ross offers that "When Native people use the phrase "consensus decision-making" I believe they are referring less to the fact that everyone agreed in the end than to the fact that the process of arriving at the decision was communal. It is akin to the process of 'joint thinking' as opposed to one where competing conclusions are argued until one prevails." *Dancing with a Ghost*, 23.
  23. "Arctic Operations: Threats to Which the Canadian Forces Are Expected to Respond in Northern Canada," presentation to Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College, Kingston, 22 Oct 84, 8. Copy in possession of the author.
  24. Interviews, Gottschalk, Lalonde, Lapatourelle, Malcolm.
  25. Interview, Malcolm.
  26. This corresponds with Ross's observations in *Dancing with a Ghost*, 21-22.
  27. Telephone interview, Gonneau.
  28. Interviews, Gottschalk, Lalonde, Lapatourelle, Malcolm.
  29. Interview, Lapatourelle.
  30. Interview, Malcolm.
  31. Interview with WO Dave Gill (5 CRPG), 21 February 2006. Ranger Master Corporal Keith Guy recalled during an interview on 6 March 2006 that "Dave Gill originally tried to make soldiers out of us, but we made him into a Ranger like ourselves."
  32. Interview with Sgt Dan Hryhoryshen (4 CRPG), 13 July 2005.
  33. Interview with Sgt Cyril Abbott (5 CRPG), 6 March 2006.
  34. Interview with Sgt Todd MacWirter (5 CRPG), 21 February 2006.
  35. Interview, Gauthier.
  36. Interview, McLean. In an interview, WO Pete Malcolm (4 CRPG) also specifically cautioned that instructors should never berate Natives in front of others.
  37. Interview, Mulhern.
  38. Marois, Rangers Briefing.
  39. Interview, Gill.
  40. Interview, McLean.
  41. CO 3 CRPG, "The Ranger Mission," [http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/3cprg/English/mission/mission\\_e.shtml](http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/3cprg/English/mission/mission_e.shtml) (last accessed 7 July 2004).
  42. Jane George, "Nunavik Rangers Honoured in Montreal," *Nunatsiq News* [Iqaluit], 30 November 1999.
  43. DND Backgrounder, "The Canadian Rangers," 8 February 2000.
  44. Telephone interview, Gauthier. For an introduction to northern social issues, see RCAP, vol. 4: Perspectives and Realities, chapter 6: The North, section 4: The Source of Current Problems, available online at [http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/sg/sj28\\_e.html](http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/sg/sj28_e.html) (last accessed 13 June 2006).
  45. Marc Milner, "Whose Army is it Anyway?" *Canadian Military Journal* 3/2 (Summer 2002), 13.
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# THE ROAD TO HELL PART 2: CANADA IN VIETNAM, 1954-1973

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*(Part 1 of this paper was presented in CAJ 10.1)*

## THE RISE OF COMPLICITY

It was not just the Canadian officers in Vietnam who were frustrated with the widening impasse. Pearson and Holmes were also becoming increasingly concerned with the International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC)'s ineffectiveness in Vietnam, and were searching for a solution. If Canadian impartiality had failed to make the ICSC an effective body, then perhaps increasing advocacy of the West's position would help advance Canada's foreign policy goals. The "unmuzzling," of Lett had shamed neither the North Vietnamese, nor their Polish supporters into concessions on the freedom of movement issue. By 23 March 1956, John Holmes, then the External Affairs officer responsible for Indochina, conceded that in view of the Polish behaviour, the ICSC was unlikely to operate any more with unanimity. Holmes therefore instructed the Canadian delegation (Candel) to "shape the record [wherever] possible so that we still have good grounds to refuse further participation in the Commission's less useful functions."<sup>1</sup> As a result, Canada tabled a minority report on the freedom of movement question in which it not only criticized North Vietnam for its obstruction, but also asserted the legality of Diem's claim that his regime was not bound by the Geneva Accords.<sup>2</sup> This position lent further credence to Diem's refusal to hold elections in accordance with the Geneva Accords. Victor Levant has claimed that Canada's increasing partisanship in the ICSC allowed Diem to refute the Accords, implying that Canadian policy had "sabotaged the political solution," thereby indirectly leading to the Vietnam War.<sup>3</sup> Although both his argument and his evidence appear on the surface to be quite persuasive, Levant misses one critical point in his indictment of Canadian policy: nothing Canada could have done, either through the ICSC or through bilateral channels with the United States, could have changed Diem's mind on the election issue.<sup>4</sup> By early 1956, both the North Vietnamese and the Diem regime recognized that the "free democratic elections," called for by the Geneva Conference would never be held. North Vietnam's leader, Ho Chi Minh realized that he would have to accomplish his goal of re-unifying Vietnam by bullet and not by ballot as he had hoped. As a result, Ho began to encourage increased activity by the Viet Cong insurgents south of the de-militarized zone (DMZ) as a prelude to war.<sup>5</sup>

The solution—or rather, non-solution—to the elections issue meant that resort to force to achieve the political goals of Ho and the North Vietnamese was almost inevitable. Trapped by the pragmatic requirement to support the West's policy of containment, Pearson and Holmes deliberately hid behind the ambiguity of the Geneva Accords. In yet another irony of history, the Canadian decision to tacitly support the American (and South Vietnamese) position undermined the very legitimacy of the ICSC and contributed to its inevitable failure. Canada had compromised its dedication to democratic principles in pursuit of a more important (and perhaps more elusive) goal: Western security and containment of communism. Given the political and strategic conditions of the time, Pearson had little choice but to make the wrong decision for the right reasons and thus help in paving the path to war.<sup>6</sup> As Pearson and Holmes were to find out, it was a slippery path indeed.

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One compromise inevitably led to another for Canadian policymakers. As the guerrilla war in the South slowly escalated throughout the late 1950s, Diem turned increasingly to the United States for military assistance. Chapter III of the Geneva Accords, however, did not allow reinforcement of forces beyond the number present in 1954.<sup>7</sup> This stipulation meant that the United States was legally restricted to only a handful of military advisors because its Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) had numbered fewer than 400 personnel when the Accords went into effect.<sup>8</sup> The American solution to this legal quandary was simple: ignore the ICSC. Between 1956 and 1961, over two thousand additional advisors entered South Vietnam under the guise of MAAG, and the Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM).<sup>9</sup> This influx touched off an acrimonious debate in the ICSC, with the Poles vigorously supporting the North Vietnamese assertion that the United States was in violation of Articles 16 and 17 of the Geneva Charter. In response to these charges, the Americans countered with the accusation that the North Vietnamese had abrogated Articles 16 and 17 first by supporting the Viet Cong insurgency in South Vietnam.<sup>10</sup> The Canadians, sympathetic to the American position, devised an ingenious, if not completely ethical argument to support their pro-American stance. First, the Canadians had from an early date supported the assertion that the North was in violation of the Agreements by supporting insurgency in the South. Second, the Canadians pointed out that the "status quo" provision made no specific mention of nationality; therefore, as the French forces, 150 000 strong when the agreement went into effect, had withdrawn completely, the Americans could legally claim to be simply taking their place.<sup>11</sup> In effect, this view meant that the Americans could "rotate" up to 150 000 "replacement" troops into South Vietnam before Canada would have to find them in violation of the Geneva Accords. This legal hair-splitting may have eased the consciences of some of the External Affairs delegates forced to take this less than truthful line in order to support the much more important Canadian-American relationship, but it further served to reduce the illusion of ICSC legitimacy in the eyes of all involved, especially the belligerents.<sup>12</sup>

The Canadian decision to look the other way on the American build-up was made with the best of intentions, but inevitably led to the worst of results. Like a man struggling in quicksand, External's well-intentioned efforts only served to open it up to further charges of collusion with and complicity in American policy in Vietnam. Yet another well-intentioned Canadian attempt at seeking a negotiated settlement outside the Geneva Accords and the ICSC was the "Seaborne Mission." In 1964, Canadian diplomat and ICSC Commissioner Blair Seaborne was employed by the United States, at the recommendation of now Prime Minister Lester Pearson and his External Affairs Minister Paul Martin, as an intermediary to the government in Hanoi. Under the aegis of his ICSC membership, Seaborne had access to the leadership of the Hanoi regime and was therefore well-placed to act as a go-between for the American State Department. At first, the Americans only asked Seaborne to try to ascertain North Vietnamese war aims and intentions.<sup>13</sup> Later, Seaborne was asked to convey peace offers coupled with thinly veiled threats of a bombing escalation to the North Vietnamese.<sup>14</sup> It was these later visits, from June 1964 until June 1965, that created controversy in Canada when they were made public by the release of the *Pentagon Papers* in 1973. Accusations that Canada had abused its position in the ICSC were hurled at the government, and, in the words of Victor Levant:

If the Seaborne mission was a peace initiative, it was clearly a failure...[P]ublic knowledge of the mission served to weaken Canada's moral position by further associating it with the increasingly discredited U.S. war effort.<sup>15</sup>

North Vietnam, already incensed by the role played by the ICSC in failing to condemn American intervention in what it clearly saw as an internal struggle, was further





The Release of Captains Patton and Thompson to the Canadian Rescue Team South Vietnam Jul 73. The four Canadian Officers in the Picture L-R Capt Wayne Denke, LCol Lew West Team Leader, Capt Ian Patton & Capt Fletcher Thompson.

offended by Seaborne's use of Canada's ICSC membership to convey President Lyndon Johnson's threats to them. As guerrilla warfare metamorphosed into a conventional conflict, the ICSC became increasingly irrelevant and illegitimate in the eyes of the North Vietnamese. In March 1965, Hanoi informed the ICSC that its headquarters was no longer welcome in North Vietnam; the ICSC, for all intents and purposes was dead.<sup>16</sup>

In summary, Canadian policymakers had allowed themselves to be drawn into the Indochina question in general, and Vietnam in particular, for all the right moral and pragmatic reasons. Nevertheless, the inherent flaws of the Geneva Accords coupled with conflicting strategic demands upon Canada outside of Vietnam, led Pearson and External Affairs to adopt a policy that was deliberately ambiguous, hoping on the one hand to contribute to peace through the ICSC, while on the other hand undermining that same peace by supporting the American (and by extension South Vietnamese) goals. High minded meddling had met the harsh realities of war, and the result was only to add to the confusion both at home in Canada, and abroad in Vietnam and Washington. It was becoming a lose-lose situation for the Canadian government.

### **ICSC Activities During Open War (1965-73)**

The ghostly apparition of the ICSC continued to exist after expulsion from Hanoi, moving its headquarters to Saigon. In reality, the Commission served only as a forum for the continued bickering and stalemate between the Polish, Indian and Canadian delegates. External Affairs found it nearly impossible to fill some of its vacancies, as career Foreign Service officers saw a stint on the ICSC as having no professional advancement opportunity, and as a personal hardship posting.<sup>17</sup> In reality, during the period March 1965 to its final demise in 1973, the ICSC was completely ineffectual. Robert Bothwell has aptly characterized ICSC functioning during this period: "life on the Commission drifted into a routine of trips North, trips South, trips out, reports and debate."<sup>18</sup> Brigadier H. Chubb, Senior Canadian Military Advisor to ICSC Vietnam from September 1966, to September 1967, described a typical meeting:

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A full meeting of the Commission in the morning...Masses of paper flowing from one side of the table to the other and the inevitable final results that add up to virtually nothing...Today it was the turn of the Canadians to indulge in a little...shouting and waving of arms...We continue this nonsense tomorrow afternoon! The only sensible suggestion... came to nowt [naught]. However, it is on the record that we tried and that is what counts—or so I am told!<sup>19</sup>

Why did Canada keep playing its part in this futile charade? There are a number of important reasons. First, Canadian policy makers were nothing if not hopeful, and throughout the period of open warfare in Vietnam, the policymakers in External Affairs refused to pull out of the ICSC in hopes that someday, somehow, it might form the basis of a peace agreement, as it had in the early days of 1954. John Holmes, perhaps the most important single figure in Canada's Indochina policy during the 1960s, reported that "Mike [Lester Pearson] was always asking me, 'when are you going to get us out of there?'"<sup>20</sup> Holmes' reply was invariably, "soon, but not just yet." In his own words, Holmes summed up the dilemma of hope: "Somehow or other we felt that in some way possibly there was one chance in a hundred that we could be of some help in bringing an end to this dreadful war...So, we stayed on."<sup>21</sup>

Furthermore, there was a real and useful purpose for the Canadian presence in Vietnam, but it was not in bringing about peace. Ironically enough, it was in supplying strategic intelligence to the United States. From its beginnings, the Canadian delegation had been quite forthcoming in their co-operation with the Americans in this respect, and, in November 1969, Brigadier Donald Ketchison (ICSC 1958-9) admitted to routinely supplying intelligence on troop movements to the Central Intelligence Agency.<sup>22</sup> It became accepted practice to send duplicate copies of all Canadian reports to the American embassy in Saigon throughout the late 1950s and 1960s.<sup>23</sup> When information on the intelligence gathering activity hit the Canadian media, there was a frenzy of denials on the part of External Affairs Minister Paul Martin Sr. but, as Brigadier Chubb said at the time:

The papers and wires have been full of yarns about the ICC running interference and doing espionage for the Yanks! True, of course, up to a point, but very disturbing in certain quarters to see it in print!<sup>24</sup>

The real problem that underlay the question of intelligence passing was that Canadians, even on the ICSC, simply identified too closely with Americans to act as anything but proxies for their "big brother" on the ICSC. The senior Canadian delegates socialized with the Americans, drank with the Americans and relied upon the Americans for logistical support and provision of services not normally available to members of the ICSC, and found it all quite natural.<sup>25</sup> There was a deep affinity between the Americans and Canadians, who were the closest of neighbours and allies everywhere else in the world except in Vietnam, an affinity that the Canadians could not share with their erstwhile "brothers" on the ICSC. Brigadier Chubb, himself one of the self-admitted worst offenders, pointed out the problem in 1967:

[It is] recommended that we stop using transport and other [American] facilities so readily made available to Candef which are not available to Poldel and Indel...Canadians have been cheating in this regard for years, and our position would be quite indefensible....To divorce ourselves from these facilities would be most unpleasant, but in my view must be done.<sup>26</sup>

## **The Roots of Complicity**

Yet this divorce entailed much more than the matter of rejecting free flights home on American military aircraft and American PX privileges; it called for a rejection of some of

the values Canadians and Americans shared, and a denial of the natural Canadian American relationship that was based on over 200 years of common history, and fifty years as close allies. Little has been written about the hundreds of Canadians who joined the American Armed Forces to fight in Vietnam, but a quick look at their own words shows that they were volunteering for almost exactly the same reasons as young American men were volunteering; some wanted adventure, but a large number joined to “fight communism.”<sup>27</sup> Moreover, the close cultural bond between Canadians and Americans was augmented by the necessity to become even closer to the Americans militarily throughout the 1960s. The increasing importance of the North American Air Defence (NORAD) agreement, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, and the Defence Production Sharing Agreement all reflected the political and strategic reality that Canadians could not divorce themselves from the United States, a nation upon which it relied so heavily for its own defence.<sup>28</sup> Writers like Victor Levant may condemn Canada for its “quiet complicity,” in American policy in Vietnam, but they ignore the geo-political realities that narrowed Canada's options until the Canadian media and public, spurred on by the example set by their counterparts in the United States, made another option feasible.<sup>29</sup> Perhaps even more so than American President Lyndon Johnson, Canada became trapped in Vietnam by a “hell of good intentions.”<sup>30</sup>



Courtesy of Author

Maj General Morton, Colonel Delamere and Lt. Colonel Reynolds

Donald Ross has argued that another reason the Pearson government may have felt compelled to remain involved in Vietnam and the ICSC was President Johnson himself, given his deeply personal approach to the ever widening American war in Vietnam, and its impact upon the United States. Pearson wanted both to be a good friend and useful ally, and opted for a policy of “quiet diplomacy” in order to shape American intentions in Vietnam. Pearson was fearful that the more reckless elements in Washington, such as US Air Force General Curtis Lemay, might push Johnson to widen

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and even “nuclearize” the war, which would have had dramatic and perhaps catastrophic effects upon the wider world, especially the balance of power in Europe. As ever, with the best of intent, Pearson made a call for American restraint in Vietnam at a speech at Temple University in April 1965. Despite its polite and even pro-American tone, the very questioning of American motives and methods in Vietnam drove Johnson into a fury that led to an impolite and vulgar “dressing down” of Pearson by Johnson at Camp David.<sup>31</sup> Given the sensitivity of the open wound that Vietnam was becoming to America in general, and Johnson’s presidency in particular, even “quiet diplomacy” could only serve to degrade relations between an American administration obsessed with winning a war and a Canadian government seeking to limit that war’s impact and extent.

There was another seeming utility to Canada’s continued participation in the sham commissions: it gave Canadian politicians a good excuse for not overtly supporting the American war effort in Vietnam with soldiers.<sup>32</sup> As the American military became more and more committed to Vietnam and Southeast Asia, Washington increased its pressure on allies to assist. Paul Martin Sr., Minister for External Affairs in 1965, considered pulling out of the ICSC in June 1965, but rejected the possibility because in part, “membership in the Commission also enables us to resist pressure for direct Canadian involvement in the Vietnam situation.”<sup>33</sup> This continuing aspect of Canadian foreign policy was recently demonstrated in the Chrétien government’s surprising decision to undertake a role in the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, thereby giving it an excuse for not being able to support more fully American initiatives elsewhere, especially Iraq.

Donald Ross’s study of Canadian involvement in Vietnam provides an enlightening explanation for the perceived inconsistencies in Canadian policy and attitudes towards the Vietnam conflict. Ross argues that Canada’s Vietnam policy suffered from the tension and conflicts between three predominant groups within not only the policy-making elite, but throughout Canadian society in general.<sup>34</sup> The first group Ross labels as the “liberal-moderates,” and included key figures such as Pearson and Holmes. They sought to find a peaceful solution to the conflict through engagement on the Commissions, by compromise and by careful diplomacy with the United States. On one side of the “mainstream” liberal-moderates were the “Left-liberals” (essentially anti-American) who vehemently opposed Western interventions in the developing world, especially Asia. Members of this group included key figures in External such as Chester Ronning and Escott Reid, as well as writers voicing an antiwar opinion like Clare Culhane and Walter Scott.<sup>35</sup> On the other side were the “conservatives” (essentially pro-American), who felt that Canada should at least provide increased diplomatic and moral support for American policy. Holmes’ quote that opens this examination clearly points to the dilemma of the “liberal-moderates”. The problem for Canadian policy makers, especially for Holmes and Pearson, was that their “liberal-moderate” compromises often left all sides feeling betrayed, and their adoption of a policy that was deliberately ambiguous, while perhaps seemingly sophisticated, also created confusion and conflict. In Robert Bothwell’s assessment, “there was, therefore, an inherent contradiction in the Canadian role in Vietnam,”<sup>36</sup> that left the government open to charges of complicity. In a scathing but eloquent condemnation of Pearson’s “quiet diplomacy,” Canadian poet Dennis Lee pointed out what to the “left Liberals” was the ultimate cost of compromise:

*In a bad time, people, from an outpost of empire I write  
Bewildered, though on about living. It is to set down a nation's  
Failure of nerve; I mean complicity...  
The humiliations of imperial necessity  
Are an old story, though it does not  
Improve in the telling and no man*

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*Believes it of himself.  
Why bring up genocide? Why bring up  
Acquiescence, profiteering?... Doesn't the  
Service of quiet diplomacy require dirty hands?*<sup>37</sup>

By 1966, the failure of Pearson's "quiet diplomacy" and the Seaborne Mission, as well as the increasing irrelevance of the ICSC and increasing irrationality and emotion of the Johnson Administration virtually paralysed Canadian policy on Vietnam. As Donald Ross has pointed out:

The Canadian government was almost silent on Vietnam publicly after 1968 both because the issue area was judged too hot for rational debate, and because there was no pressing requirement that Ottawa take a stand on any aspect of the sordid mess in Indochina. The ICSC for Vietnam had been effectively dead since 1965...there was literally nothing for the External staff to do but wait for the call to armistice supervision.<sup>38</sup>

Canada's continued participation on what had clearly become a "sham commission," as well as all its other well-intentioned efforts, pointed to the problems created by a policy predicated on the dilemma of hope. *Hope* became the chief driving principle of Canada's Vietnam policy, but, as American general, Gordon Sullivan has pointed out, "hope is not a method."<sup>39</sup> Moreover, altruistic Canadian motives were further complicated by the pragmatic realization that Canadians and Americans, in the final analysis, shared the same overarching strategic goal—the containment of communism. Pearson and Johnson, however, disagreed on the means necessary to achieve this containment, especially in Southeast Asia, and the result was misunderstanding and rancour between the two leaders, as demonstrated by Pearson's Philadelphia speech and its effect upon Johnson.

Interestingly enough, the hopes so clearly evidenced by Pearson, Holmes, and other policymakers within External Affairs were not shared by their military advisors. As early as 1959, Canadian senior officers had voiced their opinion that Canada should quit the ICSC in order to avoid the conflicting demands it created. The Senior Canadian Military Advisor on the ICSC in 1958-1959, Brigadier D. G. Ketcheson, was quoted as saying, "the ICC/VN [ICSC Vietnam] no longer serves free world interests."<sup>40</sup> The inherent contradictions in and the deliberate ambiguity of External Affairs' policy was already at this point causing distress within the Department of National Defence (DND), who were by necessity and perhaps by culture the most close in co-operating with the Americans. In the case of Vietnam, this led to an ironic divergence of opinion between the "mandarins" of External Affairs in Ottawa, and those delegates and officers actually on the ground in Vietnam.<sup>41</sup> John Holmes, the man chiefly responsible for Canada's continued participation in the ICSC, defended the government's policy of increasing partisanship against the accusation of "complicity" in American foreign policy. In an essay published in 1971, Holmes defended the Canadian delegation's increasing partisanship on the ICSC:

It would be wrong to attribute the cautious Canadian attitudes on Vietnam to U.S. pressure...Ottawa regarded the American intervention as a response to violation, rather than calculated imperial expansion... [T]he single-minded advocacy of one party by the Poles pushed the Canadians into protecting the rights of the other.<sup>42</sup>

To Holmes, Canada's *only* option on the ICSC was to compromise itself by supporting the West's interests against the obvious Polish advocacy of North Vietnam's position, thus leading to the eventual complete loss of legitimacy and effectiveness of that body. Yet, was increased partisanship Canada's only or even best option? It may seem in retrospect that a more effective approach would have been for Canada to pull



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out of the ICSC once it had proven hopelessly stalemated and at odds with the broader goals of Canadian foreign policy. As already discussed, this was precisely the advice given by the Senior Military Member of the ICSC, Brigadier Ketchison, as early as 1959. Perhaps in doing so, Canada could have sent a clear message to not only the belligerents, but to the international community at large, that at least one nation refused to be a party to a pathetic peacekeeping facade in Southeast Asia. Holmes, when considering this argument, admitted:

Canada did have one weapon it could have used: it could always threaten to walk out if the attitudes of the parties were too outrageous.... Perhaps we should have used this form of blackmailmanship [sic] and packed up, thereby saving the country frustration and humiliation and criticism of the Commission for failing to do what it was never expected to do—enforce the peace in Indochina.... We never walked out because we feared the vacuum that would be created if we did.... Perhaps it wouldn't have made much difference if we had pulled out, but I am sure that we were right not to take the chance.<sup>43</sup>

Holmes further argued that, "virtually all Canadian vets of Indochina have returned with more hawkish attitudes than prevail at home."<sup>44</sup> This statement appeared to be an attempt to justify the Canadian government's policy by pointing to what Holmes claimed were the attitudes of those who had actually seen the problem up close, and were therefore in the best position to decide. Statements by actual veterans, however, contradict Holmes' assertion. Squadron Leader Hugh Campbell, an ICSC member from 1961 to 1963, bluntly stated:

I was bloody ashamed of the things I was required to do because of the External Affairs Department policy in Vietnam.... There are men, Canadians, there [in Vietnam] trying to build a career. To antagonize the Americans would have restricted their futures. I don't recall any occasion when I saw anything in print that we should cover for the Americans, but at the same time, if you did not, you'd be in a very difficult position.<sup>45</sup>

Brigadier Chubb, himself no dove, had an excellent opportunity to examine up close, with the very best information available, the effects of Canadian policy in Vietnam. His concluding thoughts on his entire tour were:

I feel that as an individual I leave here sadder and wiser for having been. Sadder because I find it impossible to accept the policy of my own government; I feel very strongly that it is not an honest one in spite of the efforts made by various officials to justify our presence in this unfortunate country.<sup>46</sup>

Why did this gap between the policy makers and the policy executors develop? Holmes' attitude towards the people whose foreign policy he was helping to shape may provide a key to understanding why there seemed to be a disconnect between the foreign policy shapers in Ottawa, and their field hands in Vietnam. What is most striking is Holmes' surprisingly dismissive attitude toward the majority of Canadians, whom he described as, "...the Lumpen Middle, brainwashed by television, that is least aware of the fact that Canada is not itself at war in Vietnam."<sup>47</sup> This statement is all the more surprising because the media coverage of the Vietnam conflict suggests that the Canadian public actually had a fairly good awareness of what was going on. Clearly, the above quote reflects the frustration Holmes felt at trying to develop a policy that was an effective and palatable compromise between what Donald Ross has labelled the "conservative" (pro-American) view and the "left-liberal" (anti-American) position which were in constant conflict not only within the Canadian public, but within successive Canadian governments and within External Affairs itself. Attempts at compromise by Holmes and Pearson created a policy that was both ambiguous and ambivalent.<sup>48</sup> Moreover, it often resulted in a policy that was difficult to translate and communicate to

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the Canadian public in general, and even those who were tasked to execute it. Holmes himself pointed this out:

When I visited Vietnam in the spring of 1955...the solid work of the Commission was finished and the frustration was becoming more and more apparent. The morale and enthusiasm of the Canadians... was quite remarkable, but I recall reporting on my return how difficult I thought it would be for them to sustain for a long period when they could see little success in what they were doing.... It is pretty galling for them, therefore, to be told by fellow citizens who do not trouble to study the record that the Commissions have been nothing but a farce and that they have been nothing but the docile agents of the Americans.<sup>49</sup>

Thus, the deliberate ambiguity of Canadian policy in Vietnam exposed and magnified the extant cultural differences between the policymakers in External Affairs who were seemingly comfortable with the ambiguities of the policy and the diplomats and soldiers who were unhappy with the seeming muddle. Even within External Affairs, conflict eroded consensus and eventually led to a “paralysis” in Canadian policy. To some degree, the sheer institutional inertia caused by this paralysis would keep Canada involved in the ineffective and unfortunate Commission for almost twenty years, until 1973.<sup>50</sup> But the freeze could not last forever, as events both in America and in Vietnam would shake the Commission, and Canada, out of its winter of discontent.

### **Hop Springs Eternal—The International Commission on Control and Supervision**

As the Nixon Administration attempted to negotiate its way out of Vietnam in a “peace with honour” at the Paris Peace Conference in 1972-3, the Canadians were once again diplomatically press-ganged into serving on a truce supervisory body in Indochina. Despite its better judgement, and the ignominious history of the ICSC, the government of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau accepted a place as one of the four countries on the “new and improved” International Commission on Control and Supervision (ICCS), along with Hungary, Indonesia, and Poland, (the CHIP nations). American officials had made it plain to the Canadian Minister of External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, that the fragile and politically important Paris Peace Accords would be placed in real jeopardy if Canada declined participation in the ICCS. Presented with yet another offer it could not refuse, the Trudeau government agreed to participate, if only to help the United States extricate itself from the Vietnam quagmire that now threatened more important aspects of U.S.-Canadian relations. But Canadians would no longer tolerate an open-ended commitment, and a two-month deadline was set.<sup>51</sup>

In a marked departure from the “quiet diplomacy” of the Pearson era, Sharp and Trudeau decided from the outset that the Canadian delegation to the ISSC “would consider itself free to publicize the proceedings as it saw fit—which in due course became known as the ‘open-mouth’ policy”<sup>52</sup> From the outset, it appears that Canadian officials, especially Sharp, were pessimistic about the outcome of the ICCS. In order to give the ICCS more credibility and relevance, Sharp tabled a draft resolution to the International Conference on Vietnam (the Paris peace talks) that would have allowed the ICCS to forward its reports to the Secretary General of the United Nations, who could then forward them to the Security Council for comment or action. This resolution was summarily rejected by both sides, much to Sharp’s disappointment.<sup>53</sup> The ISSC was to be no more powerful or effective than its progenitor, the ICSC.

The ICCS picked up almost exactly where the ICSC had left off. Headquartered in the ICSC's old building in Saigon, and organised almost exactly like its predecessor, save for the four vice three nations, the ICCS was sabotaged from the outset.<sup>54</sup> The Hungarian and Polish officers at the team sites were not given the “delegated authority”

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to investigate alleged violations by their superiors and, as a result, the Canadian and Indonesian representatives often found themselves investigating alone.<sup>55</sup> Even more frustrating was the requirement for unanimity of opinion on not just findings, but even on *evidence*.<sup>56</sup> In reality, there was no truce to supervise—both sides were fighting major engagements, regardless of the Paris Agreements or the ICCS. In a confidential signal to Ottawa, the Canadian delegation to the ICCS reported that: “[I]t is incontestable that the ceasefire has not... been effective throughout Vietnam... [a] **total of six thousand sixty incidents have been reported between Jan 28 and Mar 14** [sic].”<sup>57</sup> A later message spelled out that the Polish and Hungarian representatives were clearly blocking any ICCS action, much to the growing consternation of the Canadian delegation.<sup>58</sup> This time, however, Ottawa vented its frustrations publicly, following its “open-mouth policy,” but its public castigation only served to undermine Canada’s position further vis-à-vis the United States and Vietnam.<sup>59</sup> When two Canadian officers were detained by the North Vietnamese as “spies,” and another was killed when his helicopter was shot down “mistakenly,” Ottawa was moved to action.<sup>60</sup> For the first time ever, Canada withdrew unilaterally from a peacekeeping role. Although Canada had gone for all the right reasons, there were no more illusions about the effectiveness of “Commissions” in Indochina. The last Canadian peacekeeper left Vietnam in July 1973, ending almost twenty years of frustration and failure.

The Commission’s eulogy was written even before its death by Canadian delegate R.D. Jackson:

The International Commission for Supervision and Control has for much of its existence been an ineffectual and rather pathetic body. In recent years, problems from without and within rendered it a veritable vegetable of an institution... Its achievements fell pitifully short of what was expected of it. It squandered its time, it frittered away its energies, it consumed its own resources, while the smoke and flames of war engulfed it. A victim in part of the perversity of nations, it also became a sad monument to poorly conceived and poorly employed international machinery. The Canadian delegation trusts that it at least provided all concerned with experience that can be usefully applied in the future.<sup>61</sup>

## Lessons Learned

What can Canada’s twenty-year involvement in the Vietnam conflict tell us about Canadian foreign and defence policy, and those who formulate and execute it? There are seven lessons that emerge from the peculiar Canadian quagmire in Vietnam. First, Canada’s policy in Vietnam, and especially the “liberal-moderate” tendency to support American political ends but disagree with American military means, points unequivocally to the difficult “acceptance of paradox” that has formed a central tenet and conundrum for much of Canadian foreign policy, including the current debate over support for the American intervention in Iraq.<sup>62</sup> This “acceptance of paradox” and the “liberal-moderate” tendency towards compromise often results in a foreign policy that seems reactive, confusing and incoherent, both to the Canadian public, and to the world at large. These charges were precisely the ones being levelled at the Chrétien government’s policy over Iraq; when asked if Canada was for or against the American position, the Chrétien answer was an unequivocal “maybe.”<sup>63</sup> If anything, then, Canadian policymakers have been consistent in their inconsistency—trying hard not to choose any one side and often maintaining a deliberately ambiguous foreign policy in order to walk the tightrope between all.

The second observation to be made from the history of the ICSC and ICCS is the significant role that Canadian soldiers played in the execution of foreign policy, and not



just in the military realm. Canadian Army officers on the ICSC were expected to be, in Holmes' words, "soldiers, diplomats, and judges," and by his own admission, those officers sent to Vietnam fulfilled these often complex and contradictory roles with skill and aplomb.<sup>64</sup> Canada's involvement in Vietnam, therefore, points to the peculiar Canadian penchant for sending soldiers to do the job of diplomats or humanitarians. As seen, the military component of the ICSC, when the right pre-conditions had been set, had no difficulty in achieving its goals. The success of the first 300 days of the ICSC in disengaging French and Vietnamese forces and in establishing governmental authority on either side of the DMZ points to this. But military personnel cannot be consistently expected to solve political, humanitarian and diplomatic problems beyond their scope, and beyond their mandate. Ironically enough, as we have seen, DND was adamant that it have no formal say in the policy it was expected to execute, despite the fact that the

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twenty-year commitment to the Commissions was a significant drain on the Canadian Army's resources in a theatre that was of little strategic importance to Canada. Soldiers continue to play a key role in the execution of Canadian foreign policy, especially at the operational and tactical levels. They create the miracle of transubstantiation of foreign policy; they are the physical manifestations of the hot air and cold ink of debate and policy transformed into the warm flesh and hard fact of physical reality. Yet, if soldiers are to understand and implement policy, then perhaps they must also have some contribution into the direction of policy. The Vietnam experience suggests that in future, DND in general, and Canadian Forces (CF) officers in particular, may wish to have more formal input into the foreign policy of their nation. This change would have implications not just for the training of officers, but also for the closer interaction, or even integration of elements of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and DND. It would also allow an increased harmonization and synchronization between policy makers, and policy executors, and may remove some of the friction and frustration so evident in the reaction of ICSC members such as Brigadier Chubb. Increased input into foreign policy debates can only enhance the ability of the CF and its officers and troops in the execution of policy.<sup>65</sup> As historian Harry Summers has pointed out, American politicians and military leaders have learned to harmonize their political and military strategies from their mistakes in Vietnam.<sup>66</sup> Perhaps it is fitting that Canada learn the same lesson from the same conflict, but from a different perspective.

Thirdly, Canadian experience in Vietnam points to Canada's dilemma of being a very junior partner in its own defence. Heavy dependence upon the United States for its security forced Canada into seeming complicity in American policy in Vietnam, and into participation in the sham Commissions that were the source of so much frustration for Canadian diplomats and soldiers alike. Dependence upon an ally is, in itself, not a negative thing; in fact, from a strategic, geo-political and economic point of view, such dependence seems a highly pragmatic solution to the dilemma of Canadian security.<sup>67</sup> But it must be recognized that the economic and strategic advantages of being able to rely so heavily on another nation for our security are purchased only at the concomitant price of the surrender of some of our sovereignty and independence. Moreover, increasing cultural, economic and security convergence with the United States has, in fact, eroded Canadian political sovereignty. Canadian governments may choose to stand apart from American policies, but given our close ties, there will nevertheless be widespread disagreement and disappointment on both sides the border. As the John Holmes' quote that opened this study so vividly pointed out, even the broadest possible compromise is likely to offend a significant portion of the population. Canada's role in Vietnam points most clearly to this dilemma. Moreover, the chance of giving offence is increased if an already contentious policy is then ineffectively communicated or implemented. While Canadian governments should not allow themselves to be railroaded by their giant American friend and neighbour into decisions that they morally or ethically oppose, the onus remains on the policy maker to communicate that policy in an effective and understandable manner. In both the historical case of Vietnam, and apparently in the current case of Iraq, the Canadian government has failed this test.

Pearson's "quiet diplomacy", the reaction to his speech in Philadelphia by Lyndon Johnson, and the failure of Sharp's "open-mouth" diplomacy to have any serious effect on American conduct of the war also point to the conclusion that disagreement with American actions must be done with tact, or it will inevitably prove counterproductive to the aims of Canadian policy, and to the wider Canadian-American relationship. Here, again, Chrétien's unwillingness or inability to curb the more vocal "left-liberals" in his government from their emotional anti-American and *ad hominem* attacks on the Bush administration over the Iraq question have proven highly counterproductive and



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potentially damaging.<sup>68</sup> As seen by the historical example of Vietnam, the American *juggernaut* is little influenced by high-minded Canadian rhetoric, and “open-mouth” diplomacy is seldom of much effect.

Perhaps the most relevant deduction that can be made about the current rift in the Canada-US relationship in light of the Vietnam experience is that it is highly unlikely to inflict permanent damage upon the friendship between Canada and the United States. Despite the dire predictions of many pundits that Canada’s position on Iraq will permanently and significantly damage the Canada-U.S. relationship,<sup>69</sup> history seems to indicate otherwise. Successive Canadian governments disagreed with the means used to accomplish American policy in Vietnam, and at times that disagreement was open and angry. But the disagreement focussed on the *means* used, and not on the ultimate goal—the establishment of a free and democratic South Vietnam, and solidarity in the face of the Communist threat. Short of declaring open support for Saddam Hussein’s regime, the Chrétien government cannot fundamentally alter the deep and continuing relationship between the people of the United States and Canada. The governments can disagree on this one issue, but as amply evidenced by the public outcry in both Canada and the United States, the two North American peoples will continue to consider themselves family.<sup>70</sup>

Another lesson gleaned from the experience of the ICSC and ICCS points to the difficulty in reliance upon multilateral international institutions that have neither the will nor the means to enforce their mandate. The ICSC’s impotence in the face of the intransigence and transgressions by all sides in the Vietnamese conflict, and the humiliation and frustration this caused Canadian soldiers, diplomats and politicians should serve as a stark reminder for future Canadians to ensure that future international institutions have the “teeth” required to execute their mandates, or they will be doomed to irrelevance at best and abject failure at worst. The United Nations is clearly the most obvious of Canada’s cherished multilateral foundations, and Canadian diplomats should perhaps focus on how to re-create the UN to overcome its past failures, especially in light of the impasse and its impotence in disarming Iraq. No less a personage than the preceding UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, called for this himself.<sup>71</sup> Other multilateral international institutions embraced by Canada need to receive the same scrutiny for effectiveness, including the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Accord. Care should also be taken not to undermine those effective multilateral organizations that Canada has come to rely upon, including NATO. The road to Hell is not necessarily paved with good intentions, but it is most certainly travelled by organizations without the will or ability to translate those good intentions into good acts.

Lastly, despite the accusations of some writers that Canada’s participation in the ICSC and ICCS was motivated by economic or other “immoral” factors, it seems clear that Canada’s twenty-year involvement in Vietnam reflected a dilemma of hope and the limits and complexities of “middlepowermanship”. In John Holmes own words, “for a ‘middle power-in-training,’ [it was] a rough but useful lesson in the need to live with paradox and to recognize that morality in international politics is prismatic.”<sup>72</sup> For Canada, like the United States, involvement in Vietnam became a “hell of good intentions.” Proponents of an ethically-based foreign policy must be aware of this potential trap, and be ever mindful that the best of intentions can produce the worst of outcomes if the means to achieve those high-minded ends are not carefully considered and painstakingly crafted. The most recent Canadian foreign policy, as outlined in *Freedom from Fear: Canada’s Foreign Policy for Human Security*, is very idealistic in its language and intent, creating some concern for this author that Canadians may not have learned their lessons from Vietnam, or from Bosnia, Rwanda and a host of other Hells created by our good intentions.<sup>73</sup> In the real world, intent counts for little, but effect counts for much.

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## Conclusion

Canada became involved in Vietnam for reasons that were both ethically and pragmatically sound, but the instrument of that policy—the ICSC—was fatally flawed from the outset. Its initial “success” in supervising the French withdrawal planted the seeds of its own demise, as the military peace created by the Geneva Accords paved the way for the possibility of elections that neither the South Vietnamese regime, nor the Americans, nor eventually Canada, wanted. At this point, the right thing to do for Canada may have been to exit the ICSC and avoid the paradox of being a partial advocate on a supposedly impartial commission. Canada, however, allowed itself to be trapped by a dilemma of hope. Like a man struggling in quicksand, Pearson and Holmes’ well-intentioned efforts aimed at the laudable goal of helping our chief ally, while still remaining impartial in Vietnam, led only to increasing moral compromise. As American involvement in Vietnam deepened, these two goals of Canadian policy became increasingly mutually exclusive. Repeated compromise led to silent and unhappy complicity, which inevitably led to conflict as a succession of Canadian policymakers fought to find a tenable middle ground where there was none. The deliberate ambiguity of Canada’s position led to an inconsistent and at times incoherent policy that eventually became mired in frustration and misunderstanding both within Canada, and externally with the United States. Only when Trudeau and Sharp ended the ambiguity with their explicit refusal to remain a hostage to hope by quitting the ISSC was Canada able to escape the hell of good intentions that was Vietnam.

Canadians can and should learn many important lessons about the formulation and execution of foreign policy and about the difficulties of being a junior but sovereign member of the North American family from their unique experience with Vietnam. While foreign and defence policy must have an ethical component, it cannot rely on hope as its chief instrument, and must take into account the unique and pragmatic realities that confront Canada. In Vietnam, the Canadian government’s good intentions created a road to Hell that was made all the more slippery by a policy designed to be deliberately ambiguous. Shapers of future foreign and defence policy must be aware of this potential trap, and be ever mindful that good intentions do not easily or even ultimately translate into good outcomes.

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## About the Author...

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## Endnotes

1. Quoted in Thakur, p. 73.
2. See Ross, pp. 203-231; and Levant, pp. 132-3.
3. Levant, pp. 121- 141.
4. For evidence of Diem’s determination to subvert the elections, see Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam: A History*. (New York: Penguin, 1983) pp. 213-239. Ross makes a similar conclusion in his work, pp. 181-184.
5. For more detail, see Stanley Karnow, pp. 213-239.
6. Ross examines in detail the elections issue, pp. 160-202.
7. See “Geneva Accords,” in Thakur, pp. 293-296.
8. Thakur, p. 83.
9. See Eays, pp. 221-242.
10. See Thakur, pp. 82-88.

11. See Thakur, pp. 86-88, and Eayrs, pp 225-250.
12. Again, Ross examines this issue in detail, pp. 221- 254; see also Levant, p. 151-159.
13. See "Canada In The Pentagon Papers." *The Canadian Forum*, September, 1973, pp. 9-12. These are reprints in full, including classified portions, of The Pentagon Papers leaked by Daniel Ellsberg in 1973. They pertain specifically to the Seaborne mission.
14. See "Canada in the Pentagon Papers," pp. 13-19.
15. Levant, p. 181.
16. Thakur, p. 113.
17. See *Chubb's Folly*, Vol. 2, p. 140.
18. Bothwell, p.110.
19. Brigadier H. Chubb, *Chubb's Folly*, Vol. 2, p. 48.
20. Quoted in Eayrs, p. 251.
21. John Holmes, quoted in Eayrs, p. 283.
22. *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 28 January 1970; for a more detailed discussion, see Levant, pp. 191-196, and Eayrs, pp. 242-250.
23. See Levant, pp. 194-196.
24. Brigadier H. Chubb, *Chubb's Folly*, Vol. 2, p. 87.
25. Brigadier Chubb entertained, or was entertained by Americans practically on a daily basis, and found it "quite natural," to be giving a briefing on ICSC activities and on Hanoi's regime to the American Embassy; see *Chubb's Folly*, Vol.2, p. 8. See also Bothwell, p. 110.
26. Brigadier Chubb, *Chubb's Folly*, Vol. 2, p. 144-5.
27. See Fred Gaffen's collection of memoirs from Canadian Vietnam Veterans, *Unknown Warriors: Canadians in the Vietnam War* (Toronto: Dundurn, 1990), or Tracey Arrial *I Volunteered: Canadian Vietnam Vets Remember* (Watson and Dwyer, 1996).
28. This close connection has been treated in-depth by a number of authors; see, for instance, James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada, Volume 4: Growing Up Allied*. (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1980), and *In Defence of Canada, Volume 3: Peacemaking and Deterrence*. (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1972); see also, James Minifie, *Peacemaker or Powder-Monkey: Canada's Role in a Revolutionary World*. (Toronto: McClelland Stewart, 1960), and J. Granatstein, *Canadian Foreign Policy since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite?* (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1969).
29. This is the title of Levant's book on Vietnam; see above for reference. See also Ross, pp. 324-375.
30. See Karnow, pp. 383-474.
31. See Ross, pp 258-263, and Charles Ritchie, "The Day LBJ confronted LBP," *Maclean's*, Jan. 1974.
32. Granatstein, "Did Canada Make a Difference," p.226.
33. DEA Memorandum entitled "Vietnam: Future of the Commission," quoted in Bothwell, p.109
34. See Ross, pp. 4-34.
35. See Claire Culhane's book, *Why is Canada in Vietnam? The Truth about our Foreign Aid* (Toronto: NC Press, 1972). Levant's book *Quiet Complicity*, is the best example of this view; see also articles such as Walter Stewart, "Proudly We Stand as Butcher's Helper in Southeast Asia," *Maclean's*, March, 1970; Jim Lotz, "A Modest Proposal," *The Canadian Forum*, September, 1969; and Fred Knelman, "Canadians Find Profit in the War Business," *Toronto Star*, October 1, 1970, all reprinted in *International Involvement.*, ed. Hugh Innis (Toronto: McGraw- Hill Ryerson, 1972) pp. 47-56.
36. Bothwell, p.110.
37. Dennis Lee, "Civil Elegies", quoted in Charles Taylor, preface.
38. Ross pp. 23-24.
39. General Gordon Sullivan, *Hope is Not a Method* (New York: Random House) 1996.
40. Quoted in a US Embassy Saigon Report, 28 Jan 1959, in Bothwell, p. 110.
41. See also Bothwell, p. 99.
42. John Holmes, "Canada and the Vietnam War," *War and Society in North America*, eds. J. Granatstein and R. Cuff. (Toronto: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1971) pp. 186-188.
43. Holmes, "Geneva," p. 75
44. Holmes, "Canada and the Vietnam War," p. 189.
45. *Toronto Globe and Mail*, February 16, 1966, quoted in Levant, p. 174.
46. Brigadier Chubb, *Chubb's Folly*, vol 2. p. 212.
47. Holmes, "Canada and the Vietnam War," p. 196.
48. Ross's work *In the Interests of Peace* is a brilliant and detailed look at the tensions between these three views of Canadian Foreign Policy; see especially pp. 2-34.
49. Holmes, "Geneva," p. 72.
50. For an examination of this "freeze", see Ross, pp. 22-323; Bothwell, pp. 99-112.
51. Mitchell Sharp describes the evolution of Canada's participation in detail in his memoirs, *Which Reminds Me...* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991) pp. 212-216. See also The Honorable Mitchell Sharp, *Vietnam: Canada's Approach to Participation in the International Commission of Control and Supervision* (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1973). For another view, see W.M. Dobbell, "A 'sow's ear' in Vietnam," *International Journal*, Volume 24, No. 3 (Summer, 1974), pp. 359-362.
52. Sharp, *Reminds*, p.213.
53. Sharp, *Reminds*, pp. 214-215.

54. See, for instance, Colonel D.G. Loomis, "An Expedition to Vietnam: the Military Component of the Canadian Delegation (MCCD), 1973," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Spring 1974), pp. 35-39, and *International Commission of Control and Supervision Military Component Canadian Delegation Vietnam Yearbook* (n.d., n.p) in CFC Library.
55. See ICCS (Vietnam) LORE Team, "Canadian Land Ordnance Engineers in Vietnam, 1973 (part 1)," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Summer 1975) pp. 45-51.
56. LORE Team report, pp. 50-51.
57. Message, CANDELSAIGON to EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OTTAWA 21 MARCH 73, included as Annex to Sharp, *Report on Vietnam*, p. 32.
58. Message, CANDELSAIGON to EXTERNAL AFFAIRS 26 MARCH 73, in Sharp, *Report on Vietnam*, pp. 40-51.
59. See Levant, p. 235-239, and Dobbell, pp.362-365, 390-392.
60. For further information on these incidents, see Loomis, "An Expedition", pp. 37-29, and Levant, pp. 234-239, and 247-250.
61. R.D Jackson, ICSC for Vietnam, *Minutes*, 770th Meeting, 13 Mar 03, DEA Files, 2-500052-A-12-40, quoted in Ross, p. 24.
62. This is in fact the title of a collection of essays in honour of John Holmes', and is taken from a passage Holmes wrote in his work, *The Better Part of Valour*.
63. See, for instance, Daniel Leblanc, "Mixed Messages on Where Ottawa stands, and sails," *The Globe and Mail*, 29 March 2003, p. A11.
64. Holmes, "Geneva," p.70.
65. These conclusions are echoed by many officers in the aftermath of nearly a decades worth of experience in the Balkans and elsewhere. See, for instance, Major-General Lewis Mackenzie *Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo*. (Toronto: Douglas and McIntyre, 1993) pp. 330-334; or Colonel Mike Ward, "Task Force Kosovo: Adapting Operations to a Changing Security Environment," *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol .1, No. 1. pp. 67-74.
66. See Harry Summers, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (New York: Dell Publishing, 1984), and *On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War* (New York: Dell Publishing, 1992), pp. 1-138.
67. For an excellent examination of this, see Joel Sokolsky, "Clausewitz, Canadian Style" *Canadian Military Journal* Vol. 3, No.3 (Autumn 2002) pp. 3-10.
68. See, for example, "What the Liberals have said about the U.S." *National Post*, 26 March 2003, p. A1.
69. See, for example, J.L. Granatstein, "The Empire Strikes Back," *National Post*, 26 March 2003, A17.
70. See Granatstein, "The Empire Strikes Back", and Terence Corcoran, "The US was there for Canada," *National Post*, 26 March 2003, p. A17. For a similar but slightly different view, see Jeffrey Simpson, "They're Mars, we're Venus," , *The Globe and Mail*, 21 March 2003, p. A21.
71. See Kofi Annan, "U.N. must rediscover unity of purpose," Statement to Security Council, 28 March 2003, *Toronto Star*, 29 March 2003.
72. Holmes, quoted in Eayrs, p. 283.
73. *Freedom from fear: Canada's foreign policy for human security* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2002).

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## **NOTE TO FILE—AFGHANISTAN: WHAT WE THOUGHT WE KNEW OF THE SOVIET EXPERIENCE**

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**Dr. Sean M. Maloney**

It was the early 1990s, Germany was no longer just West Germany and the first Canadian members of the European Community Monitor Mission were deployed to the collapsing, nearly former Yugoslavia. Nestled in the Schwarzwald lay 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade, its members uneasy about the future of the formation after the Berlin Wall was dismantled. There were still 200 000 Russian troops in eastern Germany and the intelligence staff kept one eye on them, even though most of the staff's attention was directed at producing vehicle recognition guides depicting Yugoslav kit. The Soviets had vacated Afghanistan nearly two years previously: it was old news. Yet a briefing package called "Afghanistan-Soviet Lessons Learned"<sup>1</sup> was put together which would ultimately gather dust in the 4 CMB filing system after the Brigade intelligence staff downgraded the document for historical use and redacted a very minor portion of it.

I have taken this original briefing pack and edited it into a coherent read, [with my comments in brackets]. As with all products from those days, the Canadian authors were unlisted. A note of caution: numerous books exist on the Soviet experience in Afghanistan: Les Grau and David Isby are the best-known authors. Their works are critical to anybody's understanding of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan and what follows should be read alongside them.

### **Afghanistan–Soviet Lessons Learned**

Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, Moscow's intention was to limit its actions to a supporting role for the Afghan Army by occupying cities; providing air cover; and establishing defensive positions [NOTE: this is similar to the current ISAF strategy in southern Afghanistan]. The initial Soviet force was drawn largely from central Asian reserve units composed of troops ethnically related to the Afghans. These units proved less than effective and were soon replaced by regular Soviet forces. Throughout the conflict, the Soviets have concentrated on five basic objectives: establish control of the cities and towns; protect lines of communications; drive insurgents into isolated areas away from their population and support; eliminate resistance centres; and deny outside aid and sanctuary.

The Soviets have been less than successful in meeting any of these objectives completely. The reasons for this include the fact that the Mujahideen operates freely in most towns and even gained control of sections of the cities the Soviets were controlling. In addition, the lines of communications are regularly disrupted by guerilla attacks making self-protection a primary task for the Soviets. More importantly, Pakistan has remained the pipeline for arms and a sanctuary for rebels [NOTE: the current Taliban and affiliated insurgents have not achieved the first of these, but the second and third conditions, particularly the problem with Pakistan, exist today]. Despite bombings (both air and sabotage) Pakistan remained a pipeline. These measures were designed to put political pressure on Pakistan, not military pressure, that is, not designed to choke off deliveries by destroying them.

From the outset, it was the Soviet intention to "Afghanize" the war by providing a military shield behind which the regime and its security forces could strengthen to the point where the Mujahideen was no longer a mortal threat to their survival and to attrit the resistance, rather than defeat it. The ultimate defeat of the Mujahideen was to be





Справочник

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left to Afghan forces, once Soviet forces had disengaged from combat. Shielding operations involved a mix of limited offensive operations and defensive deployment with priority to Soviet bases and garrisons, lines of communications from the USSR, principal Afghan urban centres and above all Kabul.

Standard Soviet doctrine has not worked in Afghanistan, and even the highest Soviet levels recognized this. General Kulikov, Commander in Chief Warsaw Pact, stated in April 1987 that "in general, it is difficult to apply the experience of Afghanistan

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to a modern war such as could be waged in Europe....war in Afghanistan is very strange.”

Although their goal was to support the Afghan Army, one of the major problems the Soviets faced was their inability to build the Afghan Armed Forces into a viable independent fighting force [NOTE: ISAF is faced with this problem today]. KHAD, Sarandi, [Communist Afghan security forces], co-opted tribes and militias have been just as, if not more important, than the army per se.

Initially, the Soviets had hoped for a quick victory thinking that just the presence of the Soviet war machine would suppress the rebel activity. However, by 1980/81 they realized that a quick victory was not possible and made no attempt to gain one. They estimated that they would require at least 400 000 troops to gain control. The actual number they deployed was 120 000 which is far short of what Western analysts think is required. This was really designed to limit Soviet casualties.

In general, the campaign consisted of cautious, meticulously planned, tactical level (ie.: small scale) operations influenced by limited forces, difficult terrain, the enemy and a desire to minimize losses [NOTE: once again, these conditions apply to the Canadian situation today]. There was no attempt to decentralize command, control, and communications in Afghanistan. If anything, any modifications to the C3 system were directed at improving centralized control at the highest level [NOTE: a situation prevailing when certain American divisions are in command of OEF operations in Afghanistan]. They concentrated on detailed planning, better intelligence support, uninterrupted communications and centralized fire support. The effectiveness of the force was hindered throughout the war by limited flexibility and lack of responsiveness and initiative. Any local improvements have little application against NATO forces with sophisticated electronic warfare and counter-C3 capabilities [NOTE: the NATO referred to here is the NATO of the Cold War, not the NATO of today].

The tank as the primary weapon on the ground was soon dropped in Afghanistan. The Soviets withdrew the tank regiments from their motor rifle divisions and replaced them with standard motor rifle regiments, thus creating motor rifle divisions with four motor rifle regiments each. The motor rifle regiments did retain their tank battalions. As in Vietnam, the helicopter became one of the primary means of ground attack, troop transport and re-supply. Helicopters, together with increased numbers of Spetznaz [NOTE: Soviet special operations forces] allowed the conduct of reconnaissance, ambush, patrols, air assault and caravan interdiction operations [NOTE: the same missions the coalition Special Operations Forces conducts today]. Independent brigades each with a motor rifle regiment, air assault battalion, and multiple rocket launch battery were formed [NOTE: the Americans have employed similar combinations in Iraq which link special operations forces with the HIMARS rocket launch system].<sup>2</sup> Combined arms operations involving aircraft, motorized infantry (with tanks in suitable terrain) artillery, air assault and engineer elements became the norm, however large scale operations did not work. Conventional motorized rifle units were used primarily for less complicated tasks such as convoy and rear area security and perimeter defence of key terrain [NOTE: much in the same way 3 PPCLI and the Romanian contingent were employed at Kandahar Air Field]. Elite troops were used for specialized operations but still exercised considerable caution.

Both fast air fighter-bombers and helicopters have been used extensively. The introduction of Stinger and Blowpipe to the rebel inventory forced the FLOGGER, FITTER, and FROGFOOT [Soviet fighter-bomber aircraft] into high level delivery (ie.:

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reduced accuracy) and severely limited loiter time for helicopters. The Soviets did improve their suppression of air defence tactics with extensive use of chaff, flares and infrared suppression devices (reference the Mi-24 HIND). Air superiority was never really an issue, except along the border with Pakistan where numerous border violations occurred. Apart from the ground-based threat around Kabul and in actual combat, air missions were flown virtually unopposed. New high performance aircraft were not required or used.

After 1984 the Soviets made several improvements in firepower and mobility without a significant increase in actual manpower. They replaced towed guns with self-propelled guns; replaced BMP and BMD with BMP-2's [Note: which carried a 30mm gun that could be elevated to a high angle for use in mountains]; added the Vasilek automatic 83mm mortar; added 250mm mortars [Note: for desperately needed plunging fire in the hills and in built up areas]; added new 152mm guns; and added SU-25 FROGFOOT [NOTE: which was similar to the American A-10 WARTHOG]. Although these improvements were not specifically designed for Afghanistan, it did prove to be a valid proving ground for new equipment and basic employment tactics. The changes were driven more by availability of technology already under development than by a specific threat. Mine warfare played an important role. Minefields were used extensively for area denial, garrison security, and interdiction. Remotely-delivered mines (RDM) were employed to isolate enemy forces and deny resources and support.

The multi-disciplined, high-tech conventional intelligence collection capabilities of the Soviets are not designed to detect and follow a widely-dispersed, unconventional enemy [NOTE: neither are Canada's]. HUMINT is the primary source of intelligence for this type of operation [NOTE: but not employed effectively by Canada]. The Soviets did establish extensive spy and informant networks and also had access to normal combat intelligence. Their ability to correlate this wealth of information in a timely manner is the same problem we face [NOTE: and Canada continues to face today]. They adopted a system of increased visual reconnaissance, both by air and ground (much as the Americans did in Vietnam) to search and destroy enemy pockets.

Lack of initiative at the junior commander level has always existed in the Soviet army and no attempt was made to correct it in Afghanistan. In a high-intensity conflict against NATO, it is not seen as a problem by the Soviets. This low standard was also evident in poor discipline and terrible man management. Training in the Soviet Army has not been adjusted to develop an effective counterinsurgency force. Although some troops receive training in mountain warfare, the focus of training is still against a conventional enemy. On the other hand, recent exercises have reflected increased use of special operations such as air assaults using small units.

It seems that the Soviet military does not consider its operations in Afghanistan to be distinctive, nor that there is a requirement for counterinsurgency doctrine [NOTE: same as the Canadian Army]. Soviet military schools have not addressed the unique requirements of this type of combat, nor have Soviet military writers indicated the existence of specialized doctrine, forces or training to conduct such operations. The Soviets have passed on their experiences to client states with insurgent problems, such as Angola and Ethiopia.

On the positive side, the Soviets have gained in several areas from the experience. Ten percent of serving officers have combat experience. New weapons have been battle-tested. Intelligence collection and processing has improved at the tactical level. Air tactics have been modernized, at least against a limited ground-based threat.

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Mobilization procedures have been improved to make them harder to detect. In fact one division was mobilized and went completely undetected by Western intelligence during the mobilization phase. Soviet experiences in Afghanistan have had little impact on the overall doctrine, tactics, and organizations of Soviet forces facing NATO nor should they have. The Soviets may be better prepared to deal with internal security problems than before the invasion and may have a chance to find out if the situation in Armenia continues [NOTE: the Caucasus would within the year blow up into four separate conflicts].

## Afterword

As any reader will appreciate, this Canadian analysis was designed to assess the Soviet experience vis-à-vis their relationship to NATO's situation in the Central Region during the Cold War. It omits important considerations relating to Soviet efforts in what we would call CIMIC and developmental aid today. Most importantly, it did not and was not designed to address how the Soviet military campaign in Afghanistan related to ethnicity and tribalism in the region and what impact these factors had on the motivations for conflict. Indeed, any discussion of radical Islam, Saudi Arabian money, the Pakistani political scene and so forth would have been topics for other specialists. That said, the study does provide us with an interesting comparison to where the Canadian Army is at today in southern Afghanistan in some key areas.

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## Endnotes

1. 4CMBG Assessment "Afghanistan—Soviet Lessons Learned", no file number, dated 1991 (author's collection).
2. See Patricia Slayden Hollis, "OIF Hallmarks: Integrated Joint and Coalition Operations with Adaptable Commanders and Agile Planning and Execution," *Field Artillery Journal*, 3/1/2004.



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
# — BOOK REVIEWS —

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## WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY

CHUA, Amy. New York, Doubleday, 2003, 368 pages. \$21.00 CAN

Reviewed by Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Rostek, CD



The end of the Cold War in 1989 released the world from the grips of the bi-polar political framework heralding a new global security environment. Peace and prosperity were to be the hallmarks of this new world order. Globalization—the integration of the telecommunications and economic sectors that actually began in the 1970/80s—was now free to expand unconstrained. However, the world has become a much more dangerous place where intrastate conflict based on ethnic hatred and violence prevail. This disorder remains in evidence today and it is against this backdrop that Amy Chua's sets her book *World On Fire*.

Chua's thesis—the pursuit of free markets and democracy in the face of a market-dominant ethnic minority has resulted in ethnic conflict—runs counter to the pro-globalization belief that the market system is the most economically efficient system in the world and the anti-globalization belief that democracy is the fairest political system in the world. Her linking of ethnic violence to both democracy and free markets throughout the developing, non-Western world has seemingly been overlooked by many pro/anti-globalization writers and as such, it provides an intriguing and relatively new perspective on the effects of globalization.

The unintended consequences<sup>1</sup> of globalization, in particular the spread of free markets and democracy, continue to surface in various forms around the world. Chua makes this point patently clear through her unique analysis of market-dominant minorities—ethnic minorities who economically dominate impoverished indigenous majorities—that exists primarily, although not exclusively, throughout developing countries in the non-Western world. In many states, the current free market system focuses wealth in the hands of an ethnic minority and the pursuit of democracy focuses political power in the hands of the indigenous, impoverished majority leading to “ethnic conflagration.” Chua argues that a collision of the free market system and democratization is a global phenomenon extending from the Chinese in Southeast Asia, to the “whites” in Latin America, the Jews in Russia and the Lebanese in West Africa. Upon making her case at the state level, Chua then extends her thesis to regional—Israel—and global—United States (US) market-dominant minorities. The end result of this interplay between “markets,” “democracy” and “ethnicity”, notoriously difficult concepts to define,<sup>2</sup> results in “backlashes” against the market, democracy or the market-dominant minority. Chua optimistically prescribes a formula to confront market-dominant minorities head on through addressing “the biases and inherent dangers in both markets and democracy.”<sup>3</sup> However, she is also careful to point out what she is “not” arguing; that is, her theory is not universal, ethnic conflict does not only rise in the face of market-dominant minorities and that there is a no single cause to this phenomenon. As such, Chua provides a provocative look at the unintended



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consequences resultant of globalization or more specifically, the pursuit of free market democracy in the face of market-dominant minorities.

A great deal has been published on globalization and the effects of free markets and democracy, particularly since the end of the Cold War. Robert Kaplan's *The Coming Anarchy* and Thomas Freidman's *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* came before Chua's *World on Fire* but are often compared as they deal with similar subject matter.<sup>4</sup> A telling comparison between Freidman and Chua is offered by Keith Porter in his metaphorical conception of Chua and Freidman driving a car towards political and economic freedom; "while Freidman,..., would be pressing on the gas, Chua would be slowing the vehicle down and using caution as her guide."<sup>5</sup> Additionally, Chua herself references Freidman and Kaplan several times throughout the book (i.e. Freidman when discussing supporters of globalization<sup>6</sup> and Kaplan on global demographic trends respectively).<sup>7</sup> However, Chua's book is the first to link the current proliferation of ethnic hatred and violence to market-dominant minorities and the seemingly irresponsible spread of democracy.

Chua's thesis is well defended throughout her book; however, her thesis is repeatedly stated to the point that the reader is sure to get the message even at a casual reading of the book. In the words of Michelle Goldberg, "[h]er lawyerly penchant for summing up and reiterating her argument far too many times is the book's greatest flaw."<sup>8</sup> In addition, Chua also reiterates what she is "... not arguing in this book. I am distinctly not arguing that market dominant minorities are the source of all ethnic conflict or that market-dominant minorities are the only targets of ethnic persecution."<sup>9</sup> Despite being aware of this repetitive aspect while reading the book, it did not detract from the presentation as a whole and actually assisted in drawing the linkages between the numerous case studies Chua provides from the diverse regions around the world. As such, the repetitive nature of what Chua is or is not arguing is not of great consequence and may actually be helpful to the casual reader. Indeed, this very aspect may in part be responsible for *The Economist* honoring *World On Fire* as the best book of the year.<sup>10</sup>

Chua's arguments concerning the pursuit of free market democracy in the face of market-dominant minorities are well constructed throughout the book and particularly convincing with the Chinese in Southeast Asia. She states that "...no minority in Asia is, or has ever been, as stunningly wealthy or glaringly market-dominant as the ethnic Chinese communities of Southeast Asia, . . ." <sup>11</sup> Despite commenting that this phenomenon is not the source of all ethnic conflict, her argument tends to wane slightly when stretched to the global level in identifying the United States (US) as market-dominant minority. After all, the US is not an ethnic group and there is no global democracy. However, Chua goes on to explain that the US is generally "...viewed by the rest of the world as "one people"—and for that matter, a "white" people" <sup>12</sup> and uses the United Nations General Assembly "... as the closest thing there is to a world democratic government."<sup>13</sup> Throughout the book, Chua is never shy or prejudiced about presenting both sides of the argument as in the case above. In my opinion, this is the best quality of the book, even though at times, she may seem overtly provocative.

Chua's coverage of global conflict with respect to her thesis is impressive. She targets the majority of ethnic conflicts over the last decade in Southeast Asia, Latin America, Russia, Africa, Europe and The Middle East. Her anecdotal evidence is backed by 38 pages of notes exemplifying a rather impressive degree and sophistication to her research. Although Chua aptly demonstrates the existence of market-dominant minorities, she only marginally explains how these market-dominant minorities came to exist. To her credit, she does state that "... the pervasive existence of market-dominant minorities throughout the developing world is one of colonialism's most overlooked and most destructive legacies"<sup>14</sup> which appropriately appears in the African chapter. However, it would have been informative to expand further on the linkages between

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colonialism and market-dominant minorities due to arguments concerning neo-colonialism,<sup>15</sup> a term, interestingly enough, not used in Chua's book.

Chua's first eleven chapters are used to describe her thesis through a multitude of interesting and informative case studies. However, Chua offers only one chapter to discuss the possible solutions whereby one is immediately left with the impression that the solution may be overly simple. This could not be further from the truth. However, Chua manages to offer a reasonable strategy that although lacking detail (i.e. how to implement strategies), is easy to understand and follow. She is quick to point out that there are no "silver bullets" and the solution actually lies within the free market and democracy realms, only not in their current design. She points to South Africa's ". . . moment of rare ethnic reconciliation that has helped sustain South Africa's fragile democracy to this day"<sup>16</sup> and adds further that Western democracies did not occur overnight so why should we expect something more from developing and post-Communist countries today.<sup>17</sup>

*World On Fire* is about the unintended consequences of globalization since the end of the Cold War. An extremely interesting book written in an uncomplicated style, it allows the reader to digest the material easily and quickly. It is a timely book as its main argument deals with the increasing ethnic hatred and violence we have come to witness over the last decade. Chua's survey of the world's cultures, regions and states in defense of her thesis also provides a snapshot of global conflict, which in itself is informative and interesting. Despite lacking detail, her optimism concerning the free market system and democracy lies in addressing the current biases in the free market system and democracy. She is quite clear that there are no "silver bullets" and cautions that her thesis is but one piece of the puzzle. Time will be a key factor. *World on Fire* is a noteworthy effort and deserving of its best-seller categorization. Although this book is unquestionably apt for students and practitioners in the fields of politics, economics or international relations, it is equally interesting reading for the casual observer of global affairs.

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
## Endnotes

1. The law of unintended consequences, often cited but rarely defined, is that actions of people—and especially of government—always have effects that are unanticipated or "unintended." Economists and other social scientists have heeded its power for centuries; for just as long, politicians and popular opinion have largely ignored it. Rob Norton, *The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics*, viewed 12 Oct 04 <<http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/UnintendedConsequences.html>>.
2. Amy Chua, *World On Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability* (New York: Doubleday, 2003) p. 13.
3. *Ibid*, p. 264.
4. The author has only read reviews and excerpts of *The Coming Anarchy* and *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*. However, reviews of *World on Fire* repeatedly compare the three books.
5. Keith Porter, Review of *World On Fire*, viewed 29 Sep 04 <[http://globalization.about.com/cs/greatarticles/a/worldonfire\\_p.htm](http://globalization.about.com/cs/greatarticles/a/worldonfire_p.htm)>.
6. Amy Chua, *World on Fire*,..., p. 9.
7. *Ibid*, p. 257.
8. Michelle Goldberg, Review of *World On Fire*, viewed 29 Sep 04 <<http://www.salon.com/books/review/2003/01/13/democracy/print.html>>.
9. Amy Chua, *World on Fire*,..., p. 174.
10. Writer's Representative, viewed 29 Sep 04 <<http://www.writersreps.com/live/catalog/authors/chuaa.html>>.
11. Amy Chua, *World on Fire*,..., p. 46.
12. *Ibid*, p. 236.
13. *Ibid*, p. 238.
14. *Ibid*, p. 121.
15. For definition of neo-colonialism see, <<http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Neo-colonialism>>. viewed 4 Oct 04.
16. Amy Chua, *World on Fire*,..., p. 286.
17. *Ibid*, p. 194.

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## SAINTS, SINNERS, AND SOLDIERS: CANADA'S SECOND WORLD WAR

KESHEN, Jeffrey A. Toronto, UBC Press, 2004. 389 pgs. \$34.95 CAN



### Review by Major Helga Grodzinski, CD

Published in association with the Canadian War Museum as part of its excellent *Studies in Canadian Military History* series, *Saints, Soldiers, and Sinners* is a seminal work in Canadian history. While we can choose from a large number of books written about the strategy, operations and tactics of the Second World War, there has been, other than anecdotal histories, much less written about the conduct and experience of that war away from the battlefields. Jeffrey Keshen's book is a masterful addition to the literature—well written and distinguished by impeccable, exhaustive scholarship.

The book describes Canada's Second World War from the perspective of the home front, covering aspects as diverse as the development of recreational programs and day-care for children, the role of women in the home and workplace, efforts to

combat venereal disease and juvenile delinquency and the transformation of Canada from producer of raw materials to industrial giant.

Readers of the baby boom or later generations may be unfamiliar with the wartime exigencies that led to the development of policies and programs we have taken for granted all our lives, such as family allowance. It is intriguing to read a detailed account, for example, of how a stop-gap measure designed to increase the workforce led to irreversible social change by taking women out of the home and placing them in factories, universities and military uniform.

One of the author's recurring themes is how the social and economic policies and programs developed during the Second World War were very much based upon lessons learned in the aftermath of the First World War. This is particularly true of programs designed to reintegrate veterans into post-war society. The Veterans Charter, which has had such a profound and lasting impact on our society and military, is just one example.

The author does not back away from difficult issues, addressing racism, sexism, propaganda, sexual mores and corruption in a matter-of-fact and balanced way. He pulls no punches, squarely addressing misconduct by civilians at home and by Canadian servicemen and women at home and abroad; however he takes pains to balance the good and the bad, and backs up his assertions, some of which are counter-intuitive, by solid statistical, documentary and anecdotal evidence. The interviews and anecdotal material are particularly revelatory, providing a vivid, dynamic counterpoint to the tables, charts and statistics that comprise the hard facts of Keshen's work. There are plenty of eyebrow-raising moments in this book, especially for younger readers who may harbour certain notions of purity in their elders.

The book is very well structured, with an excellent overview provided by the introductory chapter, and book-ended by a nicely synthesized conclusion. In addition, each chapter is also introduced and neatly summarized. Of its 389 pages, 101 are devoted to notes and indexing—this book is designed to be a comprehensive reference

while encouraging more inquiry. Almost free of editorial errors, it is attractively laid out, with interesting photographs and useful graphs and tables. It has all the hallmarks of a successful PhD thesis; however, it is skilfully written and easily holds the reader's interest, even with its gauntlet of facts, numbers and figures.


Military history buffs will not find accounts of battles and campaigns in this book. They will, however, find much, much more—the stories of the people who fought and loved during the war, of those who served and those who served themselves. They will discover in this book the social and political antecedents—the prototype—of the Canada in which we live today.

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## BRITISH COMMANDOS: 1940-1946

MOREMAN, Tim. Oxford, Osprey Publishing, Battle Orders 18, 2004, 96 pages. \$33.95  
CAN

Reviewed by Lieutenant-Colonel Robert S. Williams, MSM, CD



Given the topicality of expeditionary operations, author Tim Moreman provides an excellent detailed back-ground reference on historical combined operations or 'joint' in today's vernacular with all of the associated long distance logistic and command and control problems/challenges. As many Western militaries are going through the process of re-inventing or transforming themselves, the organizational diagrams and the basic doctrine contained in this compact book should provide a potential starting point, or, at a minimum, valuable food for thought. Why re-invent something that didn't work when the mistakes have been made previously? Dare one learn from the past?

This entire volume offers a chronological description of the 1940 to 1946 period, covering both British Army and Commando units. Initial chapters deal with aspects of doctrine and training, tactics, weaponry and command and control issues. Significant as well as lesser-known commando raids including Vaasgo, Dieppe, St. Nazaire and the Commando support to Operation OVERLORD are featured and described in sufficient detail to whet a reader's appetite for future in-depth research. The maps and photos contained in this slim volume provide sufficient detail and relevant historical colour to appeal to both the novice military history reader, as well as the ardent history-buff perhaps already very familiar with this actions described.

For those interested in skipping to the salient points garnered from historical trials under fire or to avoid repeating mistakes, a short chapter on lessons learned is a must read. A key to military symbols will allow those not familiar with military hieroglyphics to be able to quickly and easily decipher the various organization charts. A short chronology completes this excellent account of Army Commando development from their inception in 1940 to their disbandment in 1946. Although Moreman covers a great deal in this book, its organization allows the information to be digested in small bites.

This compact book is recommended to those interested in special forces planning for expeditionary operations as well as those interested in a short history of the Army Commandos complete with tables of organization, equipment and the historically

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significant battle honours. As a handy reference for building an organization or a starting point for future in-depth reference, *British Commandos: 1940–1946* is highly recommended.

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## THE RED MAN'S ON THE WARPATH: THE IMAGE OF THE "INDIAN" AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR

SHEFFIELD, R. Scott, Toronto, UBC Press, 2004, 232 pages. \$29.95 CAN.

**Reviewed by Captain Darren Bromley**



Being of native Canadian heritage, this book's title caught my attention. Expecting to read stories about heroic actions of Native Canadians during the Second World War, I was pleasantly surprised to find a well-written book which examined aspects of the Native Canadian struggle not normally addressed.

Although the Native Canadian struggle is as complex and diverse as the people involved, Mr. Sheffield sheds light on issues which are important to the overall understanding of the Native Canadian matter. Via an 18-year period of Canadian history (1930-1948), using newspapers from across Canada and official government documents, the author provided analysis of the public and governmental images of Native Canadians.

This study is presented in a sequential timeline, attentively presenting the image of the "Indian" in English Canada, the "Administrative Indian", the "Public Indian" and how each was re-franchised following the Second World War. Mr. Sheffield's use of the word Indian in quotations as a literary tool provides the reader with the racist sentiments of the time, which is important to note as the book's title may turn off serious interest.

The term "Public Indian" was developed through the author's study of 18-years of Canadian newspapers. His scrutiny of Native Canadian stories in newspapers across Canada presented the wide opinion of Native Canadians supposedly held by white-English-Canada during that time period. The image of Native Canadians being the noble savage, fierce warrior, drunken criminal, lazy free loader and victim of circumstances were fashioned via the journalistic eye and not necessarily true public sentiment.

The term "Administrative Indian" was shaped through the author's study of official government correspondence over the same time period. Providing insight to the official correspondence within the Indian Affairs Bureau and the Special Joint Senate and House of Commons Committee to reconsider the Indian Act, he permitted the reader to gain an appreciation for the goals the Federal Government had with respect to honouring the treaties with Native groups across Canada.

The author, in a matter-of-fact method, superimposed the terms Public and Administrative Indian on the time period leading and following the Second World War. He argued that this series of events dramatically changed the view of white-English Canada towards Native Canadians, for the better. Readers will judge the strength of this



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statement based on their own prejudices they have developed with regards to Native Canadian issues.

Although a very well presented study of specific aspects of the Native Canadian relationship with Canada, this book provides limited value to the study of military history.

As I am cautious about the sincerity of the certainty provided by newspapers and government documents, I do not recommend this book as a primary reference for readers with a limited background to the Native Canadian struggle. Overall Mr. Sheffield's book is a good addition to the library of those with an interest in Native Canadian history.

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## **POURQUOI A-T-ON FERMÉ LE COLLÈGE MILITAIRE DE SAINT-JEAN?**

CASTONGUAY, Jacques. Montreal, Art Global, 2005, 92 pages. \$25.00 CAN

**Reviewed by Dr. Roch Legault**

Jacques Castonguay is a prolific, not to say versatile author, who has often found himself engaged in the craft of piecing together history. This time, his most recent project deals with a dramatic episode in the history of Canadian military institutions. In his provocatively-entitled *Pourquoi a-t-on fermé le Collège militaire de Saint-Jean?* [*Why did they close the Collège militaire de Saint-Jean?*], Castonguay investigates the way in which the Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean (CMR), was closed, who was responsible for the closure and the reason given for it at the time, which was to save the federal government money. In so doing, he sets out to write the final chapter in the history of CMR, since failure to do so "would be to contribute to adding the coping stone to the work of those who decreed it should disappear." The author adds, on the subject of the institution of higher education that "Worse still, depriving it of the meaning that must be attributed to its death would be to put it to death a second time" (p.11).

In a methodical manner, before he gets to the answers he shares with us, the author recalls the history of an institution that he headed in his capacity as Rector. Its foundation (chapter one), its development into an independent university (chapter two), the success of its programs (chapter three), the announcement of its closing (chapter four), and finally the reactions to it (chapter five). The facts that are missing highlights from this history are reproduced in a detailed, six-page chronology at the end of the book.

It is worth recalling that CMR, immediately prior to its closure, awarded bachelor's degrees in science, physical science, general science and space science. It comprised the four departments that made up the faculty of administration sciences and the humanities: literary studies, management, strategic studies and social sciences. The College had become a full, independent university in 1988, qualified to award its own degrees. The closure of the Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean was announced on 22 February 1994, with the termination of its activities scheduled for 31 August of the following year. The announcement took many people by surprise, for there had been nothing to indicate that such a decision was in the offing. Initially, a report issued by the Conservative government had assured the military authorities that the three-college system was there to stay. Subsequently, infrastructure expenses for CMR remained high, as was apparent from the opening of a new cafeteria dining hall at the start of the 1993-1994 academic year, a few months prior to the announcement.

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Beginning on page 49, in chapter 6, entitled "Why and how CMR was closed down," the author gets to the heart of the matter. In this and subsequent chapters, the primary focus is on "how." The "why" receives eminently satisfactory answers, because it sets out the various explanations given at the time and the hypotheses advanced since. The reasons for making the savings by closing the Collège de Saint-Jean are convincingly demolished by the author. The answers are nonetheless lacking in clarity with regard to where the responsibility lies, in other words the question of "who." According to the historian, many people in both the Department of National Defence and in the government were party to this decision. The demand by Finance Minister Paul Martin that the expenditures of the Defence Department be reduced had the domino effect of involving the Canadian Forces personnel branch, then the Chief of the Defence Staff, General John de Chastelain, then the Minister, David Collenette, and finally the Prime Minister himself, in proposing and endorsing the closing of the military colleges at Saint-Jean and Royal Roads.

Was this a matter of collective responsibility on the part of the political and military leadership of the day? Tucked away on page 56, the author writes that Prime Minister Jean Chrétien bears a major share of the responsibility, as he admits that ultimately, this decision, like all those taken by his government, was his. Castonguay is, however, quick to add that "if one considers, moreover, that this decision was probably thought out or developed in the Defence Department, our answer needs some qualification" (p.56). Perhaps we need to look more closely at the Chief of the Defence Staff. General John de Chastelain had since 1991 been advocating the closure of one or more military colleges (p.50). The historical investigation of the General's role is nonetheless limited to a recognition by a few individuals of this responsibility: "For well-informed journalists and a few others, it was not easy to forget on that day that it was hard to dissociate the General's name from the forthcoming closures" (p.71).

The only real criticism that can be levelled at the book is in fact the modesty with which it explores a number of major disputes surrounding the issue of closure. The family disputes: those of the political class on the one hand and those of the network of military colleges on the other. In order to find divisions within the government and the Liberal Party, readers must look as far as the middle of the third paragraph on page 58. The same is true of the role of Judas, played by the Royal Military College of Canada (in Kingston), which displayed "good will" (p.76) according to one of the author's sub-titles. There were in fact some winners who emerged from this episode: the Chrétien clique within the government and the Royal Military College at Kingston. The author leaves one of the most direct charges, the one which closes the volume, to another historian, Serge Bernier, who notes that RMC was in fact rewarded, despite its lack of success, compared to CMR, in training bilingual officers.


We will have to wait a little longer before we get more answers to the story of the closure of CMR. In this little book, Jacques Castonguay has brilliantly summarized what we know at this point about this historical episode. He has also opened several avenues of investigation on which it is to be hoped others will follow up. Nonetheless, for the moment, the author has underscored our inability to find out more when he relates the answer that he received in 2005 from the Privy Council in the course of his research: the documents will only be made available to the public in 20 years. Another twenty long years...

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## I IS FOR INFIDEL: FROM HOLY WAR TO HOLY TERROR

GANNON, Kathy. New York, Public Affairs, 2005, 177 pages. \$32.95 CAN

Reviewed by Dr. Craig Stone



Kathy Gannon is a foreign correspondent who spent 18 years in and out of Afghanistan. Unique among western journalists, Gannon arrived in Afghanistan during the decline of the Soviet Union and remained engaged as a foreign correspondent for the bitter feuding of warlords, the rise of the Taliban, the arrival of the Arabs and Osama bin Laden and the "transformation of the country into the staging post for a global jihad."

This book traces the history of Afghanistan after the Soviet Union departed, with specific emphasis on how the Taliban transitioned from a reasonable alternative to feuding warlords to a supporter of terrorism and providing a home to Osama bin Laden. More importantly, Gannon raises a number of issues about the current regime's credibility as a government and Pakistan's influence and connections with the Taliban when examined within the overall context of the global war against terrorism.

*I is for Infidel* is structured chronologically beginning with the Mujahedeen's rule after the collapse of Afghanistan's Communist government in 1992. Gannon makes the point that the world basically ignored Afghanistan after the Soviet Union military departed. The US wanted out of the area and they were happy to have the Mujahedeen take over the country. Gannon argues this was a mistake because it set in "motion the chaos that would eventually bring the Taliban to power." In essence, Gannon argues that Afghanistan was handed over to a group of warlords who were not interested in assembling a unified government to rule Afghanistan. Gannon notes the many of the same individuals that were responsible for the fighting prior to the arrival of the Taliban have once again been placed in positions of power and influence within the new government.

Next Gannon discusses how the Taliban achieved unchallenged power throughout the country. The irony of course is that the Taliban arrived in response to the brutality associated with the violent anarchy of the Mujahedeen commanders. In the beginning the Taliban was a nationalist movement led by Mullah Omar and created to deal with the anarchy and lawlessness. As Gannon notes "the Taliban was born out of anger and frustration with thieving Mujahedeen commanders, who had become old-fashioned highway robbers." Only later did the Taliban become the repressive regime associated with terrorism and Osama bin Laden. In fact, Gannon emphasizes that the "severe interpretation of Islam that the Taliban eventually embraced with such vigor came from outsiders who would take it over, the Afghans trained at Pakistani madrassas, and later by the austere philosophy of Wahabi Islam practiced by Saudi Arabia . . ."

In discussing the eventual fall of the Taliban and the creation of the current circumstances, Gannon raises a number of issues about the Pakistan Army's military leadership and its ties to religion and jihad. In this context, Gannon's views may be considered somewhat biased against putting so much faith in Pakistan's efforts to deal with terrorism. Gannon makes a number of observations and provides examples of

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possible contradictions between the efforts to combat terrorism and the activities of Pakistan that support the very same group of people. For example, Gannon observes that men who had been jihadis from the Afghan war would not be looked for by Pakistani security and intelligence forces but if they were found by the United States they would go to jail. One of the major issues for Gannon is that it was and still is Pakistan military policy to use jihadis to fight its proxy wars with India.

Gannon's last section of the book deals with Afghanistan four years after the September 2001 attacks. She argues that the real tragedy is that Afghanistan has never been valued for itself by the world powers. As a nation Afghanistan has "repeatedly played the role of pawn in a larger power game . . ." As well, she argues that the United States has made a mistake to assume that with both Pakistan and Afghanistan the enemy of their enemy is their friend. In reality, both nations remain full of individuals and militias "that harbor a thinly disguised contempt for the West and are knee-deep in the drug trade." They have no desire to ever be friends with the West, particularly the United States.

All of these issues lead Gannon to comment on what is perhaps the most significant point in the book. Muslims view the United States as the source of much of the problems in the war on terrorism. The West, led by the United States, continues to demonstrate double standards when it conducts foreign policy. For example, Gannon observes that her Muslim sources point out that all the attacks that are being conducted by the West are against Muslims. This creates the conditions for even more individuals to take up arms against the West. Other questions raised within this context include why it is okay for Israel and India to have nuclear weapons but not Pakistan? As well, America attacked Iraq for having weapons of mass destruction but it does not attack North Korea.

These are just a few of the issues raised by Gannon in the closing section of her book. While some may disagree with the points she is making, it is difficult to ignore them because these are the issues that moderate Muslims indicate are sources of frustration.

Four years after 9/11, Gannon argues that, with the exception of Kabul, Afghanistan is not much different than Afghanistan in 1992, the time period referred to at the start of the book. *I is for Infidel* is a well written and easy to understand account of a journalist's experiences in Afghanistan. It provides a number of issues that are worthy of considerable thought as Canada moves ahead in its commitment to Afghanistan. However, there is an underlying critique of United States' foreign policy and how they have conducted diplomacy in this region of the world. Individuals should be encouraged to read this book as well as others to ensure that they can develop a good comprehension of a very complex set of issues.

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

## CITIZEN OF THE WORLD—THE LIFE OF PIERRE ELLIOT TRUDEAU VOLUME ONE: 1919-1968

ENGLISH, John. Toronto, Knopf Canada, 2006, 576 pages. \$39.95 CAN

## WASHINGTON DIARIES, 1981-1989

GOTLIEB, Alan. Toronto, McClelland & Stewart, 2006, 656 pages. \$39.99 CAN

Reviewed by Major Gord P. Ohlke, CD



Canada's former ambassador to the United States Alan Gotlieb and historian John English have produced complementary books. Gotlieb has published his diary notes covering his years in Washington where he became the principal point of contact for all Canadian issues in the USA. Meanwhile, English has written a very detailed biography of Pierre Elliott Trudeau. Both books have received scant media attention, a surprising fact given the hold that Trudeau retains over our national psyche and our fascination with insights into American views of Canada and Canadians. That Trudeau and Gotlieb worked together during some very intensive times makes both volumes stand out as important snapshots of an era.

English takes the reader on a journey through Trudeau's often eclectic life to reveal an individual characterized by great transformation. Sourced through the late Prime Minister's extensive diaries and archived personal correspondence, we meet a young Trudeau who participates in street riots in Montreal, which see the intentional destruction of Jewish property. We read of his dreams of leading an Army of liberation. We see the maturation process of travel and education as Trudeau emerges from the oppressive nationalism and isolationism of his early schooling. For those who recall the political hype of "the swinging Prime Minister" and his often statist interventions—as reflected in "wage and price controls" and the "National Energy Policy (NEP)"—it is quite surprising to see the juxtaposition provided with Trudeau the youth, who as a graduate student at Harvard (1944-46) felt the need to request permission from a bishop in order to read Marxist political works as part of his studies. He also appears to have not consummated a romantic relationship until his late twenties.



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Gotlieb reveals little of his early life and background that is not key to his professional development. The descendant of German Jewish agricultural settlers in Manitoba, Gotlieb became a Rhodes scholar (Oxford) and was able to leverage both aspects of his personal background to great success. This not only allowed him to gain entry to the inner circles of Washington society but also those of the American Jewish elite. He found that both worlds often merged. Therein, he reveals much about the inner workings of Washington and New York society, the United States' congressional system, federal departments, agencies and domestic intergovernmental relations, big business and the role of the media. He sheds much light on the character of such leading figures as President Ronald Reagan, James Baker and Colin Powell.

Throughout, his comparisons of American and Canadian culture and society are numerous. Sometimes, however, they are unflattering of the latter—particularly in the case of the media.

From a professional standpoint, military readers will quickly see that for Canada the whole conduct of our relations with the United States equates to “grand strategy” and that Trudeau and Gotlieb both grasped the military strategic component of the relationship. Gotlieb’s book also reveals that for the Americans, Canada is a very important country and a key partner; despite the fact that they often fail to fully understand us and are frequently puzzled by those we elect or appoint as our representatives. In different ways, both Trudeau and Gotlieb came to see this as well—Trudeau being a much better friend of the United States than the Canadian media of the day often conveyed, and Gotlieb, the consummate success story of the Canadian foreign service, rejecting the Pearsonian idea of “the middle power” in favour of more ambitious “great power” vision.


Each book stands as an informative and often insightful read. Together, they provide a rich overview of recent Canadian history and some of the key personalities that helped guide and shape it.

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## SAHIB: THE BRITISH SOLDIER IN INDIA

HOLMES, Richard. New York, Harper Collins, 2005, 572 pages. \$19.95 CAN

Reviewed by Major Andrew B. Godefroy, CD, PhD



Soldier and historian Richard Holmes is already well known for his lengthy and detailed social studies of the British Army. He is the author of both *Redcoat: The British Soldier in the Age of Horse and Musket*, and, *Tommy: The British Soldier on the Western Front*, two outstanding works examining the rank and file of Britain at various points in its history. In his latest work, *Sahib: The British Soldier in India*, Holmes takes the reader to what many have labeled was the ‘jewel in the crown’ of Britain’s Empire. Indeed there is little question that the British conquest and dominion of India for nearly three centuries was one of history’s great epics, and Holmes’ book provides us a view of that period through a uniquely military lens.

As with his other British soldier social surveys, *Sahib*, follows no chronological or geographical path. Instead, after capturing the reader’s attention in the

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prologue with an intensely described account of the Battle of Sobraon (10 February 1846) during the First Sikh War, Holmes delivers twenty plus chapters each loosely following some particular theme. These subjects range from the journey to get there to living conditions, from women to religion. Each chapter draws the reader back into some particular aspect of Indian service life, often evidenced with a passage from the memoirs of an actual participant or witness to the event or time. In fact, it is these snippets of memory that provide the glue for the whole book, for it is these observations that truly capture and bind the reader to the overall story.

Holmes has chosen his stories well, for they are often as entertaining as they are insightful. He is quick to show the lighter side of a dangerous ocean journey from Portsmouth to Bombay. A passage from the book noted, "Lieutenant Lambrecht from H[His]M[Majesty's] 66<sup>th</sup> was clever and well read but was spoiled by the sentimental and sensual sophistries of the French philosophical school and was most agreeable when sober but half mad when excited by wine. Coming out of his cuddy drunk, he knocked down the sailor at the wheel and took his place, telling the furious captain that the blackguard he had just ousted knew nothing whatever about his work. [Lambrecht] was forgiven the first time he did it, but was put under close arrest when he repeated the offence."<sup>1</sup> On another occasion he relates the tale of a rather sad regimental mascot. "In Frank Richard's battalion of Royal Welch Fusiliers", Holmes noted, "a man had a pet monkey dressed in red coat, blue trousers and pill-box hat who could do arms drill with a little wooden musket. Unfortunately the creature was introduced to beer and, like too many of his human companions, eventually drank himself to death. Richards' companions opined that this was the most noble and happy end to which either man or monkey could come."<sup>2</sup>

At the same time Holmes does not shy away from addressing much more serious issues such as the 1857 Indian Mutiny. Perhaps one of the most complex political and social debates in both British military history as well as Indian national history, Holmes treats the period with respect and as much dispassionate analysis as his primary sources will allow. He freely admits that traditional narratives of the event must give way to a greater understanding of its meaning, but also remains somewhat optimistic in suggesting that the outcome improved rather than greatly soured subsequent relationships between British and Indian authorities. He notes that it was indeed a watershed, however, one that began the march towards full independence almost a century later.

Detailed, comprehensive, insightful, and entertainingly readable, this book, like his previous works, is well researched and a valuable resource for any student of these events. This book is a recommended read.

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## Endnotes


1. Richard Holmes, *Sahib: The British Soldier in India*, 106.
2. *Ibid*, 174-175.

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## COUNTERINSURGENCY LESSONS FROM MALAYA AND VIETNAM: LEARNING TO EAT SOUP WITH A KNIFE

NAGL, John A. Westport, Praeger / Greenwood, 2002, 249 pages. \$19.29 CAN

Reviewed by Captain Nils N. French



In *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, Dr. John Nagl, an active duty Lieutenant-Colonel in the US Army, sets out to determine why two Western armies achieved considerably different results in a pair of similar counterinsurgency situations. The author uses a comparative approach. Specifically, Nagl analyses the British experience in Malaya from 1948-1957 and the American experience in Vietnam from 1950-1972. His intent is to determine "how, why, and how successfully" each army adapted to their respective revolutionary wars. The work reveals the importance of an organizational culture that allows the organization to learn and adapt to the situation at hand. At the same time, Nagl's book serves as an excellent introduction to counterinsurgency in general while also illustrating some of the finer points from time to time.

Nagl structures his work well. He first sets the stage with some of the theory about how armies learn, the basics of counterinsurgency, and succinctly reviews relevant history on the British and American Armies and the impact these histories have had on the culture of the two armies. The book then moves to the analysis, first Malaya and then Vietnam, tracing the paths chronologically. The book closes with a summary of the lessons learned (or not learned) and why, and suggests what we should learn from all of this for ourselves. All of this flows smoothly, guided by clear headings that give logical divisions to the text. The only leap in logic is in Nagl's chapter on the lessons of counterinsurgency. Here he introduces a framework or question set against which both armies will be assessed throughout the rest of his book. Nagl asserts that he has developed his framework from analysis of the objectives and techniques of counterinsurgency, "heavily informed" by British General Sir Robert G. Thompson's five principles,<sup>1</sup> but the relation between the two is quite faint. Considering its importance, the author should have explained his reasoning in more detail.

Nagl's extensive research shows throughout the work. He has analyzed over one hundred interviews, sifted through boxes and boxes of archives, and has gained access to sources of information that had never before been used. His knowledge is also drawn from personal discussions with those that were actually there, from strategic and tactical levels alike. The result is a detailed look at the situations in both Malaya and Vietnam that is still kept very concise and readable. The author is able to mentally place us in the situation so we can understand his ideas in the proper context.

In the Malaya chapters, the reader's interest level is kept high with the use of colourful anecdotes and excerpts from personal correspondence that develop the leaders involved, helping us understand the intricacies of their character. Nagl includes the fact that General Sir Gerald Templer, upon arrival in Malaya to assume command, travelled to his residence in the same bullet-punctured car his predecessor was assassinated in. We hear of Templer standing on the desk of his Police Superintendent, going on patrol with the Ghurkhas, and riding elephants. These vignettes give us a

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greater understanding of these events than even the most detailed string of adjectives could ever provide. They also establish the high degree of situational understanding required to grasp the finer elements at play.

It must be noted, however, that at one point more elaboration was required. Nagl writes that Templer was not involved in the World War Two campaign against Germany because of an injury "involving a minefield and a piano," and leaves it at that. It is an interesting point, but it leaves the reader with a nagging curiosity that is never satisfied. One also notices that for all that is written on Templer, Sir Robert Thompson is not mentioned in the Malaya chapters. One would expect more, considering the fact that Nagl bases all his analysis on Thompson's five principles of counterinsurgency. We must also consider the central role that Thompson describes himself as having in Defeating Communist Insurgency. Surely there should have been more mention of him in the Malaya chapters.

On the whole, Nagl's analysis of the situation in Malaya is organized and insightful. Reviewing the most important steps taken by the leaders serves as a very useful checklist of sorts. Those finding themselves in similar situations will want to refer back to it. Students of counterinsurgency can learn a great deal about food denial, curfews, secret ballots, group punishment, intelligence techniques and the necessity of rapidly developing and disseminating relevant doctrine. The author clearly demonstrates (assisted by a helpful table) that the British Army was a learning institution during its latter years in Malaya, although he is careful to note that some British officers were reluctant to shift away from the conventional approach.

A different conclusion is presented for Vietnam. Nagl's analysis paints an organizational culture that precluded the US Army from being a learning institution during the Vietnam war. In fact, the blind resistance of US Army brass to desperately needed reform is astonishing at points. Nagl shows us that the warnings were there, the advice was plentiful, and the evidence was solid—but US generals like Abrams and Westmoreland thundered down their path of destruction, actually reducing their own chances for success. We see the resistance of US Army leadership to adjust for counterinsurgency (even on the orders of the President) and move away from their conventional mindset. Some of the quotations the Nagl uses to illustrate seem nearly absurd in hindsight, clearly showing that there were entire concepts that were completely missed. The passage presents a textbook case of close-mindedness.

Nagl is careful to ensure that the cases of US Army innovation that did occur are not missed. He speaks of the Marine combined action platoons and civic action teams and refers to journal articles and the correspondence of dissenters, showing that at lower levels, some people had the right idea. Nagl also notes that there were several breakthroughs on the technological and tactical levels that are still employed today.

The Vietnam chapters illustrate an organization that did not learn the requisite lessons during the war, and astonishingly did not do so after the war, either. It is not difficult to see how the desire to "bring the fight to the enemy" with almost total disregard for collateral damage resulted in an overall loss. Students of counterinsurgency can use the study as an example of what not to do. The US Army was not a learning institution in Vietnam.

Nagl concludes in saying that different organizational cultures were central to the outcome of each counterinsurgency. Specifically, the British Army culture led to the ability to learn as an organization in Malaya and the US Army culture prevented the same in Vietnam. We are also presented with the claim that the same culture that led to defeat in Vietnam is actually a positive influence on the army's ability to fight in a conventional conflict. Nagl presents some light evidence of the US Army being more effective than the British Army in World War Two and then suggests that it is difficult for a force that is tailored and trained for the conventional fight to transition to the unconventional fight. He

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seems to indicate that the two abilities are mutually exclusive, which leads to some confusion of ideas when we refer back to the concept of being able to adapt to any situation—this mutual exclusivity seems to rule out adaptation. Nevertheless, the majority of Nagl's ideas are clear. The reader is left with some vital knowledge of how a counterinsurgency must be fought and an understanding of how important it is to adapt to the situation at hand. One cannot help but hope that these lessons are being applied in current situations in Afghanistan and Iraq. *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* is a good, fast read for officers who wish to avoid the mistakes of the past.

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## Endnote

1. See Sir Robert Grainger Ker Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences in Malaya and Vietnam* (Study in International Security, (London: Chatto & Widus, 1966).

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## GIBRALTAR, 1779—1783: THE GREAT SIEGE

CHARTRAND, René. Oxford, Osprey Publishing, Campaign Series No. 172, 2006, 96 pages. \$26.95 CAN

Reviewed by Major John R. Grodzinski, CD



North Americans often forget to place conflicts on this continent into the context of wider events; this is particularly true of the American War of Independence, where narratives and analyses examine the war in isolation. A lot was actually going on at this time and for Great Britain, this was a period where it not only faced a large-scale insurgency in the Thirteen Colonies, but it also found itself at war with France, Spain, the Dutch and against the Mahratta Confederacy in India. This was a tough period and the setbacks in North America, the West Indies and the East Indies were further complicated by the Spanish declaration of war in 1779. Soon after, Franco-Spanish forces laid siege to Gibraltar, a military venture that would last four years.

British and Dutch forces first took Gibraltar in 1704, during the War of the Spanish Succession. Combined naval and land actions pried this strategically important

site from the Spanish and by 1713, Gibraltar was formally ceded to Great Britain, who has held it since then, albeit with occasional challenges to its authority. One of these came in 1779. The previous year, France had allied itself to the Americans and entered the war in the colonies against Britain, with Spain following the next year. Both France and Spain worked in unison, seeking to drive the British from the English Channel and out of the Mediterranean. Spain also hoped to oust Britain from its territories in North America bordering the Mississippi and the Gulf of Mexico and to retake Minorca and Gibraltar. It was in the latter objective that Spain would find the British resolute: Gibraltar would be held at all costs. Thus began a siege that would last four years and in the end, although Minorca would return to Spain, Gibraltar, more important of the two as it controlled the entrance to the Mediterranean, remained British.



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René Chartrand is a well-known Canadian free-lance military writer. He served for three decades with Parks Canada, eventually becoming a senior curator specializing in material culture, that is military dress, equipment and weaponry. He has amassed a wealth of material on this subject and as of late has produced one or more titles a year for Osprey, a publisher of military titles. Chartrand also wrote two excellent volumes titled *Canadian Military Heritage, Volume I: 1000—1754* and *Volume II: 1755—1871*. Partrice Courcelle did many of the illustrations in this book and has been a professional illustrator for some 20 years. His work has appeared in many military publications.

This volume is one of the Osprey Campaign series, which has offered some very good studies of various campaigns and battles, although there have been a few duds. The format follows a formula Osprey uses in each series, whether that is Men-at-Arms, Fortress, Campaign, Essential Histories and other series. At one time, the Campaign series had an overall editor, usually well known, such as David Chandler, but that has been discontinued. Chartrand is one of the better authors in the Osprey stable, for he relies on primary source documents, has great familiarity of the battlefield from frequent visits, has a knack for understanding soldiers and soldiering, and writes with an engaging style. This holds true for the current volume, where Chartrand paints the Spanish effort as being weak, improving only after the French not only joined in the siege in 1782, but also took overall command of the operation. The overall narrative is very good and provides much information, although the description of the defences at Gibraltar leaves much to be desired; one wonders if leaving this out was a decision by the publisher to encourage readers to purchase the Osprey Fortress volume on Gibraltar. After all, this book does provide a list of related Osprey titles readers may want to purchase.

A dramatic passage describes the Grand Attack, where the Spanish mustered 10 bombardment ships with a total of 212 guns and 5,260 officers and men under Rear Admiral Buenaventura Moreno. They appeared off Gibraltar on 13 September 1782 and commenced a fierce bombardment of the town. Many things then went wrong for the Spaniards, who received little help from the French. Allies can be such fun. The next day, the British sent out 12 gunboats manned by 250 men to attack the floating batteries. By the end of the day, fire from the gunboats and from Gibraltar had destroyed all the floating enemy batteries and the British had achieved a significant victory.

The end to the siege finally came after the British managed to reinforce Gibraltar. The issue was finally settled in 1783, when peace was agreed to. Spain kept Florida and gained Minorca, whereas Britain's position was disastrous. Gone were the Thirteen Colonies, while several islands in the West Indies were lost to the French and British holdings in the East Indies threatened. Gibraltar was the only real success of the war. The book concludes with an interesting insight in how the battlefield appears today, along with a guide for visitors.

The colour maps are excellent, however the colour illustration of the British sortie in November 1781 and the attack of the floating batteries are poor and worsened by having them run them across the gutter (that is the spine) of the book. Two further "3-D" drawings showing the sortie and another of the attack of the floating batteries in September 1782 also suffer from the same problem. Why does Osprey insist in ruining such useful diagrams in this manner? A good illustration depicting the overall defences of Gibraltar, including the location and number of artillery pieces, would have been very useful, but I guess one has to buy the Fortress series title to get it.

These shortfalls do not condemn this book to the remnant bin and those interested in this period will find this, and indeed any title by Chartrand, an engaging read and a useful reference for future study.

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# THE STAND-UP TABLE

## Commentary, Opinion and Rebuttal

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### SHAPING THE HISTORY THE CANADA'S SPECIAL FORCES

Historian and author Ken Joyce, writes ....

I am writing regarding Colonel Horn's review of my book, *Snow Plough and the Jupiter Deception*, which appeared in *Canadian Army Journal (CAJ)* Vol. 9.2 Summer 2006.

While I agree that the initial part of the book was jumpy in places, I feel that the information given was adequate for the reader to understand where the text was going. It was jumpy due to the fact that I had to cover a multitude of happenings that occurred at roughly the same time. I thought it important to keep the story in a chronological order; however, overlapping was inevitable. It can be a difficult situation to deal with for the researcher, writer and editor.

In the haste to have the book printed, mistakes were made. Some errors were the fault of the author, others the fault of the publisher. The Midland Regiment did not depart from Ottawa but Calgary. I neglected to state that the 4<sup>th</sup> Ranger Battalion was ultimately absorbed by the Force at Anzio and the Canadian battle honours are mistakenly the same as the US honours. The photo of Prince receiving his Silver Star is not Prince but a photo of another Force man receiving his medal at the same ceremony. This was a very difficult history to write and it was so easy to get caught up in the complicated side of things that some obvious errors went unnoticed. The complicated relationship between the raising of parachute troops in Canada and the raising of the Force, as well as their connection to Jupiter and its use as a deception made their history a difficult one to relate. I refused to skirt the nagging questions that had remained unanswered since their disbandment.

To begin, I felt it important to review the history of Combined Ops as they were the ones who initially presented the plan. This review brings forth the evolution and types of operations being mounted by the organization that immediately preceded—and influenced—the creation of Plough and the First Special Service Force. It was also important to provide a background of Mountbatten, one of the key figures in the drama.

I do not understand the criticism levelled regarding proposals for early Allied operations. This is part of the peripheral story of the organization and does not need to be treated in detail. The only operation worth mentioning apart from *Plough*, *Jupiter* and *Torch* was *Sledgehammer*. All these are included. However, as stated, *Torch* and a proposed raid on Dieppe took precedence. This was all outside planning already underway for *Roundup*—later *Overlord*. In the context of the FSSF, what was stated was relevant to the story.

As for, *Joyce has placed an enormous amount of emphasis on the FSSF and its ongoing linkage to Norway*, I am at a loss to explain why this is a problem with the book. This is a crucial aspect of the story of the FSSF—hence the title—which has never been mentioned before in any publication. From responses I have had from other readers, they find this very interesting and enlightening. I think the veterans also found this very interesting, as it explains to them—in detail—the true reason for their formation. To date, there has been much nonsense written about them being a suicide outfit. How were they to get out of Norway? This question is now easy to answer. They were never intended to go to Norway—at least not as part of Operation *Plough*. The use of the Force as well as other US, Canadian and British winter warfare formations as part of the deception war has never been brought forward. The evidence of this is overwhelming. I pulled the reader through this story from beginning to end so that they could see the inevitable truth

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without my necessarily stating the obvious. Yes, Churchill dreamt up some interesting schemes. However, historians who have not dealt in detail with the secret war sometimes have a difficult time wrapping their heads around such schemes. Churchill's plans for Norway were serious. He wanted to keep all his options on the table. However, in this case, he continued to pressure his allies to form winter warfare units mainly to be used as an ongoing deception. Could Norway have been an option later if other planning failed? It is not impossible. The evidence is not recounted in a single quote from Churchill, but recorded using many different sources. This includes correspondence and discussions with President Roosevelt and the Combined Chiefs. This is also well recorded in volumes written on British intelligence/ deception in World War II, including F. H. Hinsley's several volumes on *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, M. Howard's books *Grand Strategy* and *Strategic Deception*, R. Lewin's *Ultra Goes to War* and J.C. Masterson's *The Double Cross System*, to name a few. It is recounted in detail in the history of the London Controlling Section which includes piles of enemy decrypts recovered during the war. One Ultra decrypt clearly makes reference to the FSSF as part of a *Jupiter* operation, not *Plough*:

*On the 6<sup>th</sup> January [1943] Bucharest informed Berlin that they had learnt from the Swedish Legation there that a force was being made ready between Onega Bay and other places in that neighborhood to shatter the northern front with simultaneous attacks from the Fisherman's Peninsula and Kola at the end of January while Canadian and American Commandos will make simultaneous large scale attacks on northern Norway. (NA CAB154/94 London Controlling Section—Ultra Reactions—6 January 43)*

These decrypts prove the existence and use of this deception from the enemy perspective. I think I have explained Churchill's intent very well and provided the historical evidence to back it up, derived not only from the British perspective, but also from suspicions expressed by members of the Canadian Government and the Chief of the General Staff. The book also records very clearly when General McNaughton is informed by Churchill that preparations for *Jupiter* should not be guarded too closely. Mr. Horn has to remember that even Churchill's Generals were not always privy to this type of information. Their analysis, therefore, does not always have a sound basis.

As for his final criticism regarding the death of the *Plough* operation, it is very clear that any proposed intention to use the Force in Norway after September 1942, was simply to get them to the UK where they could maintain the deception effort. Otherwise, why did they continue to train in winter and mountain warfare up until February 1943? Why were they readying for a move to the UK before Kiska came about and then even after? It would be conjecture to suggest that they might have actually undertaken a commando operation in Norway. However, if one pays attention to what is written, it is obvious that Churchill had control over this organization right up to its deployment to Italy. Even in Italy, it is absurd to suggest that they were "rooted" in the American order of battle. They were never "rooted" in any order of battle, but fought as an independent organization that could easily be moved from formation to formation or completely out of Italy if the need presented itself. They were under the overall control of Churchill and Roosevelt. Operationally they were controlled by the Combined Chiefs. The British, namely Churchill, only slackened their grip when the direction of the war changed and the Force began to experience its own problems. It is interesting to note that initially one of their main difficulties in battle was their inability to co-operate with other organizations.

This was due to their constant training as an independent organization formed to complete a single mission. They never made it to the UK where Churchill's intent was to get the Force and their vehicles to Scotland so that they could begin training with other winter warfare formations to further the *Jupiter* deception. Apart from training conducted for the breakout from Anzio, they were never properly equipped or trained to operate

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alongside other units and formations as part of the US order of battle. For the attack on Rome they were dispersed to operate as lead elements of the various Divisions. Their training, tactics and in certain cases, weapons, were distinct from other US units. They were an autonomous entity throughout their existence. That is one of the interesting factors of the operational deployment of the Force.

Once in Italy, however, the problems experienced by the force continued to grow and there was a persistent call by all involved to disband it. However the need for units in Italy—after heavy fighting in the South and along the Winter Line—necessitated its use at Anzio. By this time the British had other means to continue with their deception and the Force was not necessarily required. One venture, as recorded in the book, was to create a second Force from the Lovat Scouts in Alberta. Although Churchill continued to think of Norway even after D-Day, its success precluded the need to retain many of these units as part of any deception scheme. This is why many of the winter warfare formations raised as part of the *Jupiter* deception ended up fighting in Italy or France later in 1944. One major player, the British 52<sup>nd</sup> Lowland Division, was being trained as a winter warfare formation in Scotland. However, once its use as part of Churchill's deception ended, it was sent to France in August 1944. The US 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division did not even enter battle until after it arrived in Italy in December 1944. US units formed as part of a multi-National American legion, which included the 99<sup>th</sup> Battalion (Separate), made up of Norwegians, were also formed for this very purpose. They were also utilized as a recruitment base for the OSS. The 99<sup>th</sup> was activated shortly after the FSSF and was sent to France after the D-Day landings. However with the end of the war approaching, eyes once again focused on Norway. Would the Germans make a final stand there? Many of the units formed as part of the *Jupiter* deception were gathered under General Bradley's 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group for this purpose. However, after it was realized that Norway would not be the last vestige of the Third Reich, many of the units formed as part of Churchill's deception were still sent there to police and oversee the repatriation of enemy troops back to Germany.

You will also note that Mr. Horn contradicts himself in stating that the ongoing operations of SOE negated any further use of the Force in Norway. This conflicts with his statement concerning reprisals by the Germans. What would have been the difference? Again, it is not understood that the FSSF was simply part of a deception—the plan was a spoof. I would also seriously argue that the momentum of the war did not begin until the Force was deployed to Italy. Invasions planned for France were by no means guaranteed of success. Again, it is well recorded that the British did seriously consider an operation into Norway or even into the Middle East, the Balkans and Austria if D-Day failed.

The book also brings forward much on Canada's airborne which is not included in previous books on their history. This includes the fact that the first Canadian Army parachutists were trained for the FSSF, not 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Parachute Battalion. By this I mean the group trained at Ringway, Britain. This fact totally rewrites the early history of Canada's airborne forces and the parachute battalion. The fact was that one of the main reasons for forming a parachute battalion was to cover the formation of the FSSF. That in fact, as of August 1942, the FSSF was not a secret but played up as part of a deception. This is evident on the front pages of newspapers for August 5-6-7 1942 and thereafter. Also, the facts were that the FSSF was not a parachute organization, and subsequently, that Canada never did have a Canadian Parachute Corps.

I appreciate Bernd's comments and he had a lot of good things to say about the book; however, I feel he has dismissed one of the most interesting aspects behind the formation of the FSSF. I feel I have provided the necessary facts on this. I wish I could have included more, however, I had a budget and did not have access to records and information I do now. I intend to update the book when the opportunity arises.

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# SHRINK TO GROW: MANAGED READINESS, FORCE RESTRUCTURING AND NECESSARY DEBATE

Captain Jonathan Hubble, Int O, 2R22eR, writes ...

In the summer 2006 issue of the Canadian Army Journal (CAJ Vol 9.2) LCol Mcllroy takes up the extremely important topic of the Managed Readiness Plan (MRP).<sup>1</sup> This plan, while offering many advantages, has been shown to have some limitations in its current form. LCol Mcllroy's comments are timely, and the discussion extremely valuable. As a junior officer on the shop floor, I would like to add my perspective on this issue and propose a short-term and long-term approach to the MRP. While LCol Mcllroy's proposals are very persuasive in the long-term, I believe that we must shrink the Infantry Corps in the short-run in order to set the conditions for a successful expansion in the long-run.

The short-run solution to manning difficulties in the Infantry Corps is fewer infantry battalions. Currently, infantry battalions are not force employers. They are force generators for task forces (TFs). For example, TF 3-07 includes one infantry company from each of the three infantry battalions in 5 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (CMBG). In the wake of a robust TF 3-07 built on the structure of 3 R22eR, the two other battalions are left seriously weakened in terms of personnel to the point that they are non-deployable except in the most extreme circumstances and then with reservist reinforcements.

In addition to the 10-15% of personnel who are non-deployable, personnel on career courses or on augmentation taskings must be factored into the manning equation. In a period of heavy recruiting, individual training and transformation initiatives, individual taskings are taking on epic proportions. As LCol Mcllroy states correctly and diplomatically: "With historically large summer training tasks to meet training requirements, this may have an unforeseen impact on the Army's ability to support or achieve training goals across the Army, and may impose a significant training support tempo on personnel in the reconstitution and recovery phases of the Managed Readiness cycle."<sup>2</sup> For example, the summer tasking season of 2006 included 3000-4000 individual tasks, most of which were augmented by combat arms personnel in the line units. The TFs are by definition protected from the "tyranny of taskings," but the leftover battalions are ripe for the picking. This means that the remains of these battalions are skeletal.

The skeletal remains of infantry battalions still place important demands on infrastructure and administrative personnel. Command and service companies, as well as reduced companies require a minimum of leadership in order to barely function. The end result is that non-deployable, skeletal battalions still have important leadership and infrastructure requirements. The infantry companies are reduced to providing personnel for taskings, but still have enormous demands in terms of administration. At the same time, this minimum of leadership required to maintain the semblance of an infantry battalion is not available for employment elsewhere.

## Fundamental Structural Flaw

Could one imagine a competitive corporation employing a tasking system like the one used by the Canadian Forces (CF)? The structural under-manning of important Army institutions such as the training system, relies on the fundamental assumption that infantry battalions can be stripped of their personnel. This undermines the operational capacity of the infantry battalion: only those battalions protected by commanders from taskings are actually operationally fit to fight.



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Imagine that all organizations in the CF were “taskable” and not just the line units. This type of system would not last very long. LCol Mcllroy points out the structural deficit of personnel in training institutions that needs to be remedied in the long-run with more staff: “the Army must invest in and reinforce the training system—in order to avoid burdening our operationally ready forces with training tasks and to set the stage for true reconstitution and recovery.”<sup>3</sup> Col M.P. Jorgensen and CWO L.A. Topp identify the biggest challenge to Army individual training as the shortage of personnel: “Instructors throughout the Army’s Individual Training System are working flat out. There is no denying that the tempo is high throughout the Army, but we see daily evidence of instructor stress. Augmentation—or training support, as we now like to call it—remains a source of friction and endless staff negotiations between the Army’s Individual Training System and its clients, the field force.”<sup>4</sup> Tasking must be seen as a short-run, sub-optimal solution.

In the short run, units must be amalgamated to achieve administrative efficiencies and maximize the employment of Army leadership. LCol Mcllroy argues convincingly for over-staffing the battalions to 115% in order to account for non-deployable personnel. In the short-run, two understaffed units should be combined to create one fully or over-staffed unit, freeing up unit leadership for important training and transformation initiatives. The key point that emerges by looking at the US Marine Corps experience<sup>5</sup> is that the infantry battalion is the fundamental building block for combat forces, “not parts of it.”<sup>6</sup>

Adding three infantry battalions as LCol Mcllroy proposes is a solid idea within the structure of force expansion. Given the MRP vision, more battalions are definitely needed. However, let us not create more understaffed battalions immediately. These skeletal battalions create administrative and infrastructure needs without providing any true punch. Rather, in the short term, the Army should shrink the number of battalion headquarters, and return to four infantry companies per battalion until 115% manning is achieved in those battalions. Once the manning levels are stable, then the Army can start adding battalions one at a time, realizing that a fully staffed training system means greater growth potential. Adopting a short-run, long-run growth strategy means shrinking the number of understrength infantry battalions, reinforcing the training system and building robust and overstaffed combat units one at a time until steady state is achieved and the Army can meet its force generation objectives.

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## Endnotes

1. Lcol Rob D. Mcllroy, “Army Restructure: The Key to Making Managed Readiness Work,” *Canadian Army Journal*, 9:2, 2006, 147-151.
2. *Ibid*, 148.
3. *Ibid*, 150.
4. Col M.P. Jorgensen and CWO L.A. Topp, “Guest Editorial: The CTC Perspective on Individual Training Modernization,” *Canadian Army Journal*, 9:2, 2006, 16.
5. Based on conversations between USMC cadre and the author during participation in SCF Integrated Tactical Effects Experiment, Halifax, NS, USS Gunston Hall, and Camp Lejeune, NC, September-November 2006. Further based on observation by Mcllroy, 149.
6. Mcllroy, 149.

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## COMMENTS ON: NOTE TO FILE—ON THE EVOLUTION OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT UNDER IFOR

**Major Christopher Young, Canadian Forces Liaison Officer  
at the U.S. Army Armor Centre, writes ...**

I read with interest the article entitled, *Note to File – On the Evolution of Intelligence Support under IFOR*, and would like to add a couple of observations not strictly about intelligence support, but germane to a couple of other threads within the article.

In April 1997, the Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians) Battle Group was deployed to Bosnia into the Bihac Pocket. The specific mission for the BG was to "enforce the military aspects of the General FWF Agreement Programme (GFAP)". Our predecessor, the 1 PPCLI BG, had, about half way through their tour, stood up a Factions Ops cell under Captain Tony Turco. The Factions Ops cell was initially charged with providing a means to track cantonment site holdings and movement into and out of those sites. LCol Tim Grant, Commander of the Strathcona BG, expanded the role of the Factions Ops cell and made it responsible for quality assurance.

The intent of this expanded role was that the Factions Ops cell would ensure that sub-unit inspections were completed in an accurate and correct manner; and that sub-units were aware of, and adhered to, standardized procedures for site inspections, equipment movement and, eventually, weapons amnesty procedures as well. The cell was charged with tracking all movement into and out of the cantonment site to ensure former warring factions (FWF) compliance and to advise the commander on confiscation issues.

The Strathcona BG initially manned the cell with a senior ops captain (myself), the BG Ops WO, and a mcpl clerk. Very quickly, the BG RHQ drivers, when not employed in their primary tasks, were given secondary roles within our cell to include such appointments as NCO IC for confiscated weapons (this included tracking all weapons confiscations and destruction, plus the identification of any weapons being sent to Canada for museums, etc.).

The article by LCol Williams and Maj Godefroy mentions that the cantonment of the heavy weapons of the FWF required a "determination [of] how much military kit each faction possessed in its order of battle." In fact, it was not until Captain Turco and his cell were stood up that any formalized accounting of FWF holdings was attempted. Up to that point, sub-unit records were the only records with any accuracy and often changed from BG to BG. Dealings with MND(SW) Faction Ops cell revealed an interest only in making sure that weapons transfers were completed on time and according to regulations.

Our BG took Captain Turco's work and made the development of the baseline holdings our number one priority. I was able to sit down with senior people within 5 Corps and develop not only the baseline holdings list for all cantonment sites within our AOR, but more importantly, a personal and trusting relationship with those officials. The final product of our talks with 5 Corps was forwarded to the sub-units, who actually conducted the inspections, a few days prior to the inspections for their perusal and familiarization. Whenever possible, I would try to attend a cantonment site inspection, more to assist with the inspection than anything else.

One can talk about gaining the trust of the FWF, but until the Strathcona BG completed a baseline of FWF holdings that was coordinated through the Factions Ops cell, there was really no incentive for the FWF to be forthcoming about their correct holdings. Confiscations were quite common prior to our deployment and appeared, at

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least to us, to be at the whim of UN records which were not particularly accurate. Not only did the UN risk losing credibility on these issues, the FWF were quite quick to take advantage, wherever possible, of perceived weakness or confusion. It was quite awkward to debate with an FWF commander when his manifest, based on your higher HQ's estimate of his holdings, did not jibe with the local sub-unit's records.

The best example of the importance of establishing an accurate baseline of FWF holdings occurred within the first couple of months of our tour. 5 Corps had requested the movement of some 81mm mortar ammunition from two sites in Sanica to their main barracks in Bihac, the Adil Besic barracks. The amount requested to move was about 300 rounds more than our holding lists showed they owned. We queried the amounts to MND(SW) through our Divisional Liaison Officer, British Captain Keith Foster, but resulted in no change to the request. The Faction Ops cell then notified the escort of the discrepancy (the escort in this case was Recce Sqn) and advised them to monitor the shipments closely.

It is worth noting that the BG conducted a monitor task in this instance, vice an escort role. Monitoring shipments involved having patrols placed at key junctions along a declared route to confirm that the shipment in question had indeed passed the key junctions. FWF shipments had timings to meet but were free within that window to stop as they liked as long as they stayed on the route in question.

It became clear, once the shipments were unloaded, that additional rounds had been loaded somewhere enroute. After advising MND(SW), Recce Sqn was ordered by our commander to confiscate the extra rounds. This confiscation was accomplished without incident.

About a month later, the 5 Corps COS contacted our BG and requested a meeting with OC Recce Sqn to discuss the confiscation (the rounds had not yet been destroyed, pending a 5 Corps appeal which we felt was likely given the dollar value the rounds represented at that time). Faction Ops was directed to attend the meeting. The 5 Corps COS showed up at the meeting with two brigade commanders (the intended recipients of the ammo), plus their staffs, and assorted well-armed individuals who appeared mostly intended for intimidation. All told, there were over fifteen 5 Corps officers and extras, all looking for blood. At the meeting, it was made clear to the COS that our cell's baseline holding lists were accurate (having been developed in consultations with their own staff) and that the confiscation was warranted. A major admission by the COS, that "maybe the ammunition in question had been picked up from somewhere else along the route" ended the meeting without any further problems.

This confiscation proved to be critical as it proved to 5 Corps that we were serious about the action we would take over discrepancies, and, at the same time, impressed them that the BG was now maintaining accurate, standardized holdings lists. 5 Corps accounting procedures began to tighten up considerably (consider how critical this was when you realize that their accounting procedures involved ink ledger account books) and inspection teams began to see sites with tidy holdings, accurate books or tags attached to each different row of ammunition or equipment and more pride being showed by a heretofore neglected art: that of the storesman whose work now could mean the difference between a successful inspection or a confiscation that could result in thousands of precious dollars down the drain.

I should mention one final aspect of the cell's business that became important: that of educator. By and large, this was not a problem area, but it did become necessary at times to remind people of their manners when dealing with FWF personnel. It may seem like common sense, but we found that when people were treated with common courtesy and decency, we received a more willing attitude. In my opinion, we avoided many

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problems by adopting a non-confrontational attitude. As an example of non-confrontation, we were presented with a number of Scorpion machine pistols and Steyr SSG sniper rifles with scopes (value was estimated at about \$5K each) that had been recently discovered in a police station, hidden in a corner. Rather than confiscate the items, LCol Grant decided, upon advice from our cell, that it was better to have the weaponry in a site and accounted for, than to risk confrontation over weapons that had been turned in, in good faith. That attitude would pay dividends later during our amnesty programme.

The end result of the Faction Ops cell's work at the BG-level was a recognition at MND(SW) that our work was garnering success. One area I haven't touched on were the successful amnesty programmes the BG ran, which were later adopted as the divisional model with considerable success. Our work with 5 Corps staff also smoothed the way for eventual cantonment site consolidation which was an item of mutual benefit, albeit more so for our BG.

Two lessons came out of my time as the Factions Ops O: first, that resolve plus honesty resulted in trust from the FWF, and that communication plus co-operation resulted in compliance, which in the end was our goal. The relationship we developed with 5 Corps meant that they remained content and that there were no major issues in the Bihac AO. Had they been otherwise, that discontent could have resulted in some serious civilian unrest.



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