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The Canadian Army Journal, a refereed forum of ideas and issues, is the official quarterly publication of Land Force Command. This periodical is dedicated to the expression of mature professional thought on the art and science of land warfare, the dissemination and discussion of doctrinal and training concepts, as well as ideas, concepts, and opinions by all army personnel and those civilians with an interest in such matters. Articles on related subjects such as leadership, ethics, technology, and military history are also invited and presented. The Canadian Army Journal is central to the intellectual health of the Army and the production of valid future concepts, doctrine, and training policies. It serves as a vehicle for the continuing education and professional development of all ranks and personnel in the Army, as well as members from other environments, government agencies, and academia concerned with army, defence, and security affairs.

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On the cover: A Gun crew of the 2 Royal Canadian Horse Artillery (2 RCHA) fire their M777 artillery gun during a fire mission at Forward Operating Base Sperwan Ghar. You could see the projectile flying throught the air at the end of the barrel. Combat Camera AR2006-G068-0021 11 December 2006 Sperwan Ghar, Afghanistan.

Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team Civil-Military Cooperation operator Master Warrant Officer Denis Tondreau awaits the the start of the ceremony to mark the reopening of the Sperwan School. Combat Cameral AR2007-M012-0031 20 Jan 07 Kandahar, Afghanistan.

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FROM THE EDITOR—WAITING FOR ARMYSPACE AND ARMYPEDIA

Major Andrew B. Godefroy CD, PhD

In early 2007 the Canadian Army will say goodbye to the Interim Army model as it begins its next evolutionary step towards the Army of Tomorrow. Conceived for an adaptive, dispersible, and networked army, the new force employment concept, *Land Operations 2021: Adaptive Dispersed Operations*, will emphasize the development of doctrine that will allow soldiers to continue acting decisively in an ever increasingly complex operating environment. A key component of the new concept, in fact in many ways its *Sine qua non*, is the development of an advanced and robust network that will provide improved reach-back and collaborative knowledge sharing, while avoiding the pitfall of pervasive reach down, i.e. micromanagement. But saying one will have a networked land force is deceptively simple; so much so that the facility of the demand belies the complexity of the problem. Modernization is surely a must for Canadian expeditionary forces, and a network, or more accurately a network of networks, is essential for adaptive dispersed operations (ADO). But given the nature of operations and the habits of commanders and soldiers, this is no small task and it will require new and revolutionary thinking about how we collect, share, and develop information and intelligence both in garrison and on operations.

In a period where civilian networks are becoming ubiquitous, whether cell phones, Gmail, Nintendo DS Lite, or surfing the net via wireless laptop at Starbucks, it is easy to underestimate the unique challenges of establishing networks for land forces. As one RAND analyst recently described it, "imagine an Internet where not only the individual users move, but so do the servers and routers, over rough terrain and in all kinds of weather. Then imagine setting up this network in hours or minutes. Add to that the challenge of sending and receiving signals without having line of sight between antennas and then put into the mix an enemy who is trying to jam the signals."[1] Imagine then having to dismantle it and move it every few hours, or at best, every few days. Finally, imagine building and maintaining not only one such network of networks, but also one for each mission or each theatre of operations.

The Land Force needs to give the network its most serious attention in the coming months and years, and needs to agree on a roadmap for the development of this capability. More importantly perhaps, it needs to manage expectations as well as recognize that the network is not just equipment but also people and processes. In fact, one could argue that the technology is the easy part—it is ameliorating processes, educating people and building a networked culture that will be the hard part.

Take for example our desktop computers. This device is perhaps the primary network for the land force, yet for too many it is nothing more than an electronic typewriter that is more frustrating than rewarding, requiring constant patches and updates (and annoying reboots), and with most features of the 2 generations behind operating system 'greyed out' and inaccessible. While I might be able to access email and common or shared drives, my only hope of ensuring that knowledge is shared with others depends on the recipient's mailbox not being overloaded or the recipient having privileges to a common folder (which I may or may not be allowed to create). Added to this sense of networking frustration is that even if I can get my data to the people I want to share it with, I must rely on the hope that the recipient even knows how to open the file or employ the application needed to exploit and share that data further. Unlike many months, if not years, of physical training, weapons training, and even language training,

I have received exactly 6 days of computer training during my 16 year career. Thankfully, I am a computer geek and therefore seldom annoy the Helpdesk, but I regularly observe two types of broken networks in the Land Force. Those users who lack the skills necessary to even use computers, let alone take advantage of shared computing, and those so knowledgeable of computing potential that they are continuously frustrated by being treated like children by the network authorities. The Army must encourage a networked culture, and more importantly perhaps, give us the tools to network both in garrison and on operations.

Further examples: Why doesn't the Land Force emulate open source networking tools such as Myspace or Wikipedia? Currently, if I want to find someone in the Canadian Army I need to go through mailbox address lists, contact web pages, operators, and outdated basic search engines that are seldom kept current. Why can't I simply go to a user-maintained Armyspace and type in a name or unit? The same goes for Wikipedia. Currently, if I want to collaborate on a project or contribute to general knowledge, I either have to physically walk my data to someone or email it around, both of which waste time and bandwidth. Most people don't know or don't bother to employ shortcut attachments in email instead of simply attaching whole files, and even fewer people know that if you ask for it, you can have Netmeeting installed, which is somewhat better (again assuming that the people you are trying to connect with have it and know how to use it). If there was an Armypedia, I would certainly spend less time in wasteful meetings, email fewer files, likely receive fewer emailed attachments, and be able to better network with others. It would also make in-person meetings more meaningful, less focused on status reporting and more focused on reaching the next tactical bound.

As the paraphrased saying goes, we must train as we fight. This is no less true when it comes to networks. As our areas of operations overseas become ever larger, and battle groups are expected to cover more ground with the same size or perhaps even smaller forces at their disposal, the training as well as the tools must be there to support them. This means future forces will depend on networked capabilities such as those provided by tactical communications satellites and joint fires. But if they're not trained in a networked culture at home, they will not appreciate them, trust them, and perceive them as anything other than attempts at increasing micromanagement of troops in contact. The purpose of a networked army is to increase the number of strategic corporals, not tactical generals. The building of such a culture must begin in garrison at the units, perhaps one desktop at a time.

Endnote

1. Anon. 'A Network for Future Forces', *A Campaign-Quality Army: Annual Report 2005.* (Santa Monica: RAND Aroyo Center, 2006), 28.

GUEST EDITORIAL

Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hope MSC, CD, MMAS

Introduction

It was with a sense of great privilege that I accepted an invitation to attend Army Experiment 9 (AE9) and to write this guest editorial. It is reflective of how enlightened our Army has become that the Directorate of Land Concepts and Doctrine can engage in scientific speculation of our future Force Employment Concept (FEC) for the Army of Tomorrow without the heavy-handed constraint of current "cap badge politics". Indeed, we are enjoying a period of conceptual freedom, distinguished from not-so-distant eras when doctrine was quite simply the "prerogative of the senior officer present". This is a period of collaborative, open-ended, and uncensored dialogue about the future, and I beseech all readers to take this to advantage and to contribute. What follows are my own woefully inadequate and highly disjointed thoughts about the future; but I hold them with great conviction, as they have been shaped profoundly by the harsh reality of recent combat operations in Afghanistan. My aim is to add to ongoing discussions about the future by focusing everyone's attention to what must become the centre-piece of combat development research—the human dimension of war, particularly the role of the combat leader in fighting an enemy whose culture and geography combine to diminish our technological advantages.

The FEC proposes rapid evolution toward the realization of a refreshingly original concept called adaptive dispersed operations (ADO), the key principles of which are already manifest in Canadian operations in Afghanistan. Between February and August 2006, Task Force Orion conducted 27 major offensive operations at the company-group and battle group level, during which our forces (comprising a "multi-purpose" mix of light and medium troops) alternatively dispersed and massed ("aggregated") with exceptional agility to find, fix and finish Taliban insurgent groups. Our battlespace (a fancy word for every damn thing in an AO—ground, air, water, populace, electro-magnetic spectrum, etc.—that impacts upon operations) was extremely large and complex (multi-dimensional), necessitating "full spectrum operations", during which we attempted to defeat enemy forces by both physical and moral reductions (using lethal and non-lethal means).

Only in one area does ADO diverge from how Task Force Orion operated. ADO is technology-dependent, requiring that all components of a force be connected via "a network"—with each soldier having access to an information and communications "matrix" that allows collective "knowledge management" and complete "situational awareness" ensuring detection of the enemy prior to contact. Such knowledge and awareness would—theoretically—allow our forces "to manoeuvre to positions of advantage; to influence the opponent beyond the range of his weapons with lethal and non-lethal capabilities; to destroy his forces with precision and area effects; and to conduct close combat at time and place of our own choosing." Technology-enabled forces could operate dispersed in very small manoeuvre elements (perhaps as small as a four-man group), yet "aggregate" when our sensors indicated that close combat was necessary. Our ability to always see and know the enemy would allow us to continuously pre-empt him, bringing about his defeat by "shattering his cohesion", without having to destroy him physically.

I maintain that the trajectory of force employment in Afghanistan deviates from that of ADO at the point of reliance upon this network-centric assumption of information

supremacy over our adversary and is following a divergent, more human-centric, course. Our operations in southern Afghanistan are re-confirming that despite all advances in technology, war remains—above all else—a two-sided collision of independent human will. It is a cultural phenomenon and thus neither subject to artificial law, nor governable by technological design. Quite the contrary: in all attempts to find, fix, and finish the enemy, the prevailing factors in combat are still Clausewitzian friction, uncertainty, and fear. Combined, these things conspire to expose the fatal weaknesses of all theoretically war-winning formulas and plans. Success in future operating environments will be dependent—first and foremost—upon human factors. I will provide the following observations to reinforce this contention.

Finding the Enemy in an Environment of Friction and Uncertainty

In its efforts to find, fix and finish Taliban forces, Task Force Orion was supported by a myriad of networked enablers (five types of electronic warfare (EW) platforms, at least three types of imagery platforms, and various human intelligence (HUMINT) networks). However, there were never sufficient numbers of these enablers in the brigade to cover all operations and those allocated to us often departed before H-hour or early in an operation, diverted to emerging troops-in-contact (TICs) far away. When they were present, they were plagued with the friction normal in combat: incompatibility of technologies; air gaps; insufficient and inadequate sensors; receivers that were not rugged enough for combat; vehicle and equipment breakdown; bad atmospherics and foul weather; restrictions on intelligence sharing that are inherent in coalition operations; and human error. Friction degraded our sensor and communications networks to the point where they were incapable of producing more than a fleeting glimpse of a portion of the enemy's force; temporary visibility upon only one piece of an immense and dynamic jigsaw puzzle. Therefore, regardless of what information we received about the enemy or what products we had access to, we conducted operations with a great deal of uncertainty. This will remain the norm in counter-insurgency operations, in countries where the population is culturally distinct from our own. The insurgent blends in where he can move, reside, and work in a manner completely characteristic of the local people, making him difficult to distinguish by our sensors, until the moment when he pops up with a weapon in ambushes or raids. The enemy will hide fighters amongst village supporters, allowing him to plan and execute his attacks without electronic emissions and faster than our HUMINT and imagery intelligence (IMINT) processes can operate. The assumption in ADO that we will know the enemy, see him and control his actions is highly spurious. He will remain largely unknowable to us.

We compensated for lack of specific intelligence by applying manoeuvre warfare principles. We embraced the offensive spirit and conducted a continuous series of offensive operations with the intent of maintaining the initiative, continually disrupting the enemy's operational objectives (which we guessed at) by a combination of manoeuvre to contact, battle, and follow-on information operations to maximize the effects of close combat. Through the period January-April we came to understand the futility of expecting certainty in intelligence and of deliberate operations planning, which—because of the concept of operations (CONOP) approval process—would slow our decision-action cycles to a point where the enemy could always outpace us.[1] Instead, I began to use more intuitive processes. In exercising the sense function of our FEC, I started to rely less and less on an inventory of sensors and more and more upon my very personal sense of where the enemy was, what he intended to do, and how he could be deceived. I (and the company commanders) personally reconnoitred districts and analyzed local HUMINT sources to identify trends and to guess if an enemy was in a

general area (almost always this was relayed to us as a 20-40 man Taliban group hiding in the vicinity of a particular village). We then attempted to manoeuvre into that district quietly under cover of darkness, using deception and—as much as possible—isolate the village area by using thin blocking and cut-off forces. We would conduct manoeuvre (cordon and searches) and fires (show of force artillery or 25mm fire) to produce enemy intelligence communication (ICOM) chatter, and from this ICOM chatter (or HUMINT from local nationals), we would attempt to vector in upon the enemy's locations. However, in the end, finding him was almost always a result of advance-to-contact in the close country where he hid, and was confirmed by the exchange of fire at close quarters. Seldom was the enemy found by sensor technology.

Fixing the Enemy by Strong Leadership

Once we had found him, we would attempt to fix the enemy with fires and finish him in close-quarter combat. Neither of these things was easy. It required us to stay within 100-150 meters of the enemy and coordinate fires before physically moving to clear his positions. Doing so was contrary to human nature. The degree of success we had in close quarter combat became personality-dependent. The majority of soldiers, when fired upon for the first time, would seek to disengage back toward the "last safe place" they occupied. After several encounters they repressed this urge but would be very reluctant to advance in contact (especially when separated from their LAVs). Forward movement or sustainment of our presence on the close-quarter battlefield after night-fall depended upon the continued command presence of battalion and company commanders, supported by the "natural fighters" in our ranks. It became evident to me in May that the number of true fighters we had was a small minority. By fighter, I mean those men and women predisposed to keep fighting regardless of violence and danger; those who repressed fear not just because they wanted to remain with their primary group, but because of an overwhelming desire to beat the enemy; those who truly wanted to hunt the enemy and make him the victim. I would estimate that there were only 6 or 7 such individuals in every forty-man platoon. Yet, their stalwartness almost always became the psychological pivot point for the action of a section or a platoon engaged in intensive battle. I believe that the very essence of the western tradition of sections, platoons, companies and battalions (dating as far back as the Marian reforms, which produced Roman maniples, cohorts, and centuries within a legion) was founded on the premise of ensuring a critical number of true fighters were spread throughout fighting forces. I came to rely upon the courage of commanders and this small number of fighters in each platoon and company to override the inherent fear of close-quarter battle and to ensure that we kept the enemy fixed before closing to finish him.

Finishing the Enemy by Diminishing his Status

Finishing the enemy in close combat meant killing or capturing them, and then capitalizing upon this act with aggressive information operations intended to reduce enemy confidence and raise that of the local populace (and our citizens back home). We never construed the use of lethal force as a negative action, or a "last resort". In this we were decidedly attritional. As time passed and Task Force Orion was engaging enemy forces on a daily basis (in June, July and August), I stopped thinking about clever ways of winning without fighting. I realized that "shattering enemy cohesion" and maintaining the initiative required a degree of physical destruction. In the emerging discussion of effects-based operations I contribute this: the best second-order and third-order effects are produced by first killing the enemy and then using such destruction to your best advantage in information operations. In cultures where degrees of violence are largely

accepted and indicative of strength, this is how insurgents are beaten. An idea of winning without hard fighting is complete folly. However, the act of destruction only served to finish an enemy group if we ended the action by remaining on the battlefield—forcing him to withdraw—and then beating the enemy to the punch by communicating with the Afghans first, to tell them about our successful reduction of enemy fighting power and especially about how the enemy withdrew from the area, conceding our superiority of arms. By this we achieved local (tactical) psychological advantage that allowed us to re-introduce governance and reconstruction initiatives. In a similar vein, I never left a broken fighting vehicle on a battlefield (never mind a wounded or dead soldier) for the enemy to gloat over in the international media. In fact, in operations where we had fighting vehicles destroyed, I deliberately stopped our efforts to fix and finish a particular enemy group in order to recover our downed LAV before the enemy could photograph it and from that gain a psychological victory in our misfortune. We would lose more from the image of a burning LAV on Al Jazeera than we could possibly gain by the infliction of casualties on yet another small enemy group. Physical reductions in counter-insurgency are less important than psychological reductions by publicly attacking the enemy's status. But you require both to win.

The attritional act of destruction was the key act in a larger—manoeuvrist—concept of maintaining the initiative and steadily reducing enemy confidence and cohesion, while building the confidence and support of locals. This became our centre of gravity (the thing we used to measure all our efforts). Therefore, we made decisions to act based upon what we assessed would be the psychological impact upon the enemy (reducing his confidence), upon the local Afghan people (how our actions could raise their confidence), and upon the will of Canadians (how our actions would be interpreted at home). Fundamental to our operations was the explanation of our actions in such a way as to bolster 'friendly" confidence and diminish that of the enemy. This was never in itself decisive without some destruction of enemy force capability, from which we could achieve great leverage over local national confidence. In this manner, everything became an information operation (indeed, a psychological operation) with the most important effects occurring after combat in both the media and in the heads and hearts of the locals. The true finishing of the enemy was achieved each time we reduced the status of a Taliban group to a "has-been" in the eyes of the locals.

Coming Back to the Start—Strong Combat Leadership

This method of operating required the strongest leadership. Leadership was the one guarantor against the debilitating effects of friction, uncertainty, violence, and danger, and the key to leveraging combat success on the information plane. In this environment the role of the platoon, company and battalion commander was—and will remain in the future—decisive. Enabling individual soldiers to interpret information and act independently sounds very sexy, but if ever attempted it would result in numerous loosely coordinated actions, each unfolding to meet the demands of immediate necessity. The elements of combat friction, uncertainty and fear would compound to grind our operations to a halt. Indeed, thousands of local factors—unappreciated from any distance away—would conspire to challenge each dispersed element and require of that group actions and adjustments that would draw each away from the overall battlefield and informational goal. Dispersion of forces and disparity of interpretation of accessed information, combined with the immeasurable but considerable influence of fear, fatigue, lack of experience or fighting spirit, would make the reality of "adaptive dispersed operations" hugely undisciplined. The alternative future is to return to our

roots and grow the strongest small-unit, sub-unit and unit command teams possible, and trust their judgements. Combat development for the Army of Tomorrow must focus first upon battlefield leadership. We must accept the need for robust, aggressive combat command, and work to empower sub-unit and unit leaders. The practice of mission command in the future FEC must be guaranteed by recognizing that it is at the company and battalion levels that we find the appropriate level of experience, knowledge, determination, intuition and authority to best "guess" at finding the enemy, personally coordinate and lead in the fixing and finishing of that enemy, and personally orchestrate the information effects in post-combat.

Conclusion

The essential moment of combat leadership occurs when soldiers cannot conceive of a solution to a problem during close combat and turn to their leaders for help. In that moment the leaders must be present—not watching a screen from afar—to find the solution and demonstrate the strength of will needed to bring everyone to that solution collectively. Task Force Orion had such combat leaders. At the point of highest tempo in July, the Task Force fought simultaneously in dispersed operations in Panjwayi, Sangin, and Hyderabad, then Panjwayi, Nawa and Garmser (each company fighting 50-100 kilometres from the others). Superb company leadership, supported by outstanding operational coordination of a brilliant battle group staff, handled all these separate fights. I simply worked between them to synchronize fires, medical evacuation, sustainment, and information operations. At no point in this period of prolonged dispersed combat did I have knowledge of the tactical situation in each sub-unit fight, nor did I need it. I trusted each sub-unit to continue to execute our concept of offensive manoeuvre operations designed to reduce enemy capacity, maintain the initiative and continuously create conditions that I could exploit in information operations. That these sub-units engaged in dozens of independent actions, destroying multiple enemy groups and reclaiming four districts for the Government of Afghanistan, without having one blue-on-blue or one civilian casualty, is testimony to the effectiveness of the platoon and company leadership and affirms to me that trust in subordinates—and not knowledge of their every move—is the essence of ADO.

I hope the reader has better insight into how we are operating in the counter-insurgency in Afghanistan and how force employment there should shape the evolution toward ADO. I hope, as well, that they will understand the extreme conviction with which I hold that the power of personality, intellect and intuition, determination and trust outweigh everything else in war.

Endnote

1. CONOP approval required the submission of approximately 50 PowerPoint slides outlining the intent and scope of operations and the perceived risk involved. Any CONOP based on hard intelligence and requiring a massing of forces would have to go to the Division Commander for approval; therefore we deliberately made conservative estimates of enemy strength and reduced our force requirements in order to streamline the approval process (knowing that we could pile on forces after contact was made).

LAND OPERATIONS 2021: A FORCE EMPLOYMENT CONCEPT FOR THE ARMY OF TOMORROW

Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, OMM, MSC, MSM, CD
Commander Land Forces Command

As the 21st Century unfolds, Canada's Armed Forces must be ready to operate within an international security arena marked by uncertainty, volatility and risk, in order to meet national security needs and expectations. Increasingly, the likelihood of large force-on-force exchanges will be eclipsed by irregular warfare conducted by highly adaptive, technologically enabled adversaries, media-savvy foes intent less on defeating armed forces than eroding an adversary's will to fight, rogue states bent on challenging the status quo and transnational criminal organizations ready, willing and able to buy, sell and trade everything from drugs to armaments for their own gain. Furthermore, turmoil will often occur in urban areas, with adversaries taking full advantage of the complex physical, moral and informational environments that large, densely populated cities provide.

Nor will tomorrow's security challenges be confined to the external arena. In an increasingly interconnected, interdependent and information-based world, lines between the external and the domestic will be increasingly blurred. Climate change, natural disasters and even the flow of goods and people know no boundaries and the ability to operate and interact within networks and share information will increase dramatically in significance—posing both new opportunities and challenges.

It is within this uncertain context that Canada's Land Force must continue to operate effectively as a full partner within the Canadian integrated joint force team. As such, the Army must work towards a fuller understanding of the character of the future security environment and its implications for future armed conflict. Moreover, it must foster operational concepts and doctrine that are clear, relevant and always forward-looking. Finally, it must seek capabilities that ensure its effectiveness in the future multidimensional battlespace at home and abroad.

To mitigate the unpredictability of future conflict and prepare the Army for the challenges it will face in the future, the Army has produced *Land Operations 2021: A Force Employment Concept for Canada's Army of Tomorrow*, which serves as the guide for Land Force development through to the year 2021. This capstone document was developed from a series of operating, functional, and enabling concepts that collectively describe an approach to future land operations characterized by the deliberate use of dispersion and aggregation undertaken by adaptive forces in order to create and sustain tactical advantage over adept, adaptive adversaries. In this environment, land forces will be a major contributor to the networked joint team producing integrated effects through adaptive dispersed operations.

The fundamental objective of the adaptive dispersed operating concept is to defend Canada at home and abroad by contributing to the maintenance of long-term stability and security in regions of conflict. Consequently, the concept envisages land forces fully capable of full spectrum engagement across a continuum of operations from peacetime

military engagement to major combat. Regardless of where these operations take place—in a domestic or expeditionary context—the tenets of the concept are uniformly applicable. Thus, land forces trained, organized and equipped to undertake adaptive dispersed operations will be equally effective in meeting the challenges of the future security environment in Canada or abroad.

This force employment concept is ambitious and forward thinking, but at the same time well grounded in the lessons that we have captured from today's operations. In essence, it is a conceptual guide, from which force generation must evolve, acknowledging where we are, what we have achieved, and what we must do to ensure continued success in the future.

BRIDGING TO THE ARMY OF THE FUTURE: TRANSFORMING THE ARMY'S BRIDGING CAPABILITIES

Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas A. Weber

A man standing on the bank of a river with a chicken, a cat and a dog must cross the river to continue his journey. Due to the velocity of the river current, the steep banks, and the depth of the water he can only take two animals across at a time in a large gunnysack. How will he get across without one of the animals killing another? This dilemma will never occur in the Canadian Army. Canadian Military Engineers will have identified the potential dilemma beforehand, providing an appropriate crossing at the time and place necessary to facilitate the mission of crossing the river with minimal losses. Or so we hope.

Bridging has been and remains a tactical, operational and often strategic enabler that facilitates manoeuvre and sustainment, particularly in complex terrain. An excellent historical example is the 17-day Canadian advance to Potenza during the Italian campaign in September 1943. The 1st Canadian Division was assigned the corps' right flank over mountainous terrain with inland towns that were difficult to access.[1]

> Field Marshal Montgomery, in *El Alamein to the Sangro*, has commented at some length on the important part enemy demolitions played in delaying the drive and on the opportunities the enemy sappers had to create trouble and confusion at every "twist and turn" in this mountainous country. When an advance is made against an enemy who chooses to stand and fight, the infantry have the predominant role. But in this almost bloodless trek the load bore heavily on the engineers. It was emphasized again and again, as in Sicily, that the division could go forward only as rapidly as craters could be filled, diversions or bridges built and roads repaired. A senior officer, who shall be nameless, is reputed to have remarked in an unguarded moment, "What this division really needs is three brigades of sappers and three companies of infantry."[2]

More recently, extensive bridging occurred throughout the Balkans and during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The difficult crossing of the Sava River near Zupanja, Croatia, on 31 December 1995, made headlines in America. It was the largest bridge build for an operational requirement since the Second World War, with the river swelling to a 600-meter gap due to an early spring thaw.[3] Sustainment of the operation relied on establishment of this line-of-communication (LOC) bridge. In Iraq, gap crossings of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers and the Saddam Canal in particular were a major concern.[4] Ribbon bridges were constructed as LOC bridges, medium girder bridges (MGB) were used to over-bridge damaged infrastructure[5], and armoured vehicle launched bridges (AVLB) were utilized to drive over oil pipelines perpendicular to the axis of advance.[6] Bridging capabilities are critical to successful modern military operations and will continue to be a major enabler in the future.

Canadian bridging capabilities must be responsive to the Army's requirements. Present bridging doctrine and equipment are designed to fight an attritional conflict based on Cold War scenarios as opposed to existing and future threat environments. This limited bridging capability is not synchronized with the new force structure and does not meet the intent of an effects-based expeditionary force. As a key tactical and operational enabler, bridging capability within the Canadian Army must evolve and

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas A. Weber, 'Bridging to the Army of the Future: Transforming the Army's Bridging Capabilities' Canadian Army Journal Vol. 10.1 (Spring 2007), 12-23

transform with the force structure in order for the Army to remain strategically relevant and tactically decisive.

This article conducts a critical analysis based on first principles to determine appropriate bridging requirements to support the Army of the future and identify limitations and shortfalls with existing equipment bridging capabilities.7 The probable Army tasks to meet Canada's defence objectives will be defined and examined, followed by an assessment of gap crossing capabilities required to support these tasks. Assessed capabilities for the future Army force structure will then be compared to existing Canadian bridging doctrine and capabilities to determine shortfalls and limitations. Finally, recommendations to transform Army bridging capabilities will be presented.

Bridging: At Home and Abroad

The Army's bridging requirements are dictated by the Army's mission "to generate and maintain combat capable, multi-purpose land forces to meet Canada's defence objectives."[8] These objectives are outlined in the 1994 White Paper on Defence and focus on three main pillars: providing for the defence of Canada and Canadian sovereignty, continued Canada—United States defence cooperation, and contributing to international security.[9] The Army's mission, focusing on these pillars, results in tasks that determine the bridging capabilities the Army will require to achieve success.

Author's Collection

Although the security environment in much of the world has changed,[10], security threats affecting the first pillar within Canada have been relatively constant. Threats to peace and security necessitating an Army response have been, and remain, civil disturbances and natural or manmade disasters beyond the capability of civil authorities.[11] As demonstrated by the Oka incident in 1990, provinces can call upon the military to restore or maintain civil order.[12] In response to natural and manmade disasters the Army was tasked to assist with the Ice Storm, the British Columbia Forest Fires and the Great Toronto Snowstorm as well as the Y2K threat, the Swiss Air crash and the Toronto Blackout.[13] These recent events provide excellent examples of Army capabilities

required to meet the demands of providing security and protection within the borders of Canada.

Similarly, a historical review of Army bridging support to the protection and security of Canada provides insight into the bridging capabilities and responses required to support Army domestic tasks. In 1969, 2 Field Squadron in Gagetown replaced a collapsed highway bridge at Robinsvillle, New Brunswick with a 140-foot heavy girder bridge. The following year the same squadron constructed a 170-foot Bailey bridge over the Miramichi River when floods washed out the existing bridge.[14] In 1972 the concrete bridge on the Trans Canada Highway over the Petawawa River, just outside of CFB Petawawa, collapsed due to erosion. 1 Field Squadron opened a 70 mile detour through Algonquin Park and operated a military load class (MLC) 30 light raft to ferry essential support, perishable foods and ambulances across the river.[15] Two days later the squadron constructed a 312 foot MLC 30 floating bridge two kilometres downstream of the collapsed bridge. By the time a semi-permanent bridge was completed by 1 Field Squadron, using materials supplied by the Ontario Ministry of Transportation, approximately 100,000 vehicles and pedestrians had crossed the floating bridge.[16] More recently, in support of an aid to the civil power request, 2 Combat Engineer Regiment deployed a medium raft (MR) to Cornwall in 1990 to support and evacuate police forces from Akwesasne First Nation if international bridge access was unavailable.[17] Finally, in 1997, 1 Combat Engineer Regiment deployed an MR to support Army disaster relief efforts during the Manitoba Flood.[18], which was used to move equipment and personnel to and from communities stranded by the floodwaters. All these cases involved LOC bridging to support emergency civilian movement across gaps or large bodies of inland waterways.

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Based on this historical examination and the present threat assessment, Army equipment bridging capability must be responsive to manmade and natural disasters, critical infrastructure vulnerability, and aid to the civil power.[1920] The response must be rapid, therefore the capability required must be dispersed across the country and highly mobile on Canadian roads. The capability must satisfy civilian as well as military requirements. The Army must be prepared to deal with flooding caused by natural disasters or the failure of a dam, possibly due to a terrorist attack. LOC bridges, in particular bridges along major Canadian highways, are critical infrastructure that the

military must be capable of reopening or bypassing should a bridge close due to natural or human intervention. Therefore, the most relevant capabilities for domestic bridging tasks are the ability to cross large gaps, support civilian mobility (possibly for extended periods of time), and provide crossing support quickly.

United States Defence Cooperation

The second pillar identifies the requirement for a close working relationship with the United States and other allies. "The United States is Canada's most important ally and the two countries maintain a relationship that is as close, complex and extensive as any in the world."[21] The Army recognizes that a relationship with the world superpower is a key factor in determining the Army of the future, and that it must continue to develop its capability for joint and combined operations with its principal ally, the US.[22] The intent is to "…synchronize force development to achieve joint interoperability with the ground forces of the United States".[23] Therefore future Canadian bridging capabilities must take into consideration American capabilities.

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As part of their Army Transformation, US Army equipment bridging capabilities are being developed to support the new expeditionary force framework. Existing procurement contracts have been cancelled and new contracts developed to meet the requirements of the Future Combat Systems program. The program to replace existing AVLBs with heavier capabilities based on the M1 Abram chassis was cancelled, and the requirement for heavy assault crossing bridging is currently under review.[24] A new program has been developed to produce tactical support crossing bridging equipment as part of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team.[25] The intent is to produce a relatively light equipment bridge (MLC 30) that is air transportable by C-130 aircraft and can be launched and recovered by a vehicle already in service. General Dynamics has been contracted to build the first sets of the Rapidly Emplaced Bridging System (REBS) that will be 13.8 meters long and installed on a pallet system that can launch the bridge from the back of an existing bridging truck. The bridge will take two sappers 10 minutes to launch, and it can be transported in theatre by a CH-47 helicopter.[26] Until REBS arrives, engineers supporting the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams will carry palletized MGBs.

The US Army recognizes the importance of LOC bridging as part of its future force requirements. An improved medium floating bridge (MFB) was successfully used for an LOC bridge across the Tigris River during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Since the war, the Army plans to replace its entire aging MFB inventory with the improved version.[27] As well, the US Army is procuring a beam-launched bridging system to replace MGB used as an LOC bridging system. This Dry Support Bridge (DSB) system is based on foldable bridge sections loaded on standard pallets. An 8-man section can construct an MLC 70 tracked (MLC 90 wheeled) bridge across a gap of 40 meters in approximately two hours.[28] Although referred to as an LOC bridge, the steep ramps and lack of guardrails make it unsuitable for logistics traffic.[29] American military engineers also retain the ability to construct panel bridges such as Bailey bridge variants with reserve component Bridging Panel Companies. These companies are the first response for domestic disaster relief and provide LOC bridging for expeditionary operations in austere environments.[30]

To synchronize with the US Army, Canadian equipment bridging capabilities must be capable of supporting the expeditionary requirements of the US Army's Future Combat Systems program. As a minimum, support crossing equipment bridging must accommodate wheeled MLC 30 traffic. It should be transportable in a C-130 aircraft and on a pallet loading system (PLS) compatible with US army logistics systems. Ideally, Canadian equipment bridging would be interchangeable with American systems, improving the interoperability of a Canadian battle group within an American-led coalition. With common bridging equipment, specific-to-nation bridging equipment would not have to be transported throughout the area of operations (AO). Common bridging equipment would be moved from the nearest location in theatre to where it was required. Canadian and American engineers would not have to move throughout each other's AO to construct equipment bridging, since only the equipment would need to move. The operational logistics of equipment bridging becomes easier with fewer variants, reducing equipment stocks in theatre and streamlining maintenance support for repair and parts replacement. The more synchronized Canadian equipment bridging capabilities are with the US Army, the more flexible and sustainable the Canadian component will be in an American coalition.

International Security

The third and final pillar requires the Army to be capable of contributing effectively to international stability operations. The Warsaw Pact threat of a conventional war between peer forces in a linear, contiguous battle space fought in relatively open terrain no longer exists. The threats to global security are now assessed as failed or failing states, state sponsored terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.[31] Although belligerents may have the ability to conduct a high-tempo, high-intensity operation, it will likely be limited compared to Western capabilities.[32] To counter this advantage, opponents tend to operate in complex terrain such as mountains, jungles or built-up areas in order to limit the effectiveness and lethality of new technology.[33] Also, they tend to adopt asymmetric methods of fighting in order to strike offensively at superior forces.[34] Guerrilla tactics of randomly targeting lightly defended sites, convoys or civilian infrastructure are typical examples. Thus the battle space of the future will likely be non-linear, non-contiguous, and fought in relatively complex terrain against an asymmetric enemy:[35]

> "In this increasingly unstable international threat environment, Canada must have armed forces that are flexible, responsive and combat-capable for a wide range of operations, and that are able to work with our allies."[36]

The intent is to integrate Canadian defence, development and diplomatic resources to protect and advance our national security interests, international peace and stability

and human rights.[37] Canadian society expects operations that inflict the minimum number of friendly, civilian and enemy casualties.[38] In effect the expectation is a force capable of conducting simultaneous combat and humanitarian operations abroad.

To meet these expectations the Army is transforming from its present Cold War posture into a force that is sustainable, strategically mobile, tactically decisive and able to operate in joint, interagency and multinational environments.[39] To improve strategic mobility the Army is transitioning from heavier, more maintenance-intensive tracked forces to wheeled medium and light forces. The new force structure and supporting equipment is MLC 30, air transportable in a C-130 aircraft, easier to move by sea and, due to less route restrictions from MLC or size considerations, is more operationally mobile in theatre. It will be capable of operating in mobility-restricting complex terrain and will manoeuvre quickly throughout the AO utilizing roads rather than traveling across country. To remain tactically decisive after losing its tracked vehicles the Army is adopting effects-based operations (EBO) to compensate for decreased firepower, protection and cross-country mobility.[40] ISTAR assets will provide unprecedented understanding of the enemy and allow synchronization of long-range precision fires to shape and engage him.[41] Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is one of the cornerstones of humane operations in non-contiguous, asymmetric operations. From an engineering perspective this encompasses provision of essential services and repairing or constructing essential infrastructure.[42] With these transformations the Army will be capable of supporting Canadian international policies in an asymmetric non-contiguous, non-linear environment.

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Cascading from Army transformation requirements, bridging capability requirements transform as well. Strategic mobility demands that equipment bridging be easily shipped or flown into theatre and, once in theatre, not be subject to mobility limitations in the AO due to size or weight restrictions in complex terrain. The equipment bridge must be capable of keeping pace with the force as it utilizes roads to manoeuvre. To remain tactically decisive, the Army will require a rapidly deployable gap crossing capability in

support of forward elements. Statistics show that 60% of gaps can be bridged by spans of 6 meters or less, 20% require spans from 6 to 20 meters, and the remaining 20% require bridges longer than 20 meters.[43] Therefore a bridging system, or combination of bridging systems, is required that provides a flexible response for rapid support to tactical movement or support to an LOC based on ISTAR identification of gap crossing requirements. The system should efficiently use the minimal amount of equipment to defeat the gap in order to maximize limited resources. Fortunately, EBO will minimize the requirement to conduct assault bridging in the face of enemy direct fire. The reduced risk of enemy fire during assault crossings decreases the requirement for heavy armour protection. However, an asymmetric enemy will strike at weak links to attack its opponent. Damaging or destroying key bridges is an excellent tactic to disrupt logistics and troop movements. The ability to replace or repair LOC bridges in the AO could be critical to the success of a mission. As well, the capability to replace or repair bridging for civilian use is an excellent CIMIC action to accomplish defence, diplomatic and development objectives, and is highly visible as a positive humane contribution to bettering conditions for the local population. These bridging capability requirements are necessary to support a transformed Canadian Army.

Capabilities vs. Requirements

The Army presently has three doctrinal bridging categories supported by four distinct equipment bridging capabilities, all of which were acquired and designed for use during the Cold War. Doctrinally each equipment capability is used to support a specific crossing category: assault, support, and LOC. Comparing existing equipment and supporting doctrine to new requirements to support the Army of the future will identify where transformation in bridging capabilities is required.

Assault

Assault crossing is defined as intimate mobility support to the fighting echelon, often conducted under the threat of direct or indirect fire. It is intended for use over a short period of time; extended use will require significant maintenance.[44] The Leopard AVLB provides the Army with its assault bridging capability.[45] It is based on a Leopard 1 chassis and can launch an MLC 60 bridge in approximately five minutes to defeat a gap of 20 meters. Doctrinally it provides a rapid armoured bridging capability to support tanks and tracked infantry vehicles during an assault or advance to contact. The lack of decking and support rails makes the AVLB unsuitable for wheeled support vehicles and dangerous for civilian vehicles. It is normally used in tandem with two special wheeled bridge transporters pulled by prime movers to re-supply the Leopard chassis with two other bridges. The wheeled bridge transporter has limited mobility, normally following the battle on roads. Once launched, a bridge remains in location until a support bridge is constructed or an alternate crossing site secured. A Leopard chassis with an AVLB is 12 meters long, 4 meters wide and 3.6 meters high, and has an MLC of 50.[46]

Based on bridging requirements to support the three pillars, assault bridging doctrine and equipment must be revisited. First and foremost, assault bridging is not a requirement to support the first pillar. As threat analysis and historical study has shown, the requirement for an intimate temporary gap crossing capability limited to 20 meters to support armoured vehicles is not a probable task. The size of the AVLB (think Leopard chassis complete with a bridge) makes it impractical for long road moves on a highway, limiting its domestic use unless it is pre-positioned by tank transporter. The bridge is not designed for civilian vehicle use so it will have minimal, if any, value in supporting aid to the civil power tasks.

With respect to interoperability with the US army, Canadian assault crossing doctrine and our AVLB have limited applicability. Although the project to replace their

version of the AVLB was cancelled the US still has an AVLB to support their heavy armoured forces. The Leopard system is not, however, compatible with the Abrams system, therefore the advantages gained with common equipment in an American-led coalition is not realized. As well, the Leopard bridge has an MLC of 60 with a limited ability to take MLC 70 vehicles such as the M1 Abrams. American Stryker Brigade vehicles, however, with an MLC of 30 can easily cross the Leopard AVLB.

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Finally, support under the third pillar to an expeditionary LAV-based force is limited as well. Although the Leopard chassis provides great tactical cross-country mobility, it is not strategically or operationally mobile. The size, weight and shape of the bridging system preclude it from being air-portable and it takes up significant space on sea transport. Once in theatre, mobility is further limited by route restrictions due to its weight and dimensions. The AVLB will have restricted ability to follow a LAV-based fleet as it manoeuvres using roads. With the Army phasing out tanks, deploying AVLBs in theatre would result in a disproportionate logistical support requirement to keep these vehicles operational. The AVLB does meet the requirement for a rapidly emplaced bridging system that offers significant protection. However, with the implementation of EBO, the concept of assault bridging in the face of enemy fire is less likely. As well, the system is limited to gaps of 20 meters or less. Although statistically this defeats approximately 80% of the gaps, the AVLB lacks the flexibility to expand or contract, making it somewhat inefficient.

Support

Support crossings are used to establish semi-permanent or permanent crossings for planned movements and road networks with expected high use by both wheeled and tracked traffic. Both the MGB and MFB/MR are used by the Army to conduct support crossings. The MGB was developed in 1969 and introduced into service in the late 1970s.[47] It is designed to be light, easily transportable on a pallet system, and quickly constructed by hand with minimal mechanical support. A standard MGB set is 45.7 meters long and 4 metres wide, and includes the MACH (mechanically aided construction by hand) set,[48] link reinforced sets, and a reduced slope ramp.[49] An MGB is manpower intensive, normally requiring an engineer troop to construct, however the MACH system allows for the same build time with only a section supported by a crane. The MFB/MR was introduced into service in the early 1980s. It consists of floating

pontoons that are launched from an HLVW PLS into the water, where they are configured by a bridging boat to create ferries or bridges.[50] An MFB set allows for the assembly of two rafts or an MLC 60 floating bridge 85 meters in length. The bridge can be lengthened by adding more pontoons from other sets. Equipment and manpower required to set up a MFB depends on bank conditions, size of the gap, and water speed.[51]

Considering the bridging requirements for the three pillars, support bridging doctrine and equipment are relevant to Army transformation. The concept of a semi-permanent or permanent support to road networks directly addresses mobility support requirements within Canada. From an equipment perspective, the MGB is adequate for most gaps while the MFB is excellent for larger bodies of water. Both systems are pallet loaded and easily transported on Canada's primary and secondary road networks. The MGB is easily and rapidly constructed, however it is limited by design to gaps of approximately 45 meters. Although the reduced slope ramp and decking permit civilian vehicles to use the bridge, the small curb along the outside of the bridge provides little resistance to a vehicle driving off the side. As a result traffic on the bridge must be slow and positively controlled. A walkway can be constructed on the side of the bridge to provide limited pedestrian traffic. The MFB is excellent for large bodies of water. It is easily and rapidly constructed, providing a safe and relatively quick roadway over water. The bridge is not limited by the size of the gap, but only by the number of bridge parts available. If there are insufficient parts to bridge the gap, the MFB can be used as a ferry in the MR configuration.

Canadian support bridging doctrine and equipment are currently interoperable with American concepts and equipment until future US bridging developments to support the Stryker brigade concept are implemented. The US now uses palletized MGB in a tactical support role, which is effectively assault bridging using EBO to minimize direct enemy fire on a bridging site. The Canadian MGB system is interoperable with the American system at the moment. However, when REBS and DSB bridging systems come into service the US Army will phase out MGB. Therefore interoperability for support bridging will be drastically reduced if Canada retains the MGB system. Since the US continues to use the MFB system, upgrading to the improved version, the Canadian MFB remains compatible.

Support bridging doctrine and equipment address the capabilities necessary to support the third pillar. Both the MGB and MFB are transported on a pallet system that can be shipped or flown into theatre and, once there, easily moved with minimal route restrictions. From a tactical perspective, a palletized MGB system on HLVWs has little difficulty supporting a LAV based manoeuvre force. ISTAR provides advanced notice of likely gap sizes and EBO minimizes the risk of direct fire in order for the appropriate sized MGB to be available and constructed at the right time and place. The drawback to the MGB in a tactical supporting role is the manpower and time required to complete a bridge compared to an AVLB. From an operational and strategic perspective, both the MGB and MFB can provide bridging for civilian use, although, as discussed in support to domestic operations, there are limitations associated with MGB.

Lines of Communication

LOC crossings differ very little from support bridging in Canadian doctrine. Normally LOC bridging is more permanent than support bridging, and is built in areas free from direct enemy action. An LOC bridge tends to have a larger load class requirement, a longer gap to cross, and potentially a longer life than a support bridge. Doctrinally combat engineers retain a limited ability to construct LOC bridges and will require refresher training and rehearsals to successfully construct a bridge.[52] The 700 Series ACROW bridge, an improved version of the Bailey bridge, was introduced to the Army

around 1990. It is designed for construction using heavy equipment, however it can be built by hand. A standard CF ACROW set allows for the construction of an MLC 60 bridge with a span of 48 meters and a width of 4.24 meters.[53]

Of the three doctrinal crossings and associated bridge equipment, LOC bridging receives the least attention doctrinally although it provides noteworthy support to the Army's requirements. It is an excellent resource for aid to the civil power tasks. Panel bridging is designed for safe use by civilian vehicles and can accommodate large traffic flows. It is easy to palletize and rapidly transport to site utilizing the national road network. Once on site a 40 meter bridge can be constructed within 12 hours with the assistance of two cranes.[54] Although more difficult and time consuming to construct than an MGB, a panel bridge can cross a larger gap and provides a much greater volume of safe traffic flow. Unfortunately present doctrine does not provide an inherent panel bridging capability that would be responsive to a domestic emergency.

Attempting interoperability with the US Army for LOC bridging is problematic. At the moment the Americans are still using Bailey bridges in reserve bridging companies while Canada has procured the more advanced ACROW bridge system.

LOC panel bridging is a valuable operational and strategic enabler for support to the third pillar, international stability operations. Palletization facilitates strategic shipment overseas and operational movement once in theatre. The LOC panel bridging system is not designed to support tactical mobility, since construction time is significantly longer than the AVLB and MGB. However, compared to the time required to reconstruct or repair a steel truss or reinforced concrete bridge, panel bridging provides an immediate and effective solution to logistics mobility requirements. The bridging system is extremely flexible, capable of spanning single gaps up to 60 meters with a 100(+) MLC crossing.[55] Given the asymmetric threat to key infrastructure, the ability to replace or repair an LOC bridge becomes an operational risk consideration. The panel bridging system mitigates this risk. As well the construction of a panel bridge for civilian use is an excellent method of controlling the movement of civilians for security and logistics requirements. From a strategic perspective, the replacement of a damaged bridge critical to the infrastructure of the local population is a recognized diplomatic and CIMIC action.[56] As discussed in support to domestic operations, the panel bridge is designed for use by civilian traffic. It provides a highly visible Canadian contribution to bettering the lives of the local population. The LOC panel bridging system is an excellent enabler for international stability operations.

Recommendations

Based on the proceeding critical analysis, the following recommendations are proposed to ensure bridging capabilities support the Army mission. Doctrinally, assault crossing should no longer be conducted by the Army, as the Leopard chassis is no longer a viable deployment option. In lieu, the US concept of tactical support bridging should be adopted. To support this doctrine, the Army should investigate acquiring the US REBS for its LAV-based expeditionary force. This system provides an AVLB replacement for intimate support to the fighting echelon and promotes interoperability with the Americans. In the interim, the MGB can provide both a tactical and more general bridging support capability. The doctrine for support bridging is sound and the existing MGB and MFB systems are adequate, but dated, since both these systems have been in use for over 20 years. As a second priority to the acquisition of a tactical support bridging system, replacements for the MGB and MFB should be investigated. The concept for the American DSB system provides a viable alternative to the MGB system and the newer versions of the MFB would be a relatively easy procurement. Finally, the importance of LOC bridging should be reflected in present doctrine. Panel

bridging should become a core capability of the engineers as opposed to a "limited" capability. The existing ACROW bridging system meets the requirements for the Army's present and future LOC bridging requirements.

Conclusion

Critical analysis of bridging capabilities clearly illustrates the changes required in both doctrine and equipment to support the Army mission. Although present Cold War doctrine and equipment provide some support, both are found wanting with respect to the tasks generated by the three pillars of security and protection of Canada, interoperability with the United States, and international security. The proposed recommendations will synchronize doctrine and bridging systems with the new Army doctrine and force structure, providing key tactical, operational and strategic enablers to mitigate risks and promote government policies. As a result, transforming Canadian bridging capabilities will become the solution to the dilemma of the man at the river's edge, supporting the Canadian Army aim of being strategically relevant and tactically decisive.

About the Author...

An Electrical Engineering graduate of RMC, Lieutenant-Colonel Weber has participated in three overseas and two domestic operations over the course of his career. His first tour was as the CANCON Engineer supporting the RCD in Cypress in 1989. While seconded to the British Army on the Rhine, he deployed with the British to Bosnia on ROTO 0 of UNPROFOR 2 in 1990-91. His most recent overseas tour was as the Task Force Engineer for the Multinational Bde for IFOR ROTO 0 in 1995/96. In the interim Lieutenant-Colonel Weber deployed to Cornwall in support of the Akwasasni operation and to Winnipeg during the floods. Lieutenant-Colonel Weber is currently serving in LFWA as the Area Engineer.

Endnotes

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10. See the discussion later concerning the third pillar.
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12. *Ibid*..
13. Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy* (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2004), p. 23.
14. LCol K. J. Holmes CD (Retd), *The History of the Canadian Military Engineers* Vol 3, ed. J. R. Newell (Toronto: Thorn Press Ltd, 1997), p. 370.
15. MLC refers to the tonnage that can safely use a bridge or road for an extended period of time. MLC 30 would mean vehicles weighing up to 30 tons can safely use the road or bridge.
16. Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 371.
17. The author, as a member of 2 Combat Engineer Regiment, commanded the MR detachment supporting the operation for two weeks in August 1990.

18. As a member of 2 Combat Engineer Regiment the author deployed in support of the Winnipeg Floods and observed the MR in use.
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32. Department of National Defence, DLSC Report 01/01, *Future Army Capabilities*, p. 7.
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34. In asymmetric warfare the intent is to weaken a superior opponent by undermining strengths and exploiting weaknesses, often with a more psychological than physical impact.
35. Department of National Defence, DLSC Report 01/01, *Future Army Capabilities*, p. 7
36. Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*, p. 50.
37. *Ibid*., p. 51.
38. Department of National Defence, *The Force Employment Concept for the Army* (Ottawa: DND Canada, March 2004), p. 1.
39. *Ibid*., p. 6.
40. EBO is a methodology for operations that uses the full range of effects, both lethal and non-lethal, to render an opponent either physical or morally incapable of pursuing an objective. It encompasses conventional strike and maneuver with non-kinetic means such as psychological and civil-military cooperation(CIMIC) operations. The intent is to produce cascading systemic effects at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.
41. ISTAR—Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance.
42. Department of National Defence, *Canadian Forces Operations* B-GG-005-004/AF-000 (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2000), pp. 30-2.
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44. Department of National Defence, *Engineer Field Manual: Gap Crossing* B-GL-361-010/FP-001 (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2004), p. 5.
45. Department of National Defence, *Engineer Field Manual: Gap Crossing*, p. 22.
46. *Ibid*., p. 23.
47. *Ibid*., p. 69.
48. The MACH system allows the MGB to be constructed with fewer personnel without increasing the construction time by using a crane. Link reinforcement increases a 45.7m MGB MLC to 60. Reduced slope ramp allows *civilian or lower clearance support vehicles to use the MGB. See Department of National Defence Engineer Field Manual, Gap Crossing*, B-GL-361-010/FP-001, p. 71.
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MANAGED READINESS—FLAWED ASSUMPTIONS, POOR DEDUCTIONS AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

Lieutenant-Colonel (Retired) David Pentney, CD

The Managed Readiness System (MRS) was conceived as a framework for the Army to manage shortages through a demanding transformation period: shortages of personnel, operational equipment, capabilities and training resources. Although the concept of managed readiness is sound, the MRS, in its current incarnation, is based on a series of flawed assumptions and poor deductions that will cause it to fail unless adjustments are made in the short-term. Indeed, some of MRS's underlying assumptions have already proven invalid. Nonetheless, the Army seems intent on moving forward with MRS implementation, even though the situation has changed fundamentally, requiring a review of mission analysis.

This article will first briefly review what the MRS is and what it is intended to achieve. It will then identify its flawed assumptions, poor deductions and unintended consequences. Finally, the paper will offer options for improving the MRS to ensure that it is effective and sustainable over the long term.

Description

The MRS is intended to be an overarching system that synchronizes and integrates force development, force management, institutional and training activities, and national tasks. The MRS integrates the following subordinate systems to both sustain high

Combat Camera AR2006-G043-0044 06 November 2006 Panjwayi District, Afghanistan

The Chief of Land Staff (CLS) Lieutenant General (LGen) Andrew Leslie visiting the troops in Afghanistan. The CLS took some time to talk to members of Alpha Company 2 Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (2 PPCLI) at strong point Center in the Panjwayi district.

Combat Camera IS2005-0230 19 June 2005 Fort Bliss, Texas

A Company 2nd Battalion Royal 22e Régiment conducts a morning assault on American soldiers within the final days of Exercise DESERT WARRIOR.

readiness operations and achieve the right level of readiness under a "One Army" concept: personnel management; the collective training management framework; individual training management framework; Army combat service support and the Army Reserve MRP (Managed Readiness Plan).[1]

In November 2005, Chief of Land Staff (CLS) issued a document entitled "Managing the Army's Readiness."[2] The covering letter sets the context and provides a broad overview of the key elements of the MRS and its supporting processes. The document's annexes provide details of these supporting processes. At the time the document was issued, the Army was nearing the end of the "regeneration" period. This was a period

that was intended to give the Army the opportunity to have some respite from a sustained high operational tempo. It was intended that the cyclical MRS "…will provide the critical framework to align Army vision, strategy, mission, tasks and resources to achieve the highest level of readiness. The MRS is the cornerstone on which the Army will plan its MRP transformation, regeneration, expansion and sustainment activities for the next three to five years."[3]

The MRS is anchored on a three-year cyclical, tiered readiness cycle with three phases: Support Phase, High Readiness Training Phase and High Readiness Training/Operations Phase. The Support Phase begins at the completion of an operation/high readiness period and consists of four segments: Recovery, Regeneration/Support parts 1 and 2 and Training/Support. The MRS provides guidelines to prioritize and task Army components of 12 Task Forces (TFs), three Canadian Mechanized Brigade Groups (CMBG) Headquarters (HQ) (and their affiliated Signals Squadrons (Sigs Sqn)) and the Army Reserve in terms of transformation, regeneration, expansion, generation and sustainment activities.[4]

The Managed Readiness Plan (MRP) is the dynamic plan that synchronizes activities over time. From a high readiness perspective, the theoretical operational output is that there will be one CMBG HQ with its affiliated Sigs Sqn, and two TFs in the High Readiness Training/Operations Phase at any one time. These will either be deployed on operations or prepared to deploy. A third TF will be in high readiness as a strategic reserve. Elements of the Army that are in the MRS Support Phase will focus on transformation and expansion activities such as the introduction of new equipment and the adoption of new structures. Other activities that will take place during this phase include individual training and support to the individual training system and collective training activities.

How does the MRS align with the Army Strategy? The Army Strategy has four lines of operation. These are: transformation of the Land Force; regeneration of the field force; expansion to achieve the necessary Army capacity; and generation and sustainment of the Army commitments.[5] One line, generation and sustainment of Army operational commitments, is the focus of two of the three phases of the MRS, leaving only the Support Phase to achieve the objectives of the transformation, regeneration and expansion lines of operation.

Flawed Assumptions

One of the key elements of the Army strategy objectives is "that the Army should aim at providing task forces based on its capacity and not the demand."[6] This is wishful thinking, not a practical objective. Unfortunately, it became an assumption underlying the MRS and the basis upon which the force employment (FE) structures were developed. These FE structures, based on perceived capacity rather than on practical military doctrine and experience have already been found wanting. The FE TF structures were initially developed during the Land Force Structure Working Group in October 2004 on the premise that although "acknowledging the mission requirement, the intent was to reduce the current size of the task force to a sustainable level."[7] Demand is the real driving force and always will be. Capacity is a limitation.

The concept of a managed readiness cycle makes sense. What does not make sense is basing the cycle on a fixed, three-year time scale which is divided into six-month time blocks. Operational deployments will not necessarily correspond to the MRS cycle. A TF in the high readiness/operations phase could be committed to a new operation at any time during that phase. One out of sequence TF deployment will therefore require a significant adjustment to the MRP and other supporting plans to accommodate the

change. Clearly, the MRS and its supporting plans should be flexible enough so that an out of sequence deployment does not cause wholesale revision.

Poor Deductions

The MRS is based on the TF construct. It is important to understand that a TF is distinct from a unit. "In the Army MRS, a TF is a regrouping of capabilities, which may vary from a surveillance/reconnaissance group to a robust Battalion Group equivalent. The TF represents a combat-capable, medium-size force that is tactically decisive and sustainable on an enduring basis."[8] Notwithstanding this description, the MRS details three types of TF: light, medium and robust, each based on a 750-person manoeuvre component and a 250-person support component.[9] All are infantry based. The type is based on the equipment deployed: i.e., light is based on a light infantry component; robust has a light armoured vehicle (LAV) III infantry component; and medium has both.[10] Regardless of the type, the basic construct is the same with two infantry companies, a surveillance squadron, an artillery battery and a composite engineer squadron. Operational demands have since increased the number of infantry companies required to three.

Combat Camera IS2005-0231 19 June 2005 Fort Bliss, Texas

A Company 2nd Battalion Royal 22e Régiment conducts a morning assault on American soldiers within the final days of Exercise DESERT WARRIOR.

The phases of the MRS seem to assume that a TF is a homogenous entity throughout the MRS cycle and that there are 12 TFs because there are 12 manoeuvre unit headquarters. In fact, the TF only comes together as an entity for the high readiness training and high readiness training/operations phases/segments with multiple units providing the components. The unfortunate reality is that while there are 12 manoeuvre unit headquarters available, there are insufficient forces available to sustain 12 TFs. The Army's own force generation (FG) by capability analysis published with the MRS[11], clearly identified outstanding sustainability shortfalls, yet the MRS/MRP were issued without these being realistically and practically addressed.

The main manoeuvre element of the FE TF is the infantry company. There are nominally 27 of these in the regular force (RF) infantry battalions: nine light companies and 18 LAV companies. If the baseline requirement for a FE TF is three infantry

companies, then the infantry FG base can only support nine TFs. The MRP attempted to apply the 27 infantry company FG base to the 12 TF construct. The outcome is that the companies must cycle through the MRS at a higher rate than the TF HQs, thus leading to the situation where companies would only deploy with their parent unit HQ by happenstance rather than as a result of a deliberate plan. This circumstance has had, and will continue to have, a negative impact on unit cohesion and on the FG unit's ability to manage the four segments of the MRS support phase. The fact that there are three different types of TF, (light, medium and robust) further exacerbates the problem. Generating a medium TF requires that the light and LAV company requirements will be sourced from different units. Deficiencies in artillery, surveillance, engineer and the support component capabilities further exacerbate the FG challenge.

Another "fact" that skewed the estimate was the existence of 12 potential TF HQs—the unit HQs of the nine infantry battalions and the three armoured regiments. This "fact" became a cornerstone of the MRS/MRP; indeed, it became a constraint—there are 12 potential TF HQs, therefore, there had to be 12 TFs. A more complete assessment of the own troops factor would have revealed that there are insufficient sub-units in the force generation base to support a 12 TF construct.

Unintended Consequences

It has already been established that, in order to generate 12 TFs, the infantry companies have to rotate through the MRS cycle at a faster rate than the TF headquarters. When one considers that the numbers available for each of the other components of the TF also vary, it becomes evident that they will also rotate through the MRS cycle at different rates. Current manning levels further exacerbate the FG situation. Manning levels are such that formed sub-units do not exist during the MRS Support Phase. They generally have to be built from the ground up through a relatively long collective training process. Indeed, low current manning levels create the circumstances whereby the core manoeuvre elements of a high readiness TF are generally beyond the capability of the parent unit to generate. In order to meet the deficiency, the shortfall is generated from another unit. This practice of "robbing Peter to pay Paul" later generates a requirement for "Peter" to rob someone else when it is his turn to enter the collective training window on the road to high readiness.

Consider the case of 2nd Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (2 PPCLI). At time of writing, this unit had a company deployed with TF 1-06 and was providing casualty replacement to that TF. Another 2 PPCLI company was assigned to TF 3-06 led by 1st Battalion The Royal Canadian Regiment (1 RCR). When it is 2 PPCLI's turn to lead a TF in 2007, the unit headquarters will only be accompanied by one of its companies.[12] The other two will come from two other battalions. During the 2 PPCLI TF's high readiness training and deployment phases, two of 2 PPCLI's companies will be completely out of synch. This means that they will be without the leadership of their Commanding Officer (CO) and unit headquarters while they move through the four segments of the MRS support phase when critical transformation, regeneration and expansion objectives are to be achieved. One or more companies may, in fact, begin training with another TF even before the 2 PPCLI led TF deploys on operations.

The situation portrayed above is not unique to 2 PPCLI. The support phase of the MRS is critical for the Army's transformation, regeneration and expansion activities, yet one of the unintended consequences of the MRP is to dilute the focus on these activities. It is the unit, not the TF, which is responsible for implementing them, yet the demands of the MRP have undermined their ability to do so by creating the circumstance where a unit's three sub-units could each be in a separate MRS phase. This leaves a great deal

to accomplish, at the point when an effective command structure and the availability of personnel and equipment are at their lowest point in the cycle.

The 2 PPCLI situation described above illustrates another unintended effect of the MRS/MRP—institutional undermining of cohesion and the regimental system. Granted, the 2 PPCLI TF will, in all likelihood, develop into a cohesive, operational entity through strong leadership and shared experience gained through the high readiness training period and subsequent operational deployment. However, given the composition of the TF, achieving a cohesive entity will be far more challenging than if the TF was based on a formed unit to begin with. Regrettably, the cohesion built over a 12-month period of intense collective training and operational deployment period will ultimately be squandered when the 2 PPCLI TF completes its deployment and the TF is broken up and its components revert to the command of their parent units.

Cohesion and the regimental system are fundamental to Canadian Army doctrine. Indeed, the Army's keystone manual, *Canada's Army*, states, "Cohesion is the most important requirement of a combat force and must be developed and protected above all else."[13] *Canada's Army* emphasizes the importance of the regimental system by stating, "The regimental system is of critical importance to the army, as it is within the regiment or branch that the military ethos is most visibly embodied and practiced. Its utility and value further lies in the strong sense of comradeship it fosters among members of a regiment and in its tribal/familial nature which bonds soldiers in devotion, loyalty and selflessness to each other, contributing powerfully to unit cohesion."[14]

Cohesion and the regimental system also play important roles following an operation. One of the important lessons learned from operations in the Balkans in the 1990s was the importance of shared experience and peer support in mitigating the effects of post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Time will tell whether the deliberate break-up of a TF following an operation will generate a higher incidence of PTSD.

Our doctrine and operational experience reinforce the importance of cohesion and the regimental system, yet these "fundamentals" have been apparently been discounted by the architects of the MRS.

Summary of MRS Deficiencies

In its current form, the MRS suffers from several deficiencies. The misguided assumption that the Army would provide forces based on capacity rather than demand created fundamentally unsound FE structures. Real operational demand has already caused modification of FE structures. The MRS fixed three-year cycle lacks the flexibility necessary to accommodate operational realities that will probably not conform to the MRS cycle. The 12 TF construct is unsustainable from the current FG base. While the MRS protects the ability to generate and deploy TFs for operations, it undermines the Army's ability to implement critical transformation, regeneration and expansion activities. It also undermines cohesion and the regimental system. The MRS needs modification to overcome these deficiencies.

Options for Improvement

Flexibility

The MRS cycle need not change, but it must move from a cycle based on time to one that is based on operational demand—something that cannot always be predicted with any degree of certainty. Had the Government of Canada agreed to provide troops to the UN sponsored peacekeeping force to South Lebanon recently, would the MRS been able to deliver an operationally ready TF on the ground within the 15 day period required? Whether or not this requirement could have been met is academic at this

point. What is important to understand is that the MRS must be capable of meeting such short-notice operational requirements in the future.

In order to meet short-notice operational requirements, the MRS must ensure that high readiness TFs are available for immediate deployment. This requirement cannot be met on a time-based readiness cycle. In order to be ready to meet non-forecast operational demands, when one TF in the high readiness/operations cycle is committed to operations, another must complete the high readiness training phase as quickly as possible, perhaps sooner than anticipated, in order to be ready to assume a new operational task. Similarly, a TF in the support phase would have to enter the High Readiness Training Phase earlier than planned. An alternative approach to meeting non-forecast operational demands might be to extend the period of an operational deployment of one TF to allow activities by follow-on TFs in other phases of the MRS cycle to be completed.

Adjusting the MRS to a system that better responds to operational demand will have a significant impact on its supporting components. They too must be flexible enough to respond to changes in operational demand. The Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre (CMTC), for example, needs to be flexible enough to deliver operational training when it is required rather than on an artificial "campaign" season.

Sustainable Force Employment Structures That Foster Cohesion

The current FE TF structures upon which the MRS is based lack sufficient depth and flexibility to meet the operational requirement and are unsustainable from the current Army FG base. These structures require review to ensure that both deficiencies are overcome and that the solution fosters rather than squanders cohesion.

Combat Camera IS2005-0365 November 11 2005 Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

Commander of Task Force Afghanistan, Colonel Steve Noonan, salutes during the playing of the Canadian National Anthem at the Remembrance Day ceremony held at the Kandahar Airfield in Afghanistan.

There was a time when the Army could reasonably expect to generate and sustain 12 TFs. These TFs were called battle groups and they were generated from combat arms units that each had a minimum of three effective sub-units. Battle groups, like today's TFs, were task-tailored entities that were grouped to perform a specific task. Cohesion was achieved, in part, because battle groups were based on formed units.

FORCE GENERATION CAPABILITY

AVAILABLE FROM RF FG STRUCTURE WITH ARES AUGMENTATION		12 TF FE OPTION (Three Coy TF)	9 TF FE OPTION (Three Coy TF)	OBSERVATIONS
BDE HQ	3	3	3	
HQ & SIGS SQN	3	3	3	
INF BN	9	0		
TF HQ	9	9	9	
INF COYS	27	36	27	To meet the flexibility to mount light, medium or robust TFs, a mix of these capabilities must be available
LIGHT	9			
LAV	18			
RECCE PL	9	12	9	
ARMD REGT	3			
TF HQ	3	3		These are not required in the 9 TF FE construct as long as there are nine inf bns and the FE requirement is for an inf based TF. These would be required if the number of inf bns in the FG base is reduced.
DFS SQN	2	0		DFS is not currently a FE requirement. This could change; however, even if a half sqn/sqn (-) were identified it could not be sustained.
SURV SQN	7			
SHQ	7	12	9	The SHQ shortfall could be addressed by re-tasking DFS Sqn HQs. Another alternative would be to split SHQs, given that the commitment is only one surv tp.
SURV TP	12	12	9	
A ARMOUR COY	1	0		A Armour is not currently a FE requirement. This could change. An A Armour coy could only be deployed once. An A Armour pl requirement could only be sustained for three rotations.
ARTY REGTS	3	0		
ARTY BTYS	8	12	9	The requirement is for the Bty HQ with a tp of guns/mortars. The 9 TF FE option reduces the shortfall from four to one bty.
TA BTY	1	0		
ENGR REGTS	3			
COMPOSITE SQNS	12	12	9	There are sufficient SHQs available for either model; however, manning shortfalls make the 12 TF option unsustainable.
FG SVC BNS	3			
FSG	6	12	9	There are insufficient FSGs to sustain either option

Cohesion was further fostered through habitual groupings and affiliations whereby company X would normally be grouped with armoured regiment A and each of the armoured squadrons from that regiment had a standing affiliation with one of the three infantry battalions in the brigade. Field engineer squadrons and artillery batteries had similar affiliations. Battle group cohesion was further reinforced through regular, all-arms collective training.

This time has passed. Although the number of units remains essentially unchanged, the FG base has eroded significantly. The sub-unit building blocks have decreased in number and have been adapted to accommodate new equipment and doctrine. Collective training opportunities and the level of collective training have been reduced. Brigade groups have not been trained at the formation level since the last RENDEZVOUS exercise in 1993. Brigade concentrations, the venue for battle group collective training, ended at about the same time. Their successor, the brigade training event (BTE) emerged in 2003. However, the BTE is now a venue to train the brigade headquarters rather than the formation. The only manoeuvre element engaged in the BTE tends to be one high readiness TF. The Army's FG base is also facing increased pressure with the stand-up of the Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CSOR). The FG base will face even more pressure as the land component of the Standing Contingency Task Force (SCTF) begins to form. At this stage, it seems that CSOR will assume the Army's non-combatant evacuation operations task. In time, the SCTF may relieve the Army of the task of maintaining a separate TF for a second line of operation. At this point though, it would be premature to assume that either of these tasks will migrate elsewhere. Thus, the Army must retain the ability to generate a brigade HQ and two high readiness TFs as well as a strategic reserve.

An essential first step in addressing the FG issue is to recognize that the 12 TF construct is not sustainable from the FG base and that its continued use will generate situations as flawed as the case of 2 PPCLI described above. Annex A compares the Army's FG capability against both a 12 TF model and a nine TF model. Although there are still areas of concern, the nine TF model is much more capable of generating the FE demand. Given that the current FE TF construct is infantry based, it is reasonable to deduce that, if a nine TF model was to be adopted, it should be based on the nine extant infantry battalions. Basing the TF model on extant infantry battalions would also have the positive effect of reinforcing cohesion and the regimental system by reducing the need to create ad hoc TFs. These would be replaced by unit based TFs, ideally with supporting attachments being generated from within the same brigade. Such an arrangement would also set the conditions for the Army to better achieve its transformation, regeneration and expansion objectives during the MRS Support Phase because units and their sub-units would be, for the most part, in the same MRS phase.

This arrangement does not mean that the Canadian Army should necessarily restrict itself to an infantry based TF. The Army's FG structure has the capacity to generate other types of TFs if required. Engineer or surveillance TFs are two viable options. Unfortunately, these could not be sustained beyond one deployment, but they do offer operational alternatives that could be generated if required and added as an adjunct to the MRS/MRP.

In an ideal world, the FE TF structure would be a sub-set of an extant FG structure. Both require flexibility, depth and the ability to maintain a reserve—the FE structure for the conduct of operations and the FG structure so that it can generate and sustain the FE one. The FE TF structure needs to be flexible so that it can be task-tailored to meet the requirements of the operation on which it will be deployed. In order to provide that flexibility, the FG structure needs to be an all-arms grouping that has sufficient depth to generate the FE TF, sustain it during operations by providing trained reinforcements and contain a reserve element that can be deployed on short notice to meet non-forecast operational requirements. An extant FG structure that has the characteristics described above is the Canadian mechanized brigade group (CMBG).

One option would be to task each CMBG to maintain one TF in the high readiness training/Operations Phase with another TF in the High Readiness Training Phase. In this way, the Army's operational commitments could be met based on formed units with

attachments, as required, coming from within the same formation. First line of operations, second line of operations and strategic reserve operational tasks could be rotated between the three CMBGs to ensure that actual deployments are distributed across the FG base.

In implementing this concept, the operational requirement to have a CMBG and its affiliated HQ and Sigs Sqn ready for deployment must be factored in. If a CMBG HQ is scheduled for operational deployment, then its subordinate units could be assigned under the operational control of another CMBG from the time the parent CMBG HQ enters the high readiness training/operations phase until the end of its operational deployment.

Adopting a nine TF construct using the extant CMBGs, with the current level of Army reserve augmentation as the FG base, would provide the necessary flexibility, depth and ability to maintain a reserve while reinforcing the chain of command, fostering cohesion and better enabling units to meet the demands of the support phase.

Summary

This article has examined the Army's MRS. Although the basic concept is sound, its current construct is fundamentally flawed because it is based on false assumptions and poor deductions that are having unintended consequences in its execution. In its current construct, the MRS is based on fundamentally unsound FE structures and its FG base is unsustainable. Currently, the MRS is a time-based cycle that lacks the flexibility to adapt to changing operational demands. Implementation is having unintended consequences of institutionally undermining cohesion and the regimental system and of inhibiting the Army's ability to manage its transformation, regeneration and expansion activities. With a few relatively minor modifications, the MRS can be adjusted to better meet its objective of providing the critical framework to align Army vision, strategy, mission, tasks and resources to achieve the highest level of readiness.

About the Author ...

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Endnotes

1. 3350-1 (CLS) November 2005, *Managing the Army's Readiness*, paragraph 13.
2. 3350-1 (CLS) November 2005, *Managing the Army's Readiness.*
3. Ibid, paragraph 1.
4. Ibid, paragraph 15.
5. Ibid, paragraph 10.
6. Ibid, Annex B, paragraph 11.
7. Ibid, Annex E, paragraph 3.
8. 3350-1 (CLS) November 2005, *Managing the Army's Readiness*, Annex J, paragraph 17.
9. Ibid, Annex A, paragraph 19.
10. Ibid, Annex D.
11. Ibid, Annex E.
12. DLFR 5-4 Force Generation Task Org Matrix, 19 Apr 06.
13. B-GL-300-000/FP-000 Canada's Army, 01/04/1998, pages 39-40.

CLOSE RECONNAISSANCE: ITS EVOLVING ROLE AND CAPABILITIES

Captain Jason H. Thompson

I believe that the man who adapts his course of action to the nature of the times will succeed.

-Niccolo Machiavelli

Understanding that the reconnaissance platoon's role is to gain information through aggressive patrolling and ground observation, and to guide follow-on forces to properly identified and picketed objectives, the skill set that is currently being fostered within the training system and the current capabilities within a standard reconnaissance platoon fall short of realizing the platoon's proclaimed role. The underlining concepts behind training and employing a reconnaissance platoon must shift in order to adapt to the realities of contemporary operations, where low to mid-intensity conflicts in and around urban environments is the norm.

This article will outline the changes that the Canadian Infantry Corps' close reconnaissance platoons must embrace in order to adapt to the contemporary operating environment (COE). It will identify changes to the COE, propose a new reconnaissance platoon organization, identify operational and training shortfalls in the current organization, and then explain the proposed solutions that will allow close reconnaissance platoons to be the task force commander's primary source of tactical information across the full spectrum of engagement.

Contemporary Operating Environment

The operational environment is complex and ambiguous, both in terms of the geographical area of operations, which lacks clear boundaries or a front-line, and in terms of the nature of belligerent parties… [current operations are] characterized by conflict involving both regular and paramilitary forces operating within difficult rural or urban terrain who often utilize the population as a means of concealment and pursue their military objectives using guerilla or insurgent tactics.[1]

The COE is characterized by low to mid-intensity conflict in and around complex terrain, in failed or failing states, where the enemy has integrated into the general population in order to counter western overmatch in the traditional or linear war fighting context.[2] This has been demonstrated throughout the post-Cold War period, but it has been accentuated in the invasion and subsequent stabilization operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result of the COE's nature, methods of collecting, communicating and acting upon operationally relevant information have changed.

> In response to our current joint capabilities and [Western] style of warfare, and the overwhelming dominance we have been able to achieve against enemy forces…our enemies are going to drag land warfare into urban areas and complex terrain…where environmental conditions and our ethical adherence to international laws inherently limit the effectiveness of our current joint sensor technology and networkcentric form of warfare.[3]

A vast improvement in our ability to electronically survey areas of interest through satellite, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), or vehicle-mounted platforms has greatly enhanced our capacity to monitor and collect information on traditional enemy forces and terrain. However, "…given the propensity towards asymmetrical warfare and [Canada's]

Combat Camera APD02 5000-149 March 15, 2002 Shah-i-Kot Valley, Afghanistan

Scouts Corporal Ryan MacMillan (rear) and Cpl Chris Alden prepare to advance into a ravine to search the caves for Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters.

participation in operations other than war, technical collection regarding an adversary's capability and readiness is no longer sufficient."[4]

In complex terrain, particularly where enemy forces employ insurgent and terrorist tactics, the situation changes quickly and identifying the enemy's intent, capability and critical mass is exceedingly difficult. Because of the inability of technological reconnaissance forces to provide current and pertinent information during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), commanders were forced to act without all of the necessary and relevant information they required to make sound and timely decisions. "[During OIF] commanders complained that the information…they received was the wrong kind of data because it was too often of the 'iconology' variety rather than the down-to-earth human information that SOF [special operations forces] or their own scouts…could generate. Human information told them the enemy's intent in ways that satellite imagery never could."[5]

Another example of the importance of covert passive surveillance and human intelligence occurred during Operation KNOCKOUT, where US Forces conducted counter-insurgency (COIN) and cordon and search operations in northern Iraq. Throughout this operation, despite detailed planning and advanced aerial and ground based surveillance platforms, "…surreptitious eyes-on provided last-minute updates to target sets..."[6] and that proved to be the critical deciding factor for mission success.

The importance of human information is not only important for stabilization and COIN operations. In modern high-intensity combat operations, as demonstrated during the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, commanders were reluctant to deploy their reconnaissance forces forward because of the risk that was associated with their independent action. Lightly armed (e.g. jeep and armoured fighting vehicle [AFV] mounted) reconnaissance forces moving forward of the main body did not have the necessary protection to survive contact, and more importantly, they often failed to provide information that the main body in contact could not determine for itself. The most valuable information on enemy intent, size and disposition came from SOF and scout units operating behind enemy lines.[7]

As a result of the changes to the COE, the traditional methods of collecting information through observation and surveillance is no longer sufficient to inform

commanders of the changing situation and cue manoeuvre and strike elements in a timely fashion. From a Canadian perspective, understanding the political will to participate in stabilization and COIN operations, the role of reconnaissance platoons must evolve to adapt to these tasks. Further to this, based on the US Army's experience during the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq where SOF and scout units operating behind enemy lines provided the most valuable information to commanders, Canada must evolve its reconnaissance forces in order to be remain operationally relevant in all segments of the "three block war." By preparing Canadian reconnaissance units to conduct close target reconnaissance and COIN operations while operating from a forward operating base (FOB) during stabilization operations, Canada will have the corporate knowledge to transition its reconnaissance forces for high intensity combat missions if required, and remain the task force commander's primary source of tactical information in those situations.

Recommended Organization for Reconnaissance Platoon

In order to achieve the task force commander's information requirements, the standard reconnaissance platoon is required to incorporate a vast array of skills, all of which are critical to mission success. The basis for all soldiers employed within a reconnaissance platoon must continue to be the Basic Reconnaissance Patrolman (Basic Recce) course. This will provide instruction on the fundamentals of individual field craft, small unit tactics, navigation, surveillance, and tactical tracking. All personnel in leadership positions, however, must be either Advanced Reconnaissance Patrolman (Adv Recce) or Patrol Pathfinder (PPF) qualified. By ensuring each leader has at least one of these qualifications, all soldiers in planning and decision-making positions will have the ability to conduct traditional reconnaissance platoon operations to a very high standard. In addition, each member must be trained in resistance to interrogation (R2I) to level C, be familiar with the fundamentals of human intelligence (HUMINT) and COIN operations, and be qualified in advanced first aid.

The skill set of the standard close reconnaissance platoon must expand to incorporate and embed PPF, the Advanced Mountain Operations (AMO) course, HUMINT, and COIN skills into all reconnaissance platoons across the infantry corps. These skills will allow reconnaissance platoons to adapt to the new information collection realities of the COE. PPF and AMO soldiers will give the platoon the ability to facilitate the insertion, extraction, and mobility of follow-on forces. COIN and HUMINT reconnaissance groups would act as subject matter experts (SME) who could advise task force commanders and train other soldiers within the task force. The organization of a standard reconnaissance platoon should be as indicated in Figure 1.1.



Figure 1.1

The capability and soldier allocation should be as follows:

HQ:

- Command and control (C2) and command post (CP) functions: 1 x Capt and 1 x Capt/Lt.
- Combat service support (CSS): 1 x WO and 1 x Cpl.
- Communications: 2 x Cpl (MOSID: signals)*.
- Breach / explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) advisor: 2 x Cpl (MOSID: engineer)*.
- Gunner/driver: 2 x Cpl/Pte.

61: 1 x Sgt, 1 x MCpl, 6 x Cpl/Pte—insertion and extraction
62: 1 x Sgt, 1 x MCpl, 6 x Cpl/Pte—mobility
63: 1 x Sgt, 1 x MCpl, 6 x Cpl/Pte—counter-insurgency SME
64: 1 x Sgt, 1 x MCpl, 6 x Cpl/Pte—human intelligence SME

*Signallers and engineers must be embedded into the platoon where they can be attached to patrol sections as required. These skills must be fixed in the platoon to ensure that commanders have them immediately available when operating behind enemy lines or away from the FOB for extended operations.

Note: The sniper group was intentionally excluded from the reconnaissance platoon organization chart above. The sniper group should be an independent organization within a combat support company with their own chain of command.

Role and Capabilities of Current Reconnaissance Platoons, and their Shortfalls

Reconnaissance capable of only observation is not worth the road space it takes.[8]

In its current configuration, the standard reconnaissance platoon is structured to conduct covert patrols and ground observation tasks to collect information for a task force commander. Specifically, they collect information on the strength, intent, and disposition of enemy forces. Additionally, infantry reconnaissance soldiers are trained to identify and develop positions in order to guide follow-on forces into tactically sound assembly areas, firebases, and assault positions. As a component of the Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) system, the reconnaissance platoon is responsible for assisting with "…[integrating] the intelligence function with surveillance, target acquisition, reconnaissance and other information gathering assets in order to improve a commander's situational awareness, streamline decision-making processes and cue manoeuvre, strike and/or other ISTAR assets."[9]

Although reconnaissance platoons are trained to accomplish these tasks in a variety of environments and diverse operating conditions, the COE has evolved in such a way that their skill set is lacking. Specifically, as a result of the COE moving into more complex terrain and the information requirements becoming more sophisticated, infantry reconnaissance soldiers do not have the training and skills required to effectively collect information beyond their traditional surveillance methods. Additionally, because the reconnaissance platoon identifies targets and cues movement, they are frequently responsible for guiding and assisting assault force mobility. This is particularly true in environments where transport and rope systems are required to move follow-on forces into position. As it is currently organized, the reconnaissance platoon does not have embedded within it the skills required to facilitate insertion, exaction, and mobility of a follow-on force. Also, considering that reconnaissance platoons will often be operating behind enemy lines or away from the main body, they must be prepared for the

Combat Camera AR2006-G042-0031 10 November 2006 Kandahar, Afghanistan

A Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV) Troop from the 5e Régiment D'Artillerie Légère du Canada (5 RALC) launches from its platform. The TUAV is used for both aerial reconnaissance and targeting over the battle space.

possibility that patrolmen may be taken prisoner. Because thelikelihood of their capture is higher than that of the average soldier, it is critical that each member of reconnaissance platoon be trained for conduct after capture and R2I.

In order to meet the challenges of the evolving COE, reconnaissance platoons must be able to conduct the following:

- collect human information;
- conduct tactical questioning;
- conduct COIN operations;
- assist in the insertion, extraction, and mobility of a follow-on force;
- resist interrogation (R2I) and conduct after capture;
- move tactically in urban terrain; and
- conduct covert surveillance in urban terrain.

Because of these shortfalls, particularly the inability to collect information on the intent and disposition of insurgent and terrorist forces, reconnaissance platoons can no longer meet the information, intelligence and mobility expectations that a task force commander will have of his reconnaissance platoon.

Recommendations for Reconnaissance Platoon's Core Competencies

> *This difficulty of accurate recognition constitutes one of the most serious sources of friction in war, by making things appear entirely different from what one expected.*[10]
>
> **-Carl Von Clausewitz**

The current reconnaissance platoon is described as "…consisting of patrol and sniper detachments, equipped with higher fidelity observation equipment and specialist training, which permits reconnaissance platoon detachments to carry out long-range patrol activity similar to that carried out by allied nation's SOF."[11] Despite changes to the COE, the traditional skills of a reconnaissance patrolman are no less important. On the contrary, the skills of a patrolman are critical building blocks to developing an effective close reconnaissance platoon. However, there are essential skills and competencies that reconnaissance soldiers and leaders require in order to improve their ability to inform commanders of the changing tactical situation. Some of these skills are infantry specific and should be addressed in the infantry training system, such as tactical movement and fighting in complex terrain. Reconnaissance specific skills that should be built into reconnaissance platoons include:

- HUMINT;
- COIN;
- PPF;
- AMO; and
- R2I.

HUMINT

> *HUMINT supports decision-making by commanders throughout the spectrum of potential conflict. What makes HUMINT different is its ability to make commanders aware of an adversary's intent as well as his capabilities.*[12]

Understanding that the personal attributes of a HUMINT operator are unique, not all soldiers in Reconnaissance Platoon would be suited for this type of training. However, if training opportunities in HUMINT operations were increased for reconnaissance forces and the infantry, it would be possible to identify soldiers and officers who meet these stringent standards early in their career and incorporate their unique skills into all infantry and reconnaissance units. Provided that an infantry soldier has the attributes to be a successful HUMINT operator, his basic skills as a member of Reconnaissance Platoon would compliment his overall operational capability to collect information in this form. "Specialist HUMINT operators should be pre-selected and specifically trained to conduct contact handling operations. In addition, this pre-selection and training should be augmented by advanced military training including first aid/trauma, driving, communications, weapons handling and navigation."[13] As a member of Reconnaissance Platoon, a patrolman or leader would have already demonstrated these skills at a level far higher than the average soldier would.

The soldiers in a Close Reconnaissance Platoon would be ideally suited to perform virtually the entire spectrum of HUMINT operations. The key aspects of field HUMINT being:

- debriefing and tactical questioning;
- military intelligence reconnaissance;
- contact handling;
- tactical counter intelligence;

- enhanced reconnaissance; and
- interrogation.

The only aspects of HUMINT that could not be conducted by close reconnaissance soldiers are the tasks considered to be advanced HUMINT, which includes covert passive surveillance and agent handling. SOF personnel dressed in civilian clothing conduct covert passive surveillance. Agent handling involves the recruiting and hand-off of agents by strategic counter intelligence and advanced HUMINT personnel.[14] Although these skills are beyond the infantry corps' expertise and responsibilities, those elements of HUMINT that are considered "field" could effectively be conducted by a reconnaissance platoon.

Combat Camera IS2002-0035a May 5, 2002 Kandahar, Afghanistan

A Coyote armoured reconnaissance vehicle watches the approaches to Kandahar International Airport.

From an operational security point of view, employing reconnaissance forces from regular army units in HUMINT operations would be conducive to concealing the occurrence of intelligence operations in the area of responsibility (AOR). "It is important to ensure that standard military uniforms and equipment are used, as much as practicable, so as to ensure that personnel engaged in HUMINT operations do not draw attention to themselves or stand out from other Army personnel in the AOR."[15]

The evolving operating environment requires that reconnaissance forces provide intricate and complex information on the enemy's intent and capabilities. HUMINT has become invaluable to commanders in all aspects of the COE.

> Since the size and composition of the enemy said little about his capability or his intent, commanders found that the type of detailed information that often flowed down from satellite imagery, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), and surveillance or passive reconnaissance efforts was essentially meaningless. To understand the enemy's intent, they needed human intelligence.[16]

Without HUMINT training, the soldiers in a reconnaissance platoon are limited in their ability to collect vital components of the information spectrum for commanders. Considering the types of information that have proven critical during OEF and OIF, infantry reconnaissance platoons must incorporate HUMINT skills into their core competencies in order to remain operationally relevant.

COIN Operations

> *Large main force engagements that characterized conflict in World War II, Korea, and Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom in the Middle East have become the exceptions in American warfare. Since the American Revolution, the Army has conducted stability operations, which have included counterinsurgency operations.*[17]

COIN operations have proven to be a critical component of the information war in the COE. "The primary objective of counter-insurgency operations is to neutralize the insurgents and, together with population and resource control measures, establish a secure environment within which political, social, and economic progress is possible."[18] Given Canada's strategic and operational goals in the majority of its operational theatres, COIN capability at the task force level is vital to securing mission success.

Understanding the expectations of a COIN operator, the soldiers in the reconnaissance platoon have demonstrated the necessary skills through their basic and advanced reconnaissance patrolman training to be successful. "Counter-insurgency operations have historically improved the quality of light infantry…developing and honing combat skills, such as tracking, instinctive shooting, small unit patrolling and tactics, survival, navigation, intelligence gathering and situational awareness."[19] Although there is considerable training associated with developing a COIN operator, the skills of a reconnaissance patrolman makes them ideal candidates for undergoing such training. "Arguably, Canadian light infantry should be capable of conducting normative roles of a highly trained (Ranger/Commando) unit, as well as becoming counter-insurgency specialists able to conduct operations utilizing all manners of surveillance, tactics, [psychological] PSYOP and [civil-military] CIMIC."[20] Another example of skilled infantry soldiers becoming effective COIN operators is when "…in Borneo, the [Special Air Service] SAS absorbed members of the…Parachute Brigade…all of whom were selected for their finely honed light infantry and operational skills. Hence, [Canadian] light infantry battalions could become leading edge counter insurgency experts."[21]

Although achieving extensive COIN operational goals would be beyond the limited manpower capability of a reconnaissance platoon, having these skills integral to the

Combat Camera KA2005-R106-0181d 01 November 2005 Kabul, Afghanistan

A Canadian Forces Coyote Reconnaissance vehicle proceeds along the convoy route.

platoon would allow a task force commander to achieve limited COIN objectives when employed in conjunction with at least a sub-unit in support. This skill set would also ensure that the task force commander's intelligence gathering assets are familiar with the fundamentals of COIN operations, whereby they would be attuned to the key indicators of insurgency operations in their AOR. In order to gain these skills, reconnaissance soldiers should be sent on foreign courses, which would provide COIN expertise until a Canadian course is developed. Examples are the US Army Special Forces course or its equivalent at the Indian Army Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School.

Insertion, Extraction, and Mobility

By virtue of the training that each soldier receives prior to arriving in a reconnaissance platoon, all reconnaissance soldiers are capable of conducting basic insertion, extraction, and mobility tasks in support of a follow-on force. These basic skills, however, do not provide the level of expertise that would be required to guide and transport a large force through complex terrain. This is particularly true in urban and mountainous terrain. In order to ensure that follow-on forces have the mobility options and tactical guides required to accomplish their missions, there must be PPF and AMO qualified personnel embedded into the reconnaissance platoon.

PPF qualified personnel provide an ability to establish, mark, and guide soldiers in airmobile, airborne and amphibious operations. This skill set will give the task force commander a dedicated reconnaissance group capable of inserting deep into enemy terrain and preparing for a large follow-on force. In addition to this insertion support, PPF qualified personnel also provide a limited direct action capability which gives commanders increased flexibility. Conversely, AMO qualified personnel provide a mobility capability that would be extremely beneficial in both mountainous and urban terrain. The AMO reconnaissance group could act as route reconnaissance experts, and build and maintain transport and rope systems though all types of complex terrain.

Combat Camera LG2006-01544 23 April 2006 Shilo, Mb

Soldiers from Land Force Western Area take part in annual Reconnaissance Skills Competition. Here, a patrol in a zodiac takes evasive action after coming under fire from higher ground.

Conclusion

The role of a close reconnaissance platoon is to gain information, identify targets, and guide follow-on forces. Despite the evolving nature of operations, these tasks have not changed for a standard reconnaissance platoon in the COE. However, the methods of gathering this information have transformed. With enemy forces that do not conform to doctrinal constructs, employ terrorist and insurgent tactics, and operate in increasingly complex terrain, reconnaissance soldiers must expand their skill set to remain the task force commander's primary source of tactical information. To remain operationally relevant in the COE, all infantry close reconnaissance platoons must assume HUMINT, COIN and deep penetration surveillance tasks typically associated with SOF. Additionally, reconnaissance platoons must have an insertion, extraction, and mobility capability integral to the platoon in order to achieve all aspects of their proclaimed role. Understanding that these skills are critical to a reconnaissance platoon's success, it is critical to note that prior to commencing infantry reconnaissance training each soldier must demonstrate a mastery of basic infantry skills, physical fitness, initiative, and exhibit tactical situational awareness beyond that of his peers. By mastering these basic infantry core competencies, a soldier will have demonstrated his suitability to undergo reconnaissance training and complete close reconnaissance tasks within the COE.

Points for further discussion

If infantry reconnaissance platoons assumed the skills detailed above, the division of tasks between infantry and armoured reconnaissance forces would become clearer. Armoured reconnaissance could assume the role of classic reconnaissance to include surveillance from a mounted platform, and expand to incorporate more technological methods of collecting information on the enemy and terrain using UAV and satellite resources. Infantry reconnaissance, in addition to the typical close reconnaissance tasks which make them the "eyes and ears" of task force commanders, they could also become the "mouth" whereby they could focus on HUMINT and COIN operations. If the tasks were delineated in this fashion, the information gathering components of the

ISTAR company would complement each other and ensure that the entire spectrum of potential information sources is being monitored.

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THE LAV III IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY WARFARE—TACTICAL LESSONS LEARNED

Lieutenant Benjamin J. Richard

The addition of the LAV (Light armoured vehicle) III vehicle in the 1990s augmented Canada's highly capable infantry corps with a significant asset. However, debate within the Canadian Land Force regarding its effective tactical employment has been ongoing.

The LAV III was first deployed with the Canadian Forces (CF) during United Nations (UN) operations in Eritrea in early 2001 (Op ECLIPSE).[1] The mission, within the context of United Nations Mission for Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), was to verify a ceasefire between the two host countries. Now, only five years later, the LAV is employed in more complex high-risk environments, such as counter-insurgency warfare in Afghanistan. However, we are only at the intermediate stage of demonstrating the LAV's potential and teaching junior leaders how to maximize its capabilities. Given the complexity of modern military operations, it is now increasingly imperative that infantry commanders at all levels become conversant with the effective employment of the LAVs under their command.

A Company, 1 Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) recently returned from Op ARCHER, Roto 1 in Afghanistan, where soldiers were directly exposed to complex military operations. Not since the Korean War have Canadian soldiers been so decisively and aggressively engaged in direct combat. The very nature of the campaign and the mission tasks given to Canadian soldiers have taken different forms from any seen previously.

Combat Camera AR2006-P008 0004 16 Sept 2006 Kandahar, Afghanistan

Light Armored Vehicles (LAV's) provide a safe mode of transportation in addition to continuous perimeter security for Canadian soldiers patrolling in and around in the Panjwaii District approximately 30 kilometers west of Kandahar City as part of Operation MEDUSA.

Many strategists have discussed this "new" type of warfare. Colonel Thomas Hammes wrote a clear description of the modern age of military operations, suggesting that "Fourth Generation Warfare" (4GW) is upon us.[2] Defined as "Information Era Counter-insurgency," it is precisely this type of conflict that Canadian troops are involved in, in Afghanistan. The fundamental factor determining this new type of warfare is that our enemies, the Taliban and their associates, do not represent a state, but rather a violent ideological network.

If we accept the 4GW theory and come to view it as the "4th block" of General Krulak's concept of the three-block war, we find ourselves "[dealing] with psychological or information operations aspects. This fourth block is the area where we may not be physically located but in which we are communicating or broadcasting our message."[3]This article describes some of the lessons learned by 2 Platoon, A Coy during Op ARCHER and proposes key advantages of operating with the LAV III in the four blocks of modern warfare: humanitarian assistance operations, peace support operations (PSO), war fighting, and psychological operations (PsyOps).

Humanitarian Assistance Operations

The first block of General Charles C. Krulak's conflict spectrum is entitled humanitarian assistance operations, defined as "[…] when one country helps another country through some form of donation [or labour]. Usually this block refers to helping out a country that has a special need caused by poverty, underdevelopment, natural disasters, armed conflicts, etc."[4] Given an acceptance of four blocks in the contemporary spectrum of conflict, we must visualize the need to move from one block to another in a very short space of time with minimal planning requirement. Using the LAV in humanitarian assistance operations satisfies this need immediately.

The LAV serves primarily as a powerful fighting platform. However, it can be a valuable tool in a humanitarian operations context. Soldiers cannot effectively undertake humanitarian tasks when they are fully armed and geared for combat. Such a posture frightens the local populace and hinders the development of the "hearts and minds" concept. The LAV, however, can carry all of its war fighting equipment in "ready" mode without any overbearing on the soldiers performing humanitarian duties. Additionally, the troops can leave platoon weapons, first line ammunition, explosives, and other contingency equipment in the combat-ready LAVs for quick access, in case of emergency or enemy contact.

Other than serving as a convenient mode of transporting and concealing equipment for the next levels of conflict, the LAV also offers a highly effective observation platform, providing essential force protection to soldiers focused on assisting the local population. In the observation role, the LAV is not required to be in close proximity to its "ground" commander. Its speed and manoeuvrability allow it to quickly link up with dismounts in case of emergency. A dismounted platoon without LAV support would post sentries and/or observation posts at various locations. However, this option would be highly taxing in terms of manpower, and the platoon would not benefit from the observation range that can be acquired with the LAV. Admittedly, certain types of terrain (minefields, mountains, swamps, etc.) can hinder the LAV's mobility, making the employment of dismounts a likely option. Nevertheless, in the observation role, the LAV's day-sight, thermal and infrared capabilities often compensate for its inability to move onto such ground.[5]

The first block of conflict also includes convoy and VIP escort missions. The LAV is the perfect tool for such operations because it offers protection superior to most wheeled vehicles. Furthermore, it can attain excellent speeds on flat roads and off-road

conditions[6], a capability essential when extracting soldiers from an ambush or reinforcing troops under fire. A Company's LAVs were repeatedly brought in to assist dismounted troops in firefights. It quickly became apparent that not only the firepower, but also the simple appearance of a LAV was a deterrent to insurgent attacks.[7]

Finally, the LAV can be employed in various secondary tasks such as moving barricades, heavy lifting, winching vehicles/objects, and providing ad hoc ambulance services; the examples are numerous. The key element of LAV use in the context of humanitarian assistance operations (where danger to Canadian soldiers is usually not imminent) is the requirement to dismount the vehicles to connect with the local population, while maintaining an ability to move quickly to another operation as required.

Peace Support Operations

The next block in the spectrum of conflict, Peace Support Operations (PSOs), offers multiple opportunities for the LAV III to again become an important asset. Because the key to solving rising tensions in PSOs is the de-escalation of force, the LAV can be detrimental to the successful de-escalation of conflict with its intimidating size, noise and armament. As in all operations, the commander on the ground will have to use ingenuity and quick thinking to effectively employ the LAVs under command.

Courtesy of Author

The picture of the LAV in the open desert was taken in the province of Helmand

The types of operations conducted within this second block of the conflict spectrum can vary widely. Primarily, there is a crucial necessity to conduct presence patrols, to ensure cease-fire agreements and to gather information. Based on experience from previous Canadian sub-units in Northern Afghanistan (Kabul area)[8], 2 Platoon employed three general formats when patrolling with LAVs. The first was to deploy the LAVs in a satellite patrol. Dismounts conducted foot patrols as per standard operating procedure, while the LAVs maintained a mounted perimeter patrol, separated from the dismounts by a few kilometres, depending on the terrain. The aim was twofold: to provide early

warning to dismounted soldiers of any unusual activity, and to increase the footprint on the ground. As a satellite patrol, the LAV offers two distinct advantages; dismounted soldiers are more easily approachable by the civilian population (who are often intimidated by the LAVs) and, should the dismounted patrol be attacked by insurgents, the LAVs can act as an immediate quick reaction force (QRF). The major disadvantage in using the Zulu LAVs[9] (even when they are operating in pairs) is that they have minimal manning. Clearly, this can be dangerous if they encounter insurgents. Where manpower requirements permit, a minimum of one rear security should remain in the vehicle to protect its flanks and rear through the air sentry hatch.

Courtesy of Author

The LAV picture of me taken from inside the turret was taken in Panjwai (near Kandahar)

The second format saw the LAVs employed in an intimate support role (i.e. within 100 meters from dismounts).[10] This method is intimidating, and depending on the circumstances, could even be considered a "show of force." Obviously, this is not the preferred option to increase communication with the local population or gather information. However, the situation on the ground (i.e. high threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs)) may determine this approach to be the most tactically sound option. At the platoon level, we can combine the two formats to have two LAVs in intimate support while two others are conducting satellite patrols/observation posts. While there are multiple options available to the LAV platoon commanders, the goal remains to make most effective use of the LAV vehicles to achieve the desired end state, whether it is gathering information, providing protection, etc. Secondarily, it was observed that the presence of LAVs in a community could actually instil a sense of security in the population. This is especially relevant if the LAVs have been previously used to protect the locals from insurgents. In such a situation, using the LAV in intimate support would likely be beneficial to the mission.

The last format is to employ the LAVs in a position of overwatch or to conduct an observation post (OP), making maximum use of the LAV's optical capabilities. Not all

patrol areas, however, can offer vantage points from which to observe, and there is always the possibility that such observation areas may be inaccessible due to mines, terrain or vulnerability to insurgent forces.

Other types of Peace Support Operations (PSOs) can include cordon and search, and crowd control tasks. During a cordon and search, the LAV is again employed in two roles. It can provide overwatch as part of the inner or outer cordon, or it can be attached to dismounts on the ground as intimate support. A significant advantage to using the LAV as intimate support is that the vehicle itself is a highly effective breaching tool. Persons who have studied urban warfare know that one of the crucial elements for success is the method of insertion into a building/compound. 2 Platoon LAV crews quickly discovered that the mud-wall compounds and dwellings found in Afghanistan were easily penetrated by slowly driving through them using a LAV. Another advantage of the employment of the LAV during cordon and search missions is that it helps to reduce manpower requirements, ensuring a longer observation range and wider observation arcs. When conducting crowd control, the LAV allows our troops to adopt a standoff position and a better angle of surveillance, while providing a high degree of protection.

Some might suggest that the LAV platoon could more easily fulfill peacekeeping duties than dismounted or motorized platoons because it allows for a greater presence on the ground. The LAV platoon also has a self-contained troop-lift asset that lessens the need for coordination with external transport elements such as helicopters or cargo trucks. Furthermore, the LAV platoon retains the capability to complete any dismounted task with the benefit of a "built-in" mounted quick reaction force that allows troops to react rapidly to changing levels of the conflict spectrum (i.e. combat). Arguably, aside from inaccessible terrain or hazardous road conditions, there are few scenarios that would require the absolute exclusion of LAVs during PSOs.

Combat Operations

At the tactical level, it is indisputable that the LAV III is a welcome asset when fighting against insurgent forces. In order to remain tactically sound, a commander in a theatre of war will likely use a combination of mounted and dismounted troops. That being said, unless terrain prevents the vehicle from deploying, there is little tactical reason for not employing the LAV in any one of its many roles. Of course, there is often a threat of ambush or IEDs, but the LAV-equipped section is well prepared to react to such incidents. In most circumstances, an infantry commander would be wise to include the addition of superior protection, speed, manoeuvrability, state-of-the art optics, and navigation and communication equipment, not to mention devastatingly powerful and precise firepower to the arsenal.

However, even with the availability of such state-of-the art equipment, we must remember, "The highest excellence [in war] is to subdue the enemy's army without fighting at all."[11] Our goal is to secure specific areas and to maintain positive control over them, thereby reducing the enemy's area of operation (AO). We must employ the LAV with that objective in mind. In fact, the infantry has always had the key task of holding ground that has been captured or secured, and although warfare has evolved, there is still a great requirement for the infantry fulfilling this traditional task. Today, we simply have some added responsibilities such as gathering information, protecting civilians, etc.

The technology and firepower brought to the battlefield by the LAV discourages insurgent attacks, and forces our enemy to develop different offensive methods. We know our current enemy does not have the equipment to engage in traditional conventional warfare against Canadian soldiers. Therefore, by making effective use of tools at our disposal, we reduce the enemy's possible courses of action and

consequently their will to fight. In addition, from those insurgents who will stop at nothing to attack through suicide bombings, the armour of a LAV is surely a welcome protection.

In the combat operations context, the main role of the LAV vehicle is to serve as an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV). To this end, it is imperative that infantry leaders differentiate between armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and IFVs:

> An infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) is a type of armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) used to carry infantry into battle and provide fire support for them. IFVs are similar to armoured personnel carriers (APCs), designed to transport five to ten infantrymen and their equipment. They are differentiated from APCs ("battle taxis") by their enhanced armament, allowing them to give direct-fire support during an assault, firing ports, allowing the infantry to fire personal weapons while mounted, and usually improved armour.[12]

In accordance with this definition, the LAV is inarguably an IFV and platoon commanders should therefore employ it as such.

Courtesy of Author

The picture of the back of a LAV was taken downtown in Kandahar from my turret

In scenarios that do not allow for the deployment of vehicles to the objective, the LAVs can be employed in the fire support role. Those who have seen a 25mm live-fire range will attest to its highly destructive power and the accuracy of the stabilized gun system on the LAV III. Achieving effective ranges with HEI-T, APFSDS-T (Sabot), and FAPDS-T (Frange) rounds[13], there are many ways to insert the LAVs 25mm gun into a direct fire plan.

However, in the context of counter-insurgency warfare, commanders and troops will undoubtedly observe certain of the LAV III's shortcomings. A popular debate is held over the wheeled vs. tracked vehicle topic. The fact is that tracks can deploy over types of ground not accessible to wheeled vehicles. It has been observed, however, that in urban warfare (the type of which is largely encountered in Afghanistan), speed and a narrower frame allow for easier movement within built-up areas and both are required assets.[14]

The LAV III offers many characteristics which are much more critical to the tasks overseas, than its all-terrain capability—or lack thereof. On that note, the recent deployment of the Leopard battle tanks to Afghanistan will compensate for the LAV's inability to drive pass or breach certain obstacles. In other words, the dismounted infantry will now be able to pursue the enemy where the LAV cannot go, because of continued intimate support from the Leopard tanks.

Allied forces have suggested important modifications should be made to IFVs to make them even more effective when fighting in the urban environment. First, the crew commander from a hatch-down posture should electronically control the pintle-mounted machine gun.[15] By replacing the manual pintle with an electronically-controlled pintle mounted with a camera, the crew commander would benefit from a truly independent view from the gunner, allowing the turret team to scan more ground, and act independently to fight a close defensive battle. This would have the clear advantage of limiting the crew commander's exposure to enemy fire. On the other hand, with the addition of a new electronically-controlled pintle weapon and independent camera-sight, comes the requirement for an even higher level of coordination between the turret team members (The gunner would undoubtedly find himself operating more independently). Also, there is the likelihood that such a system would be vulnerable to small-arms fire.

We know all too well that the modern enemy does not use force on force, and will not expose himself to our heavy armament. In fact, insurgents are familiar with our equipment's weaknesses and when attacking, will devise methods of approaching the LAV from the blind angles. The addition of firing ports to cover angles that cannot be viewed or covered by the turret weapons could help in truly creating a 360-degree defence. Such firing ports would be manned by troops in the back and would cover both flanks and the immediate rear. This would remove the necessity of maintaining exposed personnel standing in the rear (air-sentry) hatches.

In short, LAV platoon commanders and LAV crew commanders must be conversant with both the LAV's abilities and shortcomings in order to make effective and tactically sound use of the vehicles. It is imperative that we understand that the LAV and its section form a total weapon system. Only when the section is dismounted is the full effectiveness of all the weapons realized. By studying the lessons learned and applying sound judgement with regard to terrain and fighting environment, the LAV platoon commanders hold the key to a decisive asset that can be vital in counter-insurgency warfare or 4GW

Psychological Operations

The LAV vehicle is intimidating to even the most experienced infantry soldiers. A quick demonstration of its firepower, speed and accuracy will erase any doubt that the LAV is designed to be a highly effective killing machine. In fact, demonstrations of firepower, commonly known as "show of force," are regularly conducted in Afghanistan. The idea is to select a safe piece of ground (somewhere in the mountain ranges away from inhabited places) and conduct controlled firing with the 25mm canon. The aim is to inform insurgents hiding in the area that coalition forces have freedom of movement. It is a method of employing the LAV's armament in the psychological dimension of war against the Taliban. The fact is that the LAV serves a very important purpose when it comes to psychological warfare.

As mentioned previously, there is a responsibility for commanders at all levels to carefully select where and when to employ the LAVs as their employment can sometimes be counter-productive to winning the hearts and minds of the local population. Canadian soldiers also know that what intimidates the local population will

have the same effect on Taliban operatives. By closely monitoring enemy radio transmissions, Canadians in Afghanistan quickly understood that the mere presence of a LAV in certain areas was enough to frighten the insurgents. In fact, the LAV III vehicle, often called "green giant" by locals and insurgents alike, has become the main value target for IED strikes and ambushes. Our enemy understands the effects of the LAV and the slightest mobility kill on such a vehicle is enough for our enemy to declare a battle won. The insurgents are willing to immobilize a LAV at the cost of many of their own lives, because they understand the psychological effects of such an incident. In other words, they recognize the dramatic and important effects that result from destroying a LAV. When the media reports to the Canadian population that insurgent forces have destroyed a $2.7 million hi-tech fighting platform such as the LAV III, it gets people talking, and that makes the media our enemy's biggest weapon.

Courtesy of Author

Kandahar, Afghanistan. Coyote reconnaissance vehicles from Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians) (LdSH(RC)) drive through Kandahar Airport.

Insurgents win wars with information operations, and it is our responsibility to fight back. By employing the LAV III effectively, we can minimize information that our enemy will use against us. Conversely, by employing the LAV improperly, we create collateral damage, expose our vulnerabilities and even let our enemies kill more of the "green giants" and the Canadian troops who operate them. This becomes a key factor in our enemy's quest for victory on the psychological battlefield. Essentially, the LAV is a tool equally important in the context of information operations as it is in the other blocks of war. The recent addition of the Leopard tank will undoubtedly contribute to this argument by adding yet another key element to the psychological block of the war in Afghanistan. Essentially, such an important weapons system will play a key role in combat operations, and consequently garner much attention. By failing to understand that there are repercussions to the improper employment of fighting vehicles and other major weapons systems, combat arms leaders are giving the insurgent forces ammunition in the war of information.

Conclusion

The LAV is by no means the ultimate solution to insurgency warfare. Members of A Company will confirm that insurgents adapt to and overcome technological developments at an impressive rate. Their leaders have mastered the lessons of Sun Tzu, Genghis Khan, Mao, Ché, and even Paul Kagme. As has been stated many times, the key to the defeat of an enemy is information. By conducting effective information-gathering operations in those communities that harbour insurgents, we further our understanding of our enemy. In exchange for this information, we provide security to those communities unwillingly involved in the conflicts. This valuable source of information about the activities of our enemies is the only way we will eventually cut their support and crucial supply chain.

There exist many methods of fighting this "war of information." Most army leaders will agree that the LAV III has become an essential tool that can be used in many operations throughout the conflict spectrum. In the Canadian infantry, we have the opportunity to use the LAV III during counter-insurgency operations. This vehicle offers speed, protection, impressive optics, communications, transport, devastating firepower and intimidation. By studying its capabilities and making detailed after-action reports available to training centres across Canada, we will be able to perfect our employment of the LAV. Undeniably, the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre (CMTC) at CFB Wainwright is crucial to our movement in that direction, helping us improve our tactical employment of the LAV in the 4GW context. Nonetheless, we must stay vigilant and not become overly dependant on the LAV. The LAV III is a tool that can only be used effectively in concert with solid dismounted infantry skills.

About the Author

Lieutenant Benjamin Richard joined the regular force in June 2000 and graduated from RMC with the class of 2004. He obtained a Bachelor's degree (Honours) in History with a minor in Politics. Since graduation, he has served as a platoon commander with the West Nova Scotia Regiment and with 1 PPCLI. Lieutenant Richard recently returned from Op ARCHER, Roto 1, where he served as 2 Platoon Commander, A Company, 1 PPCLI.

Endnotes

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4. "Humanitarian Assistance," (Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopaedia, 2006), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humanitarian_assistance (accessed 30 Mar 06).
5. Directorate of Army Doctrine. *Interim LAV III Tactics Manual* B-GL-321-007-FP-001, (Kingston, ON: Land Force Doctrine and Training System, Jan 2001), p. 1-3.
6. "LAV III," (The Website for the Defence Industries, SPG Media Limited, 2006), http://www.army-technology.com/projects/piranha/ (accessed 14 Apr 06).
7. We could suggest that units, battle-groups, combat-teams, etc. deploying in theatre continue to make a point of demonstrating the firepower of the LAV III to locals and the host country's military leaders. If Canadian infantry soldiers are highly impressed by LAV firepower, then it is fair to assume that foreign populations will also be impressed. This point is discussed in further detail later in the article.
8. Captain A.J. Gimby. "Urban Patrolling" *The Canadian Army Journal* 7, 3/7,4 (2004): 30.
9. When dismounted soldiers disembark the LAV leaving only a driver, crew commander and gunner, the LAV itself is now considered "Zulu." Units make use of this prefix when communicating to indicate that the members a LAV section have now adopted the dismounted role. This typically means that the LAV has now assumed the intimate support role, direct

fire role or is placed in a quick reaction state.
10. This was the method most often employed by 2 Platoon, A Coy, 1 PPCLI during Op ARCHER, Roto 1.
11. Sun Tzu, *The Art of Warfare*, (6th cent. B.C.) in Caleb Carr, *The Book of War* (Toronto, ON: Random House of Canada, 1993), p. 79.
12. "Infantry Fighting Vehicle," (The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition. Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004), http://www.answers.com/topic/infantry-fighting-vehicle (accessed 1 Apr 2006).
13. Directorate of Army Doctrine. *Interim LAV III Tactics Manual* B-GL-321-007-FP-001, (Kingston, ON: Land Force Doctrine and Training System, Jan 2001), p. 1-2.
14. Major Ross A. Bradley. "Observations on the Employment and Training of the LAV III in an Infantry Battalion" (Article—Canadian Forces Infantry School).
15. 2 Platoon, A Coy, 1 PPCLI employed the C6 heavy machine gun on the pintle as opposed to the C9 general purpose machine gun during Op ARCHER, Roto 1. The main reason is that the C6 has a longer effective range, and better penetrating power than the C9. "The Role of Armour in Urban Combat," (Defense Update, 2006, Issue 1), http://www.defense-update.com/features/du1-06/urban-armor-2/htm (accessed 23 Mar 06).

TOWARD A JIMP-CAPABLE LAND FORCE

Mr. Peter Gizewski and Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Rostek

The CF have to think and operate as a single entity with air, land and naval assets working as a joint team, both at home and abroad. They have to learn how to work even more closely with all of the elements that can help in achieving the Canadian government's objectives, as well as those of whatever international coalition we may choose to work with…This implies changes to the command and control mechanisms, to the way the CF equips and trains its teams, and even in the way they are educated and view the profession of arms within the larger political and social context in which they will have operate, both at home and overseas.

Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie: Chief of Land Staff, "Boots on the Ground: Thoughts on the Future of the Canadian Forces" The 2004 Haycock Lecture, *Canadian Military Journal*, (Spring 2005).

Introduction

In today's security environment, successful military operations are unlikely to be achieved through the use of military power alone. In a world where conflict often involves a myriad of ethnic, religious, ideological and material drivers, an ability to bring to bear all instruments of national—and coalition—power and influence (e.g. diplomatic, economic, military, informational) on a problem in an effective, coordinated fashion is increasingly essential to achieving effective results. So too is an ability to address and, if possible, effectively harness the views and reactions of the public—both domestic and international, as well as the media, in support of operations as they unfold.

Canadian Forces (CF) acknowledgement of the need for a more coordinated and holistic approach to operations is ever more evident—and pressing. Accordingly, DND leadership—both civilian and military[1]—have increasingly called for the adoption of a force that is joint, interagency, multinational and public (JIMP)-enabled. Such a force would see diplomatic, defence, development and commercial resources, aligned with those of numerous other agencies, coordinated through an integrated campaign plan and applied in areas of operations as needed. As such, the approach would see traditional and non-traditional military activities being carried out collaboratively within a broader context known as the "effects based approach to operations" (EBAO)[2] resulting in greater mission effectiveness.

Land force interest in such an approach is particularly strong. Indeed, the capacity to be "JIMP-capable" or "JIMP-compliant" is now cited as an important enabler for the Army of Tomorrow (AoT) operating concept of adaptive dispersed operations (ADO)[3] and a key means to better ensure mission success in an ever more complex land environment.

Yet what precisely does it mean to be JIMP-capable? Why is this important in today's security environment? And how can such a capability be achieved?

The following discussion explores the opportunities and challenges that attend Land Force movement toward such an approach. More specifically, the paper:

- examines the meaning of JIMP and the rationale underlying movement toward a more JIMP-capable Army;

- the challenges and opportunities it presents; and

- the requirements that must be addressed to ensure its effectiveness.

The discussion concludes by identifying a number of initiatives and actions that promise to facilitate movement toward a more JIMP-enabled land force.

"JIMP—Capable" Definition, Rationale and Requirements

Definition

In essence, the term JIMP is a descriptor that identifies the various categories of players (i.e. organizations) which inhabit the broad environment in which military operations take place. To be "JIMP-capable" entails the adoption of an approach to operations, both domestic and international, that allows such players to effectively interact. Most importantly, it involves a belief in the requirement to adopt a comprehensive approach to problem solving that involves the holistic consideration– and, ideally the coordination of all relevant players.

A JIMP-capable organization involves both the development of a **framework** identifying key players and **capabilities** allowing for effective collaboration with those identified.

Indeed, a JIMP-capable force would interact with players in four domains:

- Joint[4]—involving other national military elements and support organizations.

- Interagency—involving other government departments (OGDs) and agencies (OGAs), both domestic and foreign (these agencies will include: host nation government

AR2006-A01-449a 30 Jan. 2006 PRT Site Kandahar, Afghanistan Photo by Sgt Jerry Kean/DND

(First from Left) Mr. Robert Greenhill of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and (Sec from left) Superintendent Wayne Martin, Royal Canadian Mounted Police visit with Mr. Ross Heinz of Foreign Affairs Canada (FA), and Colonel Steve Bowes, Commander of the Provincial Reconstruction Team at Camp Nathan Smith, Afghanistan.

departments including security forces; government departments and agencies from support nations; and international government bodies, such as UN agencies).

♦ Multinational[5]—involving one or more allies or international coalition partners.

♦ Public—involving a variety of elements including: domestic and international publics, including host nation populations, media agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), public volunteer organizations (PVO), international organizations and commercial interests involved in reconstruction and/or development programs, and private security firms recruited to support the government.



Figure 1: Department of National Defence, Canadian Forces Strategic Operating Concept, Draft 4.4, 21 May 2004, For CDS Review (Ottawa: Department of National Defence; 2004), pp. 17-18.

Yet a JIMP—capable organization is also informed by a willingness to actively engage other players in each of these categories in a cooperative, collaborative relationship in pursuit of a desired end-state. And it is aware and cognizant of the potential impact that its actions have on other players and on the likelihood of achieving strategic objectives.[6] Indeed, what differentiates the broad JIMP environment from those interacting in a JIMP framework *is the reasonable expectation of co-operation* in a unity of purpose to achieve defined goals.

The JIMP construct is thus somewhat reflective of the "whole of government" and 3D+C (i.e. defence, diplomacy, development and commerce) philosophies articulated and advanced at the national level in recent international and defence policy statements.[7] In fact, JIMP further "disaggregates" many of the capabilities that these philosophies identify—more clearly specifying the various categories of players that they describe. And becoming JIMP-capable involves developing a capacity to interact with those in each in a cooperative, constructive manner.

Rationale

CF interest in JIMP and more specifically, the capacity to be "JIMP-capable" thus reflects a growing belief in the importance of achieving greater interoperability and

collaboration among key players in the operational arena as well as in the development of the requisite networking capabilities and skills increasingly essential to achieving one's objectives.[8]

Combat Camera AR2006-G029-0067 22 October 2006 Kabul, Afghanistan

The Honourable Josée Verner, Minister of International Cooperation, and Minister for Official Languages and La Francophonie, today during her visit to Afghanistan announced three new investments, including two new projects to support the role of women and girls in society. She made the announcement during a meeting with the Afghan Ministers of Education and Women's Affairs at the Canadian Embassy in Kabul. During her visit the Minister was presented with a drawing picturing Afghan women and education.

Yet even more fundamentally, support for the creation of JIMP-capability stems from a growing consensus that outward focused, integrated and multidisciplinary approaches to security threats and challenges must be the norm to address the complex problems and challenges posed by an increasingly multidimensional security environment. That environment is increasingly dynamic, uncertain and challenging.

Often, it involves irregular and asymmetric conflict conducted by range of foes—including highly adaptive, media-savvy terrorist organizations intent less on defeating armed forces than eroding their will to fight; warlords seeking to retain power and influence over local populations at any price, and trans-national criminal organizations ready, willing and able to buy, sell and trade everything from drugs to armaments for their own gain. Often as well, it involves failed and failing states; whose tenuous existence and inability to meet popular demands offer ready breeding grounds for rebellion and civil war and a secure base from which adversaries can function. And, it involves complex human and physical terrain—with large, densely populated cities and highly diverse populations (e.g. ethnically, religiously, economically and culturally) often serving as the backdrop for military operations.

Increasingly, conflict zones are highly fluid and multidimensional. Battle lines are murky, with no clearly defined front or rear. Enemies are often dispersed over a wide geographical area. And, distinguishing friend from foe (or neutral) is difficult. Beyond this, conflict itself represents only part of the problem, as rampant civil disorder, famine and disease linger in the background and threaten societal collapse as well as the prospect of even more carnage to come. As such, efforts to address *these* dangers may well be as crucial to military success and the creation of stability as prevailing on the

battlefield. In fact, future conflict is likely to be as much about winning "hearts and minds" and gaining legitimacy among surrounding populations as engaging in armed combat and destroying adversaries.

The upshot of such a world is greater complexity—both in terms of the causes of instability and in terms of the solutions required to address it. It also suggests that addressing future challenges may well involve a wider range of personnel, skill-sets and resources than ever before. To be sure, traditional reliance on military power will often provide one component of the solutions required. Yet the prospective role(s) and the relative importance of the military and of other organizations in providing lasting solutions will nonetheless vary—both from case to case as well as within each case that arises. So also will their need to interact, cooperate and collaborate with a range of players if solutions pursued are to be lasting and effective.

The JIMP concept reflects an implicit recognition of the CF's need to address such realities. In fact, it is critical in order to balance the requirement to be able to fight and win in war—the CF's fundamental role—with the need also to be able to undertake a wide range of operations other than war (OOTW).

By attempting to better enable collaboration and cooperation between the military and other—often non-military, and civilian organizations and interests—JIMP promises to increase the likelihood that the information skills and resources needed to address the problems and challenges that the complex security environment raises will be available and effectively brought to bear. Such interaction would promise to increase the quantity, quality and types of information available to commanders, thereby increasing situational awareness. It would help sensitize players to a variety of viewpoints and variables at work within an operation as well as a number of potential second and third order effects which their actions may yield. And, it would help to better ensure that the actions of the military as well as those of other players are better coordinated in support of broader mission goals and objectives. Indeed, it promises to make decisions and actions more "strategic "in character.

Most importantly, a JIMP capability *could* serve, over time, to better socialize both the military and other organizations within the JIMP environment to the varied demands of the security environment itself and the important contributions which each can, and should, make in addressing its challenges. The result would be a clearer understanding, respect and appreciation of the assets which varied players bring to the table in addressing security challenges, a willingness to cooperate with these players if and when possible, and to defer to others in reaching such goals—when circumstances warrant. In short, it would serve to generate a more "holistic" view of security and how to achieve it.

Requirements

To be sure, realizing such an integrated, "holistic" approach to operations is challenging. For the military alone, the demands that realization of a JIMP-capability would involve are numerous. The initiatives required will likely include:

- The adoption of a 'team' approach to develop an integrated campaign plan in order to realize its operational objectives in full spectrum operations.

- Creation of an ability to immediately plug into joint battle space operating systems to interoperate effectively.

- The capacity to access key information in an efficient timely manner—so as to identify targets for attack and influence as well as determine JIMP resources required in operations.

Combat Camera AR2006-G029-0117 22 October 2006 Kabul, Afghanistan

The Honourable Josée Verner, Minister of International Cooperation, and Minister for Official Languages and La Francophonie, today during her visit to Afghanistan announced three new investments, including two new projects to support the role of women and girls in society. She made the announcement during a meeting with the Afghan Ministers of Education and Women's Affairs at the Canadian Embassy in Kabul.

♦ The willingness to consider second and third order effects in its planning process.

♦ An ability to facilitate the building of interagency and multinational interoperability through collaborative planning mechanisms and protocols.

♦ An ability to connect non-governmental agencies with CF operational architecture and provide liaison to support these agencies in the execution of the mission.

♦ The ability to implement effective communication with joint and other multinational agencies. (This also would include the ability to provide an efficient interface between conventional and special forces).

♦ An ability to clearly and effectively communicate mission goals, objectives and actions to the public and members of the media as *required*.

Add to this the diversity of organizations and agencies that inhabit the JIMP environment—each with its own culture, mindset, biases and capabilities, along with the need to connect with publics in a clear, constructive manner—and the challenge of devising a truly effective JIMP approach to operations is doubly challenging. The fact that the effectiveness and credibility of some organizations—particularly certain NGOs—can be seriously compromised if they are perceived as working with military organizations only compounds problems.

Such dilemmas suggest that establishing goals for the development of an effective JIMP capability must be measured and realistic. In particular, they must be based on a recognition that the involvement of certain organizations and players within of the JIMP environment can, and will, vary. So too will the character and quality of the relationships and interactions that ultimately occur. In fact, possession of JIMP-capabilities by military organizations cannot, in and of themselves, guarantee that an effective JIMP approach will always be followed (result). Rather, both the *capability* and *willingness* of other

organizations and players to engage in a cooperative relationship is essential. And that in turn will often be somewhat dependent on the character of the players involved, as well as their own resources, agendas and goals.

Still, the creation of a JIMP capability can help to increase prospects that such interactions not only occur but that they are also cooperative, constructive and useful—not only to the military, but to all those involved. Indeed, while the creation of a JIMP capable organization *cannot* bring all players to the table, *it can* at least ensure that the possibility (option) to link is present for those willing to participate, and that the linkages and interactions that occur are as effective and valuable as possible. Beyond this, it can increase prospects that all concerns of JIMP participants are considered and addressed in the CF decision-making process.

Efforts at Implementation

Certainly, CF and Land Force interest in a JIMP approach is not without precedent. In fact, efforts to practice a more "JIMP-oriented" approach to operations are currently underway. Ongoing operations in Afghanistan offer a case in point. Over the course of Western involvement, coalition allies have combined counterinsurgency operations involving special forces and regular infantry with broader efforts aimed at stabilization and reconstruction of the country. Military, diplomatic, development and law enforcement personnel are in fact working together in a relatively collaborative, cooperative framework to help realize the Afghanistan National Strategy (ANS) and thus bring stability, prosperity and good governance to the country.[9]

Within this context, new forms of military organization called provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) have emerged and are undertaking stability and reconstruction tasks. First established in early 2003, PRT's consisted of sixty to one hundred soldiers plus, eventually, Afghan advisors and representatives from agencies such as foreign affairs and international aid and development agencies. PRTs have the potential to become a model for future stabilization and reconstruction efforts.[10]

Combat Camera AR2006-M011-0033 22 Nov 06 Kandahar, Afghanistan

Visit to the Shaheed Abdul Ahad Khan Orphanage in Kandahar City to drop off items donated by the Assistance to Afghanistan Fund. PRT medical technician Cpl Ashley Brace, speaking through an interpreter, instructs an orphanage worker on care for a child who injured her foot playing, after he finished cleaning and dressing the injury.

Today, there exist approximately 24 PRT's from 13 countries operating in Afghanistan. "They have played important roles in everything from election support to school-building to disarmament and mediating factional conflicts."[11] Although PRT's are not without their problems, including inconsistent mission statements, unclear roles and responsibilities and ad hoc preparation, PRT's provide a good starting point for developing tools to achieve JIMP success in future security missions.

The Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) also assumes a range of tasks that encompass JIMP contributors. Formed in 1996 after the Canadian Government recognised the need for a rapid response capability to provide effective humanitarian aid, DART extends the CF's 'warfighting' training regime,[12] by tasking it to provide humanitarian assistance in response to both natural disasters and complex humanitarian emergencies. Today, the CF has about 200 personnel ready to deploy in forty-eight hours to any location in the world.

Such organizations are illustrative of nascent JIMP capability within the CF. Neither has a warfighting focus as a primary function.[13] And perceptions of their growing utility increasingly suggest that the traditional understandings of warfighting as the dominant paradigm for armed forces is shifting as tasks once considered "sideshows" are now occupying "centre stage."

That said, much more remains to be done if JIMP capabilities are to be firmly institutionalized. Indeed, a truly JIMP-capable force will require: the elaboration and eventual codification of JIMP procedures, protocols, and standards of "best practice"; the creation of training and education programs for effective JIMP operations (including the possibility of training in the establishment of effective governance), some determination of the level at which JIMP activities are best integrated into operations (e.g. task force, battalion, etc.), an identification of the conditions which must be satisfied for operating with NGOs in the field, and; some idea of how best to develop effective communication strategies for dealing with the public and media as operations unfold.

Beyond this, the human and technological networks that an effective JIMP capability involves must be further elaborated—with initiatives to identify and inventory the individuals, organizations and agencies likely to be of importance—perhaps serving as an important first step in developing a truly capable and collaborative JIMP approach to security threats and challenges in the years to come.[14]

Toward a JIMP-Capable Land Force

To be sure, JIMP is a broad concept and is beyond the sole purview of the Land Force. The CF as a whole represents but one JIMP player among many. However, it is within the Land Force, and especially its AoT conceptual construct, that efforts to operationalize JIMP have received particularly detailed attention and expression. Indeed, Land Futures of the Directorate of Land Concepts and Doctrine (DLCD) has recognized the importance of JIMP as an enabling concept[15] both for the CF and the Land Force. And initial analysis clearly suggests grounds for cautious optimism.

In fact, when broken down into its component parts, it is clear that the ideas underpinning JIMP are not particularly novel. The joint and multinational aspects of JIMP are already well established—both within the continental general staff system and in the Canadian practice of staff responsibilities.[16] And while the interagency and public components pose greater challenges for the Land Force—most notably in terms of interfacing with entities that are essentially non-military in nature and have well-established cultures, some experience is nonetheless resident in past civil military cooperation (CIMIC) practice.[17] Ever since the creation of civil affairs units established within the US military during WWII, civil military coordination (CIMIC) has been considered a force multiplier[18] for commanders. CIMIC, a wholly reserve function within



Figure 2: National Defence, Chief of Land Staff, Civil-Military Cooperation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, B-GL-355-001/FP-001, 2006-03-01: 4.

the Land Force, provides an institutionalized foundation from which the JIMP concept, in particular the interagency and public components, can evolve (see Figure 2).

With the nascent foundations for JIMP already in place, (i.e. the continental staff system and CIMIC), further development of JIMP as an enabling concept can proceed.

Within the Land Force, this is undertaken through the Land Force Capability Development[19] process and use of the Land Force Capability Development Continuum. The continuum consists of four pillars—conceive, design, build and manage—of which the capability development process is encapsulated in the first three. Each has a lead agency appointed to discipline, analyze and record the documentation necessary to guide the capability through to realization. Moreover, the work performed within each pillar sets the foundation and conditions for subsequent, iterative or spiral activity.

Land Futures, the lead agency for the AoT and the JIMP enabling concept, focuses its activities within the "conceive" pillar. And the research performed to establish the foundation and conditions for future work is articulated through a PRICIE[20] analysis—which provides a structured approach to identifying new Land Force capabilities and/or deficiencies and provides a process to design conceptual structures.

In terms of the JIMP concept, a "conceive" PRICIE analysis yields a number of insights in a range of key categories.

Personnel, Leadership and Individual Training

Personnel. As noted by Christopher Ankersen, ". . . human capital is a key component in developing defence capability."[21] This point has not gone unnoticed by the Land Futures staff in the development of a JIMP capable AoT. However, although one would immediately assume that military personnel are the sole focus of the JIMP concept; this has not been the case. Land Forces are more familiar with the joint and multinational components but less familiar with interagency and public components and

there has been clear recognition that the interagency and public components of JIMP cut across many cultures and organizations. Although there is no tolerance for military parochial viewpoints in the development of a JIMP concept, it is understood that there is little the CF can do to prevent parochial positions from other JIMP contributors. What is important to recognize at this point is that within the emerging security environment, status quo attitudes that reflect the total subversion of other JIMP contributors, in particular interagency and public, to the defence agenda will not suffice. This is not to degrade or downplay the importance of the security function within that environment, but rather a recognition that in conflict zones of the future, there will be many more players, inside and out side Canada's "whole of government approach", whose agendas may not necessarily coincide with that of the military's.[22]

The Land Force personnel who best represent the JIMP capability at present—especially the interagency and public components—are those within the CIMIC specialty.[23] The fact that the reserves singularly execute this function within the Land Force has not gone unnoticed. There is both promise (broad mix of civilian capabilities) and peril (sustainment of operations) associated with the reserves solely undertaking this function; however, current thinking within the CIMIC Directorate is a preference for "full-time" staff with little regard to whether the person is reserve or regular force.[24] Historically, there has existed a cultural divide between the reserves and regular force that continues to exist in various forms today. Much of this divide involves issues of trust. This has obvious implications with the reserves filling a function believed to be a key enabler in the emerging security environment. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that when the two forces are brought together for operations, the necessary levels of trust emerge between the commander and staff regardless of whether the soldier is regular or reserve force.[25] The fact that the reserves have been able to fulfill this task is good news for the CF as they continue to face shortfalls in certain occupations and challenges related to human resource planning and retention.[26] In fact, this issue supports a view expressed by some that the CF are not leveraging the reserves to their full capacity and that they may provide more cost effective investments to increasing CF capacity.[27]

As noted above, human capital is the key to developing a JIMP capability within the Land Force. Although CIMIC informs the JIMP concept and represents the more difficult aspects, the interagency and public components, it does not wholly represent the JIMP capability, which is more holistic in nature as described above. However, the full-time CIMIC capability currently resident within the CF represents an institutionalized structure from which the CF can build a part of its JIMP capability. From an AoT perspective, the reserves offer the specialty roles and capabilities associated with civilian qualifications, as well as the expertise relevant to establishing a more robust JIMP capability in the future operating environment.[28]

Leadership. Army leadership is fundamental to the development of force employment concepts.[29] The direction to conduct a separate line of investigation concerning a JIMP capability for the AoT signals recognition by Army leadership of the importance of this function within the emerging security environment. Furthermore, the pervasiveness of the JIMP concept anticipated in that context relates directly to the current GoC's "whole of government" approach and the CF's focus on the "Three Block War." CF CIMIC policy highlights the importance of this capability in current operations:

> In contemporary CF operations, civil-military relations have become increasingly complex and the degree of interaction required between deployed forces and civil actors is now significant. Likewise, civil actors have a great impact upon the conduct and successful outcome of CF operations. As a result, effective

coordination of information and activities between deployed forces and civil actors is now a key element to the success of CF operations.

Although civil military cooperation has existed in military operations for several years, the conduct of modern military operations is constantly changing and evolving. As part of this change, it is now recognized that the civilian environment in which military operations take place, must be considered in everything the CF does. A robust CIMIC capability is required to ensure that the intentions and actions of civil actors are coordinated with military intentions. This policy is intended to be the foundation for the development of the CF CIMIC function and capability. [30]

Combat Camera DSC00091e Photo by Capt Edward Stewart

Major Erin Savage, Officer Commanding, Health Service Support Company (HSS Coy), 1 Royal Canadian Regiment Battle Group (1 RCR BG) shows Afghan children the photograph she just took of them. Elements of HSS Coy travelled to various villages west of Kandahar Airfield (KAF) to conduct a Village Medical Outreach (VMO)

If we return to CIMIC as the institutional foundation for a JIMP capability, the importance of leadership may be articulated as follows:

> CIMIC, whether domestic or international, is a *command responsibility* and requires *leadership* from the highest military appointments in cooperation with the heads of civilian agencies.[31]

As such, the successful implementation of a JIMP concept will require continued active endorsement from CF and Army leadership as well as other GoC departments.

Individual Training. Adaptive dispersed operations, the foundation of AoT, demand that every soldier be a JIMP contributor. Today, we are witness to the genesis of this concept through the "Three Block War" and "Whole of Government" approach. As such, it would be prudent for the Army and CF to address the pervasiveness of the JIMP concept for the AoT through an appropriate and effective regime of individual training. Reaching down to the individual level of training will provide the necessary foundation for the establishment of a JIMP capability. To a certain degree, it is understood that many of the JIMP concepts already exist within the current Army training system;

however, it is recommended that the JIMP concept be driven down further—i.e. to the Basic Individual and Training and Education level as outlined in DAOD 5031-2,[32] thereby highlighting its importance.

From a philosophical standpoint, there is considerable literature and research which concludes that soldiers, in response to what are called "new wars",[33] are taking on greater non-warfighting functions that seem at odds with their traditional warfighting roles (i.e. policing and development projects). Although it is not the intent to examine this debate here, it should be noted that this idea fits neatly within the "Three Block War" construct as well as the recent development of a CF PRTs and is perhaps an indication of things to come.

Research and Development (R&D) and Operational Research (OR)

Research and Development. Thrust advisory groups (TAG) exist for each of the operational functions—command, sense, act, shield and sustain. TAGs are well suited to address R&D issues surrounding a JIMP concept. For example, building "trust" between different "cultures", be they within the CF, GoC departments, or NGOs, is a critical prerequisite for the emergence of an effective JIMP concept. This is in fact a current command TAG experiment being conducted at Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) Toronto which currently has a CF focus but has the potential for expansion to incorporate the broad range of JIMP contributors.

Operational Research. The significance of OR and its success in support of commanders is well documented. OR support to Army commanders extends as far back as Vimy Ridge (1917) and includes current operations in Afghanistan.[34] As such, it is anticipated that OR will support research focused on the JIMP concept. For example, Army Experiment 9A recently exercised, in part, the JIMP concept within a warfighting context. And examination of the JIMP concept in a peace support operation, a humanitarian crisis or in a disaster assistance response context—both international and domestic—is being considered for future Army Experiments within a synthetic environment. Furthermore, consideration is being given to implementing an OR team within the AoT experimental battle group set to commence in the summer of 2007.

Infrastructure, Environment and Organization

The AoT construct does not envisage major infrastructure changes to further the JIMP concept. As mentioned earlier, the continental staff system and the CIMIC specialty provide the institutional foundations to build a JIMP capability. Viewed primarily as a holistic approach to operations, the chief focus of JIMP is on inculcating a new approach to operations primarily involving new agencies and publics while retaining and indeed improving joint and multinational collaboration and cooperation in both warfighting and stability and reconstruction operations. However, while it is anticipated that interagency and public organizations will become more closely integrated into a force structure it expected that they will be non-permanent structures. Further, it is anticipated that liaison officers (LOs) in support of the JIMP concept (i.e. LOs to other agencies and publics) will become increasingly important and more numerous.[35] The increased importance of the JIMP capability and LOs can be viewed within the latest designs for current battle group and brigade headquarter structures (see Figures 3 and 4). Moving to a fully JIMP capable headquarters will constitute an evolutionary step from the structures illustrated below (permanent JIMP capabilities outlined in red with non-permanent in yellow box).

Concepts, Doctrine and Collective Training

Concepts and Doctrine. As mentioned above, the JIMP concept is not entirely new to the CF. Joint and multinational aspects have been with us for some time and



FIGURE 3: Director Army Doctrine, BDE and BG Structures 11 Oct 06, viewed 17 Nov 2006, <http://lfdts.army.mil.ca/dglcd/files/03_CDR/03_CDR_Active/06004_Command/CDR>.



FIGURE 4: Director Army Doctrine, BDE and BG Structures 11 Oct 06, viewed 17 Nov 2006, <http://lfdts.army.mil.ca/dglcd/files/03_CDR/03_CDR_Active/06004_Command/CDR>.

resident with the continental staff system. For future development, it is recommended that the continental staff system be retained to adequately represent the joint and multinational aspects of the JIMP concept.

Interagency and public aspects of the JIMP concept have been evident within CIMIC doctrine. The real change, however, is the increased emphasis of the interagency and

public aspects in the contemporary operating environment and the future security environment. This is largely based on recognition that stability and reconstruction are now as important as warfighting within these contexts—particularly in light the range of challenges associated with failing and failed state phenomena. Here, while our current tactical CIMIC doctrine is sound, the operational level requires revision. In fact such revision may provide the backbone for future JIMP concept doctrine development.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). PRTs[36] inform the JIMP concept as they bring together the military (including CIMIC), agencies and publics under a single construct in a conflict zone. Although there are many lessons which still must be learned from this new type of unit, the PRT can been seen as representative of the next iterative step for both brigade and battle group structures incorporating political, developmental and other JIMP players (i.e. RCMP, Corrections Canada, NGOs, etc.) on a permanent or non-permanent basis. Although the core PRT structure illustrated below is a US model, it highlights the interagency and publics perspectives of the JIMP concept (outlined in red) and their position within the unit.



FIGURE 5: US Aid, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment, viewed 17 Nov 2006 <http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADG252.pdf>: 28.

Collective Training. The required pervasiveness of the JIMP concept throughout the CF is important and can be achieved to a certain degree through individual training and education initiatives specifically aimed at highlighting its significance for the current Army and the AoT. However, higher-level formation and general staff training must be achieved through collective training. Collective training must incorporate OGDs, IOs, NGOs and PVOs to inculcate coordination aspects of the JIMP concept such as collaborative planning. An ability to integrate the above agencies into the operational architecture and provide liaison to support them is crucial for JIMP success.

Information Management and Information Technology

Information management and technology will be a "crucial" aspect of JIMP-enabled HQs. Security protocols resident within the CF as well as other agencies will require careful study to enable an adequate functioning of the JIMP concept (i.e. access to key information). An immediate "plug and play" capability in the JIMP environment will be required to interoperate quickly and effectively. And all agencies will require communications utilizing the latest technological advancements.

Equipment and Support

At this time, it is anticipated that the major capital requirement to support a JIMP concept will reside within the information management and technology realms; namely communications equipment.

Conclusion

JIMP is a concept that will have a considerable impact within the emerging security environment. Although primarily holistic in nature, JIMP articulates a perspective of operations which until recently has been regarded as being of **secondary** importance to the military. Yet times are changing. In parallel with the US's declaration that conventional warfighting operations and stability and reconstruction operations are equally "decisive",[37] the GoC has endorsed "Whole of Government" and 3D+C philosophies whereby the security mission is no longer the sole purview of military forces. The nature of operations today and in the future will resemble the "Three Block War" construct—a construct which demands that soldiers interact with many different players other than their own armed forces and undertake non-traditional tasks. This is in fact a new norm for the Army. It is also a norm that reflects the dynamics of the current and future security environments.

Although there remain many issues to be researched and discussed with respect to a JIMP-capable army, three broad areas require particular attention:

♦ **Security**. A JIMP-capable army does not imply an abrogation of its security function. Rather, it implies recognition that the future security environment is much more complex—with an increasingly varied number of players interacting within it. Indeed a range of players can contribute to the security function. Further, decisive operations do not equate exclusively with warfighting. Increasingly, stability and reconstruction tasks are of equal importance. It is perhaps the US that has led the way in institutionalizing this concept. In fact it is reflected in US Presidential Order No. 44 as well as in current

KA2004-R103-1193d 26 May 2004 Kabul, Afghanistan Photo by Cpl John Bradley

Mr. Christopher Alexander, the Canadian Ambassador to Afghanistan, meets senior fire officials at the opening of a refurbished fire hall in the Khoshal Khan Meena district of Kabul, Afghanistan. The project was a joint effort between the Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) section of the 3rd Battalion Royal 22nd Regiment Battalion Group (3 R22eR Bn Gp), and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).

Army capstone doctrine. Within the Canadian Army, the evolution of the DART and PRT, along with recent recommended changes to BG and Bde HQ structures (including CIMIC) provides the foundation from which a JIMP capability for the Army can be further developed and institutionalized.

♦ **Coordination and Networking**. A JIMP-capable army requires a robust coordination and networking function. Although there is a general perception that the military will attempt to control the agenda through its robust communications infrastructure and coordination capabilities, this is simply not the case. Within the emerging security environment, there will be few organizations, if any, equipped as well as a military force to sponsor this critical function. As such, the Army must be equipped and trained to support a broad coordination and networking function with NGOs, IOs, OGDs, coalition forces and, potentially, host nation publics. The necessity of this function also highlights the importance of enabling concepts—such as the network—and of networking technology to support effective and robust communications with JIMP contributors.

♦ **Consequence Management**. A JIMP-capable army will also be expected to conduct efficient consequence management. Although there is no official definition of this term, the AoT must be ready to systematically take action in the face of life threatening or destructive events. As such, JIMP contributor roles, responsibilities and plans must be identified and a clearly defined response channel set up. From battle damage to infrastructure destruction to the deaths of innocent by standers, a JIMP-capable army must be ready to react alone or in concert with other JIMP contributors. A lack of ability in this domain will allow opposing forces to seize the initiative and exploit events to their own benefit.

To be sure, the creation of an effective and truly holistic JIMP capability will pose a range of challenges. Yet initiatives in the three broad areas outlined above are especially important. Only then will JIMP represent a truly effective means for coping with the increasingly complex challenges likely to characterize the security environment in the years ahead.

About the Authors...

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Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Rostek joined the Canadian Forces in 1979 by way of Le College militaire royal de Saint-Jean. In 1984, he graduated from the Royal Military College of Canada with a Bachelor of Arts (Commerce) and was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps. Upon completion of armoured training in 1985 he became a member of The Royal Canadian Dragoons stationed in Lahr, West Germany. He has held a variety of command and staff appointments as well as various school and training positions. He was promoted to his current rank in 1999 and has served as Directing Staff at both the Canadian Forces College in Toronto and the Australian Command and Staff College in Canberra. He holds two Master's degrees - a Master's of Arts (Defence Management and Policy), Royal Military College and a Master's of Management in Defence Studies, University of Canberra, Australia. His is currently completing his doctorate in War Studies at the Royal Military College while employed as a Staff Officer in the Land Futures section within Directorate of Land Concepts and Doctrine.

Endnotes

1. Department of National Defence interest in JIMP has been evident in early drafts of the Strategic Operating Concept, See, Department of National Defence, *Canadian Forces Strategic Operating Concept*, Draft 4.4, 21 May 2004, For CDS Review (Ottawa: Department of National Defence; 2004). See especially pp. 17-18. And the Canadian Forces Experimentation Center lists JIMP in its Glossary of Terms. Nor is interest in such an approach confined only to Canada. In fact similar calls have been echoed in NATO circles. Speaking at a NATO meeting in 2004 Dr. John Leggat—former

Assistant Deputy Minister for Science and Technology observed that" (t)he alliance has agreed to adopt a more holistic approach to defence and security that deals with a full range of potential missions spanning the spectrum of conflict from crisis prevention to humanitarian operations through to high intensity warfare. This reinforces the need for a concerted and coordinated political, military, civil and economic approach. The military forces of the Alliance will have to operate in a multilateral environment alongside forces of other countries in close cooperation and coordination with a wide array of organizations. Future military operations will be linked to other informational, economic, social, legal and diplomatic initiatives and will need to be implemented ." See, Dr. John Leggat http://www.act.nato.int/multimedia/speeches/2004/110304keynoteleggatcde04.htm).

2. As defined by Edward R. Smith, effects based operations (EBO) are coordinated sets of actions aimed at shaping the behavior of intended targets (e.g. friends, allies, neutrals and foes in peace, crisis and war). See Smith, *Effects Based Operations: Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis and War*, (Washington, DC: DoD Command and Control Research Program; July 2003) p. 108.

3. See Directorate of Land Concepts and Doctrine, *Toward Adaptive Dispersed Operations, The Army of Tomorrow: Seminar Wargame Handbook*, 28 August-1 September 2006, (Kingston: DLCD, Futures Cell; 2006), especially pp. 102-104, Director General Land Capability Development, *Proceedings of the Army of Tomorrow Seminar Wargame*, 28 August-1 September 2006, (Kingston: DLCD; September 2006), especially pps. 10-11, 14-15, 18-19, and p. 22, and Directorate of Land Concepts and Doctrine, *Land Operations 2015: The Force Employment Concept for the Army of Tomorrow, Towards Adaptive Dispersed Operations*, (Kingston: DLCD; 2007).

4. Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organizations in which more than one service of the same nation participates. Defence Terminology Bank, http://terminology.mil.ca/TermBaseWeb/Main2.aspx?changeTermbase=0.

5. Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organizations, in which elements of more than one nation participate. An adjective that connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc, between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies. Defence Terminology Bank, http://terminology.mil.ca/TermBaseWeb/Main2.aspx?changeTermbase=0.

6. The authors are grateful to Mr. Georges Bordet of CANDEM for identifying and highlighting this point.

7. Both the 3D+C and "whole of government" philosophies derive from a broader interest on the part of government officials in a more collaborative, integrated approach to operations. As stated in Canada's most recent Defence Policy Statement (DPS), such thinking reflects the belief that "(a)chieving responsibilities and goals " . . . in today's complex security environment will require, more than ever, a "whole of government approach" to international missions, bringing together military and civilian resources in a focused and coherent fashion. As part of this strategy, and building on recent experience gained in Afghanistan and elsewhere, the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces will work more closely with other government departments and agencies, including Foreign Affairs and the Canadian International Development Agency, to further develop the integrated "3D (+C) approach (defence, diplomacy, development and commerce) to complex conflict and post-conflict situations." See, Government of Canada, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World Defence*, (Ottawa: 2005), p. 28. Similarly, Canada's recent international policy statement notes that " . . . government Departments must become better connected with each other, and the system as a whole more efficient at leveraging current assets—wherever they reside. See Government of Canada, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World Overview*, (Ottawa: 2005), p. 26. Notably, one seeming distinction between JIMP and these other philosophies is that while the former aims at developing a capacity applicable all operations—both at home and abroad—3D+C and "whole of government" thinking tend be heavily international in both focus and intent (a fact at least implied by their inclusion of diplomacy and development as key aspects of their approach).

8. The Canadian Forces Experimentation Center notes that Joint, Interagency, Multinational and Public. Command and Control concepts of specific interest will directly relate to interoperability issues associated with operations within the JIMP framework. Interoperability across JIMP categories will occur in three broad domains: information interoperability (the way we share information including technological and procedural aspects); cognitive interoperability (the way we perceive and think reflected in doctrine and decision processes); and behavioral interoperability (the way we carry out the selected course of action). See Canadian Forces Experimentation Center Glossary of Terms Website at http://www.ops.forces.gc.ca/cfec/viewHTML_e.asp?islandid=452)

9. Here, while success is by no means assured, the experience of "learning by doing" is likely to prove beneficial for the conduct of future operations—offering lessons for future consideration. Already for instance, it has underlined the benefits of an integrated approach—making clear that the presence of HUMINT and civil affairs as well as an effective information campaign is critical to achieving success in stability phase of operations.

10. Michael J. McNerney, "Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?", *Parameters*, (Winter 2005-06): 32.

11. Michael J. McNerney, "Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?", *Parameters*, (Winter 2005-06): 33.

12. The Canadian Army has adopted an operational model to better explain the different scenarios Canadian soldiers may face. 'View 1' operations involve intense combat missions in situations of general war such as those in Korea or the Second World War. 'View 2' operations involve a mix of combat and non-combat operations in conflicts that differ from traditional interstate warfare and include Rwanda and Sierra Leone. The overlap between the two is defined as the CF's 'vital ground'. The Canadian Army is frequently committed to 'View 2' operations while retaining its standing requirement to be prepared for 'View 1' eventualities. The prospect of combat is prevalent in both views. Furthermore, the effectiveness of forces engaged in 'View 2' missions often rests on their demonstrable ability to use combat power to achieve their goals, even if this combat capability is held as a deterrent. Therefore, a credible combat capability is seen to be essential for both

views. Consequently, the Canadian Army trains its soldiers, leaders and units for 'View '1—multipurpose, warfighting skills—and adds to this training the theatre and mission-specific training required for View 2 operations. National Defence, Chief of Land Staff, *Training Canada's Army*, B-GL-300-008/FP-001, 2001-08-30: 14.

13. Indeed, while the PRT does have a definite "use of force" requirement in non-permissive environments, its broader economic, environmental, human, and societal aspects are nonetheless clear and far more predominant.

14. Based on these requirements, Land Futures convened a working group to investigate many of these questions. The following section outlines work to date on the JIMP line of investigation undertaken in support of the AoT Force Employment Concept.

15. An enabling concept is a description of how a particular task or procedure will be performed, within the context of a broader functional area using a particular capability, such as a specific technology, training or education program, organization, facility, etc. An enabling concept describes the accomplishment of a particular task that makes possible the performance of a broader military function or sub-function.

16. Department of National Defence, *Land Force—Command*, B-GL-300-003/FP-000, 1996: 70.

17. For a complete review of CIMIC doctrine, see *Civil-Military Cooperation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*, B-GL-355-001/FP-001, 2006.

18. Force multiplier—a force multiplier is a military term referring to a factor that dramatically increases (hence, "multiplies") the combat-effectiveness of a given military force.

19. The methodology and procedure is detailed in the *Army Strategic Decision Making Handbook* (ASDMH). For the history of capability development within the CF, see Major Andrew B. Godefroy, PhD, "Chasing the Silver Bullet: The Evolution of Capability Development in the Canadian Army", *Canadian Military Journal*, forthcoming.

20. PRICIE: Personnel, Leadership and Individual Training; Research & Development and Operational Research (plus Experimentation); Infrastructure, Environment and Organization; Concepts, Doctrine and Collective Training; and Equipment and Support.

21. Christopher Ankersen ,"The Personnel Crisis", *Canada without Armed Forces*, Ed. Douglas Bland, (Kingston: School of Policy Studies, 2003): 35.

22. The increase in the use of PMCs has grown dramatically these last ten years. During the first Gulf War in 1991 for every one contractor there were 50 military personnel involved. In the 2003 conflict the ratio was 1 to 10. Deborah Avant, "The Privatization of Security and Change in the Control of Force," *International Studies Perspectives* (2004) 5, 153-157.

23. For further development of CIMIC as Reserve task see David Peabody, "The Challenges of Doing Good Work: The Development of Canadian Forces CIMIC Capability and NGOs", October 2005 available at <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/symposia/2005/Peabody.pdf>.

24. JIMP Working Group, DLCD Kingston, 23 October 2006, LCol Rick Powell, Deputy Director CIMIC.

25. See "Canadian Army Needs Reservists to Fill Gaps: Commander", viewed 30 Nov 06 <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2006/11/21/reservists-pressure.html>, and "'No Worry' with reservists in combat", viewed 30 Nov 06 <http://www.hamiltonspectator.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=hamilto/Layout/Article>.

26. See Ombudsman Report *The Canadian Face Behind the Recruiting Targets: A Review of the Canadian Forces Recruiting System: From Attraction to Enrolment*, 19 Jul 06, viewed 24 Nov 06 <http://www.ombudsman.forces.gc.ca/reports/special/recruitment/recruit_toc_e.asp>.

27. For further thoughts on this issue, see Michael A. Rostek, "Developing a Surge Capacity for the Canadian Forces", *Defence and Peace Economics*, Keith Hartley and John T. Warner, Eds, Volume 17, Number 5, October 2006: 421-434.

28. Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, *Future Force: Concepts for Future Army Capabilities*, (Kingston, Ontario—2003): 205.

29. Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, *Future Force: Concepts for Future Army Capabilities*, (Kingston, Ontario—2003): 205.

30. CF Policy on Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), viewed 10 Nov 06 <http://sjs.mil.ca/dgplans/supportspec/pages/cimic_e.asp#policy>.

31. National Defence, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War*, B-GG-005-004/AF-023, 1999, viewed 10 Nov 06 < http://cfd.mil.ca/conceptsdoctrine/docs/AF-023_e.pdf>: 1-1

32. DAOD 5031-2 Individual Training and Education Management Framework, viewed 10 Nov 06, <http://www.admfincs.forces.gc.ca/admfincs/subjects/DAOD/5031/2_e.asp>.

33. Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999): 1-2.

34. For a more detailed view see Fred Cameron's "A Century of Operational Analysis for Commanders in the Canadian Army", viewed 10 Nov 06 <http://www.mors.org/meetings/combat_analyst/read_aheads/Cameron-SAS44-A_Century_of_OA.ppt>.

35. This fact is supported by proprietary research conducted at DRDC Toronto.

36. For more information on Canada's PRT visit http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/prov_reconstruction-en.asp.

37. United States Government, Secretary of Defense presentation, viewed 3 Oct 06, <www.ndu.edu/ITEA/storage/687/Army%20Support%20to%20SSTR>.

THE ROAD TO HELL PART 1: CANADA IN VIETNAM, 1954-1973

Lieutenant-Colonel Shane B. Schreiber, CD, MSM

(This is the first part in a two-part article. The second part will appear in CAJ 10.2)

To join in the fighting would please American opinion without contributing essential military strength. On the other hand, to denounce U.S. policy would only stiffen their determination at the expense of incalculable damage to U.S—Canadian relations. The problem is difficult for Canadians who honestly believe that one or the other of those straightforward positions is our moral obligation, but the Government knows that neither would carry the judgement of a majority.[1]

It is an irony of history that the above words, written over twenty years ago about the conundrum faced by Canadian policy makers over their involvement in Vietnam, could just as easily be written today to reflect the current Canadian policy debacle over the American intervention in Iraq. Canadian policy in Vietnam from 1954-1973 provides an interesting insight into the difficulty created for Canadian politicians and strategists by American-led military interventions that do not have wholehearted national or international support. The current conflict in Iraq, like that in Vietnam, creates a natural paradox for Canadians, who often support the broader ends of American foreign policy, but disagree with their American friend and ally on the means. Conflicting and complex interests collide, with the result that Canadian policy often appears inconsistent, ill-defined, and ill-considered. Moreover, the Canadian tradition of an often deliberately vague and ambiguous foreign policy allegedly predicated on high moral grounds and with the best of intentions has consistently led to confusion and conflict both domestically and abroad. This paradox has become one of the central themes in Canadian foreign policy since the end of the Second World War.[2] The Chrétien government's acrimonious break with the American policy on use of military force to accomplish "regime change" in Iraq is a recent manifestation.[3] For politicians, there may be some very pressing reasons to create and maintain deliberate ambiguity. Politically, such a policy allows politicians the freedom to manoeuvre and exploit high-minded rhetoric, especially if the topic is fraught with emotion, or a key relationship is involved. The downside, however, is that a deliberately ambiguous or vague policy predicated on hope, and not reality, has often become frustrating for those tasked with conducting it, especially if the true aim is not readily identified or identifiable. The policy conundrum faced by Canadians over Vietnam from 1954 to 1973 posed precisely this dilemma of hope and ambiguity that has become a central and lasting theme in Canadian foreign and defence policy. As this paper will illustrate, Prime Minister Chrétien's stance on Iraq is consistent with what has come before.

It has been nearly three decades since the last Canadian peacekeeper left Vietnam in a cloud of ignominy and frustration. By that time, Canada's nearly twenty-year involvement in attempting to achieve a peaceful solution to the Vietnam conflict had become engulfed in a sea of controversy and acrimonious debate, fuelled by a suspicious media, and compounded by a sense of national angst over the seeming inconsistency and incoherence of our national policy. This sense of guilt and frustration was created not so much by Canada's own actions, but by the perception of complicity with the policies of its American neighbour and friend. Public reaction and revulsion in the United States toward its misguided and tragic policy migrated across the border and ignited the debate in Canada over our nation's role in Vietnam. Yet, if the Americans have been able only very recently to come to grips with their role in the tragedy that was Vietnam, and to learn vital lessons from it, then perhaps it is time Canadians did the same.[4] There is a dearth of writing on the subject of Canada's involvement in Vietnam, and it remains a sensitive subject in some government circles.[5] Nevertheless, the time has come to re-examine Canada's role in Vietnam, and to ascertain what it can teach us about our nation, and its foreign and defence policies.

How did Canada come to be involved in Vietnam? And how did successive Canadian governments struggle with competing and conflicting demands in order to meet both the moral and pragmatic imperatives they faced? Canada's role in Vietnam became a road to Hell paved with good intentions and mapped out by a deliberately ambiguous policy. Moreover, the conflict surrounding Canada's policy was exacerbated by a cultural difference between the policymakers (primarily in the Department of External Affairs) and the policy executors (primarily in the Department of National Defence). In the final analysis, Canadian angst over its involvement in Vietnam is misplaced because, to some degree, Canada could not have avoided the role it played as a simultaneous quiet accomplice and victim of its own—and America's—"hell of good intentions." The delicate balancing act that Canadian policymakers sought to use was both underpinned and undermined by Canada's close relationship with the United States.

An Offer we Could not Refuse

The role Canada found itself playing in Indochina in general, and Vietnam in particular, came about not because of a deliberate government policy, but by virtue of a number of special relationships it held at the beginning of the Cold War, including personal relationships with the leaders of Communist China, and its unique position vis-à-vis America, Britain, France, and even India. Canada's place in the world at the conjunction of several large blocks of power—chief Dominion among the British Commonwealth, best friend and neighbour of the American hegemon, and most eloquent proponent of multi-lateralism and peaceful solutions—allowed it to play a role on the world stage the throughout the 1950's that marked the heyday of Canadian diplomacy and the high point in the history of the department of External Affairs.[6] Under the mentorship of future Prime Minister (and Nobel Peace Prize recipient) Lester B. (Mike) Pearson, External Affairs was leveraging Canada's unique geo-strategic position using the emerging doctrine of "middlepowermanship."[7] But being a middlepower came with its disadvantages as well as its advantages, as Canada was soon to find out in its entanglement in the thicket that was Vietnam.

Canada's role in Vietnam was virtually thrust upon it unseen and unwanted. The Department of External Affairs had sent three observers to the Geneva Peace Talks on Indochina in May of 1954, led by then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Pearson. Accompanied by two Foreign Service officers, John Holmes and Chester Ronning, Pearson had been instructed by the Prime Minister, Louis St. Laurent, simply to act as

an observer, and, only if absolutely necessary, to tender Canada's good offices as a mediator. Pearson and Ronning, however, had too many old friends in Geneva among the diplomats from Britain, the United States, and Communist China. Ronning's influence with China's Chou En Lai led to an offer that the Canadians could not refuse—membership, along with India and Poland, on the International Commissions on Supervision and Control (ICSC) for Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.[8] These bodies were set up to oversee and report on the implementation of the Geneva Accords, the basis of a tenuous peace plan for the Indochina region.[9] Canada had been a last-minute replacement for Belgium, whom the Americans and French preferred, but was unacceptable, as a previously "imperial" power, to the Communist Chinese and Vietnamese. Chou En Lai himself proposed Canada—and France and the United States, eager to make deal, quickly accepted.[10]

The full ramifications of Canada's nomination to the ICSC were significant, but perhaps not fully understood by all involved. John Holmes, who would go on to become a *doyen* of Canadian foreign policy and the *primus inter pares* among all of the bright lights burning in the Department of External Affairs during its zenith, was also to become the chief architect and apologist for Canada's role in Vietnam.[11] Holmes described the Canadian nomination thusly:

Canada's name had sometimes been mentioned jokingly, but there seemed no reason to take it seriously. Canada had already acquired…the reputation of being the most objective of the NATO countries and it is believed that [Indian Representative] Krishna Menon persuaded Chou En-Lai that Canada would be the best Western candidate….[12]

To Holmes, however, it was clear from the outset that what was expected from the Canadian representation was not true objectivity, "but a judicial approach—a willingness to look at evidence and if necessary agree with decisions which might be contrary to the wishes of the South Vietnamese, the French, or the Americans…. We had been appointed at Geneva to make sure that the other side of the case got a fair hearing…."[13] In other words, Canada was to act not as an impartial *judge*, but rather as an *advocate* on behalf of Western interests. For their part, the Americans accepted Canada's involvement because, as President Dwight Eisenhower put it, "[ICSC membership] will put Canada in a position where it can block things."[14] The Americans were not particularly supportive of either the Geneva Accords, or the ICSC, but from the outset saw the opportunity for Canada to act as their unofficial "proxy" veto on the Commissions, much as the Poles were expected to act for the Communist Block. This view of a "partial but fair" role for the Canadians, however, was not shared by all. Senior Canadian diplomats such as Chester Ronning and Escott Reid, for example, had truly expected Canada to act in an impartial manner. So had most of the members of the Indian delegation, who hoped in general that the Commission would prove objective, non-partisan, and effective.[15] From the outset, then, Canada's role was ambiguously and paradoxically conceived.

Ambiguity was the stuff that the Geneva Accords were made of. Robert Randle, the foremost historian of the Geneva Accords, has argued that the deliberate ambiguity of the Accords as a whole was key to its acceptance and implementation, as there were just too many stakeholders in the outcome to craft a precise document that everyone involved could formally agree to.[16] In fact, the final declaration of the Vietnam Ceasefire agreement portion of the Geneva Accords was never formally signed, but merely "approved" by various Foreign Ministers, thereby adding to the ambiguity. More ominously, the head of the South Vietnamese delegation openly stated that his government refused to be bound by the agreements. In short, the Geneva Accords were a very flawed document on which to base the ICSC and Canadian involvement; in Douglas Ross' view, they were "a rush job…. Confusing, contradictory, and ambiguous because of the fundamental absence of consensus among the Geneva powers [United States, Soviet Union, China, France, and Britain]."[17] The Accords were, however, the best that could be had, and their ambiguity was accepted for expediency's sake. Nevertheless, the deliberate ambiguity designed into the Geneva Accords would find itself translated into Canadian policy, with confusing and crippling effect.

Ottawa's initial reaction to Canada's nomination was, in Holmes's words, "a shock," and its reception to the invitation was ambivalent at best.[18] St. Laurent and Pearson were wary of accepting a commitment in a region marginally important to Canada that had the potential to bring it into conflict with important friends like France and the United States. Moreover, membership in the ICSC also called for the deployment of a large number of Army and External Affairs officers, both of which were already in short supply. Regardless of these demands, Canada could not have rejected the offer without creating

the danger of the collapse of the fragile peace accords. Refusal also would have made hypocrisy of the rhetoric of "Pearsonian internationalism." Holmes stated:

> In the early stages the Americans offered us neither support nor understanding, going no further than saying that if there was to be a Commission, they would prefer to have us on it. On the other hand, the [Canadian] Government… never doubted for a moment that it was an obligation we had to accept…. To have rejected it … would have caused the whole settlement to become unstuck, for the composition of the ICSC was one of the most delicate and latest of the compromises reached.[19]

Foreign policy analyst Douglas Ross has argued that "refusal [to participate] was a very real option," but even he admits that the repercussions of such a stance would have proved too daunting for a Canadian government focussed on "Eurocentric defence priorities… and fears of American nuclear adventurism…."[20] Faced with an offer it could not refuse, the St. Laurent government accepted its invitation with a pragmatic discretion that has since become a hallmark of Canadian foreign policy.[21] "We have no illusions," claimed a Department of External Affairs statement, "that the task we are undertaking will be either easy or of short duration, but we take satisfaction from the fact that in performing it, Canada will be playing a worthy and responsible part in an effort to strengthen peace."[22] In Holmes' own words, "our role in Indochina was a classic case of middlepowermanship."[23]

Preparation for the ICSC

If the decision to participate in the ICSC had been made easier by its inevitability, the actual setting up of the Commission and its logistics were not. Preliminary meetings between the three commission members were held in New Delhi in early August 1954. Here, the basic framework for the Commission's work was mapped out.[24] ICSC headquarters (HQ) in Vietnam would be in Hanoi, and the Commission would officially begin its work on August 11, 1954. On the ground, the Commission would have representatives in Hanoi, Saigon, and in fourteen fixed team sites at designated legal entry points, seven in the North, and seven in the South. From these locations, ICSC representatives would monitor the exchange and withdrawal of military forces, equipment, or supplies, and would supervise the handover of governmental authority to the respective regimes north and south of the 17th parallel, the artificial and temporary boundary imposed by the Geneva Agreements. An undetermined number of "mobile teams" were to have freedom of movement throughout the border zones and the demilitarized zone (DMZ) along the 17th parallel, monitoring the ceasefire and disengagement of forces in these highly sensitive areas. The fixed team sites were to be manned by six ICSC members, two from each delegation, and the mobile teams were to consist of three members, one from each country. These teams were also tasked with the responsibility of investigating and reporting any complaint about a breach of the Geneva Accords. These reports would be passed to the ICSC headquarters for formal findings to be recorded. These findings were then passed to the co-sponsors of the Geneva Accords (Great Britain and the Soviet Union), and to the Joint Commission, an organization consisting of high-level French and North Vietnamese officials, who would then decide on what action would be taken to rectify the problem. The most significant flaw in this whole arrangement was that the ICSC had no executive power whatsoever; its mandate was only to report and record violations to the Co-sponsors, and the Joint Commission. Once the French had completed their withdrawal and had left the Joint Commission, the South Vietnamese government refused to abide by the provisions of the Geneva Agreements, and the ICSC became wholly ineffective. In short, the ICSC's mandate was never to "keep the peace," but rather to facilitate the withdrawal of the French.[25]

India's position on the ICSC was critical. Not only did it supply the majority of logistical and command and control support, but it also acted as the Permanent Chair of the ICSC, and was responsible, through the Secretariat, for the production of the reports on investigations. The bulk of the ICSC staff were Indian; for example, in 1955, there were 150 Canadian personnel in ICSC Vietnam positions, 135 of these being military personnel, but more than one thousand Indian personnel, of which 941 were military.[26] Despite the fact that most of the ICSC's decisions required unanimity before being passed to the Joint Commission, reports of majority and minority positions could also be lodged to the Co-sponsors of the Geneva Agreements. As a result, with the Polish stance being considered a foregone conclusion, Canadian External Affairs officials emphasized India's crucial "swing vote" between the Poles and the Canadians. This pivotal role proved a continual discomfort to the Indians, who disliked having their honest opinions disparaged as "taking sides," and played a role in the eventual breakdown of the ICSC, as will be seen.[27]

The New Delhi Conference ended on 6 August 1954, after setting an ambitious target date for the opening of ICSC operations in Vietnam as 11 August 1954, only slightly more than a week away. A scramble ensued in Ottawa to find personnel available to fill the slots. Some of the more senior ICSC members went directly from New Delhi to their positions in Indochina, their luggage to be forwarded once packed. The Canadian contingent required over 150 military and diplomatic personnel, 83 of these being military officers.[28] This requirement, given on such short notice, necessitated the "panic posting" of many officers, some being jerked directly out of field training exercises to be shipped overseas.[29] Despite the extremely short notice, ICSC Vietnam opened its HQ in Hanoi on time, by 11 August 1954. In order to help alleviate some of the administrative and logistical problems that inevitably faced a large group entering a war-torn and strange country, an advance party of Canadian Army officers was hastily shipped in from Korea to make whatever preparations it could for the others. Unfortunately, little has been written about the logistical nightmare that must have confronted these individuals, but it appears that ad hoc, verbal, temporary arrangements became permanent as the ICSC's tenure dragged on throughout two decades. Canadian officers found themselves living in rooms "permanently" rented by the ICSC in all manner of establishments, from mere huts in the DMZ, to squalid brothels in small villages, to the best hotels in Saigon and Hanoi.[30]

Holmes gave great credit to the Canadian Army for the success of the deployment, and it is interesting to note his view of the Army's success in its first ever "peacekeeping mission:"[31]

> The response of the Canadian Army to this challenge was highly creditable…. I recall some quite understandable tendency in military quarters to say that this was not a soldier's but a diplomat's job, and that they did not want to do the dirty work for the Department of External Affairs… but the Department of External Affairs could not possibly have fielded officers on the scale required…. [The Canadian Army] rounded up on short notice the best staff-trained officers who could be taken away from their present duties and fielded within a few weeks teams for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos which carried on their unaccustomed duties of soldier, diplomat, and judge with remarkable success.[32]

Despite the critical role Canadian Army officers were to play in the ICSC, the Department of National Defence emphasized that it wanted nothing to do with the direction or formulation of policy, an interesting abrogation of bureaucratic interest.[33] This disinterest in what would become a long-standing and controversial task for the

Source: The World Factbook. 2003. Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 2003.

Canadian Army, however, is understandable given the Defence Department's fixation with the Soviet threat in Europe. As historian Jack Granatstein has noted, "[the ICSC] was a serious drain on limited resources, one that was resented by National Defence Headquarters at a time when the country's commitments to NATO were large and taken very seriously indeed."[34] Given the problematic future of the ICSC, however, perhaps the Department of Defence would have done better to demand a much larger role in policy formulation. But it was early in the Canadian Army's experience with peacekeeping, and if they failed to act or acquiesced to their political and diplomatic counterparts too easily, it was more out of naïveté than a deliberate act of subordination or abrogation.

In addition to looking to the Canadian Army for the bulk of the ICSC's officers, the Canadian government felt it necessary to reach outside its own foreign service bureaucracy to find a man suitable for the highly sensitive and significant post of Commissioner for ICSC Vietnam. On 17 August 1954, the government nominated Sherwood Lett, a corporate lawyer and ex-Deputy Chief of the General Staff, for the position. Lett had been highly-decorated during the Second World War, and had retired at the rank of brigadier general. Having wrangled with the toughest military and legal problems Canada had to offer, the St. Laurent government considered him the best choice to undertake what it rightly assumed would be the gruelling task awaiting him in Hanoi. Holmes praised Lett by saying, "Lett was not only a soldier, but also judicial by training and temperament. No one could have been more fair minded," and later added that, "[Lett was] a man of extraordinary integrity ...dedicated to the principle of impartiality."[35] The American Consul in Vancouver was asked by his government for his opinion of Lett, to whom he gave his enthusiastic endorsement: "the Canadian government could not

have selected a finer man for this difficult position...."[36]

Lett recognized that his mission of supervising the disengagement of two almost intractable foes would be a daunting challenge, but he accepted it nonetheless. What he could not have foreseen was that his task would be made even more difficult by the ambiguous instructions given to him by the Canadian government. Lett received his ambassadorial "Letter of Instruction," from the government on 22 August 1954.[37] In it, External Affairs Minister Pearson outlined the policy objectives he expected Lett to pursue. The first objective was, not surprisingly, "the maintenance of peace in Indochina." This primary goal, however, was almost immediately contradicted by the second: "to encourage the development of a Southeast Asia Defence Organization...as a safeguard against Communist aggression." The third objective was to further the economic development of the region, preferably in the capitalist mould, under the auspices of the "Colombo Plan." The last objective set Canada's policy directly at odds with the successful completion of Lett's mission, and the mandate of the ICSC: development of, "strong, independent, non-communist (emphasis added) regimes on the Asian mainland outside present Communist areas." As James Eayrs has rightly pointed out, "the last three of these objectives were clearly anti-communist in purport," and therefore compromised the impartiality of Lett's position on the Commission.[38] The government's instructions concluded that Lett should "reflect a Western outlook," while at the same time, "maintaining an attitude of judicial impartiality;" in essence, he was to be fair, but not too fair. Neither Pearson nor Holmes saw this dichotomy as being impossible to achieve, and the deliberate ambiguity of the government's instructions did not seem to them, at the time, to be a signal of the potential dangers to come.[39] As Douglas Ross has pointed out, Pearson was rightly cautious that Canadian involvement in the ICSC should not undermine the more important goal of assisting the Western world in "containing" communism. The paradoxical Instructions he provided Lett, however, would ultimately, "pave the way for ambivalence, potential lack of direction in policy implementation—and an endless litany of misguided accusations of moral turpitude by anti-interventionist critics."[40]

The ICSC's Initial Success

By the end of August 1954, ICSC operations in Vietnam were underway and the Commission enjoyed a brief honeymoon of impartiality. Lett's instructions had also included a warning about what Lett should expect from his Polish counterpart: "[He will] combine a show of co-operation with varying degrees of obstruction, deceit, and bad faith," including, "abusive language."[41] Initially, at least, this description of the Polish delegates proved to be incorrect. The first Polish Commissioner, P. Ogrodizinsky, proved to be "co-operative, friendly, and easy in his manner," according to Canadian delegate R.M. Macdonnell.[42] The accomplishments of the ICSC's first year were quite remarkable given the short time it had been given to organize and execute its functions. Within its first year, the ICSC effectively completed its largest and most difficult task, that of overseeing the transfer of government authority on either side of the DMZ. Simultaneously, ICSC observers had supervised the military disengagement of the North Vietnamese and French forces, and the French withdrawal from South Vietnam; this too, was accomplished with few problems. Even Charles Taylor, one of the harshest critics of Canada's role in the ICSC, later said:

> During the first 300 days the ICC [ICSC] performed a remarkable task in supervising the separation of the former belligerents without any serious incident. It was an achievement in which the Canadian diplomats and soldiers rightly took enormous pride.[43]

The third task, however, that of overseeing the repatriation of displaced persons and

refugees, became a chronic problem for the ICSC, and neither belligerent ever felt that the other side had been completely honest in its efforts or rhetoric on this issue.[44] The fourth and last task, that of verifying compliance with the Accords with respect to the rotation and replacement of military personnel and equipment, was to prove to be the stumbling block that eventually exposed the ICSC's impotence and fatally compromised its impartiality.

Frustration and Increasing Partisanship

In order to ensure that military equipment and reinforcements were not being smuggled into prohibited areas, the ICSC supervision teams needed complete freedom of movement. North Vietnam refused to grant the ICSC this freedom, and insisted that the ICSC advise it 48 hours in advance of an inspection. When the ICSC acquiesced, the North Vietnamese then further demanded a "de facto" veto on a team's movement by stipulating that all ICSC inspection teams had to be accompanied by a North Vietnamese Army (NVA) "guide" in addition to the NVA Liaison Officer already present; if the guide failed to show up, the inspection simply could not occur. As early as October 1954, the ICSC teams had found their movements restricted by this kind of North Vietnamese intransigence.[45] When a compromise was finally reached allowing teams "freedom of movement" only within their clearly specified zone, the Canadian delegation assented, but was clearly unhappy. In Ramesh Thakur's words:

> The zone of action, in sum, had been narrowed from the whole of Vietnam on 10 September [1954] to a ten- kilometer wide strip on 21 December 1954. The debate also set the pattern for the positions of the three delegations in the ICSC: Poland would agree with North Vietnam, Canada would seek to shape the Commission into a forceful body willing to assert its authority, and India would move away from an initial broad view to a position of.compromise.[46]

In historian Robert Bothwell's words, "The Canadians pressed, the Poles obstructed, and the Indians dithered."[47]

The freedom of movement issue continued to act as a reef against which the ICSC would wreck continuously throughout the rest of 1955. More sinister was the fact that the Canadians were finding the Poles increasingly partisan in their support of North Vietnam. The Polish change in attitude probably stemmed from a change in the inter-Communist Block politics. When the Poles had originally joined the ICSC, the Soviets had sent a very clear message to them about their expected behaviour: in the interests of "international socialism," and "peaceful co-existence," the Polish delegation was to behave, "as if they were neutral."[48] As a Sino-Soviet rift began to appear, and the Cold War re-heated, the Poles found themselves under increasing pressure to side further and further with the North Vietnamese against the other ICSC members.[49] North Vietnam also began restricting movement of refugees to the South, because the burgeoning exodus was proving a growing embarrassment and potential threat to the regime in Hanoi. News of these restrictions created a humanitarian uproar in the Canadian House of Commons, and in an attempt to create some movement on the issue in December 1954, Pearson instructed Lett to take a harder line with North Vietnam and the ICSC. For his part, Lett was content with the government's decision to, as James Eayrs puts it, "unmuzzle him."[50] Lett, like many Canadians that would follow him, had become increasingly frustrated with the growing obstructionist tendencies of the Poles, and with the indecisiveness of the Indian Chairman, Mr. Desai.[51] To Canadian minds, the freedom of movement question was not only unambiguous, it also went to the heart of the effectiveness, and therefore the relevance of the ICSC. If the teams were not free to move, then why have the ICSC at all?

Polish obstructionism and North Vietnamese intransigence towards the ICSC were

not the only factors that helped to end the early days of co-operation. The Geneva Accords had provided for free elections to be held in July 1956, elections that would probably have been won by the Communists. In an ironic and troubling twist for Pearson, Canada, by virtue of its membership on the ICSC, was placed in a position whereby it might have to actually help install and legitimize a Communist regime in South Vietnam by upholding democratic freedoms. This was a nightmare scenario for a Canadian government that shared the same fears as the United States about the Communists winning a legitimate electoral victory, and the "domino theory" found as many proponents in Ottawa as it did in Washington.[52] The ambitious and ruthless President of South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, also recognized the very real potential for a communist victory in any free elections held in 1956, and therefore set out to stall, if not destroy this possibility by again stating that, "the Government [of South Vietnam] does not consider itself bound in any way by the Geneva Agreements, of which it was not a signatory."[53] He underlined his refusal to abide by the Geneva Accords by encouraging protests and violence *against* ICSC members, especially in Saigon, South Vietnam's capitol city.[54] American President Dwight Eisenhower tacitly supported Diem's position, and as a result, Pearson found himself trapped between his desire to have an effective ICSC in Vietnam, and his need to support the West's policy of "containment." While Lett's careful juggling act throughout 1955 kept alive hopes for both ICSC effectiveness, and for eventual Western triumph in Indochina, the election issue further hastened the polarization of East and West in Vietnam.

Why was the ICSC so effective in achieving its first two goals of transfer of government authority and military disengagement, and yet so ineffective in fulfilling its mandate on refugee return and democratization? The answer lies in the ambiguity of the Geneva Accords and the ICSC's mandate and powers, and the will of the parties involved. Because all parties had truly wanted to achieve the first two objectives, they created clear, well-defined, and unambiguous political guidance in the Geneva Accords (Articles 1-16) which was easily translated at the operational level into tasks which could be achieved through the use of military means; in this case, the observers working as part of the ICSC. More importantly, both the North Vietnamese and French forces were *willing* (and perhaps even desperate) to comply with these conditions. As historian Robert Randle has pointed out:

> Demobilization, regroupment, disarmament, and withdrawal were often accomplished without adequate ISC supervision. This was due to the decision of the commanders … to comply with the procedural terms of the military cease-fire before the ISCs had established their headquarters and posted their inspection teams.[55]

In short, the ICSC was successful in these missions because the political preconditions had been properly set for their conduct, appropriate strategic guidance had been given, and appropriate military means had been employed. The essential precondition—the *political* will to withdraw—was already in place even before the ICSC came into existence. Success—the achievement of the strategic and operational goals—was therefore achievable by the limited tactical military (and diplomatic) means employed.

The same political will and strategic preconditions, however, did not exist for the implementation of the other aspects of the accord. The ICSC was given neither the political mandate (through the Accords), nor the operational capability (through its militarily insignificant "observer" force), to enforce compliance. This was deliberately done by the drafters of the Geneva Accords, because they did not want to have their freedom of action curtailed by an effective ICSC once the French had made good their exit. Again, in Robert Randle's blunt assessment:

> It is not surprising that the ISCs for Laos and Vietnam were institutional symbols of the inadequacy and incompleteness of the Geneva Conferences…. Neither the co-chairmen nor the Geneva Powers displayed any great interest in the functioning of the ISCs after the conference adjourned in July 1954…. The great powers might give lip service to the "Geneva Accords", but by 1956 it was clear, even to the Hanoi government, that they were prepared to see the ISCs drastically reduce, perhaps even cease, their operations.[56]

Success, therefore, was impossible; the ICSC's operational capability was deliberately designed by the Geneva Powers to be impotent, and therefore incapable of fully enforcing the rhetoric of the Accords.

Why did Canadian policymakers not recognize this situation, "clear" as it was to everyone else involved (less perhaps the Indians)? The answer provides some profound insight into the conduct of Canadian foreign policy. There are two key elements to the answer. First was the illusion of utility created by the delusion of hope and fear. As Holmes has himself admitted, "Canadians never walked out because they feared the vacuum that would be created … Not that the teams would have been much missed, but … (the ICSC) seemed the only thing that prevented the area from lapsing into anarchy."[57] Simply put, Canadian policymakers were too afraid to move, and too hopeful that the ICSC's presence might somehow, someway, prevent the coming anarchy. Second, as will be seen, sound military advice on the operational futility of the ICSC was never heeded; the Canadian soldiers and diplomats of the ICSC were abandoned like the "forlorn hopes" of Napoleonic warfare to the humiliating job of "supervis[ing] an armistice in a country at war."[58]

About the Author...

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Endnotes

1. John Holmes, "Key issues in Canadian Foreign Policy," *Peace, Power, and Protest*, ed. Donald Evans (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1967) p. 210.
2. C.P. Stacey argued that this deliberately ambiguous foreign policy actually began with MacKenzie King even before the Second World War, and has become one of the lasting characteristics of Canadian diplomacy; See Stacey, *Canada and the Age of Conflict*, Volume II (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), esp. p. 426.
3. The recent furor over remarks made by American Ambassador Paul Celluci are most indicative of this break; see, for example, Joseph Brean and Sheldon Alberts, "US Loses Faith In Canada," Allen Gottlieb, "Ottawa let down two nations," and J Granatstein, "The Empire Strikes Back," all in the National Post, 26 March 2003. Vol. 5, No.126,
4. See, for example, Harry Sommers, *On Strategy II* (New York: Dell, 1992), and Richard Nixon, No More Vietnams (New York: Hearst, 1984).
5. See Victor Levant, *Quiet Complicity*. (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1986), preface, and pp. 1-6. Levant claims that External Affairs (now called the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, or DFAIT,) has actually destroyed some of the more incriminating files and documents about its role in formulating Canada's Vietnam policy, and "continually frustrated [his] research, preventing access to its files." (preface). Levant resorted to finding some of the destroyed documents in personal collections, and in the U.S. State Department Archives. See also the bibliographical note at the end of this paper.
6. It is clearly beyond the scope of this paper to give an account of the Canada's foreign policy and status during this monumental period in its history. The most widely acclaimed overview is James Eayrs' five volume work *In Defence of Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, v.d.), which covers the period from the interwar years to the end of the Vietnam conflict in 1973. For a more specific treatment, see Robert Bothwell, "The Further Shore: Canada and Vietnam," *International Journal*, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Winter 2000-1) pp. 89-114.

7. For an in-depth discussion of "Middlepowermanship", see *Issues in Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite?* Ed. J.L. Granatstein (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1969).
8. The ICSC was also variously known as the ICC (International Control Commission) or the ISC (International Supervision Commission). For clarity, this paper will use the "ICSC" abbreviation.
9. The complete text of the Final Agreements of The Geneva Conference on Indo-China is included as Appendix 1 to Ramesh Thakur, *Peacekeeping In Vietnam*. (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1984) pp. 287-309.
10. The best studies of how Canada came to be named to the ICSC are James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada, Volume 5—Indochina: Roots of Complicity*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983) pp. 1-70, and Douglas Ross, I*n the Interests of Peace: Canada and Vietnam, 1954-1973* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), pp. 67-92.
11. Holmes's impact upon External Affairs and Canadian Foreign policy in general is examined in *An Acceptance of Paradox: Essays in honour of John W. Holmes* ed. Kim Richard Nossal (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1982); see especially Denis Stairs essay, "The Pedagogics of John W. Holmes," pp. 3-16.
12. John Holmes, "Geneva: 1954," *International Journal*, XXII (Summer 1967) pp.469-483, reprinted in *Canadian Foreign Policy since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite* ed. J.L. Granatstein (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1969) pp. 69-76.
13. Holmes, "Geneva," p. 70.
14. Quoted in Eayrs, p. 49.
15. See Thakur, pp. 1-30; Boothwell, p. 97, Ross, pp. 4-92; and Eayrs, pp. 55-56.
16. See Robert Randle, *Geneva, 1954: The Settlement of the Indochinese War* (Princeton: Princeton University, 1969) pp. 389-427, and pp 525-568.
17. Ross, pp. 85-86. Ross bases much of his argument on Randle's work; see note above.
18. Holmes, "Geneva," p.70.
19. Holmes, "Geneva," p. 70.
20. Ross, p. 92.
21. For a good discussion on this "pragmatic discretion," see John Holmes, *The Better Part of Valour: Essays on Canadian Diplomacy* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970).
22. Press Release by the Department of External Affairs, quoted by Eayrs, p. 57.
23. John Holmes, "Canada and the Vietnam War" in *Canadian Foreign Policy: Historical Readings*, ed. J. L. Granatstein (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1993) p. 244.
24. It should be noted that the Geneva agreements established, in effect, three ICSC's, for Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam respectively. I have limited my discussion in this paper to ICSC Vietnam, although Canadians played a crucial role in all three Commissions. For more information on ICSC Cambodia and ICSC Laos, see Randle, pp. 482-523; Eayrs, pp. 71-124, and Granatstein, "Canada: Peacekeeper, Indochina," *Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response*. (Lindsay, Ont.: Canadian Institute for International Affairs, 1968) pp. 109-111.
25. See Ross, pp. 82-92; Randle, pp.267-288; Thakur, pp. 58-63; and Fred Gaffen, *In the Eye of the Storm: A History of Canadian Peacekeeping*. (Toronto: Deneau and Wayne, 1987) pp. 189-192.
26. See Thakur, p. 63.
27. Eayrs, pp. 151-171, or Thakur, p. 69.
28. Granatstein, "Canada: Peacekeeping, Indochina," p. 110.
29. See Eayrs, p. 60.
30. Evidence for this is contained in the self-published memoirs of Brigadier H. E. Chubb, Senior Canadian Military Advisor to ICSC Vietnam, September 1966 - September 1967, eloquently titled *Chubb's Folly—There be Dragons Here*. (Saigon: Unknown, 1967). See Volume 1, pp. 2- 92, and Volume 2, pp. 2–101; see also Bothwell, p. 98.
31. The ICSC predates the Suez Crisis and UNEF by two years (1954 vs. 1956), and it may therefore be argued that this was the genesis of "peacekeeping"; see, for instance, Holmes, "Geneva," p. 71.
32. Holmes, "Geneva," pp. 70-71.
33. See Ross, pp. 106-107.
34. J Granatstein, "Peacekeeping: Did Canada Make A Difference? And What difference Did Peacekeeping make to Canada? in *Making A Difference? Canada's Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order*, eds. John English and Norman Hillmer. (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1992) p.226.
35. Holmes, "Geneva," p. 70.
36. See Eayrs, p. 61, for both these quotes. It may prove redundant to remark on the irony that when External needed a good man to do a tough job, it had to look outside its own organization, even in its heyday of the 1950s.
37. Letter from L. B. Pearson to Sherwood Lett, 22 August, 1954, National Archives of Canada Record Group (RG) 25 (Dept of External Affairs files), 4629 / 50052-A-40(1).
38. Eayrs, p. 67.
39. For a more detailed discussion of the Letter of Instruction, see Eayrs, p. 67; Ross takes a similar if more sympathetic view, Ross, p. 100. For another view, see Levant, p. 118-119.
40. Ross, p. 100.
41. Eayrs, p. 207.
42. Quoted in Levant, p. 177.
43. Charles Taylor, *Snow Job: Canada, the United States and Vietnam [1954 to 1973].* (Toronto: Anansi, 1974) p. 10.
44. See Ross, pp. 111-144; Eayrs, p. 132.
45. This allegation has been the subject of much discussion, with some writers claiming that the ICSC, especially the Canadians were at fault, an allegation that seems not to be wholly supported by the facts. For further information, see

Eayrs, pp. 133-185, and Thakur, pp. 65-73.
46. Thakur, p. 69.
47. Bothwell, p. 101.
48. Mieczyslaw Maneli, legal advisor to the Polish delegation, quoted in Levant, p.117. See also Eayrs, pp. 207-213.
49. Thakur, p. 72.
50. Eayrs, p. 141.
51. Eayrs, pp. 170-171; Ross, pp. 92-148.
52. The election dilemma is discussed in detail by Ross, pp. 144-202. See also Levant, pp. 128-130; Eayrs, pp 172-178; and Taylor, pp. 11-12.
53. Quoted in Levant, p. 129. For a discussion on the legal basis for Saigon's renunciation, see Randle, pp. 455-480 and pp. 533–568; and Thakur, p. 142.
54. See Levant, p. 129.
55. Randle, p. 564.
56. Randle, p. 564-565.
57. John Holmes, *The Better Part of Valour—Essays on Canadian Diplomacy* (Toronto: McClelland Stewart, 1970) 226.
58. A "Forlorn Hope" was an element chosen for a difficult and highly dangerous job with small chance of success that brought either death or glory e.g. storming a fortress wall. The last phrase is a description by John Holmes, *Better Part of Valour*, p.226.

Source: Canada. Dept. of National Defence / Library and Archives Canada / PA-146523

Canadian members of the International Commission's truce team in Indo-China discussing the inspection of an ammunition ship

NOTE TO FILE—COALITION INTEROPERABILITY: ABCA'S NEW FOCUS

General Richard A. Cody, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and Lieutenant-Colonel (ret'd) Robert L. Maginnis, U.S. Army

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The U.S. Army is simultaneously transforming and fighting the Global War on Terrorism alongside foreign partners who are also transforming and aggressively working to advance battlefield interoperability. One of the best venues for that important work is the re-energized 60-year-old umbrella organization known as ABCA—the American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies' Standardization Program—recently in 2006 adding New Zealand as a member. Although not a formal alliance, ABCA has become an interoperability standard-bearer focused on the challenges associated with our current operating environment.

Professional Army leaders need to understand ABCA, its rich history, its transformation, and what it is doing to enhance global coalition readiness.



History

ABCA evolved from a World War II coalition, a security relationship between the United States and her Anglo-Saxon allies based on a common culture, historical experience, and language.[1] The ABCA Armies' Standardization Program was seeded in 1946 when British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery recommended to U.S. Army General Dwight D. Eisenhower that America, Britain, and Canada should "cooperate closely in all defense matters." Added Montgomery, "Discussions should deal not only with standardization, but should cover the whole field of cooperation and combined action in the event of war."[2] Later that year, the British Government concluded that these three countries should consider the feasibility of standardizing the weapons, tactics, and training of their armed forces.[3]

The 1947 "Plan to Effect Standardization" agreement led to ABCA's standardization program among the American, British, and Canadian armies. Its aim was to remove doctrinal and material obstacles to complete cooperation.[4]

The 1954 and 1964 Basic Standardization Agreements replaced the 1947 Plan. The 1964 Agreement remains in effect today; however, a new memorandum of understanding to improve cooperation and program effectiveness is expected to be finalized by 2007.

The 1964 Agreement states that the program's aim is to "ensure the fullest cooperation and collaboration" and "to achieve the highest possible degree of interoperability among the signatory armies through material and non-material standardization."[5]

Courtesy of author

Canadian and American soldiers attend a joint briefing.

Not surprisingly, given the peculiar nature of multinational arrangements, standardization and interoperability have been hit-and-miss among the ABCA armies. Historically, the program's success was measured by the production of cold war-era tactical standards and pamphlets and hosted seminars or exercises.

ABCA Transforms

In June 2002, the ABCA Executive Council—composed of four-star-level generals—concluded that the new conditions and circumstances of our rapidly changing strategic and operational environment had outstripped the program's culture, structure, procedures, and practices. It was time to revitalize the organization and respond to new global security requirements.

A special working party identified four distinct phases of work: strategic assessment; vision, mission, and enduring goals; prioritization of efforts; and business practices. The group examined the international security environment and concluded that "the extensive range of threats requires ABCA armies to address those areas where it can achieve significant advances in interoperability . . . rather than allocating scarce resources to an expansive range of areas that may only achieve minimal outcomes."[6]

Focusing the program's limited resources on a smaller universe of advances in interoperability gave direction to the team's work on a new vision, mission, and goals. The new vision statement is much shorter than the old one. It focuses like a laser on the effective integration of the armies' capabilities in a joint environment. The new mission seeks to optimize interoperability through collaboration and standardization. The goals are ambitious: relevance and responsiveness; standardization, integration and interoperability; mutual understanding; sharing knowledge; and efficiency and effectiveness.

ABCA's new goal to be relevant and responsive was tested in late 2002, when the organization became an integral and critical part of coalition war planning. ABCA assembled a cadre of urban operations experts to draft coalition procedures before the coalition's armies entered combat in Iraq. These procedures became a chapter in ABCA's Coalition Operations Handbook.[7] The handbook has proven to be a valuable document. In addition to urban operations, it addresses such topics as forming effective coalitions, logistics, communications, and full-spectrum operations. In 2004, NATO used the handbook as the base document to produce the NATO Handbook for Coalition Operations.[8] The U.S. Army's Battle Command Training Program has used the ABCA handbook for mission-rehearsal exercises to prepare units for deployments to Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

The special working party took its cue from the narrowed mission and vision to define the program's new priority efforts as well. The new priorities include the contemporary operating environment and emerging threats, transformation and modernization, joint interagency multinational operations, capability integration, knowledge exploitation, and ABCA products. These priorities support the U.S. Army's

transformation strategy, focus on the war on terrorism, and recognize that closing capability gaps among coalition members will provide armies needed punch.

During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), ABCA partners caught a glimpse of just how challenging capability gaps could be. British and American forces were interoperable to some extent because of shared procedural measures, the use of liaison officers, and doctrinal compatibility, but they didn't come close to satisfying U.S. Joint Regulations requirements for interoperability.

ABCA's most visible program changes were in its business practices: prioritizing resources across identified interoperability gaps, particularly for combat operating systems. A futures concepts capability group worked with member armies to identify gaps. Other capability groups, formed around battlefield operating systems—Command, Sense, Act, Shield and Sustain—produced solutions to close those gaps.

ABCA officers worked closely with forward-thinking transformers from the U.S. Army Transformation Campaign Plan's Objective Force Task Force to brainstorm and exchange ideas from the embryonic concept development stage through experimentation, doctrine, and equipment fielding stages. This was a significant effort that enhanced interoperability to depths and degrees never seen before.

In 2003, ABCA leaders reviewed the results of the year-long program assessment and approved a series of radical changes focused on closing interoperability gaps among the member armies.

More ABCA Contributions

Today, the revitalized ABCA is active on many important fronts. The new program's first annual meeting took place in July 2004 at the [U.S.] National Defense University.

Courtesy of author

Americans and Australians on a joint training exercise.

Annual meetings have been guided by strategic guidance issued by the Executive Council, which stands-up project teams to tackle tough, combat-relevant coalition interoperability challenges. These teams are closely supervised by capability groups of subject-matter experts from the member armies.

ABCA's 2006 Strategic Guidance focuses on a range of critical stability operations tasks with an emphasis on the production of reports based on recent coalition battlefield lessons. Member armies take these reports to their appropriate commands for inclusion in doctrine, training, and standing operating procedures.

In April 2006, ABCA's National Directors (one-star-level leaders from each member army) concluded that ABCA can no longer limit its valuable interoperability work to its five member nations. They directed the capability group leaders (of the Command, Sense, Act, Shield, and Sustain domains) to produce battlefield appropriate, universally applicable, interoperability solutions that apply to all potential coalition partners and include the wide variety of missions required for the long war on terror.

ABCA's new way of doing business led to the creation of a Coalition Lessons Analysis Workshop (CLAW) to gather, collate, and analyze observations from current operations and exercises, and to produce an annual report to inform the program directors and to support interoperability gap analyses. Additionally, ABCA's CLAW seeks to identify best practices and then pass them to the nations to complement other findings. These products, which are closely monitored by the Department of the Army and the Training and Doctrine Command's Center for Army Lessons Learned, play a critical role for the revitalized program by validating its necessity.

To help prepare America's leaders for the ongoing coalition battlefield, the U.S. Army is working hard to incorporate ABCA products into its doctrine and to push ABCA products into its curricula and unit standing operating procedures (SOP). Indeed, ABCA has already had an impact:

- As aforementioned, the U.S. Battle Command Training Program is using ABCA's Coalition Operations Handbook for mission-rehearsal exercises.

- U.S. Army Field Manual 3-16, *The Army in Multinational Operations*, acknowledges that "much of the information in this manual is based on the ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook."

- The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College uses the handbook as part of its elective course curricula.

ABCA is very much a joint forces player. For years, the U.S. Marines have participated in ABCA meetings, but in 2004 the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps became an official member of the Executive Council, and now Marine experts are active within ABCA capability groups.

Finally, ABCA hosts a biennial exercise, with each army sharing the responsibility in turn. In the past, the purpose of the exercise was to validate ABCA standardization agreements, to identify areas for future standardization efforts, and to facilitate information exchange. In recognition of the new focus on interoperability and realistic operations, the program's National Directors are considering designing an ABCA exercise hosted by the U.S. Army at one of the Combat Training Centers. Using stressful combined arms training that approximates actual combat and reflects realistic future coalition scenarios, this ABCA-CTC "boots on the ground" event will look closely at interoperability.

Prior to the war on terrorism, ABCA exercises were especially helpful in preparing for real operations. For example, the 1998 ABCA exercise RAINBOW SERPENT '98 was a dress rehearsal for a later, actual operation in East Timor, Indonesia. A brigade-level command post exercise involving an Australian deployable joint-force headquarters, RAINBOW SERPENT focused on peace support operations and operations other than war in a fictitious Pacific island. It resolved many interoperability issues. When the East Timor operation became a reality in 1999, the ABCA armies quickly responded. The United States provided logistic and intelligence support, and Australia, augmented by a New Zealand battalion, a Canadian company, and a British battalion with a Gurkha company, provided the bulk of the land forces.

The Bottom Line

ABCA has come a long way from 1946 when Field Marshal Montgomery and General Eisenhower created the program. Today, a revitalized ABCA addresses the post-9/11 security environment by providing relevant interoperability solutions to ensure the free world's ground forces meet their many important combat-related challenges. The U.S. Army understands the need to fight alongside our allies. It is aggressively working through programs such as ABCA to build interoperability with our best coalition partners.

Endnotes

1. After the World War II, the ABCA partners established peacetime security arrangements with the United States. Canada and the United States established the Military Cooperation Committee in 1946. Australia and New Zealand joined the United States in the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) Security Treaty in 1951. The 1954 Manila Treaty established the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), which includes these partners as well.
2. Cited in Thomas-Durell Young, "Whither Future U.S. Alliance Strategy? The ABCA Clue," *Armed Forces and Society* (Winter 1991), 282.
3. Edward C. Ezell, "Cracks in the Post-War Anglo-American Alliance: The Great Rifle Controversy, 1947-1957," *Military Affairs* (December 1974), 138-139, as cited by Thomas-Durell Young in "Supporting Future U.S. Alliance Strategy: The Anglo-Saxon, or ABCA Clue," (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1 June 1990), 7.
4. Ibid, 8. The other ABCA programs are the Air and Space Interoperability Council, the ABCA Navies Quadripartite Standardization Program, the AUSCANNZUKUS Naval Communications Organization, the Combined Exercise Agreement, the Combined Communications Electronics Board, and the Technical Cooperation Committee.
5. ABCA, "Basic Standardization Agreement among the Armies of United States-United Kingdom-Canada-Australia," 1 October 1964.
6. Special Working Group Program Review, "A Strategic Assessment of the Security Environment," 2 May 2003, C-21.
7. *ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook*, The American-British-Canadian-Australian Armies Program Primary Standardization Office (Arlington, VA).
8. *NATO Handbook for Coalition Operations*, no other information given.

— BOOK REVIEWS —

"SPOOKS AND SOF IN AFGHANISTAN: THREE REVIEWS"

FIRST IN: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF HOW THE CIA SPEARHEADED THE WAR ON TERROR IN AFGHANISTAN

Gary Shroen. Presidio Press: 2005.

JAWBREAKER: THE ATTACK ON BIN LADEN AND AL QAEDA: A PERSONAL ACCOUNT BY THE CIA'S KEY FIELD COMMANDER

Gary Berntsen (with Ralph Pezzullo). Crown Publishers: 2005.

HUNTING AL QAEDA: A TAKE-NO-PRISONERS ACCOUNT OF TERROR, ADVENTURE, AND DISILLUSIONMENT

Anonymous. Zenith Press: 2005.

Reviewed by Dr. Sean M. Maloney







The secretive world of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Special Operations Forces (SOF) has produced three key memoirs that should be read by anyone seeking insight into the first two years of war in Afghanistan, particularly by members of Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM) and the Canadian intelligence community (hopefully the members of Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) know all this already). In addition to recounting the atmospherics and events on the ground from several personal perspectives, the sum of these works is a superb starting point for a lessons learned process that has applicability to Canadian operations in the region.

Gary Shroen's *First In* handles the first phases of CIA covert operations in support of the Northern Alliance in the fall of 2001. Hampered to a certain extent by CIA censors who would not let him identify such things as the type of helicopter the CIA uses in the region (modified Russian-built Mi-17's with no markings based at Kabul International Airport—seen and photographed by it seems every aviation magazine on the planet), Shroen is still able to give a credible account of what he and his team accomplished in those dark days.

The Northern Alliance Liaison Team (NALT) codenamed JAWBREAKER, was led by this on-the-verge of retirement CIA covert operator brought back by the Agency because of his specialized knowledge of the region and its personalities. The mission was to convince the Northern Alliance to work with American and coalition forces to remove the Taliban regime in northern Afghanistan and to use every means available to track down Osama bin Laden and his immediate advisors to capture or kill them. The Northern Alliance Liaison Team was made up of Special Activities Division (SAD) personnel, a CIA organization consisting of former US military personnel, many from Tier I SOF units. The introduction of SAD personnel instead of American Tier I SOF was done for a number of reasons: Tier I SOF had stringent synthetic aperture radar (SAR) requirements that could not yet be met in-theatre and actionable intelligence was really dependent on human intelligence (HUMINT) sources that could only be gained by building trust with the Afghans.

Infiltrating via Mi-17 helicopters from Tajikistan, Shroen's NALT had to "establish a solid relationship with the Northern Alliance leadership, to secure the cooperation of the Northern Alliance military forces in working in concert with the US military attacking the Taliban, and to arrange for the Panjshir Valley to serve as a base of operations for US Special Operations forces." The NALT conducted basic tasks like global positioning system (GPS) mapping of the battlespace and establishing one of the most critical components in the effort, intelligence liaison with the vast Northern Alliance intelligence system, which for the most part, was based on HUMINT. Shroen also knew from experience that, with enough money, Taliban leaders, units and even formations could be bought off, so NALT deployed cash as much as bullets and JDAMS against the enemy: "Most of the successes of the Taliban had been won not in hard fought battles but by siege and bribery, and most combat engagements had been small, short fights with few casualties." The NALT also brought signals intelligence equipment to the fight, exponentially increasing the flow of information on Taliban and Al Qaeda movements.

First In not only depicts Shroen's coalition-building efforts with the diverse Northern Alliance leadership, which was still in shock after the death of Ahmad Shah Massoud right before the 9/11 attacks, but also between American organizations. The introduction of uniformed US SOF posed additional challenges. How exactly, were NALT and US SOF supposed to coordinate after NALT had facilitated US SOF entry into the theatre? Could NALT pass intelligence derived from Northern Alliance sources to US SOF for targeting? Could NALT personnel working alongside Afghan forces designate targets for American aircraft with Special Operations Forces (SOFLAM) systems or not (the CIA brought their own anyway)? Tier II US SOF such as the US Army Special Forces, were structured to train and support a guerilla force, but the Northern Alliance was a conventional army. And what about Tier I US SOF, such as the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) units? Who handled its targeting? Should US SOF wear uniforms or not?

Shroen and his counterparts established working relationships in the field that addressed these problems. For example, US SOF handled the target designation mission, while JAWBREAKER sub-teams provided intelligence derived from local sources. Both worked together on several Northern Alliance fronts to assist local commanders—efforts which were ultimately successful at breaking the back of Taliban military resistance in northern Afghanistan. Notably, Schroen is critical of those who believe that American air power alone convinced the Taliban to quit the field.

A lack of understanding by those with bureaucratic and organizational agendas back in the United States started to interfere with NALT's mission as Shroen handed over to Gary Berntsen, his successor.

Berntsen (known as “Gary II” in *First In*)’s *Jawbreaker* pre-dates and overlaps with the events of *First In* but moves the CIA story further into early 2002. Edited by a CIA censor, the blacked out bits do not necessarily detract from the story Gary II tells. Indeed, the author has helpfully annotated some bits with general details about what was removed. A picture of a Mi-17 graces the cover.

Berntsen’s account takes us from his experiences dealing with Al Qaeda attacks in Africa in 1998, to his leadership of JAWBREAKER in 2001, when he replaced Gary Schroen. Berntsen was confronted with several additional problems. These included the need to reign in Northern Alliance commanders who wanted to get into Kabul as quickly as possible; the requirement to support a JSOC unit tasked with a hostage rescue mission; to gather actionable intelligence from captured Al Qaeda members so that other 9/11-type operations that were in planning stages, could not be mounted; and to ensure that Northern Alliance commanders did not turn on each other and precipitate a repeat of the 1993-96 civil war.

Berntsen is more outspoken than Shroen. His particular pet peeve is the inability of the bureaucratic machine to respond to time-sensitive intelligence. For example: JAWBREAKER had enough verifiable information that Osama bin Laden was extricating himself from Tora Bora, where a combined JAWBREAKER-US SOF team was wreaking havoc on Al Qaeda forces. Calling Central Command (CENTCOM), Berntsen explained that if a US Ranger battalion could be inserted, they could get the Al Qaeda leadership. Delays, civilian versus military interaction and command and control issues prevented the mission from taking place. In another stunning section, Berntsen describes a conversation with a Major General, the JSOC commander, who refused to even look at an agreed-to concept of operations for JAWBREAKER and US SOF: “If things go badly in Tora Bora, he won’t have his fingerprints on it. If they go well, they’ll have a party for him in the Pentagon.” Berntsen and other US Special Forces commanders were forced to rely on informal intelligence-sharing methods to avoid the scrutiny of the Washington and Tampa-based bureaucrats.

Two US Special Forces members wrote *Hunting al Qaeda* based on their team’s experiences in Afghanistan throughout 2002. *Hunting al Qaeda* follows the adventures and misadventures of BEAST 85, a reserve US Special Forces team deployed as part of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM’s Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF). The freewheeling spirit of CIA operations as portrayed by Schroen and Berntsen comes to a shuddering halt as BEAST 85 got caught in the bureaucratic quagmire of a US Army that was trying to “conventionalize” the war in Afghanistan.

Hunting al Qaeda moves the action from the north in 2001 to Kandahar and surrounding provinces in 2002. Before getting into the fight, BEAST 85 had to manoeuvre through a US Army bureaucracy that was prejudiced against reserve personnel, even though they were Special Forces. Initially, BEAST 85 was supposed to deploy to Somalia or the Sudan, but after much to-ing and fro-ing, they wound up in Afghanistan. Then, it was unclear how they would be employed: at first, it looked like the team would take over a forward operating base in the north, but then the CIA needed a training team to build special bin Laden hunting units that were made up of motivated Afghans. When this task fell through, BEAST 85 was employed in a firebase in the south. The task was to react to missions demanded from higher headquarters, to develop local intelligence and act on it as necessary.

In situations reminiscent of those faced by Gary Berntsen’s team in *Jawbreaker*, BEAST 85 developed intelligence on several Taliban high value targets, including Mullah Omar, but higher headquarters refused to act on it in a timely fashion. On another

occasion, signal intelligence (SIGINT) discovered on-going conversations from the Bin Laden party on a cell phone but there was no "kinetic" response from JSOC.

Frustrated with having to file "haircut profiles" and watch paint dry, BEAST 85 developed its own intelligence in its operating area. Higher headquarters insisted that any contingency operation be approved: on average a concept of operations (CONOP) took 24 hours to approve—in effect, permitting the target to get away while resources were "deconflicted." Working alongside Afghan units of questionable reliability was another hazard, as was the superb Taliban spotter network in the south. Consequently, BEAST 85 had to deceive its commanders and allies by pretending to be conducting route reconnaissance missions, while they were in fact conducting direct action missions. BEAST 85 team leaders also noted that the Tier I JSOC unit did not catch a single high-value target during the time they were deployed. Using informal and unauthorized methods, BEAST 85 snared three, including Mullah Osmani. Subsequently, a military police investigation was conducted to determine where BEAST 85 was getting its information, in part because staff officers in US CENTCOM weren't getting enough glory.

In terms of physical production, I would especially commend the staff at Zenith Books for their creative approach to *Hunting al Qaeda*. Most publishers eschew maps and photographs in order to save money, but Zenith chose to use colour photos (which are useful to get a sense of the terrain and operating environment). More importantly, the book jacket, when unfolded, has a 1:100 000 map of the BEAST 85 operating area printed on it, making following the operations much easier. Other publishers need to understand that military history needs maps; they can learn from the Zenith approach. Crown did not scrimp either: terrain sketches and colour photos also added to understanding the trials and travails of *Jawbreaker*.

Because we lack public access to lessons learned information on American covert and special operations, I would recommend all three works as a good starting point. They are more useful than the plethora of exploitative journalistic works on SOF that are more readily available in Chapters or Indigo bookstores. It is a truism that personal opinion permeates all three books, but this can be more a strength than a weakness when it is identified and taken into account. In any case, there will be no documented historical-analytical work on these operations available to the reading public for decades. Given the close working relationship that exists between CANSOF and its American counterparts, I would not be surprised to discover that similar problems have emerged in the hills and valleys of Afghanistan for Canadian soldiers.

DON'T GIVE UP THE SHIP! MYTHS OF THE WAR OF 1812

Hickey, Donald R., Robin Brass Studio: Toronto 2006. 464 pgs. $39.95

Reviewed by Captain Zane Piekenbrock

Canada and the United States have not always maintained a close relationship. Over the course of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the United States fought two wars against the British forces in North America. The first was the American Revolutionary War and the second, the War of 1812, is the subject of this book. In *Don't Give Up the Ship! Myths of the War of 1812*, Donald R. Hickey focuses on the "mythology of war" and addresses some of the misconceptions surrounding the war of 1812. While the book is scholarly in nature, it is also entertaining and readable, accessible to both the scholar and recreational reader. *Don't Give Up the Ship! Myths*



of the War of 1812 is a collection of facts and information that addresses widely held "misconceptions and myths" about the War of 1812—a compendium to "set the record straight." This book is about questions, more than finding answers. This book finds the truth if it is available. The shrouds of time that tend to obscure and obfuscate the truth are ripped aside as Donald R. Hickey presents research and fact finding in *Don't Give Up the Ship! Myths of the War of 1812*.

Don't Give up the Ship! is appointed with many maps and illustrations, along with paintings and drawings from the period. These enhancements help to give the book a decidedly non-academic feel but do not detract from its content. In addition, the maps and illustrations assist in the thematic organization of the book, which is divided into six chapters: The Causes of the War; Battles and Campaigns; The Maritime War; Soldiers, Sailors and Civilians; The Mechanics of Waging War; and The End of the War. These are all large categories that allow Hickey significant leeway in his choice of facts to include in each chapter.

As well as the six chapters, Hickey has included a chronology of the war that "is designed to stand alone and serve as a reference tool." The chronology is very detailed and includes previously unpublished information from War of 1812 sources. The chronology is very detailed and is well worth reviewing. Also included is a series of appendices. Appendices A and B contain interesting histories of two songs of the period. Appendix C describes shipwrecks and rebuilt ships of the time, while Appendix D investigates the name of the war, its origin and when the phrase "War of 1812" first entered common use. These additions add value to the book and further the understanding of a war that took place 194 years ago.

A leading authority on the War of 1812, Donald R. Hickey has published many articles and books including the award winning book *The War of 1812: A forgotten Conflict* (1989). A Professor of History at Wayne State College in Nebraska, Hickey holds a PhD from the University of Illinois. He served as the John F. Morrison Professor of Military History at the United States Army Command and General Staff College in 1991-92, and as Visiting Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College in 1995-96.

Donald E. Graves, who contributed the *Forward*, describes this book as " a book that not only sheds much-needed light on its subject but which will serve as a guide for those who wish to write, study or read about the war." With the 200th anniversary of this conflict approaching, Donald R. Hickey has written a timely book that is accessible and appealing to an audience of scholars and general readers alike. The facts and information presented are a wonderful expansion in to our understanding of the War of 1812. This book is a worthwhile addition to bookshelves on both sides of the 49th parallel.

PRISONERS OF THE HOME FRONT: GERMAN POWS AND "ENEMY ALIENS" IN SOUTHERN QUEBEC, 1940–46

AUGER, Martin F., Vancouver, UBC Press, 2005, 228 pages. $29.95 CAN

Review by Mr. Charles Létourneau



The issue of the labour and re-education camps set up during World War II has been widely addressed over the last sixty years, but few works offer a strictly Canadian point of view, and even fewer focus on Quebec. Thus, Martin F. Auger's work is most welcome. He describes the living conditions to which prisoners, mostly Germans and Italians, were subjected for several years, and explains the various reasons that drove Canadian authorities to set up such labour camps.

Auger's work focuses on camps located in Quebec on the South Shore of the St. Lawrence River from 1939 to 1946, in Farnham, Grande Ligne, Île-aux-Noix, Sherbrooke and Sorel. Though conditions were difficult during the camps' first few years, the author agrees that the situation quickly improved to the point of exceeding Geneva Convention requirements concerning treatment of prisoners of war. Initial failures are likely explained mainly by lack of time and very high demand for space and personnel.

The book also addresses the topic of prisoners' daily lives. Auger believes that although living conditions were superior to those in similar institutions in other countries, some detainees nonetheless suffered from negative psychological effects of long-term captivity. In order to prevent such effects from having repercussions on the security of the camp and the safety of neighbouring civilian populations, government authorities devised plans of action aimed at keeping prisoners occupied, including offering them a series of accessible recreational activities, paid work—in the form of money to pay for certain luxuries—or voluntary free education. In addition to helping prevent rebellions and attempted escapes, these tactics also initiated detainees to Canadian democratic practices. Despite the fact that it is nearly impossible to quantify the success of such practices, Auger believes that they had beneficial effects on detainees' morale as well as their ideological direction. "During this period, Nazism prevailed in the camps of southern Quebec and violence was frequent. (…) By using lectures and seminars, literature, films and radio broadcasts as re-educational tools, Canadian officials were indeed able to open the minds of prisoners towards democratic ideals."[1]

In hindsight, Martin Auger considers that prisoner of war camps in Canada were successful on all levels and that they contributed to making the country an internationally respected player. The prevailing living conditions were certainly an important factor. A number of former detainees decided to return to Canada afterwards and became citizens, thereby demonstrating that their treatment was not only adequate, but much better than average. Although it may seem questionable to compare Canadian labour camps with those located in Germany, Italy or Japan, it is certainly relevant to compare them with those on Allied soil.

In short, Auger's work is indispensable for anyone interested in Canada's national war effort during the Second World War.

Note

1. Martin F. Auger, p. 146.

WAR AND SOCIETY IN POST-CONFEDERATION CANADA

By Jeffrey A. Keshen and Serge Marc Durflinger (Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2007), 412 pages, $45.95, ISBN 0-17-640811-8

Reviewed by Dr. Aaron P. Plamondon



War and Society is a strong collection of scholarship on Canadian social-military history compiled by Serge Durflinger and Jeffrey Keshen. Serge Durlflinger is an Assistant Professor in the Department of History at the University of Ottawa, specializing in the study of war and Canadian society. He holds a doctorate from McGill University and served as a historian at the Canadian War Museum from 1998 to 2003. Dr. Jeffery Keshen is also a professor at the University of Ottawa where he specializes in 20th century Canadian political and military history. He is well known for his work on Canadian social history during the Second World War.

As with any review of a collection of articles and documents, the opinions and writing style of the editors is not the focus; however, Durflinger's and Keshen's selection clearly demonstrates their acumen in the field. *War and Society in Post-Confederation Canada* is not simply an anthology providing a wide range of perspectives on a particular topic. The scope of the book is broad and contains material from much of the prominent historical literature on everything from Louis Riel to the conflicts in the Balkans. Sources include primary works from government committees, Privy Council records, House of Commons Debates, and senior Canadian politicians. In order to enhance the reader's understanding of how war has affected Canadian society in the post-Confederation era, Durflinger and Keshen have also included the research and conclusions of some of Canada's preeminent historians. The editors have assembled and abridged classic works of Canadian social-military history that are to be found on any PhD student's composite reading list. The editors have clearly spent much time and focus on reducing the larger studies into their essential form. The abridged articles include such acclaimed works as: George Blackburn's, *The Guns of Normandy*; Terry Copp's and Bill McAndrew's *Battle Exhaustion*; and David Bercuson's *Significant Incident*, on Canada's involvement in Somalia. More contemporary works are also present to help round out the historiography. Each separate article is fully footnoted and is replete with listings of research from our National Archives. The result is an exceptional synthesis of professional opinion on how war has shaped us as a nation. It is easily accessible either in part or as a whole.

The readings are grouped around themes, or as the authors call them, modules, that "convey some measure of war's often transformative effect on Canada and Canadians." Each module begins with an introduction that provides historical context and an additional bibliography for further study. Of particular importance is the inclusion of some of the classic debates in Canadian history. One notable example is Louis Riel and the 1885 Northwest Campaign. The articles that were selected cover the competing views on whether Riel was a hero or a traitor, the nature of French Canadian alienation, and whether the military campaign was a success or not. Racial and ethnic prejudice is

also covered through the use of contrasting Liberal and Conservative newspapers. Other controversies include the Canadian participation in the strategic bombing campaign in Germany during the Second World War, the 1970 October Crisis, and what the term "Peacekeeping" has meant in Canada. The editors claim that they wanted to avoid the "well-trodden ground and over-exposed areas" of conscription during both world wars and the wartime evacuation of Japanese-Canadians. Although the 1885 Rebellion is hardly an untouched area in the historiography, and modules included present the popular topics of the Vimy and Normandy campaigns, the editors address this apparent contradiction later in the book, rightly claiming that the focus is on "lesser-known" dimensions of these topics, such as Canadian Radio overseas within the framework of the Normandy Campaign.

The editors readily acknowledge that war has had many lasting effects on Canada's politics, society, economy, and industrial and technological development. But the overall theme of the book is that war is fundamentally about people and it alters the human experience. The editors wisely conclude that: "studying the human face of war—in all its horror, confusion, and perhaps, necessity—is a critical element in understanding Canada's social-military past."

Although *War and Society* is not meant to break new ground, it will be a valuable aid to any university reading course. It will also provide great supplementary material for more introductory courses and facilitate learning and discussion on the many topics covered. The book's weakness is that it will never replace the knowledge that would be gained by reading its sources in their complete forms. But these are readily available elsewhere for those who interested or required to digest them fully. Any Canadian still unclear about the profound ways that war has affected the nation would be well served to pick up this book.

THE OPERATIONAL ART: CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES CONTEXT AND CONCEPTS

Edited by: Allan English, Daniel Gosselin, Howard Coombs, and Laurence M. Hickey
Published by: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005 ISBN 0-662-40997-3 Paperback, 380 pages

Reviewed by Mr. Vincent J. Curtis

The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives, Context, and Concepts is a compilation of essays on operational art written by senior Canadian officers, both active and retired. The book is divided into two sections: the first contains essays on the theme of the operational art in the Canadian context; the second, essays on Canadian operational art concepts. The first section is descriptive of the state of operational art, while the second is prescriptive in the sense that the essays it contains put forward ideas on the application of the operational art to the Canadian Forces and how operational art in general should develop in the future.

In the descriptive section, Allan English opens with a broad survey of the operational art beginning with basic concepts, to the origins and development of operational art in the 20th century, through the concept of maneuver, to how the future trends of fighting will affect the operational art. Other chapters cover the problem of "jointness" of operations (the integration the combat capabilities of two or more elements or services to produce decisive effects on the enemy), and how jointness pertains to operational art both in Canada and the United States. A lot of effort is spent on defining operational art within the context of prior understanding of traditional interpretations of Clausewitz, and on relating the operational art to achieving national aims, Canadian national aims in

particular but also national aims in the general case. Brigadier General J.P.Y.D. Gosselin writes a perceptive essay tracing the history of CF unification and relating it to the problem of jointness in CF operations at the present time.

In the prescriptive section, three essays are concerned with lack of jointness in CF operations. They shape the debate about jointness and the operational art as it relates to CF command structure and staff training for overseas contingency operations. The problem in the CF is that sea, land, and air elements each have their own ideas on the operational application of their capabilities, and on the proper role their element plays when operating as contributor to a NATO or coalition mission. Because of these differing conceptions, the CF itself is a long way from operating as a truly unified force overseas, but only a little further away than the three US services are at present. Because we have US doctrine as an example to work from, the CF does not have to reinvent the wheel; it only has to put in the intellectual effort and apply the necessary will to adapt US concepts to the Canadian context. A little money from the government to acquire the necessary equipment for joint operations is also a requirement.

The remaining three essays in Part II are concerned with relating the operational art to CF land operations, or with its future development in general. Because the operational art relates to the campaigning of corps sized forces, there is no likelihood short of another major land war that the CF will be called upon to conduct operations of that scale in the foreseeable future. So why should the CF fuss about the operational art? The CF can satisfy the strategic needs of Canada at the tactical level without having to be concerned about the "operational art", that thing in the middle between strategy and tactics. The contribution of a battle group or brigade group, a few air squadrons, or a couple of ships to a coalition effort satisfy all that can be asked of Canada by our allies, does it not? The conclusion seems to be that if Canada, as a middle power, expects to play a role commensurate with its intellectual capabilities and its pride, the CF needs to school itself in the operational art and in joint operations so that its senior officers are able to take part at a high command level in a NATO or coalition major operation. CF officers working at the operational level would be an example of Canada indeed "punching above its weight." That is also why CF officers should put forward their own contribution to the on-going discussion of jointness and the operational art, as is done in Part II.

Many famous writers have often spiced up their work with sex and violence as a means of sustaining the reader's interest. As a book concerned with the scientific application of primordial violence, *Perspectives* is in need of a lot more sex. This book is dry, dry, dry. The authors all do a commendable job in writing on their topics, but *Perspectives* is practically devoid of concrete examples of "operational art." It is like Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo, and Vincent van Gogh writing essays on the theory of painting without relating how their theories applied to creating the Mona Lisa, the Sistine Chapel, and "Sunflowers." In contrast, when Moltke the Elder used the term "operational objective" he was not referring to some broad, abstract conception, he meant the destruction of the French Army.

Perspectives reveals a major weakness in the handling of the operational art in a purely abstract way. Discussions on pure abstractions require skill in the arts of dialects and philosophy, and doctrine writers are usually unschooled in these arts. The most elementary mistakes abound. The most common dialectical mistakes are the use of the word to define itself and the failure to employ the proper construct in formulating a definition. For example, "operational art" is defined in the manual *Canadian Forces Operations* as "the skill of translating strategic direction into operational and tactical action". This definition is structurally correct, but it uses the word operational to define operational. It also asserts that art is a skill, when usually art is thought to be the product of skill.

The CF is not alone in its unfamiliarity with Hellenic reasoning. According to Allan English, the US joint doctrine defines the Operational Art as: "Operational Art requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate . . . Operational Art is practiced by not only JFCs but also by . . . Joint operational art looks not only at the employment of military forces . . . Joint operational art focuses on the fundamental methods . . . " A definition is an expression which predicates the essence of the thing, and contains a genus and differentia, preferably in that order. What is required, who practices it, what it looks at, and what it focuses on is irrelevant to a definition of the "operational art". The passage quoted above does not amount to a definition, though it claims to be one.

Here is a proper example of a definition: "a strategy is a plan for the attainment of an object." It follows from that definition that a military strategy is a plan for the attainment of a military object. It follows from that that military strategy should be concerned with the use of an engagement for the purpose of the war, for that which is for "the purpose of the war" is a military object, and the engagement is the means by which the military object is gained. From such a simple definition is Clausewitz's famous dictum on strategy derived. The tightness of reasoning just demonstrated is not only possible but necessary when dealing with purely abstract ideas, as the "Operational Art" is handled in current military literature.

Another weakness in the philosophical handling of abstract subject matter is the habit of creating systems of thought. System building gives rise to its own axis of evil, the components being terminology, dogmatism, and rule-following. In the hands of system builders, ordinary terms assume significance special to the system and are rightfully capitalized; terms like Synchronize, OODA loops, Network Centric Warfare, Effects Based Operations. That different systems of thought are competing dogmatisms becomes apparent when terminology changes. For example, US Army doctrine manual FM100-5 of 1982 referred to the three levels of war being the strategic level, operational level, and tactical level; and in the 1986 revision it referred to strategy, operational art, and tactics. The significance of eliminating the concept of "levels of war" is still discussed by military theorists.

The problem with rule-following arises when rule-following gets in the way of achieving the end. As related in *Perspectives*, during the 1991 Gulf War, US division commanders set the fire support coordination line (FSCL) some 80 km beyond their forward line of own troops (FLOT). The US Air Force felt obliged to let tens of thousands of Iraqi troops escape encirclement and destruction because the Iraqis used a corridor between the FSCL and the FLOT. Clausewitz could have had an episode like this in mind when he said that military genius follows no rules.

So, given the errors and dogmatisms in the intellectual discipline known as the operational art, how is it possible that its study is useful? The situation has an analogy in football. After several years experience every football coach at the college and profession level has developed his own system, his own terminology, and his own set of plays. They exist in a comprehensive playbook. But playbooks do not win football games. Talented players with the proper equipment who practice together as a team in the coach's system and who follow the game plan win football games. Because commanders and staff officers wargame practical problems together they come to understand what is supposed to happen and who is supposed to do what. Their minds are continually bent to anticipating and solving real problems together. They recognize problem areas before they arise on the battlefield. From all this working together arises a common understanding and outlook.

All this mental preparation is a real advantage when going up against an opponent who has given little or no thought to the problems with which he will be confronted after the war starts. That is the advantage in studying the operational art.

Abstract theorizing about the operational art is dry and highly unsatisfying given the weaknesses in dialectics and philosophy with which it is framed. Far better is the consideration of operational problems that could arise in concrete examples. If there is any military principle that needs to be applied to the operational art, it is the KISS principle.

CANADA AND LIBERATION OF THE NETHERLANDS, MAY 1945

By Lance Goddard (Dundurn Press: Toronto, 2005) paper, 239 pages,
ISBN 1-55002-547-3.

Reviewed by Lieutenant-Colonel Robert S. Williams, MSM, CD

Since the end of the Second World War, there has been a strong emotional relationship between Canadians and Dutch, beginning with the birth of Dutch Princess Marguarite in Ottawa when the Dutch Royal family was hosted in Canada and highlighted publicly with the annual Tulip Festival in the nation's capital, Ottawa. This book is a must for those curious as to how the link was forged and why the bond is so strong between the two geographically distant countries.

This book offers a chronological and pictorial description of the period from 1944 to 1945 in the war-torn Netherlands. The consequences of Operation MARKET GARDEN and the final liberation of the Netherlands by the 1st Canadian Army are well known in the West. Not so well known, however, is the suffering endured by the Dutch population during the 1944 Winter of Hunger, when countless thousands of innocent Dutch civilians starved to death. The photographs, many unique, offer stark proof of who suffers in wartime, and the destitute state to which many Dutch were reduced during the "Hongerwinter." Witnessing this suffering almost certainly left no doubt in the minds of the liberating Canadian soldiers as to why they were in the Netherlands. Goddard's book allows the reader an often intimate glimpse of both the happy and tragic events that our Canadian veterans and the over seven thousand soldiers and airmen who remain forever on Dutch soil were participants in or witness to.

As time marches on and the number of Canadian Army veterans of Dutch eyewitnesses to the 1944/1945 Liberation of the Netherlands "De Bevrijding" declines, first-hand information is lost. Soon, photographic records of these events with eye-witness and/or participants' anecdotal stories of the kind preserved within this book will be the only record of the human impact of war. The Germans lost the war, but not before much suffering, often against civilian populations particularly in the closing stages of the war, was inflicted upon the various peoples of Europe. The air-dropping of much needed

food supplies by refitted Allied bombers in April 1945 highlights the problems still encountered by liberating armies, once the guns go silent.

Goddard also chronicles the hope for a better future that persisted amidst all the suffering in the anecdotes and stories of the many Dutch war brides and immigrants who came to make Canada their new home. These living symbols of the bind between Canada and the Netherlands are certainly a testament to the strength of the human spirit. The many private and local monuments to the actions of individual soldiers bear mute testimony to the depth of the Dutch appreciation of Canada's actions and the lives sacrificed. In addition to describing the well known annual tending of Commonwealth graves by young Dutch school children, Goddard discusses this annual event with people who were children after the war, describing what the event has meant to them and how the sacrifices of over sixty years ago have been instilled in young minds.

This compact book commemorating the 60th anniversary of the liberation of the Netherlands is highly recommended to those interested in the personal stories of participants and eye-witness non-combatants as opposed to those looking for more of a broad-brush campaign analysis. Goddard's book also offers an excellent insight into the problems encountered by a liberating army once the fighting has stopped—lessons that apply as much today as they did in 1945.

STRUGGLE FOR A VAST FUTURE: THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

Edited by Aaron Sheehan-Dean (Osprey Publishing, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2006),
Hard Cover, 272 pages with 66 illustrations and images, $42.00 CAD,
ISBN 1-84603-011-6.

Reviewed by Mr. Geoff Hall



The American Civil War ended in 1865. Over 140 years later it is still a matter of great debate in America and has spawned numerous battlefield parks, re-enactment events, books, films and magazines. In fact, the interest has spread outside the borders of America as evidenced by four Ontario chapters of the Civil War Round Table, including one in Kingston. This new book offers an analysis of elements of the Civil War from a modern perspective organized into 12 chapters, each written by a different military historian.

The first offering is entitled *Extremists At The Gate* by Dr. William A. Blair. Of the two main theories regarding the cause of the Civil War (abolition and States' rights) Dr. William's treatise opines that the Civil War was fought because of the potential threat to the way of life of both sides if the institution of slavery was abolished. To establish this theory, Dr. Blair discusses how slavery affected politics, economics, demographics and wealth, the law, religion and the struggle for new territories such as Kansas. The theme of slavery is carried on in *The World Will Forever Applaud*. Dr. Michael Vorenberg explores the politics of freeing America's slaves starting with the policy of Lincoln and the Republican Party at the beginning of the war that the institution of slavery would not be touched where it already existed. He then follows the process of emancipation from May 1861, when the Union Army started calling slaves contraband, through to the First Confiscation Act of August 1861 that legally allowed for the seizure of slaves as a

traitor's property, to the Second Confiscation Act of July 1862, which granted emancipation to all slaves owned by rebel masters, to Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation of January 1863, and finally to the amendment to the American Constitution passed in December 1865.

Professor Richard Carwardine compares how well the two chief executives, Jefferson Davis and Abraham Lincoln, governed in *I Would Not Be Master.* He first examines the environment in which each leader worked and then compares each leader in terms of three major areas of responsibility: the manner in which they established and maintained a strategic vision, their respective ability to productively manage the political and military aspects of the nation, and how they handled the issue of communicating the government's purposes to the population to mobilize it during the war.

In *The Power Of The Land*, Mr. Robert K. Krick considers the senior military leadership. At the start of the Civil War, the US Army had an authorized strength of 1,000 commissioned officers. While those with previous military service or military schooling generally became generals, colonels usually came from the ranks of lawyers and politicians. Mr. Krick analyses how the senior officers on both sides operated in terms of logistical challenges, the two different theatres of operations, and their ability to adapt tactics and organizations to the changes in weaponry and the results of battles and campaigns. Dr. Gerald J. Prokowiez continues this theme but at the soldier level in *Our Hearts Were Touched With Fire*. At the start of the war, the US Army consisted of 14,000 soldiers while there were over three million Confederate and Union soldiers by the end of the war. Dr. Prokowiez discusses the life of a soldier including the food he endured, the clothing he wore, the diseases he suffered, the equipment he used, and the effects the battlefield had on him. The concluding portion looks at how the soldiers were affected by the brutality of the war.

In *Remorseless Revolutionary Struggle*, Professor Mark Grimsley looks at the Civil War as a revolutionary or peoples' war, à la the French Revolution, as compared to a national war or conflict between governments, such as the Franco-Prussian War. He discusses how the weapons of the Civil War affected the arts of warfare and defensive fortifications, and concludes by examining the Union's war against the South civilian population and property.

Uncle Sam's Web Feet, looks at Civil War navies. Dr. Craig L. Symonds first describes the Union's two-part strategy (the Anaconda Plan) that entailed imposing a complete blockade on the 3,500 miles of the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico coastlines facing the Confederacy, while concurrently advancing down the Mississippi River with the aim of splitting the Confederacy into two. The Confederate navy tried to counter the Union strategy by its own two tier strategy of using experimental weapons (e.g. ironclads, torpedoes and submarines) and commercial raiders, both privateers with Confederate issued Letters of Marque and government ships such as the English built CSS Alabama.

While most literature seems to concentrate on the war in the east, Dr. Jeffrey S. Prushankin uses *They Came To Butcher Our People* to look at the war in the trans-Mississippi, which stretched from the Mississippi River to California and from Minnesota to the Rio Grande. Both Union and Confederate governments had a similar objective of territorial security, but with different expectations, with the Union concentrating on political control and the Confederacy focussing on it as a source of manpower and resources. The author starts by describing the vicious guerrilla warfare that was conducted in Missouri and Kansas, and then looks at the campaigns in Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, New Mexico, California and Colorado. He ends with a description of how Indian tribes were caught up in the War.

Dr. William B. Feis uses *That Great Essential Of Success* to delve into the realm of espionage, covert action, and military intelligence. While he touches on both

Confederate and Union clandestine intelligence activities, the author spends most of the article discussing military intelligence. He describes the common characteristics of military intelligence, delves into the intelligence resources used, and then explains in some detail the organizations and operations that both sides used.

In *We Never Yielded In The Struggle* Professor Victoria E. Bynum takes the reader away from the battlefields to look at the home front. She discusses how race, region, wealth and position, class, and especially gender, affected life at the homes of the soldiers away fighting. She concentrates on how the women endured the war in both the North and South.

How the American Civil War influenced Europe is reviewed in *One Great Society*. To set the scene, Dr. Hugh Dubrulle first looks at the relationship between Europe and America before the War started. He then examines the issues of European public opinion, international law, economic relations, diplomacy, and the legacy the Civil War left in Europe

Dr. Aaron Sheehan-Dean's last essay, *A Fearful Lesson*, examines the legacy of the Civil War. He looks at the consequences of the War in terms of emancipation, American style democracy, labour, the consolidation of political authority, the professional US army, and the cultural impact. He concludes by discussing how the memories affected Americans and how these memories are kept alive today.

In summary, this book offers something for both newcomers with an interest in the US Civil War, as well as for the old hands. It can be digested in easily manageable chunks, as each essay is about twenty pages long and sprinkled with photographs, drawings and maps. The chronology at the beginning is well done and useful. If the reader is at all interested in the US Civil War, it is worth a read.

WAR ON THE HOME FRONT: THE FARM DIARIES OF DANIEL MACMILLAN 1914-1927

Edited by Bill Parenteau and Stephen Dutcher (Fredericton: Goose Lane Editions, 2006), 109 pages, $16.95, ISBN 0-86492-451-8.

Reviewed by Mr. Charles Dumbrille



Little did Daniel MacMillan know when he carefully kept a diary of his life between 1914 and 1927 that over three quarters of a century later he would be making such a significant contribution to Canadian history, and in particular, World War I and its aftermath. Although a small time farmer and very much a member of his rural community, his diaries reveal not only an ability to follow world events, but also an ability to express his emotions as he went about every day life when the world around was in shambles. While he continually questioned his contribution to the war effort, it is obvious today that he made a very lasting contribution if for no other reason than through his diaries. In this regard, while much has been written about the facts surrounding World War I battles, little has been written about how small rural communities in Canada coped with the war and its aftermath. It is increasingly important today that if

this period of history and its lessons learned are to live on, a more personal approach must be found to make it appealing. The diaries of Daniel MacMillan fulfill this role.

The editors of MacMillan's diaries have played a significant role by placing the diaries in the context of not only world but also local events, and by placing MacMillan in the context of his family relationships. This role is accomplished in the introduction and at the beginning of each chapter, which gives the diaries the appeal they need to attract the attention of today's readers. Following the introduction, the editors divide the diaries into three chapters following three timelines. The first chapter—"A Great European War has broken out 1914-1916"—describes the initial impact of the war and MacMillan's efforts to contribute. The second chapter—"Having a Difficult Time 1917-18"—emphasizes the difficult time that war presents, while the third chapter—"Aftermath 1919–1927"—illustrates how the war, although ended, did not suddenly make life any easier.

Throughout the entries recorded in the chapters, MacMillan, obviously fearful of being called a "coward," continually questioned whether he was contributing enough. It is reoccurring themes like this that today give the diaries of MacMillan a new life as an inspirational tool to Canadians everywhere, no matter what their walk of life. MacMillan found his own way not to be called a "coward" by a recruiting officer, and although he could only contribute in a meagre way when his country needed him the most, he had it within himself to do what he could in spite of very difficult circumstances. Lastly, because of its brevity the book could be criticized as a little confusing when imparting family and friend relationships; however, the diaries not only reveal an important legacy, but through its publication help to make this legacy live on.

IMMIGRANTS OF WAR—AMERICANS SERVING WITH THE RAF AND RCAF DURING WORLD WAR 2

W. Peter Fydenchuk (WPF Publications, 2005/6), Paper, 316 pages,
ISBN 1-9737523-0-0.

Reviewed by Lieutenant-Colonel Robert S. Williams, MSM, CD



Well known is the fact that the United States entered the Second World War after the December 7th, 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. What is not well known is the number of its citizens who joined other Allied countries' services to fight against Hitler. Were it not for books such as this one, the number and accomplishments of many of them would remain fairly much unknown, perhaps forever.

Peter Fydenchuk has produced an excellent book chronicling the number of American citizens who served in both the Royal Air Force (RAF) and the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) in the Second World War. Mr. Fydenchuk's book, replete with many personal stories and containing many photographs never before published, is a gold mine and goes a long way towards remedying this gap in knowledge. The sight of an RCAF uniform with a "U.S.A." insignia on both shoulders is certainly unique, and will come as a surprise to many readers. Readers will also likely be surprised to discover that almost 1,000 American citizens were killed while serving as part of either the RCAF or the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve (RAFVR).

The early chapters detail how an American would go about joining an Allied air force while his own country remained neutral. The flight training at the various flying training establishments in Canada and operational training units (OTUs) are chronicled with the anecdotes that typify the experience of young men going off to war. The various stories deal with homesickness, road trips, pub life, and romantic ventures. All of the personal stories are dealt with in a tasteful and at times poignant or amusing manner.

Fydenchuk's excellent historical explanations are further enriched by a number of participant stories relating their combat experience. Later, Fydenchuk deals with the issue of transfer to the Unites States Army Air Force (USAAF) starting December 8th 1945. This, for those involved, was an emotional decision. Many chose not to transfer but to remain with their commonwealth colleagues; the bonds forged by war being at times stronger than those by birth.

By way of conclusion, the author highlights the quest of young men for adventure, and the paths that this thirst takes them. The desire to get into the war before it was all over motivated many, while the desire to do something out of the ordinary motivated many others. This book is especially timely given the dwindling number of surviving American veterans who flew as part of the RCAF or the RAFVR.

The highly readable stories contained in Fydenchuk's book should provide ample direction for much needed future research into some of the lesser-known chapters of Air Force history during World War 2. I highly recommend this book to all those interested in the experiences of young men whose thirst for adventure led them to join the cause for freedom against Hitler's Third Reich over sixty years ago.

ENDURING THE FREEDOM: A ROGUE HISTORIAN IN AFGHANISTAN

By Sean M. Maloney (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005), Hard Cover, 336 pages, $27.50 USD, ISBN 1-57488-953-2.

Reviewed by Major Andrew B. Godefroy



As the Cold War military standoff between the superpowers slowly receded during the 1990s, observers of wars and war zones turned their attention to the many emerging hotspots around the world that had previously failed to attract focused scrutiny. A number of excellent monographs were produced during this period combining academic investigation with first hand accounts, including notable works such as Artyom Borovik's *The Hidden War: A Russian Journalist's Account of the Soviet War in Afghanistan* (1990), Jocelyn Coulon's Les casques bleus (1994), William Shawcross's *Deliver Us From Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords, and a World of Endless Conflict* (2000), and Robert Kaplan's *Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground* (2005). These writers among others have revived a genre of military analysis that has since become a staple in the world of strategic studies literature.

Dr. Sean M. Maloney, a military historian at the Royal Military College of Canada, has joined this genre with his latest book, *Enduring the Freedom: A Rogue Historian in Afghanistan*. Covering various events taking place in that theatre in early 2003, his brief journey across the war torn country is retold in five parts taking the reader from Kabul to Bagram to Kandahar province. Maloney provides one an opportunity to vicariously experience the combined excitement and anxiety of traveling through one of the world's more dangerous locations, giving good physical descriptions of not just activities, but also of the people, places, sites, and smells. His ability to capture the "look" and "feel" of the environment in his writing is one of the book's main strengths, and reflects the perceptive eye of a well-traveled author.

As with many of the books in this genre the title belies the depth and complexity of its contents. Much more than a simple travelogue, Maloney presents solid concise overviews of Afghanistan's recent military history, the early days of the 2001-2002 Al-Qaeda War, as well as detailed analyses of both International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) missions in the country through the end of 2003. Though he observed mainly the operations of German and American forces in theatre, Maloney also discusses at the length the activities of an incredibly long list of nations that contributed to both the war and the stability campaign that followed it. Italians, Romanians, Irish, Lithuanians, Dutch, and many other flags could be spotted across the theatre providing everything and anything from special forces to support forces.

The international aspect of the Afghanistan War in its early days is often lost in some accounts that are focused solely on American operations and in presenting the conflict as some form of new American imperialism. Others may simply be surprised by the number of countries that operated in the theatre at all levels. Canadian involvement is also covered, of course, and given its due merit where appropriate throughout the discussion.

Overall, the book suffers few flaws in its presentation. The chapters are acronym heavy, and though a glossary is provided those less familiar with military-speak may find it taxing to constantly flip back and forth between it and the text. The author's personal commentary is also at times distracting from the overall story. Obviously injected throughout to add colour and context to the narrative, it nevertheless does provide insight into the author's own admitted personal biases and is representative of many third party observers to bureaucracy in war.

Dr. Maloney's book, *Enduring the Freedom: A Rogue Historian in Afghanistan*, is a valuable snapshot of this theatre in early 2003. At a time when the world was rapidly turning its attention to the looming war with Iraq, he reminds us that the Global War on Terrorism stretched far beyond any single country and had many faces. This is book is a worthy and recommended read.

THE STAND-UP TABLE

Commentary, Opinion and Rebuttal

IDEAS TO IMPROVE TRAINING FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS IN URBAN TERRAIN (MOUT)

Corporal Charles Crossan CD of 1 Troop, 6 Field Engineer Squadron, writes …

Complaining about the way training is done seems to be one of the constants that I have noticed in my time in the Reserves. Many people seem to have good ideas that are not passed up the chain of command for various reasons. I have attempted, with my limited experience, to put my 'money where my mouth is' and have come up with various ideas to help improve military operation in urban terrain (MOUT) training (or FIBUA for all the old soldiers). You will notice that there are no references at the end of this list. The idea was not to draw on what other people have written or what is shown in the manuals, but rather to brainstorm and think about what I would like to have seen or what I have actually witnessed in training or heard mentioned by people much smarter than I. Some of these ideas are more than likely in various handbooks; some are already incorporated in our training. I hope that some of these suggestions can be of use in training (especially with regards to the reserves).

During this little explanation the use of OPFOR will be taken to mean the following:

**enemy combatants (civilians with weapons);

**civilians/local government;

**NGO personnel (civilian aid workers);

**paramilitary/military forces of the local government;

**other non-allied forces/non Canadian Forces personnel; and

**actual uniformed and armed enemy force.

This brief (which is essentially a list so that it found useful it can be copied down and used) is sub-divided into the following headings:

- things that should be paramount;
- points with regards to realism;
- points with regards to safety;
- other points; and
- final points.

Hopefully my arguments will be of some use, and make training more realistic and informative and (heaven forbid) enjoyable. Keep in mind this list is essentially for when the soldiers are on foot and not driving in by vehicles.

Things that Should be Paramount

Exercise control staff should be clearly & visibly marked—such as using orange marker vests and/or white hard hats or even hot pink T-shirt (who doesn't want to see a warrant officer in a hot pink T-shirt?)—but something distinctive and visible. This will enable both sides to 'ignore' them during the scenario(s).

OPFOR shall not wear any part of the CADPAT uniforms and wherever possible and if appropriate should be in civilian clothing. At a minimum they should be in PT Strip (sweatpants & sweatshirt)—unless in an agreed to enemy force dress.

OPFOR should not be from the unit that is involved in the exercise. Personnel from that unit should be exercised in their current and/or designated role.

Rules of engagement should be given to every soldier involved and they should be followed. Any breaches are to be dealt with severely and in accordance with regulations.

Points with Regards to Realism

If not available for the whole exercise for approaching into the town and for patrolling MILES gear (or equivalent) should be worn. Safety is important and troops should be equipped with receivers only and OPFOR should only have a few (no more than 3) weapons equipped with MILES lasers.

Canadian Forces (CF) Admin Area should be out of bounds however a camp entrance should be marked, guarded and in play.

Armed Forces news teams could be embedded with the troops as this would not only enable them to report and/or get footage required but will condition the troops to having the press with them. They can actually be in civilian clothes instead of uniform.

Simulated improved explosive devices (IEDs) should be emplaced to allow the troops to know what they may look like or to let them know what to look for. Even if they are not to be used during the scenarios.

The indiscriminate use of booby traps through out the scenario should be carefully considered. However, such things as weapons caches should have booby traps emplaced (for exercise purposes we could use F1A1 combination booby trap)

There will be no 'travelling' from the CF Admin Area to the village / MOUT Site—except for the following: (i) in an emergency, (ii) as part of a patrol or recce and (iii) if you are exercise control staff.

As many as possible female personnel should be utilized in OPFOR and some could be designated as being pregnant or having an infant (use of life sized doll encouraged). This point may be considered sexist, but troops deploying overseas will be interacting with all facets of the local community, which will include women and children.

Children may be the one thing that would be hard to simulate in an MOUT exercise but I believe every Army Reserve unit has an associated Army Cadet Unit and the use of cadets should be encouraged. Younger cadets (e.g. 15 years or less) should be utilized as Civilians. Older cadets could be utilised as enemy combatants and of course the CIL officer(s) can be utilized in such roles as village mayor, NGO personnel etc.

Not all personnel should be enemy combatants some should be acting only as civilians / local government. Where no armed or otherwise hostile action to be taken.

Medical training aids, such as fake wounds, may be utilized. This is not only to simulate medical training but also to train soldiers to deal with civilian injured.

Canadian Forces should designate at all times what each section or platoon is doing, such as who is on patrol, who is quick reaction force (QRF), who is on sentry, etc.

A quick explanation of the rules of land warfare &/or the Geneva convention outlining what you can & cannot do to a prisoner, such as implying the threat of death if they do not open door, or answer questions, or using prisoners as human shields to enter rooms, or access stairwells, etc.

Points with Regards to Safety

Safety distances and out of bounds areas/ sections (e.g. rooftops) **must** be adhered to.

An out of play exercise command/medical area should be created.

Medical personnel should not be in play for the exercise. If you wish to have medical treatment for exercise casualties a second ambulance and medical team should be used.

Canadian Forces Admin Area will be set up properly and all personnel should be in tents (either recce or modular) and not sleeping in the open or in hooch's.

Exercise playbook to be created with a list of exercise rules, a do-and-do-not list and possibly even safety words and how designate persons/vehicles as OFF EXERCISE, signal Instructions, etc.

Reservists usually train on weekends and there is an attempt to get as much as possible done in that time and certain things may be forgotten or rushed. But the soldiers should be given time to eat and if necessary the exercise will stop to ensure all personnel are fed. **However**, if time is permitted to eat and OPFOR want to make use of that time to demonstrate or cause an incident against the Canadian Forces, then that should be allowed.

Other Points

OPFOR should be given time prior to the exercise begins to 'walk the ground' and this will enable them to better know the ins and outs of the scenario area.

Certain OPFOR personnel should be designated as important—such as bomb maker or combatant leader. This should not be based on their rank within the Canadian Forces.

If available foreign weapons should be utilized (or even the C1 Rifle).

Canadian Forces casualties who are 'killed' or wounded should be placed off to one side to watch and kept from taking part in the remainder of the event that is happening e.g. patrol or search. Not for the complete exercise just for the individual event.

Identification for OPFOR should be created. This can be of the basic variety and have no picture but a little imagination and a digital camera can go a long way.

As this not training for convoy drills or for vehicle check points vehicles should not be utilized by the Canadian Forces or by OPFOR however, Canadian Forces can use vehicles to evacuate exercise casualties, deploy a QRF or as a diversion for infiltration. However, any in play vehicles that are taken by OPFOR during the training can be used by them.

Intel should be constantly updated and this should be used to amend plans, deployments or even the rules of engagement.

It may be politically incorrect but a local religious leader may be part of the scenario. This can be to the benefit or detriment of the Canadian Forces.

Sealed reaction to event cards should be issued to OPFOR and they can be opened in the event something happens, such as a cordon and search. Cards can give a various choice of action from complete co-operation through verbal hostility to even actual hostile action. They can also be used to make things interesting such as be non-hostile, but also be hard of hearing.

The same type of cards can be used with regards to injuries and/or 'medical events'.

If civilians are going to be demonstrating against Canadian Forces then appropriate slogans should be agreed on as well as demonstration signs created, such as NATO = NAZI.

Use of graffiti that is relevant to the scenario may be used. However to aid clean up large sheets of paper should be taped to walls for this use or even using rolls of wall paper turned back on to the wall. Personal insults against specific persons or sexual /racial epitaphs will not be allowed.

If time permits proper living areas should be set up within the scenario. Camp cots may be substituted for beds but other house hold items, furniture, clothing and dishes can be picked up relatively cheaply at goodwill stores or even old items from unit members.

"Normal" events should be simulated during the scenario such as celebrations (e.g. weddings) solemn events (e.g. funerals) or emergencies (e.g. fire).

We may want to develop scenario dealing with a suicide bomber (s). This could be considered insensitive by civilians, but the threat of someone who will kill themselves as part of completing their mission is totally different (and is currently a fact faced by the troops deployed overseas) to what training has concentrated on in the past.

The use of tape recorders and/or karaoke systems should be investigated so as to increase the noise level in the area. Can be used to cause distractions or as cover or to unsettle the Canadian Forces. Imagine the reaction by a patrol that is greeted by a loudspeaker welcoming them to the village and describing them in detail (such as five men with four rifles, one light machine gun – no grenades evident) or even welcoming them by name may be, at the least, unsettling.

Final Points

WEAPONS CACHE

A Weapons cache should be emplaced and hidden.—This may or may not have the weapons for the enemy combatants, but its location and inventory (should have items that will not be removed) should be known only to a few personnel. This would include the commander of the enemy combatants, the senior exercise controller and the personnel (enemy combatants or exercise control staff) who emplaced it. This can be utilized by the enemy combatants or not and it can be intelligence developed by the Canadian Forces for a cordon and search, or it may be found accidentally. This leaves options open, depending on the training.

LANGUAGE

As local populations do not generally speak English it may be worth while to use translators to accompany the troops involved. Although it would be best to use the language that the troops would be hearing in a deployment (e.g. Arabic) it is not necessary, as what this will simulate is the delay between asking questions and getting answers, and also the fact that body language may be more important that words. OPFOR should be instructed to not disperse, act, or answer until the commands or questions are translated (even if they do not understand the language being used).

A prime example would be if a unit had a number of French speakers then a 'translator' would accompany the troops and be used (especially if French speakers are in OPFOR) even if the majority of OPFOR did not understand French. They would know what was being asked or wanted by them as the Canadian troops would be speaking in English but would wait for the translation before answering.

Certain members of OPFOR could also be deemed to have a working knowledge of English or even be fluent.

This, if properly used, could only aid to the training value.

Hopefully, this article gives some food for thought and can be of some use. It was not my intention to insult or change the training doctrine or focus, but rather to provide discussion or an aide-memoir for those who do.

ANIMOSITY IN THE RANKS: THE DIFFICULTY OF INTEGRATING RESERVE AUGMENTEES INTO REGULAR FORCE BATTALIONS

Sergeant Kurt Grant of the Directorate of History and Heritage, writes…

The fundamental cause of the breakdown of morale and discipline within the Army usually comes to this—that a commander or his subordinates transgresses by treating men as if they were children or serfs instead of showing respect for their adulthood.[1]

S.L.A. Marshall

Make no mistake, we will ask more and more from our reservists, from operational commitment to training support to close recce, to numerous specialties which they, and they alone, will have.[2]

Gen. R. Hillier, Chief of Defence Staff

Transformation!

It is a word that has a unique connotation for members of the Canadian Forces (CF). For some, the word conjures emotions of fear and uncertainty, while for others it holds the promise of opportunity. Coined to describe the process by which the CF will adjust its approach to the new reality of full spectrum operations[3], everything from command structures to the operational art—the strategy, operations and tactical approach governing the way the CF fights—has and will come under scrutiny.

Among the many changes to be addressed is the need to more successfully integrate larger numbers of reserve force personnel (augmentees) into line battalions preparing for overseas deployment. Since the beginning of the 1990s the marked increase in the number of peacekeeping operations has necessitated a shift in thinking within the CF and allowed ever-larger numbers of reservists to volunteer for overseas service. The result has been the opening of a Pandora's Box of administrative and personnel problems that need to be addressed if integration is to be successful. While the ensuing fifteen years of high-paced operations have created a large number of administrative work-arounds, the larger issue of how to successfully integrate the augmentees into the section/platoon has been largely left to the junior leadership, a practice that is not unique to the CF. Indeed, Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the United States each with varying degrees of success have all had to address this same issue.

At the heart of the problem lies command's desire to create unit integrity and the esprit de corps that is so important to survival when conducting full spectrum operations. To this end, it is well recognized that some of the factors that contribute to esprit among military groups in peacetime [are] compatibility, conformity, comradeship, competition, tradition, territoriality and status. These and other factors are also operative in combat environments and are reinforced by recognition, fostered by combat, of the importance

of interdependence.[4] Yet when two unknown groups come together, it is natural that "fear of the unknown" will cause the ranks to close against outsiders. Further, soldiers will bring their own form of "baggage" based on their own experience, which colours their approach to the integration issue. All Canadian soldiers have been indoctrinated into the regimental system, but the attitudes and approaches it fosters can sometimes lead to an adversarial environment. The purpose of this paper, then, is to discuss some of the problems faced when integrating reserve and regular force troops, and to suggest some ways in which to reduce those problems.

History

For the Canadian military, the issue of integration is not new. Historically, the difference between the regular and reserve force can be traced back nearly as far as Canada itself. The Sedentary Militia highlighted the issue first in the early 1800s. The performance of the militia during the War of 1812, coupled with an over-zealous desire by some to claim credit for their accomplishments, led first to the creation and later to the propagation of what has become know as the "Militia Myth."[5] This myth held that it was the militia—with the help of a few regular army troops—who had saved Canada during the war with the Americans.

History has shown the Militia Myth to be just that—a myth. That Canada survived at all during its early years is probably more attributable to good luck than the fighting ferocity of its militia. In every war fought in North America until the American Civil War, the brunt of the fighting was born by regular troops, French, British or American. Regular officers planned the campaigns, husbanding their resources of trained men. Militias were useful, sometimes critically so, but militiamen fresh from the farm or the shops of the towns would not and could not stand up the rigors of the battlefield.[6] That is not to imply that the militia did not acquit themselves well in battle. On the contrary, in October 1813 for instance, a mixed force of regulars and militia numbering approximately 1700 men in various states of training, forced the retirement of a superior but ill-led American force of 3000-4000 after a short, sharp engagement that saved Montreal.[7]

As Canada gradually took control of its destiny in the late 1800s, the creation of the first permanent force units to help the militia train directed further attention to the issue. The militia considered the early permanent force units to be nothing more than the dregs of society. Conversely, the permanent force and professional soldiers in command positions often lamented the club-like atmosphere of the militia units. The war of words that was waged between the two groups was frequently vitriolic and protracted. Each side remained firmly entrenched, unwavering in its belief that it was the pre-eminent force.

It can be said that much of the problem was centred upon the discrepancy in the level of training between the two forces. It can also be said that in the early days this problem was largely overcome by time spent in the field working together. However, as the level of sophistication in warfare increased, the time required to train augmentees up to the required standard correspondingly increased. This, in turn, only served to highlight the discrepancy.

Shifting Emphasis

From the Boer War to the end of the Korean War, the regular and reserve forces jockeyed for position as Canada's pre-eminent defence force. Three wars had largely levelled the playing field as far as skills within the combat arms were concerned; yet skill-fade within the militia ranks was a real issue between the wars. By the late 1950s the advent of tactically deployable nuclear weapons forced Canada to re-examine its requirement of the military. The result was a shift in emphasis from a force generation

capability to a highly trained rapidly deployable force modeled on the Korean experience. CGS Guy Simmons determined that the militia was not capable of providing trained men immediately available for rapid mobilization to meet a sudden crisis[8]. Once subordinate to the Militia, the regular force now surged ahead, taking the leading role in the defence of Canada and leaving the militia with few opportunities for "real soldiering." The ensuing gradual, but inevitable, decline in the standard of training of the militia soldier led to the emergence within the regular force of the belief that the militia were nothing more than weekend warriors.

During the thirty years following Korea, the regular force occupied the place of prominence while the militia languished on the sidelines with no clearly defined role or opportunity to perform the tasks for which they trained. In 1987, the government attempted to address the situation by releasing a White Paper that embraced the concept of Total Force. The White Paper spoke about one army and proposed an experiment in which some battalions and regiments would be regular/reserve amalgams, having specific, order-of-battle related roles in a rejuvenated CF. Thus was born the 10/90 Battalion. Indeed, the promise implicit in the proposal was soon realized when reservists found themselves on the front-line at Oka and actively supporting Operation FRICTION. But thirty years of high-readiness training within the regular force only highlighted the discrepancy between regular and reserve soldiers, and few remained convinced of the concept.

Troubled Relations

The demise of the Iron Curtain again shifted the CF's operational pace into high gear with a quick succession of deployments to Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Cambodia and Somalia. Faced with the drastically under-strength battalion establishments caused by long-term government policies of force reduction, the regular force turned to the militia to fill in the ranks. They were so reliant on the militia that on some of the early deployments to Yugoslavia as many as 50% of some companies were reservists[9].

By 1995, despite a sudden increase in the number of reserve augmentees, the relationship between the regular and reserve command was not on a good footing. Given the increased operational pace, the regular force felt the militia should do as they were told and continue providing a ready source of augmentees. The focus of the regular force was on meeting the ever-increasing operational needs, and not on regimental survival. To this end, and in an effort to meet their force-generation targets, the regular force offered direct entry to as many reserve soldiers as would come.

The reserve establishment, on the other hand, distrustful of the regular forces' intentions and seeing their ranks being depleted faster than they could recruit, fought to oppose any change to the traditional role of national mobilization and to keep all of its regiments, no matter how small, alive. Each organization's distrust of the other grew to such a state that it can be said that 1997 marked the "low water" mark in the history of their relations.[10] And thus the lines were drawn.

A Question of Leadership

The 1990s represented a period in which the operational pace for the CF increased many times over. In the former Yugoslavia, for example, there were no fewer than 62 separate and distinct operations mounted between 1991 and 2003[11]. Throughout, the regular and reserve forces had to learn to work together more effectively. *Administrative work-arounds* dealing with the issues of pay, contracting and benefits packages were being addressed but had (and have) yet to be consolidated, resulting in some reserve soldiers being treated differently than their regular force counterparts.[12] An example of this comes from early in the ramp-up training for Operation HARMONY, Rotation 5. A

reservist's wife was reportedly admitted to emergency in Ottawa while he was in training in Petawawa. Reporting to the company commander (OC), the solider was informed that he would not be permitted to leave training and go to Ottawa. The reason given was that since the OC did not know if the soldier was entitled to emergency leave under his Class C contract, he wanted to save the soldier's leave for a *real* emergency. Though this episode worked out in the end, it aptly demonstrates the officer's lack of understanding of the nuances of the terms and conditions of service of soldiers under his command.

Other issues complicate the integration of augmentees into regular battalions. Junior leaders often fostered the "us vs. them" attitude at the platoon level. Again, early on in the training for Operation HARMONY, Rotation 5, the initial selection of the augmentees had not yet begun. Many of the reservists were still trying to figure out where they were in the pecking order and what was expected of them. During a battalion parade one of the reservists had the misfortune of collapsing due to heat exhaustion and had to be helped off the parade square. This led to a tirade by the platoon warrant officer. Talking to "his boys" (the regulars force troops in his platoon), he began to run down the "weekend warriors," describing in great detail—but quietly enough that only his platoon could hear him—how he was going to run the reserves into the ground, and how they weren't worth wasting his time on. This had the desired detrimental effect upon the reservists, and morale promptly plummeted.[13]

It could be convincingly argued that both examples cited here illustrate a lack of leadership ability on the part of the individual leaders involved. Indeed, following the ten leadership principles espoused by CF, the platoon warrant failed to "know his soldiers and promote their welfare."[14] In addition, the company commander did not make a "sound and timely decision."[15] More accurately however, one could explore the question of what the leadership "aught reasonably to have known." Would either of the leaders have treated a regular force member in the same manner? Or do these examples speak to the level of institutional discrimination inherent in the Army at the time—a discrimination that had degenerated into name-calling that can still be heard today.[16] Either way, the 1990s represented the first real large-scale exposure the regular force had to large numbers of reservists in its ranks and some of the problems of integration.

A New Relationship

The times however, were changing. Despite the "weekend warrior" reputation, reservists volunteering for overseas service brought more than basic soldiering skills to the table. Many reservists had educations that were better than their regular counterparts, and some brought skills that were not readily available in the combat arms trades.[17] Long exposed to poorly trained militiamen, both of these factors served to open the eyes of some in the regular force, earning the militia more respect. Of course, the fact that the bulk of reservists acquitted themselves exceptionally well while on tour has served to impress upon the regular force that the reserves bring one critical factor to the table over and above just their basic skills: they brought the desire to be there. The ensuing fifteen years of exposure to well-trained and disciplined reservists has done much to dispel the notion of "weekend warrior" and garner the augmentee greater respect within the regular force ranks.

The expanded role planned for the militia in future operations as articulated by the Minister of Defence in the Defence Policy Statement[18], forecasted a much closer working relationship between the regular and reserve forces and sets the stage for a revised working relationship. While it is true that there continues to be a discrepancy between the training and experience levels of the two forces, great strides have been made to reduce the gap (at least on the training side) by Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) with the adoption of the One Army One Standard policy[19]. This standardization in training

has been bolstered by a more recent phenomenon. Not only are reserve soldiers returning from tour with valuable experience to pass on, but across Ontario, reserve units are seeing increased numbers of regular members with twenty or more years of experience leaving the regular force only to join the local reserve unit so that they can continue on with the soldiering that they so love. The result has been a gradual levelling of the playing field between the two forces. The evidence of this new direction can be seen in the upcoming rotation 03/06 to Afghanistan, in which 220 reserves will deploy as part of the main contingent at ranks from private to major, proving that the reserves are being recognized at their rank and experience level as equals. Today, it is expected that reserve soldiers of all levels will have received the same training as their counterparts with the only distinguishing factor being the amount of experience the soldier brings to the table.

Still, any time outsiders join an existing body, whether troops in battalion or professionals in an office setting, there will be a feeling-out period in which the group tests the new individual(s) to determine whether they will be accepted. In his book *Men Against Fire*, S.L.A. Marshall points out that just as men will not fight for a leader they do not know, the soldier has an inherent unwillingness to risk danger on behalf of men with whom he has no social identity.[20] This is particularly true of new augmentees. With this psychology in mind, the question of how does the leader/commander integrate new augmentees into his command must be addressed. The question of what does the augmentee has to do to prove that he/she belongs must also be addressed. To answer these questions, one must first have an understanding of small group dynamics.

In an article entitled "Developmental Sequence in Small Groups", Bruce Tuckman outlines the five stages of group development:

- forming;
- storming;
- norming;
- performing; and
- adjourning.[21]

In Stage One: Forming, group members rely on safe, patterned behaviour and look to the group leader (section commander) for guidance and direction. They have a desire for acceptance by the group and a need to know that the group is safe. They set about gathering impressions and data about the similarities and differences among them and forming preferences for future sub-grouping.[22] In the military context, in order for the group to feel safe, the existing group must feel comfortable with the incoming troops. In order for this to happen, the new troops must convince the group being joined that they are capable and worthy of respect.

For the augmentee, respect is garnered in a number of ways. First and foremost, it must be remembered that the Army, and in particular, the combat arms trades, is a profession largely based on *physical fitness*. The reservist must arrive at battalion ready to meet—or exceed—the basic PT level. Being capable of strapping on a 55 lb backpack, helmet, webbing and rifle, and marching 10 miles in the allotted time begins to earn the individual a measure of respect.

Next, *technical competence* plays a large factor in acceptance within an infantry section. Being able to take a C6 medium machinegun (or any other of the platoon weapons) and strip, clean, reassemble and perform the function test without asking for help, means, in the eyes of those watching on, that the individual does not require additional training or supervision. This builds trust in the individual's competence.

Being *situationally aware* also plays large in acceptance, as it speaks further to the individual's level of training. Knowing where to go and what to do without being asked

or told, helps to instil confidence among the members and build the team. It is worth noting that these three points will require much of the reserve soldier. In a three-hour-per-week army, it is implicit that the individual volunteering for overseas service will need to devote personal time to training over and above regular obligations in order to meet or exceed the acceptable standard.

Stage Two of group dynamics, Storming, which deals largely with attitude and personality, is likely the most important determining factor on whether the individual is accepted by the group or not. As the group members organize for the upcoming task, conflict inevitably results in their personal relations. Individuals have to bend and mould their feelings, ideas, attitudes and beliefs to suit the group organization. Because of "fear of exposure" or "fear of failure" there will be an increased desire for structural clarification and commitment. xxiii It is here that the junior leader (section 2IC, Section Commander, Platoon 2IC, and Platoon Commander) becomes all-important. Solid leadership at this level, by knowing your men and employing them to the level of their ability,[24] can make or break an organization. An individual's ability to "blend" with the existing group can be the determining factor on whether that individual is accepted or not. Nothing spells rejection faster than an individual who has the attitude of knowing it all and an unwillingness to learn.

Acceptance, however, is a two way street, and the strongest builder of bonds within a section or platoon, is shared adversity, such as an event or task that forces the group to work together as a team to accomplish the mission. This can be something as simple as a particularly gruelling physical training (PT) run, or as harrowing as a firefight. In the end, the team will begin to gel because of the realization of a shared need to rely upon each other, and the testing of that need under trying conditions. Regardless of each individual's background, the trust built under adverse conditions can cement friendships, and build effective working units.

Regular force junior leaders charged with making the sections and platoons work effectively must apply the principles of leadership and recognize that individual reservists who appear on the parade square ready to train often sacrifice much to do so. In many cases, reservists have either quit their jobs or put their education on hold in order to take the opportunity to serve their country and go overseas. And, that individual may well have skills that are not readily available within a combat arms trade, but that may come in handy in situations outside the normal job description of the soldier while deployed. This demonstrated desire to put their lives "on hold" is worthy of respect within the larger picture.

Conclusion

The desire to serve one's country is a long-standing tradition in Canada. From the late 1600's up to the present day, many are the examples of Canadians setting aside their tools to take up arms to defend our nation. But the world is a changing place, and to meet the challenge of the increased tempo of full spectrum operations, our armed forces are undergoing a major transition, the end state for which will be nothing short of a full working partnership between the regular and reserve [militia] forces.

For the reservist, it is no longer sufficient to pick up a rifle and stand shoulder to shoulder with regular force counterparts to ward off the enemy. Today, much more training is required. The reservist intent on deploying overseas must arrive at battalion physically fit, technically proficient, situationally aware and prepared to begin training in order to be successful. To accomplish this requires a devotion of personal time over and above regular training. In short, the reservist must become a full-time soldier on a part-time basis.

The regular force too, at the junior leader level, must accept that it can no longer meet the increased operational tempo without the help of the reservist as it integrates militia augmentees into the ranks. This is best achieved by the application of, and adherence to, the leadership principles. Further, regulars must come to recognize and accept that skill-sets not traditionally found within the ranks are strengths rather than weaknesses. And finally, regular forces must appreciate that reservists brings with them an intense *desire to be there*, often times at personal sacrifice.

The ghosts of past reputations will continue to haunt the CF as long as individuals and institutions hold on to preconceived notions about each other. In an environment as unstable as full spectrum operations, animosities between individuals cannot be afforded, since any doubt about levels of training or ability to execute the job could well lead to the loss of life. Much work is required by both sides to ensure that appropriate trust is built and fostered within the section and platoon.

There can be no more appropriate place to build this trust than through the shared adversity of pre-deployment training.

ENDNOTES

1. Marshall, S.L.A. (1947). *Men against Fire*, (William Morrow and Company, New York), p115.
2. Lt. Gen Hillier. (2003). *Army Transformation, Punching Above our Weight*, CDS.
3. Full Spectrum Operations is the CF term used to describe the Three Block War, a concept devised by Marine Gen Charles Krulak in the late 1990s to describe the complex spectrum of challenges likely to be faced by soliders on the modern battlefield. In three contiguous city blocks soldiers may be required to conduct full scale military action, peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief.
4. Kellett, A. (1982). *Combat Motivation, the Behavior of Soldiers in Battle*, (Kluwer-Nijhoff, Boston), p 97.
5. Granatstein, J. (2002). Canada's Army, (Toronto 2002), p 10.
6. Ibid, p 10.
7. Granatstein, J. (2002). *Canada's Army*, (Toronto 2002), p 11.
8. The following discussion is largely based on the report titled Militia Reform by Dr. Steven Harris, senior historian with DHH, written on 30 March 1995 and updated 13 January 2002.
9. Personal interview with CWO J.O.M.P. Leblanc, 2 Vandoo, B Company Sergeant Major on Op Cavalier.
10. Interview with MGen Fitch, Oct 2005.
11. This figure is based on the research conducted by the author as part of his duties with the Department of National Defence's DHH War Diaries team.
12. Interview with Commander E. Naismith, COS DGMHRPP, ADM (HR-Mil), Dec 2005
13. Both examples cited are based upon the author's own experience and are recounted in the book *All Tigers No Donkeys*, A Canadian Soldier in Croatia (St. Catherine's, 2004)
14. From the *Principles of Leadership* poster published by the CF 2004 edition, Leadership principle #5.
15. From the *Principles of Leadership* poster published by the CF 2004 edition, Leadership principle #8
16. The regular force often referred to the reserves as "toons." Short for cartoons, "toons" implied that the reserves wore colourful hats; were hugely entertaining; and came out only on weekends. The reserves, on the other hand, referred to the regular force as "soaps," implying that they were enormously boring and hugely melodramatic, and that they were done by 2:00 on a weekday afternoon.
17. The following is an example of the skills brought by three reservists to one section alone: carpenter, painter, commercial helicopter pilot, industrial engineering technician, three university degrees, two technical certificates, and seven military trade qualifications (TQ's).
18. Minister of National Defence, *Defence Policy Statement, A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*, June 2005,
19. Capt. M.T. Aucoin, *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin*, One Army One Standard; Vol. 6 No. 3 Fall/Winter 2003
20. Marshall, S.L.A. (1947). *Men against Fire*, (William Morrow and Company, New York), p 153
21. Tuckman, B. (1965). *Developmental Sequence in Small Groups*. Psychological Bulletin, 63, pp 384-399. In the article, Tuckman outlines five stages to of group development. **Stage 1** is *Forming*. In the forming stage, personal relations are characterized by dependence. Group members rely on safe, patterned behaviour and look to the group leader for guidance and direction. Group members have a desire for acceptance by the group and a need to know that the group is safe. They set about gathering impression sand data about the similarities and differences among them and forming preferences for future sub-grouping. **Stage 2**, *Storming*, is characterized by competition and conflict in the personal-relations dimensions and organization in the task-functions dimension. As the group members attempt to organize for the task, conflict inevitably results in their personal relations. Individuals have to bend and mould their feelings, ideas, attitudes, and beliefs to suit the group organization. Because of "fear of exposure" or "fear of failure" there will be an increased desire for structural clarification and commitment. Although conflicts may or may not surface as group issues, they do exist. **Stage 3** is labelled *Norming*. In this stage, interpersonal relations are characterized by cohesion.

Group members are engaged in active acknowledgement of all members' contributions, community building and maintenance, and solving of group issues. Members are willing to change their preconceived ideas or opinions on the basis of facts presented by other members, and they actively ask questions of one another. Leadership is shared, and cliques dissolve. When members begin to know and identify with one another, the level of trust in their personal relations contributes to the development of group cohesion. **Stage 4** is labelled *performing*, and is not always achieved by the group. In this stage, people can work independently, in subgroups, or as a total unit with equal facility. Their roles and authorities dynamically adjust to the changing needs of the group and individuals. **Stage 5**, *adjourning*, involves the termination of task behaviours and disengagement from relations. A planned conclusion, such as the end of a tour, usually includes recognition for participation and achievement and an opportunity for members to say personal goodbyes.

22. Ibid, point 1
23. Ibid, point 2
24. The ten principles of leadership taught within the CF are as follows **1)** Achieve professional competence, **2)** Appreciate your own strengths and limitations and pursue self-improvement, **3)** Seek and accept responsibility, **4)** Lead by example, **5)** Know your soldiers and promote their welfare, **6)** Make sure that your followers know your meaning and intent, then lead them to the accomplishment of the mission, **7)** Develop leadership potential in your followers, **8)** Make sound and timely decisions, **9)** Train your soldiers as a team and employ them up to their capability, and **10)** Keep your followers informed of the mission, the changing situation, and the overall picture.

ARE WE ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTION? FIGHTING IRREGULAR WARFARE WITH IRREGULAR WARFARE

Lieutenant-Colonel Mike Bullock, G5 LFWA HQ, writes …

Preface: While attending a seminar on the subject of NATO and its further evolution, the seminar's basic premise was that the global situation had changed significantly and hence the need for NATO itself to adjust if we are to collectively succeed in an era of instability stretching from now off into the foreseeable future. This seminar was attended by a number of high-ranking general officers tying down key NATO posts and, similarly, by some respected academics and thinkers on military affairs. One would therefore have reasonable grounds to consider this a useful gathering of the '*wise men*' to ponder at least the outlines of how we might adjust our approach. The discussion proceeded apace until the undersigned threw out a question, one that you would think would be quite basic:

Why would we even consider fighting an asymmetric situation with conventional forces?

This was met by silence, as was the case for the solution offered: that we shun, in their entirety, the employment of conventional forces against an asymmetric threat. Instead, we seize back the initiative and use similar tactics to the opposition's, which are better suited to the operational environment. In short, we use *unconventional* forces. Not of any one particular kind but instead the full panoply of outfits such as the SAS (and, yes, our own JTF2), long range patrols, commando raids, airmobile raids, etc. Essentially, we use anything other than visible boots-on-the-ground in the form of conventional forces.

This is not a casual suggestion. Step back from our accustomed thinking, and ponder instead the factors involved.

Recognize first the nature of the cultural environment within which we are operating. Disregard even the religious aspects. Consider instead the presence of foreign troops with boots-on-the-ground. Many if not all of these other cultures have a long (very long) history of being xenophobic. And it matters very little whether we are actually doing some good. Build a school, a hospital, or restore some safety to some of the village streets. These matter little in such an environment. Instead, at the most basic level, we are attacking their native pride in themselves that foreigners must do what they themselves cannot. Similarly, rather than either propping up or restoring the authorities, by our very presence we are instead implicitly undercutting the authority of the village

elder, the provincial governor, or the national authorities writ large. There are other associated elements in this argument, but these are sufficient for the basic point. Which is that we are '*they*', and not of their own. And this raises a perfectly understandable adverse reaction to our very presence, regardless of what actual good we may be accomplishing in specific works. And this reaction is alive and well . . . let alone one which is fostered by hostile propaganda.

Consider the nature of conventional forces. Regardless of how employed, or the degree of sophistication in technology, sensors and weaponry, the inherent characteristic of conventional forces is one of '*mass*'. Consider how much in terms of mass or numbers this would require to be effective, not only in the short to mid-term, but in the longer term. Just how large a presence would be needed for such forces to be effective? Would we need to blanket a country to smother the opposition? Could we perhaps settle for a series of safe hubs, which could be gradually expanded outwards over time? No matter the approach, we are talking significant numbers of troops, and a lengthy duration if they are ever to be effective.

Which brings us to the next imponderable for conventional forces, which is that of political will and the willingness of Western governments to 'do the right thing' in the first instance, and decide whether to become engaged or not. This means to be able to go beyond more than the initial surge of public support for their troops, but instead remain engaged over the longer term as the casualties mount and the graphic imagery becomes ever present in the media and the consequent public debates. Similarly, this means to be able to stomache the cost involved against competing budgetary pressures far closer to home such as health budgets, education, and the gamut of social programs . . . the classic arguments of '*guns versus butter*'. Remove conventional forces from this equation, insert lesser numbers, less visible, and at less cost? Sounds rather attractive to being able to commit with political will and public support over whatever mid- to longer term that may be necessary to ensure success. And we should never consider fooling ourselves that any such venture would ever be accomplished in anything but the longer term.

Reconsider other pressures, the urge '*to be seen to be doing something*'. Yes, in the absence of large conventional forces you have surrendered a certain level of insecurity to the opposition and will see schools leveled, women raped, and other forms of intimidation and repression. However it is suggested that you will see this in any event, until such time as success is achieved. Unless, of course, you could in some fashion solve the question of mass and 'numbers' and be able to be in all places, at all times. (Revert therefore to the earlier imponderable posed on mass.)

So what would unconventional forces do, to better enable success? Recognize first that there are many heads to this hydra. What we would seek to do is to gradually remove one head after another. We would do so incrementally, over time, in cumulative effect. We would target and raid the recruiters, the training camps, their infrastructure, and their leadership. We would select appropriate targets and strike them, the key point being that this would be on our own terms and at a time and place of our own choosing. We would seize back the initiative, and there would be the impact of never quite knowing who, when or where we would be striking next. We would often use the cover of darkness, and seek to be gone before anyone were to see us. We would, if you will, become a cloud of avenging angels. The result is incremental and cumulative. The tactic is a classic turning of the tables.

What about intelligence to locate these targets? To which the counter is: would this in any significant fashion be different than whatever forms of intelligence we have with conventional forces? Either less or more effective? (A draw).

What about basing locations? In or out of country, we get into the legalities of where

to mount our operations from. Again, perhaps this is no different from the same question posed from the employment of conventional forces, and their mandate, both practical and legal, to need to be based 'somewhere'. The only difference in fact is the use of a surgical tool, rather than a sledgehammer. Whatever legal mandate is required internationally remains the same, whether it be for NATO, the UN, or some other form of coalition. A key difference, however, being that any locations must effectively be with an invisible footprint, lacking visible boots-on-the-ground. We would instead be at all times within the wire, in the form of a fortified Fort Apache. Our sorties outside would instead, to the maximum extent possible, be invisible. The implication being the opposite from our present stance, and that any basing would be in remote locations away from habitation. Usefully, such a posture would tend to tip the scales where we require these other governments' consent for basing.

These are the main elements of a debate, discussion or argument. There certainly are others. But perhaps this is sufficient, at the moment, for the West to collectively ponder whether or not we have been asking ourselves the right question.

Postscript:

This discussion is not NATO-specific, but is instead with regards the West in general.

The situation posed is also not country-specific and is neither Iraq nor Afghanistan, but instead is more general to the next situation-X. Whether it could be effectively applied in theatres where we are presently engaged would require some further thought as to losses and gains. In those postures we no longer have the freedom of a blank sheet. However, we could learn from these experiences, before the next such engagement.

Nor is the argument that the West can do without conventional forces. Not so, and they will certainly have a role to play in other emerging scenarios of the future (an entirely separate discussion). But the point must be that conventional forces are engaged against a conventional threat, and are inappropriate for the reasons stated for asymmetric warfare.

The author is not of a Special Forces bent or bias. Instead, his most recent operational tour was active warfighting operations in the Middle East, in the context of a British Armoured division.

Dropping down from coalition to instead the national level, this doctrine is, arguably, most useful to low—or mid-ranking powers such as Canada and appeals to our relative lack of mass—yet the quality of our forces at unit size or smaller, the initiative of our soldiers, and so on. On its merits, however, the thrust of doctrine taking this form is equally applicable to more major powers such as the US, the UK and France, and collectively to whatever form a common undertaking will take, be it NATO or otherwise.