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On a pale horse? Conceptualizing narcotics production in southern Afghanistan and its relationship to the Narcoterror Nexus

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The purpose of this short note is to examine the so-called ‘Narcoterror Nexus’ in Afghanistan through the lens of a conceptual model of heroin production and distribution for the region. The western media, the UN, and the law enforcement community have portrayed the linkage between narcotics production and the Taliban insurgency in near-apocalyptic terms, while the issue has been used for domestic political purposes in various countries to call into question the efficacy of the western military effort against the Taliban and the reconstruction support provided to its allies in Afghanistan. Consequently, there are numerous misconceptions and assumptions that have perhaps distorted the reality of the situation in that country.

There are, no doubt, a variety of classified studies generated by the American Drug Enforcement Administration, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and their British and German equivalents. This study is not informed by access to classified information or sources from them. It is by no means exhaustive and does not pretend to be comprehensive. Its purpose is to propose one possible method to understand the reality of how the Taliban and the narcotics producers interact and thus inject some better-grounded assumptions than are presently available.

The popular portrayal of the situation

Let us allow a series of chronological media headlines to set the stage and establish the context of our problem as understood in the popular domain:

Business as Usual for Traffickers?

-BBC online, November 2001

Heroin Oils Afghan War Machine.

-The Guardian, October 2001

End of Taliban Will Bring Rise in Heroin.
Let us then establish the process by which heroin is produced and transported in very general terms. First, there is demand for heroin (or opiates in general) in North America and Europe and an individual chooses to meet that demand. They then decide where to get the product to feed the need. The main heroin-producing regions in the world are: Southwest Asia (Afghanistan and Pakistan); Southeast Asia (Burma, Laos, and Thailand); and Latin America (Mexico and Colombia). Each of these regions possesses a variety of organizations that compete to service the narcotics market with an array of products, one of which is heroin. These
operations cooperate in varying degrees to establish ‘turf’, i.e. North America is serviced by Colombian and Mexican organizations. The servicing organizations may select the specific areas they wish to acquire the product from. This will depend on the nature of law enforcement, climate, time of year, transportation routes, and pure economics.

An individual must plant the seed and then cultivate the poppy plant from which heroin is derived. Opium must be extracted from the plants. As Zerell, Ahrens, and Gerz have demonstrated, traditional heroin production in Afghanistan includes the collection of raw opium from poppy plants from which a morphine base is made from a combination of hot water, calcium oxide, and ammonium chloride. The morphine base is modified with acetic anhydride and sodium carbonate to make a brown heroin base of about 50% purity. With the addition of hydrochloric acid, activated carbon, and ammonia, a white heroin base is formed. Then, when an acetone/hydrochloric acid process is employed, the final white heroin hydrochloride product approaching 74% purity is created. In this process, 70 kg of raw opium becomes 3.9 kg of white heroin.

In general, there are three primary transportation routes to markets in Europe from Southwest Asia. The first route, and most obvious, is directly by air. The second route is by sea from the Indian Ocean to the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean or around Africa to European destinations. The third route is over land through the former Soviet Union or from Iran to Turkey, the Balkans, and then European destinations. All of these methods require task-oriented logistics networks to move the product to distribution nodes in European cities. The final stages of the process are the simplest: heat up and inject or snort the product and get high.

How long has this process been operating throughout history? The best answer is that as long as opium has been a commodity, somebody has provided it to end-users. Generally, however, heroin use seems to have exploded after the Second World War in the 1950s with the jazz culture and then use geometrically expanded to coincide with the 1960s’ counter-culture. We can safely say that the process described above has existed in some form in Afghanistan since the 1960s: 20 years before the Mujahideen opposed the Soviet occupation; 35 years since the Taliban were formed; and 40 years before Operation Enduring Freedom and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force arrived in Afghanistan to combat Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their allies. The only thing that appears to have really changed is the amount of product being delivered, how much money is being made from it, and where exactly that money goes.

**Narcotics production and movements during the Taliban era**

There are a lot of popular myths about where the Taliban stood on the issue of poppy growing and heroin production. The dominant paradigm circa 2004 goes like this: the Taliban, since they were a religious fundamentalist Islamic movement, forbade the growth, distribution, and use of poppy, opium and heroin when they were in power from 1996 to 2001 and rigidly enforced anti-opium
measures while in power. Statistics allegedly demonstrate that after the Taliban were removed, there has been a record poppy crop in Afghanistan every year from 2002 to 2008. This information is used to retroactively ‘prove’ that, since the production numbers during the Taliban era were much lower, the situation was somehow benign then, is worse now and thus the current NATO-backed government is a failure. (The absurd logic that falls out of this is, therefore, that we should not have toppled the Taliban because they were suppressing the drug trade.)

The reality of the situation was that narcotics production in Afghanistan is estimated to have increased by 25% the year after the Taliban took control of southern Afghanistan in 1996. Nearly, 97% of this product came from Kandahar and Helmand provinces. Keeping in mind that the Taliban were essentially created and supported by the Pakistani government, it is reasonable to accept that there are linkages between what was happening in Afghanistan and in Pakistan when it came to narcotics production and transportation.

Former Pakistani Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, ‘claims that the Pakistani Army Chief of Staff General Afzal Beg, together with the Director General of the Inter-Services Intelligence service (ISI) asked Sharif’s permission to smuggle heroin to fund covert operations’ in the Kashmir. Pakistan then played a role in developing Afghan poppy production in the 1980s and 1990s. How was this done?

Loretta Napoleoni argues that ‘The Afghan narcotics industry, the largest in the world, was assembled during the anti-Soviet jihad by the ISI in cooperation with the Mujahideen to fund the war against Moscow’. It appears as though the primary organization that handled the hands-on aspect of the struggle was Hizb-i-Islami, controlled by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Hizb-i-Islami or HiG ‘operated many of the heroin laboratories along the Pakistan border, and some of his allies in the Pakistani intelligence services were deeply implicated in the international drug trade’. The links between the ISI and Hizb-i-Islami are well documented. That relationship clearly played a role later when Hizb-i-Islami allied itself with the Taliban. By the late 1990s, Helmand province was essentially one big poppy production zone and Hekmatyar’s narcotics organization was ensconced in it in partnership with local power brokers. The dramatic increase in narcotics production in 1997 and then its doubling in 1998–1999 is therefore no coincidence with the confluence of these entities in southern Afghanistan.

The Taliban permitted the narcotics producers to carry out their business as long as they paid tithes, which initially amounted to 10% of the take, up to 25% later on. Taliban forces provided security for transportation of the product, particularly the overland routes that were available at the time. In 1999, there were four primary routes out of Helmand and northern Kandahar provinces:

1. Kandahar to Quetta and then to Karachi, Pakistan;
2. south from Helmand to the border town of Baram Chah and then to Pasni, Pakistan;
through Nimroz province and then into Iran; and
to Herat and then Iran and Turkmenistan.

The Taliban also conducted what Alain Labrousse calls a ‘pseudo-campaign’
against narcotics for the benefit of the UN and other potential aid donors. The
pseudo-campaign had little discernable impact on opium production. Media
outlets parroted Taliban propaganda with statements like ‘UN drug control
officers said the Taliban religious militia has nearly wiped out opium production
in Afghanistan’ or ‘Some UN officials privately believes that the Taliban have
not received enough credit for controlling drugs’.

The Pakistani end of the operation dramatically expanded during this time, in
part because of an agreement reached between Pakistan and Taliban-controlled
Afghanistan, called the Afghan trade and transit agreement (ATTA) which
essentially ‘opened’ the ‘border’. Note that the collection of Quetta merchants
who funded and supported the Taliban in the early years was primarily concerned
about banditry along the Quetta–Kandahar highway because it was affecting
their ability to make money. Similarly, having a strong independent Afghan
government in Kandahar was equally inimical to profit-making because the
Quetta merchants would have to pay taxes and levies to Afghanistan. The ATTA
opened things up to the benefit of Pakistani merchants at the expense of
Afghanistan.

The Treaty also fuelled ‘a massive illegal smuggling network’, which when
combined with the narcotics trade, ‘created an artificial system of exchange in
smuggled goods’. The ‘smuggling mafia…has created massive cross-border
operations. These operations were conducted every day under the watchful eyes
of the local and national authorities in both countries’.

However, a significant air route emerged by 1997. The infamous modern
version of Catch-22’s Milo Minderbinder, Viktor Bout, was contracted by the
northern Alliance to fly weapons and ammunition into northern Afghanistan
using Bout’s fleet of Illyushins and Antonovs. When one of his aircraft was
intercepted near Kandahar and seized by the Taliban, Bout gained a new client –
while at the same time continuing to service Massoud and the northern Alliance,
who were also exporting opium to fund their war in the north. For Bout, it was
weapons in, drugs out. Western intelligence agencies were already watching,
suspect[ing] that some of the Persian Gulf royals were using [flights] as cover the
export Afghan heroin’ via the United Arab Emirates and the Sudan in Africa, and
then detected a similar pattern with several large transport aircraft connected to
Bout-owned shell companies. The Taliban-controlled Ariana Airlines, also
supported by other Bout enterprises, was strongly suspected of moving product.

In essence, the state of play from 1996 to 2001 had the Taliban regime using
taxes from the trade to fund their government and, in return, it protected the
movement of the product out of the country. Hekmatyar’s HiG (and others)
provided conversion laboratories, received the product from poppy farming clans
in Helmand and Kandahar, and probably acted as liaison between those clans and
the Taliban, who in turn had a relationship with Viktor Bout to move the product out. The Pakistani ISI organized, abetted and monitored aspects of the process, though the full nature of their involvement remains shadowy. It is not a stretch to suggest that narcotics production played a substantial economic role in maintaining the Taliban regime in power, as Neamatollah Nojumi explained, ‘Controlling Helmand was crucial for the Taliban movement and they completed the task very rapidly’. The regime knowingly responded to outside incentives and pressures to maintain its position despite its public denials to the contrary.

After 9/11
To what extent did Operation Enduring Freedom, when unleashed in 2001, alter this state of affairs? The removal of the Taliban regime lifted the enforced tithing. After the assassination of a key elder in Quetta, a blood feud broke out between Hekmatyar’s organization and the clans in Helmand province, which temporarily disrupted activities in that region. The Afghan Interim Administration (AIA) announced that opium production was illegal and unIslamic; however, because the AIA was unable to project power throughout the south outside of Kandahar City, the ability of the new government to enforce their edicts was practically non-existent. Taliban remnants retreated into northern Helmand, western Oruzgan, and northwestern Kandahar provinces to continue the struggle. Viktor Bout’s Taliban support operation was, obviously, shut down inside Afghanistan. The transport and smuggling mafias in Pakistan were not and could not be shut down, and the farmers in southern Afghanistan continued to grow opium.

Operation Enduring Freedom had no poppy eradication mandate, but, in 2003, a schizophrenic American policy emerged. Military personnel handling counterinsurgency operations knew instinctively that eradication would force farmers and their families into opposing the government, and that the Taliban and their allies would exploit this, so they opposed the use of military forces for eradication. At the same time, the US State Department, the US Drug Enforcement Administration, and the British government tried to influence the AIA into conducting eradication. Indeed, in 2002, rioting broke out in southern Helmand and a number of farmers were wounded and killed by AIA forces. Having inherited a long-standing state of affairs vis-à-vis opium production in the country, and, at the same time, under pressure from its primary supporters, the AIA created a variety of counter-narcotics units including the poorly named Afghan Eradication Force, later called the Poppy Eradication Programme. These organizations have operated in southern Afghanistan with debatable success.

The US Presidential election process in 2003–2004 also played a significant role in distorting the issue. Criticism of the ‘lack of progress’ in stopping poppy cultivation became a cudgel to beat the Republican party with during the campaign. Uncontextualized statistical data from the UN, which essentially depicted the ‘problem’ as ‘out of control’, bolstered this perception. Even an episode of the television drama Law and Order breathlessly brought the
problem’ into middle class viewing audiences’ living rooms and implied that Afghan heroin was flooding American streets and killing American children (it was in fact Mexican and Colombian heroin, not Afghan).22

Academic, media, and national analyses were equally breathless and focused on the ‘Narcoterrorism Nexus’, an ill-defined term which emerged around early 2004.23 For the most part, these analyses were based on extremely generalized data and the answers that came out the other end were not only extremely generalized but also, in some cases, politicized. A distillation of ‘Narcoterrorism Nexus’ analysis broadly concludes that:

(1) The Taliban are nearly fully funded by narcotics profits.
(2) Security in the country has worsened in proportion to increased crop yields.
(3) There is a symbiotic relationship between the two.

The level of detail does not even come close to approximating the complex reality of the problem – there were few names of organizations or even individuals identified. Who are the players? How are they organized? Nobody explained where, exactly, the money really went. It was – and remains – all rather vague.

Testimony in the American House of Representatives’ Committee on International Relations in February 2004 is illustrative. Karen Tandy, Head of the DEA, stated that:

Many have suggested that there must be financial ties between drugs and terrorism in Afghanistan. At this time, we do not have evidence capable of sustaining an indictment of direct links between terrorism and narcotics trafficking groups in Afghanistan. To the extent that allegations have been raised based on more than speculation, they generally come from single sources. Clear corroborating evidence of such sources has been difficult to obtain . . . Raw intelligence and uncorroborated confidential sources continue to indicate possible relationships . . .24

Thomas W. O’Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict also added that:

In Afghanistan, the illegal narcotics industry is comparatively fragmented with numerous organizations and smuggling networks involved in the trade. In addition, the extremist and terrorist elements in Afghanistan, which are also fragmented . . . do not control narcotics networks. So in Afghanistan, the problem we see consists of linkages and cooperative arrangements between disparate trafficking elements, extremist groups, and sometimes local leaders and militia commanders.25

There were – and are – linkages. How exactly does it all work?

The view from the Durand Line

Because of our lack of access to specific intelligence data on individuals, groups, or organizations, we will have to build a conceptual model or models that approximate the behaviour of the elements involved in the Afghanistan drug trade. Let us start with investment. Capital must be raised and invested to pay for vehicles, bribes to security forces, to establish contact with farmers inside
Afghanistan, and even to provide seed and fertilizer. This can be done on both sides of the Durand Line, but, in the early days, the only functioning banking and supply system was in Pakistan and since Quetta is the major financial and economic hub located near Helmand and Kandahar, it is likely that Quetta is the base for this activity. Who exactly are the investors? That is not clear: some may be from the region but many of them probably live nowhere near Quetta or even in Pakistan. Are some of them Taliban? Al Qaeda? ISI? Elements within the Pakistani armed forces? All of the above? We will come back to this later.

Contact people must then approach farmers inside Afghanistan and convince them to grow poppy. It is likely that this is not done on an individual basis and given the amounts of poppy required, entire communities would have to be negotiated with to do the job. That would bring tribal dynamics into play. A given tribe in any province will be vertically and horizontally integrated into the economic and social life of that province. Consequently, poppy cultivation is not some furtive ‘grow op’ like it is in Canada or in the USA. Everybody in the community has connections to those involved in cultivation, in one way or another. The contact people will have to understand the power relationships between the communities and tribes in the province – and those in power will have to take a cut of the action to permit the cultivation to be done.

Once the poppy is cultivated and the opium extracted, it must be processed. The question becomes, where does the processing take place? As we have seen with Zerell, Ahrens, and Gerz, there are certain chemicals required. Some can be obtained from other legitimate products, but at least one cannot – acetic anhydride. If the processing is done inside southern Afghanistan, acetic anhydride must be smuggled in from Pakistan or in a pinch from Iran. This will require access to the Pakistani transportation mafia networks in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. As Afghanistan transportation mafias grew after 2001, they demanded a slice of the action too. Those Afghan transport mafias will be owned by or have relationships to up-and-coming power brokers in Kandahar and Kabul. They will want another slice of the profits. If the processing is done in Pakistan, the raw opium will have to be transported from Helmand and Kandahar to facilities across the Durand Line. Again, the transportation mafias will play a role in this activity. Once the product is processed, it must continue on its way to the end-users in Europe and elsewhere. Again, the transportation mafias will have a say in how it gets to Karachi port or overland to Iran. The availability of at least three airfields near Quetta provides other options including Gulf state destinations and beyond.

If we are looking for a Taliban-drug nexus, or even a terror-drug nexus, where would it be? Taliban, Al Qaeda, or HiG leaders or personnel would have to occupy positions or play roles in the investment, cultivation, transportation, or processing phases of the operation. Taliban, HiG, and Al Qaeda cooperate and support each other via the Quetta Shura, or the command council for the south, but it is possible that they independently interact with the drug trade.

It is unlikely that 100% of the investment in the narcotics trade in the south comes from Taliban, HiG, and Al Qaeda, even when their resources are
combined. There are just too many others who have been players in that scene for decades – far longer than Al Qaeda and the Taliban have existed as organizations. There are even limits to the power wielded by those three organizations. Determining exactly what percentage of investment comes from the insurgent groups is impossible using open sources.

Looking towards cultivation, we see again that the Taliban and associated groups also have limits on what they control. We would have to determine which districts and communities grow poppy in Helmand and Kandahar, and then determine which ones are under insurgent influence. It is unlikely that 100% of that territory is under insurgent influence, though vast swaths of Helmand are. The issue here, vis-à-vis the Taliban-drug ‘nexus’, relates to which tribal groupings support the Taliban and which do not, regardless of whether the Taliban is in power or not. The more probable scenario is a cooperative security arrangement whereby the Taliban provide security for the people in the cultivation areas and take a cut from that endeavour, rather than having the Taliban control cultivated areas and then paying off local power brokers to transport the product to Pakistan. This is a subtle but important difference. The Taliban and HiG are not the only armed groups that provide such security.

The Taliban by no means has a monopoly on transportation or the security of that transportation system either. In areas they influence in the south, the Taliban probably provide security to passing product-laden vehicles for a price or may even act as armed guards all the way to Pakistan. Again, there are other entities that provide security for a price as well – usually the poorly funded police forces.

When it comes to processing, HiG seems to possess the expertise on both sides of the Durand Line, but again that does not rule out non-insurgent players. It is difficult not to conclude that other entities are profiting from the Afghanistan narcotics trade to a greater degree than the Taliban.

We can say for certain that the Taliban influence some areas in southern Afghanistan, and some of those areas contain poppy cultivation activities. They profit from providing security to those areas and/or product moving through them. The Taliban will have to liaise with narcotics entities adjacent to areas they influence to deconflict their activities: those entities will include provincial and community power brokers and their security forces, plus the transporters. The Taliban probably have little control over the product once it reaches Pakistan where the processors take over – these processors could belong to a myriad of groups, including the Taliban and HiG. The transportation mafias, who will be independent entities from the Taliban, will play a dominant role from there.

Determining who, exactly, controls the Pakistani transportation mafias and higher narcotics structures is even more difficult to determine. Either some, all or none have Taliban control or influence, but again there are larger players in the game. Ayesha Siddiqa’s study of Pakistan’s military economy, *Military Inc.*, explains that the biggest player in over land transport in Pakistan is an organization called the National Logistics Cell (NLC). This is a military-owned transportation company that, in 1999–2000, carried 77% of private goods moved.
by road in Pakistan. The NLC reports to the Army’s Quartermaster General and ‘has one of the largest public sector transport fleets in Asia’. Notably, as Siddiqa points out, ‘NLC vehicles do not face the checks and controls that an ordinary transportation company is likely to encounter at the hands of customs, the police, and other authorities’. Is the NLC involved in narcotics transport? The probability is high given its dominance of the Pakistani transportation market.

The implications
What does this all mean? Most analysis and public commentary has placed too much emphasis on the centrality of the Taliban when it comes to involvement in narcotics production. The Taliban are not the leaders of this industry inside Afghanistan and certainly not in Pakistan. Yes, the Taliban movement does benefit from the narcotics trade at the tactical level inside Afghanistan and uses the relationships and conflicts between tribal entities for operational effect in the context of the larger war against the Afghan government. It is probable that the movement’s base in Quetta financially benefits from the trade to some extent, though there are other financial instruments deployed to support the effort, Zakat moved through Hawala banking systems for example.

Southern Afghanistan essentially functions as the growing area for a product that is for the most part processed, transported, and consumed elsewhere. It is only part of a larger transnational organism. The owners of the processing and transportation phases are in a better position to dramatically profit from the enterprise than the people who control the cultivation phase in Afghanistan. Those latter phases of the enterprise are variably and inextricably linked at multiple levels to the political and economic processes and people that constitute the nation – state of Pakistan – and have been for some decades.

Pursuit of an overly aggressive poppy eradication policy inside Afghanistan will destabilize this state of affairs and those that stand to lose from it will react to protect their commercial interests. Part of this reaction will be to use linkages to the Taliban – be they through retired or serving ISI personnel, HiG connections, supportive merchants, and the like – to influence Taliban operations and thus introduce a general or specific level of friction into the international effort to stabilize southern Afghanistan. This may be where the real ‘drug-terror’ nexus exists: an ambiguous symbiosis whereby both the Taliban movement and the narco-shadow state in Pakistan cooperate inconsistently on various levels, not the simplistic models provided by the media and other commentators. We will probably not see violent Cali–Medellin-like competition between interested entities. There may be no singular Pablo Escobar to hunt down. The protagonists may be too diffuse to even target effectively – or may reach into the higher spheres of governance so they cannot be targeted. Either way, the Narcoterror Nexus is not what the proponents suggest it is – it is, perhaps, something worse – and the situation is ignored at our peril.
Notes

2. Leland, *Hip*.
3. This sort of logic emerged during the US Presidential race in 2004 but is difficult to pin down in written media. It was deployed almost like a myth on the talk show circuit and entered the public consciousness via word of mouth.
6. Ibid., 187. Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid goes further and asserts that the CIA was involved, but offers no specific evidence. The issue of CIA involvement in global heroin production and trafficking goes back to allegations made over the conduct of the war in Laos and Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s in McCoy, *The Politics of Heroin*. The debate over the degree, nature, and extent of CIA complicity remains vociferous, with the more ragged edges leaning towards various conspiracy theories. Mohammad Yousaf, formally of the ISI, asserts that the CIA played merely a supporting role in the 1980s anti-Soviet jihad and ISI ran everything when it came to dealing with insurgent groups. This presumably included the heroin trade which Yousaf notably does not address in his book *Afghanistan*.
10. Farah and Braun, *Merchant of Death*, 141.
15. Parry, ‘End of Taliban will bring Rise in Heroin’.
17. Ibid., 186.
18. Farah and Braun, *Merchant of Death*.
20. Hafvenstein, *Opium Season*, 130
21. The author was present in Kandahar in 2003 while this problem played itself out.
22. Episode 335 of ‘Law and Order’ was entitled ‘Enemy’ and aired on 1 December 2004.
23. There are almost too many to mention. Examples include Taylor, *The Nexus of Terrorism and Drug Trafficking in the Golden Crescent*; McGirk, ‘Terrorism’s Harvest’, 1–3; Anderson, ‘The Taliban’s Opium War’; Scarborough, ‘Osama Bin Laden a Narco-Terrorist’; and Chouvy, ‘Narco-Terrorism in Afghanistan’ notes, refreshingly, that the drug issue is not new to Afghanistan.
25. Ibid., 24.
27. Siddiqua, *Military Inc.*, 115, 144
Bibliography


