

CANADA AND UN PEACEKEEPING: COLD WAR BY OTHER MEANS, 1945-1970

By Dr. Sean M. Maloney

St. Catharines: Vanwell Publishing Ltd., 265 pages, \$35.00.

Reviewed by Major David Last

“UN peacekeeping,” Sean Maloney argues, “was but one blue-feathered arrow in Canada’s Cold War quiver: the others had nuclear and conventional heads.” (p. 249) He has written an uncompromising and soundly researched history of Canadian contributions to peacekeeping, describing them as part of the strategy for preserving Western interests in the confrontation with the communist world that lasted from the Second World War to the fall of the Berlin Wall. Canada’s NATO and UN contributions were part of a coherent strategy, and Canada was an important player in the Cold War. I finished the book with a comment and three questions. First, surely there is room for some humility about Canada’s central role in the peacekeeping story, and perhaps this would change the perception that peacekeeping is just another blue-feathered arrow in a Cold War arsenal. Our Cold War role in peacekeeping supported NATO, but the conflicts were not all about our interests and us. The questions prompted by the book are more important. Is it possible to write a national history of an international endeavour without changing the story? And, having viewed the story of international peacekeeping through the lens of national strategy, what does it tell us about converging ideas of peacekeeping and warfighting? Most important, where are the other histories of the many campaigns in Canada’s 50 years of peacekeeping?

Like the majority of officers serving in Canada’s forces today, Sean Maloney is a product of the Cold War. A reserve force reconnaissance officer, he was the brigade historian who produced the definitive history of Canada’s brigade in Germany, *War without Battles*. His doctoral research explored Canada’s nuclear policy, soon to be published as *Learning to Love the Bomb: Canada’s Cold War Strategy and Nuclear Weapons, 1951-1968*. It was in researching Canada’s nuclear strategy that he came across documents casting a new light on Canada’s peacekeeping motivations. Canada’s contribution to peacekeeping during the Cold War was fundamentally an adjunct to our NATO strategy. This is an important antidote to the ideas that Canada had no coherent strategy, or that our NATO contribution is an embarrassment to our peacekeeping record.


We learn from recently declassified Cold War plans and from internal memos and correspondence that the UN Truce

Supervision Organization (UNTSO), the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), and the International Commission of Supervision and Control (ICSC) in Viet Nam were economy of force missions supporting the security of potential base areas for America-Britain-Canada (ABC) nuclear warfighting plans. UN collective security mechanisms failed because of the East-West deadlock in the Security Council, and NATO had to make its own plans for security. By 1954, NATO thus became the central pillar of Canadian security policy. Peacekeeping throughout the 1950s was a sideshow to the new facts of nuclear confrontation. Like its allies, Canada viewed all conflicts and their outcomes through the lens of East-West competition, whether that is how the local belligerents viewed the conflicts or not. Thus, “Iran was secured from communist control in 1954” (p. 40), though this might now be seen as part of the unfortunate prelude to today’s “clash of civilizations.” In the 1950s, peacekeeping was a vehicle for managing conflict outside the NATO area in the economic and strategic interests of Canada’s allies. The UN Emergency Force (UNEF) was conceived as a robust force by Canadian General Tommy Burns before it was proposed by Pearson, and it was really about extricating Britain and France and reopening the Suez Canal, rather than resolving any dispute between the Arabs and Israelis. Maloney is critical of the legacy of the first peacekeeping force:

There would be more ad hoc operations mounted. There would be belligerent interference in UN force structuring in later operations. There would be disparity between a UN Force Commander’s minimum requirements and what he is actually provided on the ground to work with. UN forces would remain light forces with vague enforcement mandates and minimal capabilities. (p. 75)

True, but true because these are not just our conflicts — they affect the interests of the belligerents more than our own. The Suez crisis was also about nationalism, decolonization and North-South inequities. Burns suggested a force that would support Western strategic interests. Hammarskjöld, Bunche and Pearson shaped a force that might have helped to resolve the conflict. This is one of the places where a national history of an international endeavour falls short of telling the whole story — peacekeeping is not just about the strategic interests of the larger powers pushing it.

The Canadian story gets really interesting in 1958. Fear of the consequences of nuclear war drove people like Howard Green and Norman Robertson in External Affairs to link peacekeeping, disarmament and neutrality — if peripheral conflicts could be managed under the auspices



of the UN, the ideological conflict could be pushed aside and would not threaten us. We did not have to take sides at every turn. But as Maloney describes, we did take sides in conflicts like the Congo. Canada helped to deny the Soviet Union potential base areas, while preserving UN credibility essential in subsequent operations in Cyprus. Cyprus, in turn, was crucial to NATO's Cold War interests.

What does the Canadian peacekeeping story tell us about converging ideas of peacekeeping and warfighting? The constrained nature of our contributions to peacekeeping — a few observers here, some signallers there, an aircraft crew or two — meant that the military community seldom saw the bigger picture, despite being an active participant. This helps to explain how little we know about peacekeeping strategy and tactics after all these years of being the world's peacekeeper. There is an advantage to this. While the US was developing coherent ideas about the limits of foreign internal defence, counter-insurgency and the importance of legitimacy, Canada in blissful ignorance was living the peacekeeping myth of altruistic conflict resolution. And with the end of the Cold War, it turned out that that was exactly what was needed. It wasn't all about our wars and us after all. When Maloney writes, "undoubtedly the myth will continue to drive us into operations that have no bearing on defined Canadian interests," he is omitting an important epiphany of the Cold War and its aftermath. A threat to peace anywhere is a threat to peace everywhere, and Canada *does* have a defined interest in international peace and security. Furthermore, new collections of conflict data are demonstrating that the prevalence of intrastate conflict actually began in 1945, not 1989¹ — the Cold War just blinded us to it. Now peacekeeping for conflict resolution might be more important than peacekeeping for strategic advantage.

However, the most burning question is this: Where are the other histories of the many campaigns in Canada's 50 years of peacekeeping? For that matter, where are the other histories of Canada's military operations? The War Diaries Team at the Directorate of History and Heritage has a database of 94 Canadian operations between 1947 and 2001. Three projects are in progress to produce official histories of UN operations in the Congo (ONUC), in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the Air Operations over Yugoslavia. Maloney has provided the first good history of Canadian peacekeeping from 1945 to 1970, including the most important operations and several with low profiles (UNTEA in West Irian, UNYOM in Yemen and the International Control Commission in Laos, amongst others). Maloney's forthcoming books about the UN Protection Forces in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) and NATO's Kosovo operations will almost certainly be available before any of the official histories. If they live up to the standard set in this gripping and provocative book, we can anticipate some good reading. I hope it won't be long coming.

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NOTE

1. Nils Petter Gleditsch, Havard Strand, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg and Peter Wallensteen "Armed Conflict 1946-99: A New Dataset." Paper prepared for Identifying Wars: Systematic Conflict Research and Its Utility in Conflict Resolution and Prevention, a conference co-sponsored by the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, and the World Bank, Development Economics Research Group (DECRG), Uppsala, 8-9 June 2001.

LA SÉCURITÉ HUMAINE, UNE NOUVELLE CONCEPTION DES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES

Edited by Jean-François Rioux

Paris: Raoul-Dandurand Collection, Harmattan, 366 pages, no price given.

Reviewed by Fahim Yousofzai

The main theme of this book is human security in the international context of the post-Cold War period. The book is divided into three sections and its conclusion offers a synthesis of the subject.

The first section includes articles about theories of 'human security'. Early on, Charles-Philippe David and Jean-François Rioux define the concept of human security (pp. 20-30). They maintain that human security is linked to the humanitarian duty to intervene, and based on the assertion of universal human rights. In the present context, they write, the state is no longer the only legitimate protector of security. Daniel Colard then examines the concept of human security from a legal point of view (pp. 31-56), arguing that according to this perspective, human security is rooted in the foundation of the Red Cross (1864) and gained recognition with the United Nations' development of human rights and humanitarian law. Colard focuses on three defini-

tions of this concept: that of the former Director-General of UNESCO, Frédéric Mayor, for whom human security merges with the protection and defence of human dignity, that of Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who thinks "the most important thing is that the human being be at the center of all that we do," and that of the former Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, for whom "essentially ... human security means the protection of individuals against threats, whether or not these involve violence. It refers to a situation ... where there are no infringements on fundamental human rights, on people's safety, and indeed, on their lives." In the following chapter, Daniel Colard acknowledges that the field of application and the content of human security are vast, and that the impact this notion will have on international law and international relations is enormous, even revolutionary. In a subsequent article, Jean-Jacques Roche writes of the importance of taking a realistic approach to human security, and suggests that matters of security must be considered from a larger perspective than that adopted by the diplomatic-strategic tradition. He adds that it is the dysfunction of certain Third World states that poses the principal threats to individual security, and proposes "the transformation of these States into more civilized States," evoking "Decent States," the expression J. Rawls used in 1999 in *The Law of Peoples*. For Keith Krause, whose article is entitled "A Critical Approach to Human Security" (pp. 74-98), it is not

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sufficient merely to formulate a new idea. This idea must satisfy three conditions: it must be accepted and propagated by different players, it must affect practices, and it must affect the power of the new players.

The second section of the book brings together articles dealing with various aspects of human security. Guy Maurissette's article emphasizes the importance of water in relation to human security (pp. 101-111). Next, J.F. Guildhaudis (pp. 113-135) states that the concept of human security seems underdeveloped, incomplete and immature and needs further elaboration. Jean-Paul Hébert then analyzes human security and the new arms race (pp. 137-145). According to him, the new arms race, which pits the United States against European producers, is not taking place in an atmosphere of violence, but through the intermediary of economics and technology. Noting recent increases in military spending in industrialized countries, Hébert recommends that, as human security evolves, certain limitations should not be forgotten, such as the fact that the Anti-Personnel Mines Ban Treaty has not yet been ratified by the United States, Russia or China. This section ends with an article by Bernard Adam, who deals with initiatives aimed at fighting against the proliferation of small arms (pp. 145-156). Adam recommends reducing the availability and the use of small arms by efforts simultaneously directed at supply and demand, which would help to attain the dual goal of improving collective and individual security.

The third section of the book brings together articles based on the implementation of human security. Josiane Tercinet's analysis of "...the Security Council and human security" (pp. 159-179) follows Frédéric Ramel's study of "international economic institutions and human security..."

(pp. 182-203). Then there is a chapter by Michèle Bacot-Decriaud (pp. 205-221) and another by Marie-Claude Plantin (pp. 223-244), both of which discuss humanitarian action in the European Union. Next, Claude Garcin examines the penal aspects of human security (pp. 245-262), and Jean-François Rioux turns his attention to national defence in relation to human security (pp. 263-282). There is a case study of Canada by David Haglund and Jennifer Ross (pp. 282-300), and a study of human security and development assistance in Canada by Jean Daudelin (pp. 301-320). The last two chapters in this section are a case study by Stanislav Kirschbaum, devoted to human security and the democratization of Central Europe (pp. 321-331), and Jean-Paul Joubert's article dealing with the intervention of humanity (pp. 334-351).

In a conclusion that outlines the lessons to be drawn from human security for international relations (pp. 354-363), Jean-François Rioux maintains that "the human security approach is just beginning to evolve." He adds that it is a "more theoretical than practical" concept that "suffers from a problem of definition," and that it is legitimate to "...ask oneself what the ideological roots of the concept really are." At the same time, Rioux acknowledges that it is a new concept and that "never before has a foreign political doctrine so openly envisioned the primacy of the security of people in relation to that of States." He concludes that: "human security could bring about important changes, but only if the concept strongly influenced large non-governmental and inter-governmental organizations, several middle powers and some great powers."

Fahim Yousofzai is a professor in the business administration department at Royal Military College.

FLAGS OF OUR FATHERS

by James Bradley with Ron Powers

New York: Bantam. 376 pages, \$39.95.

Reviewed by Captain (N) A. Okros

Joe Rosenthal's photograph of six Marines raising the US flag on Iwo Jima has become an enduring symbol of not just the Marine Corps, but American wartime grit and determination. Like many war veterans, John Bradley, the last of the six to pass on, rarely spoke of his war experiences and eschewed the 'hero' designation which the media awarded him, simply stating that "the real heroes were the guys who didn't come back." Following Bradley's death in 1994, his son James sought to better understand his father's role in the Second World War, to learn more about "The Photograph", and to find out what had happened to the other five men forever frozen in triumph. *Flags of Our Fathers* provides his very personal account of the six Marines from their backgrounds, through their short military careers and, for the three who survived Iwo Jima, the challenges of sudden, glaring fame and adjustments to peacetime.

Although Bradley declares "I am not a professional scholar or researcher," he, along with co-author Ron Powers, gets to know the six through painstaking research: talking for hours with their families, their high school sweethearts and football team-mates and, especially, their

surviving Marine buddies, but also by reading the cherished letters home and visiting their hometowns. Throughout, he consciously tries to set aside preconceived notions to truly understand who these men really were — even the enigmatic Pima Indian, Ira Hayes, who lost his struggle with his many demons. The treatment of their upbringing provides an excellent snapshot of pre-war America, with many echoes north of the border: the geographic, ethnic and religious differences among the six overlaid by the commonalities they shared — poverty, a hard work ethic, religious faith, close families, including responsibilities for younger siblings, and a soon to be shattered innocence.


The ensuing chapters provide a brief overview of the events leading up to Iwo Jima. There is sufficient detail to follow the unfolding Pacific Theatre: from Manchuria through Pearl Harbour to the jungles of Guadalcanal and Bougainville and finally the amphibious assault of Tarawa. Paralleling these are the individual stories of the six — through boot camp to specialist training and months of rehearsals in Hawaii to hone battle skills and develop the tight bonds of cohesive units. In these portions, the reader is provided Bradley's perspectives on the prerequisites for combat success, the 'uniqueness' of being a Marine and the essentials of effective leadership. The knowledgeable reader will also recognize the evolutionary nature of warfare and the power of constantly applying lessons learned to new circumstances. Those drawn by Iwo Jima's Commander, Lieutenant

General Kuribayashi, from the German defences in Normandy proved, unfortunately, to be particularly effective.

The middle third of the book presents, in often horrific but sometime humorous detail, the exploits of the mis-named “Easy Company”, which included the majority of the flag raisers. Admiral Nimitz’ “Uncommon valor was a common virtue,” subsequently inscribed on the Marine Corps Memorial at Arlington, summarizes much of what Bradley puts into very real terms. In a month of fighting, Easy Company suffered 84 percent casualties. Included, of course, are the sequence of events leading to the first flag raising, the requirement for a second flag (after Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, asked to have the first), and the chance occurrences which brought the six men and three photographers together for what was, at the time, a rather inconsequential few minutes. Bradley follows the photo in the hands of the media by describing not only its riveting effect on the population, but also the simultaneous combination of myth making, hyperbole and sloppy fact checking which led to misconceptions, errors and misunderstandings, including the almost two-year delay in correctly identifying the last of the six men.

Bradley then turns his lens to homecomings and, especially, the PR campaigns which sought to capitalize on “The Photograph” and its instant heroes: stirring words in the US Congress, the unparalleled \$26 billion Seventh War Bond Tour, movies and monuments. Woven throughout are the efforts of the three survivors to deal with fame, meetings with presidents and celebrities (including scenes with John Wayne in the *Sands of Iwo Jima*), and the constant press coverage. As Bradley shows in comments from other veterans, the three probably provided a representative sample of those who came back from war: Ira Hayes loosing his

10-year battle with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression and alcoholism, Rene Gagnon constantly seeking that elusive lucky break to capitalize on his name, and John Bradley stoically distancing himself from the media myth and refusing to discuss any of the events, even with his own family. Author Bradley eventually comes full circle, describing his father’s passing, his eulogy which emphasized his service to the community and not his war record, and the three boxes of letters and memorabilia which set Bradley off on his four-year quest for knowledge.



At its core, *Flags of Our Fathers* is about values: the values the six acquired as depression-era youths, those instilled in them during formative Marine training and which sustained them in the hell of combat and, especially for John Bradley, the values which guided him in his successful transition from war hero to prosperous citizen and pillar of the community. In its telling, James Bradley provides not just a moving eulogy from a grateful son to his father, but a tribute from the generations who followed to those who sacrificed so much. Eminently readable, *Flags of*

Our Fathers is recommended as a good story, well told with insightful observations on war at its most visceral level. Of greater importance, the key messages of this book are invaluable for those who would seek to transform highly diverse, naïve individuals into cohesive teams which can persevere in the face of a well prepared, seasoned foe determined to exact the highest possible toll for each inch of ground yielded. In an era tantalized by the promise of victory solely through precision-guided munitions, *Flags of Our Fathers* is a sobering reminder of the necessities, and realities, of putting boots on the ground.

Captain (N) A. Okros is Director of the Canadian Forces Leadership Academy in Kingston.

A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA IN THE AGE OF GENOCIDE

by Samantha Power

New York: Basic Books, 611 pages, \$44.95.

Reviewed by Major Arthur Gans

I guess you know you are getting old when what other people regard as history are events which happened during your lifetime. Such is the case with Samantha Power’s book, *A Problem from Hell*. With the exception of the first event, the Armenian Genocide of 1915-16, all of the events covered in this book have happened during my lifetime. [For a visual history of the Armenian Genocide, you might want to see Atom Egoyan’s new movie *Ararat* which is now playing in theatres.]

Samantha Power is the executive director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. She is a graduate of

Harvard Law School and also was a war correspondent in the former Yugoslavia. Her work in this book is very detailed and backed by a very complete set of notes.

This has been one of the most difficult books that I have ever read. I was born in the United States and spent the first 36 years of my life in that country. Although I have chosen Canada as my home, I do still have strong feelings about the country of my birth. Yet I must say that after reading this book, some of those feelings have been destroyed. For this is the story of genocide in the 20th century. It is the story of a number of incidents of the attempted destruction of whole peoples by others, and it is the story of how the United States, as a matter of policy, not only failed to stop these actions, but also prevented other countries who wished to do so from coming to the aid of the victims. It is a story which I had to read in small portions at a time because I grew so angry at the deliberate actions which continually reversed the “Never Again!” which we all heard at the end of the Second World War.

There are heroes in this story, including Raphael Lemkin, who almost single-handedly brought the Convention Against Genocide into being. There are politicians like Senators Claibourne Pell and William Proxmire, and congressmen like Frank McCloskey, who put their own political lives on the line to work, often against their own party administration, for the passage of the Genocide Convention. There are soldiers like our own Roméo Dallaire and the American General Wesley Clarke, who tried to convince governments of the necessity to intervene. There are a number of reporters and diplomats who risked going to places where genocide was erupting, and who attempted to get the story of this crime against humanity out to the public.

There are also villains from many US administrations who ignored what was happening because it was not considered to be of vital interest. Some of those administrations even assisted those committing genocide, because, for the time being, they were acting as their surrogates. One such surrogate was Saddam Hussein, whose battles against Iran brought a certain amount of American support.

It would be impossible for me to list all of the heroes or all of the villains in this review. But it is important to recognize that anyone who says that these actions, war crimes and crimes against humanity were carried on in the dark is simply lying. The information was there. Much of it was in official diplomatic intelligence. The governments knew what was happening, and a conscious decision was made by successive American administrations to avoid using the “G” word because they really understood that if they did use it, they would have to take action.

Why is it important for soldiers to read this book? Soldiers live in a world that is controlled by politicians, most of whom have never served in the military. These

politicians often make decisions which ignore military realities, but which are politically popular. Some soldiers also become involved in the political side of things, and forget that the real function of a military force is to place its soldiers’ bodies between those who would harm the innocent and those who must be defended. That is the high calling of our vocation, our profession. But sometimes we fail to learn lessons from history and allow our experiences or those of others to bend our thinking. This happened in the Pentagon on several of these genocidal occasions, when previous missions and the tragedies connected with them caused senior officers to determine that their soldiers should not be used to stop a horrific crime against humanity. They even had a name for it — “combatant immunity.”

I think every commander of troops and every policy maker in Canada should read this book. Not only to see the history of the past, but to look seriously at the future. For better or for worse, we are joined in alliance with the Americans and with NATO. The decisions that are made by the Americans and NATO are going to have a lot to do with how our military is used, where it is used, and why it is used. Therefore, it is important for those who are in decision-making positions, now and in the future, to be truly aware of the ways in which our allies make the decisions which will affect us all. This book deals with one very serious factor in that decision-making process; namely, the use of genocide as a weapon against entire populations. It is important for us to recognize it and to understand the processes by which these decisions are made. Power has done all of us a great favour by shedding a strong light upon a series of decisions that have had immense consequences in the history of the world, and will probably continue to affect us in the future.

Major (ret’d) the Rev. Arthur Gans *is a retired chaplain who has a special interest in military ethics.*

THE FINAL INVASION: PLATTSBURGH, THE WAR OF 1812’S MOST DECISIVE VICTORY

by David G. Fitz-Enz

Cooper Square Press, 269 pages, \$42.95.

Reviewed by Major John R. Grodzinski

The *Final Invasion* is a study of the British offensive into northern New York in September 1814, which ended with the American naval victory near Plattsburgh on Lake Champlain, and the British land commander’s decision to retreat back to Canada. It claims, perhaps correctly, to be the first book-length study of this important aspect of the War of 1812, although much of the same ground was covered by Alan S. Everest in his book, *The War of 1812 in the Champlain Valley* (Syracuse, 1981). *The Final Invasion* has received several positive reviews and the author, Colonel (ret’d) David Fitz-Enz, has been awarded the Distinguished Writing Award by the Army Historical Foundation for this work. This is his second book, but his first title dealing with military history.

The author’s central thesis is that once the British offensive — based on a ‘secret plan’ drawn up in London — failed, the Plattsburgh campaign fell into obscurity as “the British

kept it confidential for over a century.” This claim hinges on a secret order received by Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost in July 1814 that outlined British offensive plans in North America for the remainder of 1814. Described in the introduction as “one of the best kept secrets in military and diplomatic history,” Fitz-Enz informs us that he obtained “a rare copy” of the order from a descendant of Sir George Prevost. He also claims that the original document went missing sometime after 1922. This is not accurate. A copy of this ‘secret order’ was obtained from the Prevost family in the first decade of the 20th century, and has been available in the Colonial Office documents (CO 42, Secretary of State, In Letters, Canada) at the Public Record Office since 1910. It can also be found at the National Archives of Canada (CO 42/146 or CO 43/23) in Ottawa. Furthermore, the full text of the document was printed in 1965 in J. Mackay Hitsman’s *The Incredible War of 1812* (re-issued in a revised edition by Robin Brass Studio in 1999). In fact, historians have known about and used this document for decades. Its existence and contents are well known and, as a result, Fitz-Enz is not shedding new light on this aspect of the Plattsburgh campaign.

The author’s thesis therefore stands on rather shaky ground, and his position is further eroded by his poor scholarship. *The Final Invasion* lacks a bibliography and contains very few citations. Those it does possess reveal a very limit-

ed use of the relevant primary and secondary sources for the Plattsburgh campaign. Several key documents and studies are totally ignored. The author consulted the diary (actually the memoir, as much of it was written years after the war) of Sir George Prevost's daughter, but he neglected to consult the surviving papers of Major-General Frederick Robinson, one of the British brigade commanders at Plattsburgh. These papers are found in the Special Collections of The Royal Military College of Canada and include that officer's fascinating journal of the campaign. This is a major omission on Fitz-Enz's part, as this journal contains many relevant and interesting facts on the campaign.

Among the many relevant secondary works that the author could have consulted profitably are *Wellington's Headquarters* by S.P.G. Ward, probably the best single study on British army staff organization, the essential *Peninsular Preparation* by Richard Glover, the best overall analysis of the army for this period, and Hitsman's *Incredible War of 1812*, which incorporates that historian's own research into the generalship of Sir George Prevost. As a result of the author ignoring these works, several critical aspects of the structure and principles of command and control of the British Army — and how these evolved over nearly twenty years of continual warfare — are missing or incorrectly interpreted. For example, Prevost was both the governor-general and commander-in-chief of British North America. As such, he answered directly, in terms of strategic policy and operational matters, to the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies and not, as the author believes, to the War Office or Horse Guards. His contact with that department was limited to such routine administrative matters as officer postings and promotions. Lord Bathurst, the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, was primarily responsible for the prosecution of the war in North America, not the Duke of York, the commander-in-chief of the British Army at the War Office. It is (and was) a very confusing command organization, but any historian who writes on the British Army during the War of 1812 should first master its complexities.

Due to his limited research into that army, the author tends to perpetuate many myths. He also fails to acknowledge that nearly two decades of conflict had given the British considerable experience and accelerated the promotion of officers by merit, rather than by birth or purchase. By 1814, only about 20 percent of the British officer corps owed their rank to purchase; the remainder had earned it the hard way.

The author appears to have misunderstood the strength and composition of the invading British, and has repeated a myth regarding the participation of "Wellington's Peninsular veterans" in the campaign. In this case, the author is not alone. The figure often presented of 15,000 British troops employed in the British division at Plattsburgh is based on British military records in the National Archives of Canada. Historians have often overlooked two other important returns dated at Plattsburgh and Odelltown in September 1814, which only appear in the Colonial Office records found in the same institution. These documents provide a total strength of approximately 10,000 officers and men. However, deducting the sick, other detached personnel and those absent for other reasons, the division upon reaching Plattsburgh probably numbered no more than 8,200. Six of the 14 infantry battalions in Prevost's army came from Wellington's Peninsula Army. As two of these battalions and the greater part of two others served on the line

of communications, they were not present at Plattsburgh. The author also exaggerates the level of British desertion, at one point implying that it was as high as 1,000 men. This estimation is completely without foundation — the two documents noted above show that, between 6 and 15 September, the army lost 239 deserters, most coming from three units which had never served with Wellington, and one being a Swiss mercenary unit notorious for high rates of desertion. The one brigade composed entirely of Peninsular units did not lose a single man to desertion. Scrupulous scholarship would have avoided these incorrect statements. This reviewer knows of only two living historians, Donald E. Graves and Alan S. Everest, who have studied these two documents in detail.

There are many minor errors of fact in this book — entirely too many. The Provincial Marine (not Maritime) was part of the Quartermaster General Department and not under the "scrutiny" of the Royal Navy during the first year of the war. It ceased to exist in the spring of 1813 following the arrival of Commodore (not Admiral) Sir James Yeo. The New York militia colonel, Solomon Van Rensselaer, was not killed at Queenston Heights in 1812; he survived the war to publish an interesting memoir in 1836. The appointments held by William Henry Robinson and Frederick Robinson are reversed between the text and the list of British participants in the appendices. William Henry Robinson was the Commissary General for North America and not a major-general. The British did not participate in the peace negotiations to end the war in Russia, but chose to deal directly with the Americans at Ghent (which was not, in 1814, in Belgium, but rather in The United Kingdom of the Netherlands). The Royal Americans were the 60th and not the 62nd Foot. These could be characterized as minor errors, but the sheer number of such errors in this book is disturbing and this, combined with an apparent lack of editing resulting in technical problems such as proper capitalization (major-general Brock, for example) detract further from the text.

The study of history is basically a dynamic process of accretion. One historian takes a subject so far in terms of research and analysis, and another historian picks up from that point and broadens our knowledge and understanding of that subject with further research and analysis. Unfortunately, *The Final Invasion* is a backward step in this process because its central thesis is not founded on fact. Its text betrays the author's failure to use key primary sources and relevant secondary sources, which has led to fundamental errors regarding this campaign. This glaring weakness is compounded by the many factual errors in the text and the apparent lack of proper editing. As a result, this book cannot be regarded as a scholarly work or as a valuable addition to the literature of the War of 1812. It is a curious matter why it has earned so many accolades.

Unfortunately, with all this in mind, I cannot recommend *The Final Invasion* to any serious student of either the War of 1812 or military history. Until a better work on this subject appears, Alan S. Everest's *The War of 1812 in the Champlain Valley* remains the best overall study of the 1814 Plattsburgh campaign.

Major John R. Grodzinski is the G3 of the Land Force Doctrine and Training System and Managing Editor of the Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin, the professional journal of the Canadian Army.

A CENTURY OF SERVICE: CANADA'S ARMED FORCES FROM THE BOER WAR TO EAST TIMOR

by Jim Lotz

Halifax: The Nova Scotia International Tattoo Society, 180 pages, \$29.95.

FAMILY OF VOLUNTEERS: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE 48TH HIGHLANDERS OF CANADA



by George W. Beal

Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 176 pages, \$29.95.

Reviewed by Major Michael Boire

In *A Century of Service*, the author Jim Lotz and his editor Colonel (ret'd) John Boileau have produced an attractive and practical book while meeting their aim, which is to put "a human face on Canada's distinguished record in war and peacekeeping." Their paperback is concise and economical in its treatment of the military aspects of our nation's complex history. At a brisk pace, the reader is marched through one hundred years of our military history from the Boer War, our first intervention overseas at the end of the 19th century, to peace support operations in Kosovo and East Timor at the end of the millennium. The book is a first-rate overview, and would give good value as a high school textbook, as it introduces the reader to the significant moments of Canada's military history while avoiding the detailed analyses of more scholarly tomes. The book's most notable feature is its appealing visual effect. A balanced montage of war art, combat photos and good maps are complemented by straightforward commentary, which together presents the reader with an easy-to-read synopsis of a century's worth of Canadian military accomplishments.

It is unfortunate that the authors limited their good work to the last one hundred years of Canadian military history. In their engaging format, it would have been a pleasure to read about the Red River Expedition, the North West Rebellion, the Fenian Raids and, of course, the War of 1812. We can only hope that a subse-



quent edition will also include a complete rendition of Canadian military achievements of the 19th century. Lotz and Boileau have made a solid contribution by giving us a competent and engaging summary of the contributions of Canada's citizen-soldiers to the defence of the nation.

In *Family of Volunteers*, George Beal tells us the secret of success behind one of Canada's most famous regiments — Toronto's 48th Highlanders. The winning formula consists of volunteers, family and leadership. Beal spends some time explaining the voluntarism displayed by Canadians who continue to dedicate significant portions of their lives to service in the Canadian Militia. In the 48th, these citizen-soldiers have found a second family, with a bond among its members "no less emotional, no less visceral and no less real than one's biological family." Those who have spent time in a Militia regiment know that this is not an overstatement, but rather an accurate description of the profound commitment Militia service can create in young Canadian men and women. As for the crucial role of leadership in the regiment's life, the chapters dedicated to the unit's accomplishments in two world wars put in plain words the merit and value of brave men.

Beal's work spans the regiment's 111-year history, laying appropriate emphasis on its achievements in peace as well as war. In fact, the author breaks new ground in his treatment of the Canadian Militia. Few regimental histories have included a proper description of the difficulties faced by prominent and patriotic citizens who stepped forward to raise regiments for the Canadian Militia in the 19th century. Beal fills this gap with fascinating descriptions of the role played by prominent Torontonians in establishing the 48th as a feature of the city's life in the years before the Great War.

At a time when the Canadian Militia is about to be restructured, yet again, Beal's book can serve as a point of reference in discussions of the Militia's role in preserving and protecting our nation.

Major Michael Boire teaches history at Royal Military College.

SHADOW FLIGHTS: AMERICA'S SECRET AIR WAR AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION

by Curtis Peebles

Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 322 pages.

Reviewed by Dr. Sean M. Maloney

We now have in existence a generation of Canadians that have no memory of the Cold War. Attempts to explain this twilight struggle, its place in Canadian history, and the fact that it did not result in a war more


catastrophic than the First or Second World Wars are complicated by the difficulty in transmitting the *zeitgeist* and level of danger inherent to those times. Documenting the Cold War experience has never been easy, particularly in intelligence matters related to nuclear warfighting, yet Curtis Peebles, the author of several authoritative studies on the development of American reconnaissance programmes, has done a superb job of prizing the cover off some of the most secret events of that 45-year long conflict. Aerial reconnaissance was a most dangerous game, but the stakes were extremely high. Without the information gathered by these Cold Warriors, it was likely that the Western powers would not have triumphed and we would

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now be occupying a radioactive wasteland. Connected with the nuclear deterrent effort, aerial reconnaissance sent a message to the Communist adversaries that the NATO powers were 'on watch'.

The Gary Power/U-2 story and its place in the Cold War drama is not a new one, yet how many have heard of the exploits of British Spitfire reconnaissance pilots operating from Hong Kong against Communist China? Or the dangerous but critical RB-45C penetrations of the Soviet Union by the RAF for the purposes of revealing the locations of Moscow's air defences? Or the American use of unmanned balloons drifting through Soviet airspace to photograph vital nuclear facilities? Or the mass use of RB-47s conducting overflights over the Kola Peninsula? Peebles also discusses the role of aerial reconnaissance in collecting information on peripheral Cold War conflicts in the Middle East, noting that information was a vital factor in resolving such conflicts. Scott Ritter and the United

Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) U-2s over Baghdad were not an innovation.



Though Peebles is careful to announce the limits of his study to American aerial espionage efforts, the close relationship with Great Britain receives some attention, specifically British participation in the U-2 programme. It is unfortunate that Peebles has not documented the even closer Canadian-American intelligence relationship and its aerial components. These missions were equally important factors in maintaining the long polar watch during the Cold War. It is just as unfortunate that *Shadow Flights* ends in the 1960s, rather than progressing into the last two decades of the Cold War.

An engaging work, *Shadow Flights* should be read by anyone interested in how the Cold War was fought and won.

Dr. Sean M. Maloney teaches military history at Royal Military College.

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